

# **Chormaqan Noyan: The First Mongol Military Governor in the Middle East**

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## Dedication

For Michaeline

## Acknowledgments

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## Abstract

In the year 1230, the Mongol Empire was essentially the same size as it had been when Chinggis Khan died in 1227. After Ögödei Khan came to the throne, the Mongol Empire expanded at a fairly rapid pace. By 1241 the empire reached from the Sea of Japan to the Danube River. While the conquest of Russia normally is the focal point of attention for scholars of this era, another campaign of equal importance took place to the south of the Kipchak steppe. It was led by a general named Chormaqan.

This work is an examination of Chormaqan's career. The first section discusses the possible origins of Chormaqan including why he was selected to lead the campaign into Western Asia, his ethnic identity, as well as his position in the military hierarchy and the nature of his command. The second chapter discusses the invasion of Iran, the pursuit of the last Khwarazmian sultan, Jelal al-Din, and the method which the Mongols used in order to conquer new territories. In the third chapter, an examination of the conquest of Transcaucasia is made, including its position in the scope of the Mongol conquests. The fourth chapter is an examination of the military rule of Chormaqan and how it was carried out. Within this chapter, I also challenge the idea that Chormaqan's authority was reduced in order to limit his power. Instead, there was a gradual transfer of power from military to civil control. This allowed the Mongols to maintain their military supremacy on several fronts. In the final chapter a summation of Chormaqan's campaigns as well as the strategy of conquest by the Mongols is provided.

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## List of Abbreviations


<u>AEMA</u>	<u>Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aeivi</u>
<u>CAJ</u>	<u>Central Asiatic Journal</u>
<u>HJAS</u>	<u>Harvard Journal of Asian Studies</u>
<u>JA</u>	<u>Journal Asiatique</u>
<u>JRAS</u>	<u>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</u>
<u>MS</u>	<u>Mongolian Studies</u>
<u>RHC</u>	<u>Recueil des historiens des croisades</u>

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
Map 1

The Mongol Empire at 1230



## Map 2

## The Flight of Jelal al-Din




Map 3  
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
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## Introduction

The Mongol invasion of the Khwarazmian empire in 1218 was the beginning of Mongol expansion westward. Despite being a powerful empire in its own right, the Khwarazmian empire crumbled beneath the Mongol onslaught. Attacking from several directions, Chinggis Khan, the ruler of the Mongols (1162/7 - 1227) orchestrated perhaps one of the most successful wars in history. In addition to overcoming all obstacles set before them in terms of sieges and occasional battles, the Mongols effectively destroyed the empire so that it could never be resurrected. In addition, its ruler, Muhammad 'Ala al-Din Khwarazmshah II (r.1200-1220), was forced to flee. He died a less than imperial death on a lonely island in the Caspian Sea in 1220. His successor, Jelal al-Din (r. 1220-1231), was also hunted down until he escaped into the torrid climate of India in 1221. Jelal al-Din returned only when he received word that the Mongols had withdrawn from the remnants of his father's empire.

Of equal importance to the destruction of a powerful empire was that Western Asia was now exposed to the Mongols, and the Mongols were exposed to Western Asia. It is important to understand that these were two elements on a collision course, each relatively ignorant of the other. The initial contact occurred when Chinggis Khan granted permission to Subedei and Jebe, two of his most capable generals, to continue their reconnaissance in the West, after they pursued Muhammad Khwarazmshah II to his death. Although Jebe probably died before they returned to Mongolia, this small Mongol army fought a number of battles stretching from the Caspian Sea, through Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, across the Caucasus Mountains, through southern Russia, and back to the Kazak steppe.

This feat had probably never been accomplished before or since. Their ride is even more amazing when one considers that they could not have received reinforcements, nor supplies, and were without the benefit of modern communications or maps while riding through territory unknown and hostile to them. Afterwards, the might of the Mongols was now known to much of Asia, but as quickly as the Mongols passed through, they were just as quickly forgotten except as bad memories. Yet, the Mongols, did not forget their experiences.

This expedition set the stage for the spread of Mongol power westward. At the forefront of it was a Mongol general named Chormaqan (ca. 1218-1241). Chormaqan conquered the core of the later Il-Khanate: Iran and the Transcaucasia region. Furthermore, it was accomplished swiftly and efficiently. In his campaigns, he maintained not only the Mongol superiority of arms, but furthered psychological fear in the minds and hearts of the enemy: the Mongols could not be defeated and it was useless to oppose them. In addition, under the direction of Chormaqan, the last vestiges of the Khwarazmian empire was swept away into oblivion and one of the most effective opponents of the Mongols at that time, Jelal al-Din, was pursued relentlessly until his death.

Unlike the conquest of Russia or the continuing war in China against the Jurchen, Chormaqan conducted his campaign with a substantially smaller force. Even upon receiving reinforcements from Karakorum, at no point did Chormaqan's army exceed fifty thousand troops. His accomplishments extended after his death. The subjugation of the Seljuks of Rum by Baiju, Chormaqan's lieutenant, would have been difficult if not impossible without the earlier conquests. In addition, his favorable, or at least non antagonistic treatment of Christians and the Armenian and Georgian nobles as a whole, set the stage for the important alliance with King Hethum II of Cilicia and later Prince Bohemund of Antioch in the 1250s. Also, all of the conquests of Hülegü were dependent on the earlier campaigns of Chormaqan.

Yet, this critical figure in the history of the Mongol empire has continually been overlooked, or only mentioned in passing. This thesis is an attempt to correct this neglect. It should be noted that part of the lack of attention to Chormaqaqan is due to the absence of material in the primary sources. Still, there is sufficient data to analyze and perhaps shed new light on this elusive general. This work is not so much a biography of Chormaqaqan as a critical analysis of the data within the sources. In addition, it is a study of the Mongol methods of war and rule, as Chormaqaqan's activities were the perfect working model of many aspects of Mongol military strategy and also the transfer of power within the Mongol empire.

It is this writer's intention to examine the origins of Chormaqaqan and establish his position within the military hierarchy before his campaigns began. Also, as Chormaqaqan either directed or personally took part in several minor campaigns within the overall campaign, I hope to demonstrate the method of conquest which the Mongols developed. It is important to understand that the Mongols were not haphazard in the direction of their campaigns. This method, which I refer to as the "tidal wave method", will hopefully reveal the intentions of the Mongols when applied to other campaigns. Finally, I intend to shed more light on the governing apparatus of the Mongols, with emphasis on the evolution of the government from a military state to a civil administration.

# Chapter 1: The Origins and Background of Chormaqan Noyan

Although the campaigns of Chormaqan Noyan against the last sultan of the Khwarazm Empire, Jelal al-Din, and the subsequent conquest and subjugation of Arran, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia are well recorded by a variety of chroniclers, the leader of this expedition prior to the campaign, remains an enigmatic figure. In this chapter, I will attempt to assemble the data concerning his origins and the reasons behind his selection as a major figure in the Mongol army. While scholars have given the early campaigns in the Middle East less attentions than those of Chinggis Khan, or the later campaigns by other khans, the reader must bear in mind, that Chormaqan's campaign was, in fact, one of greater consequence as Chormaqan was able to acquire a sizable amount of territory for the empire, as well as, destroying the last of the Khwarazmian emperors. Therefore, only a general of equal rank, if not calibre, as that of the great Muqali, Subedei, or Jebe, would have been given command.

## *Origins and Position within the Army*

The first mention of Chormaqan is in paragraph 260 of The Secret History of the Mongols. In the episode in which Chinggis Khan reprimanded his sons, Jochi, Chaghatai, and Ögödei, for not reserving a share of the plunder of the city of Urgench, which they had recently captured:

Just as he was addressing them with reprimands and admonitions, Qongqai-qorchi, Qongtaqar-qorchi and Chormaqan-qorchi -- these three quiver-bearers-- *also* petitioned Chinggis-qa'an [sic] as follows: 'Like grey falcons that have just begun training, the sons are barely learning *how* to wage a military campaign, and, right then, you rebuke them

in such a way, ceaselessly, discouraging the sons. Why? We fear lest the sons, being afraid, will lose heart.<sup>1</sup>

Though this quotation is only a brief portion of paragraph 260, from it, much may be determined. Chormaqan was a member of the *keshik*, or body guard of Chinggis Khan, as he was a *qorchi*, or quiver-bearer. At this time, the *qorchi*, consisted of a thousand men.<sup>2</sup> The total composition of the *keshik* consisted of ten thousand men. In addition to the thousand-strong quiver-bearers, there were also one thousand night guards. The remainder consisted of ten thousand day guards. From these, a special unit of one thousand formed a special body guard who always accompanied Chinggis Khan in battle.<sup>3</sup> There were also other members who formed many of the non-martial units attached to the house of the Khan, such as cooks, falconers, etc.

Of greater importance is Chormaqan's relationship with Chinggis Khan. As it should be apparent from the passage, the three quiver-bearers are able to speak freely with Chinggis Khan. This is not something which an ordinary member of the *keshik* could do. Obviously, Chormaqan and his compatriots are of greater significance. This is marked by their grouping in threes. As triplicated triplets invariably mark an instance of great importance in Mongolian folklore, it does not seem likely that Chormaqan's group is of lesser importance when one considers the two other sets of triplets within the passage.<sup>4</sup> The first set is the sons: Jochi, Chaghatai, and Ögödei. Then follows the second set of triplets, consisting of those

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<sup>1</sup>Igor de Rachewiltz, "The Secret History of the Mongols," Papers on Far Eastern History 30 (September, 1984): 99. Italics are from the original.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid, "The Secret History of the Mongols," Papers on Far Eastern History 23 (March, 1981): 122-123.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid, 123.

<sup>4</sup>Larry Moses, "Triplicated Triplets: The Number Nine in the *Secret History* of the Mongols," Asian Folklore Studies 45 (1986): 287-293.

generals who attempted to calm Chinggis Khan before the quiver-bearers, generals : Bo'orchu, Muqali, and Shigi-quduqu. The final set consists of the quiver-bearers: Qongqai-qorchi, Qongtaqar-qorchi, and Chormaqan-qorchi.

Furthermore, these triplicated triplets are marked, specially noting that they are groups of three:

Chinggis-qahan [sic] reprimanded Jochi, Cha'adai [sic], and Ögödei -- the three sons in question....<sup>5</sup>

Then Bo'orchu, Muqali, and Shigi-quduqu, *these* three, petitioned as follows...<sup>6</sup>

Qongqai-qorchi, Qongtaqar-qorchi, and Chormaqan-qorchi - these three quiver-bearers-- also petitioned Chinggis qa'an [sic] as follows...<sup>7</sup>

The connection of proximity to the great khan cannot be ignored. The first group are his sons. Then comes the three generals. Bo'orchu and Muqali are among his oldest companions while Shigi -quduqu is his adopted brother. Shigi-quduqu is also listed among those who received command of a thousand man unit in paragraph 202.<sup>8</sup> None of these commanders are related by blood, thus establishing another commonality within the triplet. Certainly then, the three *qorchin* must also be of a greater degree of confidence than other guards. It is very clear from the sources that not everyone could speak freely with Chinggis Khan. In one instance, the recorder of the Tabakat-i Nasiri, Minhaj Siraj Juzjani, barely escaped with his life even though he had enjoyed great favor in Chinggis Khan's court.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Igor de Rachewiltz, "Secret History," 30 (1984): 98.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid, 98.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid, 99.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid, "Secret History", 21 (1980): 25.

<sup>9</sup>Minhaj Siraj Juzjani, Tabakat-i Nasiri vol 2. translated by Major H. G. Raverty, (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1970): 1040-1042. This is the well-known incident in which

During their speech, the three *qorchin* also requested to be sent out to extend the domain of the Mongols. In this, they included a target: Baghdad. This had a great effect on Chinggis Khan, which *The Secret History* best describes, “The qahan (sic) was appeased by these words and his anger abated.”<sup>10</sup> There is no further mention of his anger at his sons after this.

While Chinggis Khan agreed to their plan, Chormaqaqan, however, was the only one of the three to be assigned to the mission. This last portion, as with the entire length of paragraph 260, bears great significance into uncovering the origins of Chormaqaqan:

Chinggis-qahan [sic] approved *their proposal* and issued the *following* order, favouring the three quiver-bearers Qongqai, Qongtaqar and Chormaqaqan: ‘Qongqai of the Adargin and Qongqatar of the Dolonggir shall stay at my side.’ He sent Chormaqaqan of the Ötegen on a campaign against the Baqtat people and the Qalibai-soltan [sic].<sup>11</sup>

From this last passage, the possible ethnic origins of Chormaqaqan are revealed, as well as the presenting of command to Chormaqaqan is first given. However, there remains the question of why Chormaqaqan, as opposed to the others, received this commission. Chormaqaqan is not mentioned in any of the campaigns in China or in the wars of unification in Mongolia. Unfortunately, neither are Qonqqai and Qongqatar mentioned. Yet, as a member of the *keshik*, they had to have had considerable campaign experience against the Jurchen as well as in the invasion of Khwarazm.

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Chinggis Khan, during the conquest of Khwarazm, asks Juzjani if he will leave a great legacy behind him. Juzjani, after securing a promise of allowing no harm to befall him replied: A name continues to endure where there are people, but how will a name endure when the Khan’s servants martyr all the people and massacre them, for who will remain to tell the tale?”. Chinggis Khan, turned away in anger and after he recovered his calm, he, in turn, replied, “I used to consider thee a sagacious and prudent man, but, from this speech of thine, it has become evident to me that thou dost not possess complete understanding, and that thy comprehension is but small.”

<sup>10</sup>de Rachewiltz, “Secret History,” 30 (1984): 99.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid, 99-100.

Still, the very nature of the command suggests that they are figures of some consequence within the hierarchy. Examining the sentence of the order in the Mongolian may lend a hand to revealing this. In Mongolian, the last phrase concerning Qongqai and Qongqatar is, “adargidai qongqai dolonggirdai qongtaqar qoyer-i minu dergede atuqai...”<sup>12</sup> This translates as “Qongqai of the Adargin and Qongqatar of the Dolonggir shall stay at my side”.<sup>13</sup> Igor de Rachewiltz’s translation is flawless in transmitting the meaning of the Khan’s order. His interpretation, however, of the verb “a-” in the optative imperative (-tuqai) could be the wrong choice. While defining “atuqai” as “[they] shall stay” is essentially correct, the literal definition of “minu dergede atuqai” is “Grant that [they] be at my side” or “[They] shall be at my side”. Without doubt, this is simply a matter of semantics, still, this alternative translation reveals that these particular *qorchin* definitely hold positions which place them near Chinggis Khan on a more habitual level than perhaps other members of the *qorchin*. Moreover, it should be remembered that most of the Mongol commanders received their training as a member of the *keshik*.

The “Qalibai-soltan of the Baqtat” even to the most inexperienced eye appears to be the Caliph of Baghdad. Without doubt, the three *qorchin* are referring to an enemy west of Transoxiana. Prof. de Rachewiltz’s translation amply demonstrates this. In his notes referring to paragraph 260, Prof. de Rachewiltz discusses and apparently agrees that Chormaghan was to attack Baghdad.

It should be noted however, that the use of “Qalibai-soltan of the Baqtat people” probably meant something else to the Mongols than simply the Caliph of

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<sup>12</sup>Igor de Rachewiltz, Index to the Secret History of the Mongols (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1972): 157. More properly, the transcription of “atuqai” should be “atugai” with “g” representing the Greek gamma. Undoubtedly, de Rachewiltz simply overlooked this due to the somewhat dubious characteristics of Mongolian orthography in the Old Script or simply uses “q” to represent the Greek gamma.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid, “Secret History” 30 (1984): 100.

Baghdad. First, the Mongols probably knew, through their experiences in the invasion of Khwarazm, that “soltan” or rather “sultan” was a title referring to a ruler.<sup>14</sup> It is doubtful, however, if the Mongols quite comprehended the role of the Caliph in Islam. As a titular head of spiritual affairs would have been outside their own culture and experience, the Caliph was apparently taken as a name.

Furthermore, the Mongols, hearing Baghdad as “Baqtat”, thought that Baghdad was a people, as noted through the appearance of the Mongolian word *irgen* or people after Baqtat in each occurrence.<sup>15</sup> “Baqtat” never occurs in the genitive. Finally, in the Mongolian language, the final “-ad” in Baghdad would be mistaken for the plural form “-d”. However, Baghdad and the Caliph escaped from possible destruction at the hands of the Mongols at this time, as Chormaqan did not carry out an attack on the city.

The meeting between Chinggis Khan and his sons, generals and the three *qorchin*, took place in April of 1221/ 618 H. There is one problem. This meeting as Prof. de Rachewiltz points out, is only recorded in the Secret History of the Mongols.<sup>16</sup> Based on this alone, the events should not be ruled problematic. However, when other factors are taken into consideration, this encounter between Chinggis Khan and his sons is clearly apocryphal. First, Chinggis Khan at this time, according to The Secret History, was camping at the former camp of Jelal al-din, which is called by The Secret History, “Altan-qorqan”.<sup>17</sup> Prof. de Rachewiltz, after

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid, “Secret History,” 30(1984): 96, 97, 101. All references to Jelal al-Din are made as “Jalaldin-soltan”. The Mongols knew he was the ruler, or at least de facto ruler with the flight and death of Sultan Muhammad Khwarazmshah.

<sup>15</sup>Igor de Rachewiltz, Index, 156-7, 162, 165. It has already been noted about de Rachewiltz’s use of “q” in place of the Greek letter gamma. This being the case, it would be interesting to know if, in the original text, if the “q” in Baqtat was actually the Greek gamma. If this was the case, it would certainly confirm the idea that Baqtat is indeed Baghdad.

<sup>16</sup>Igor de Rachewiltz, “Secret History,” 30 (1984): 149.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid, 98.

comparing with Muslim sources, believed it to be in Badakshan.<sup>18</sup> The meeting and the events took place during the pursuit of Jelal al-Din, who was eventually defeated along the Indus in the fall of 1221. Secondly, after the capture of Urgench, Jochi never saw his father again. He led his followers into the Kazakh steppe.<sup>19</sup> Third, Muqali, Bo'orchu, and Shigi-quduqu intervened on behalf of the sons despite the fact that Muqali was commanding the forces left in Northern China.<sup>20</sup> Thus this event could not have happen as described.

Interestingly, Muqali appeared alongside Bo'orchu whenever Chinggis Khan went into a rage. The two of them inevitably were able to restrain his anger and offer a more reasonable solution to the problem at hand. The first instance of this appeared after the year 1207 in paragraph 240 of the Secret History. It should be noted, however, that this date is somewhat problematic. Chinggis Khan sent Boroqul-noyan to subjugate the Qori-Tumat. Boroqul, however, was slain by the Qori-Tumat. Upon hearing of this, Chinggis Khan became greatly angered and was assembling a force to lead in person against them in order to exact retribution when Bo'orchu and Muqali intervened. The two great generals than “pleaded with him until he desisted.”<sup>21</sup>

Then in paragraph 242, these two appear again in addition to Shigi-quduqu in an effort to stop Chinggis Khan from executing Daratai, Chinggis Khan's uncle and younger brother of his father. They were so persuasive in their pleading, that the great khan,

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<sup>18</sup>Ibid, 149. de Rachewiltz consulted the works of Rashid al-Din as well as Juvaini.

<sup>19</sup>Juzjani, 1101. Juzjani reports that Jochi went out to subdue the Kipchak with Chagatai in his company. This would be rather odd, as the two were not friendly. However, it is certain that Jochi did head northward.

<sup>20</sup>H. D. Martin, The Rise of Chingis Khan and his Conquest of North China, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1950): 273. In May of 1221, Muqali received orders from Chinggis Khan, via messenger, to complete the conquest of the Chin Empire.

<sup>21</sup>Igor de Rachewiltz, “Secret History,” 26 (1982): 45.

“He snuffled, as if  
He had smoke in his nose”.<sup>22</sup>

Oddly, enough, they do not intervene when Chinggis Khan is about to execute his brother Qasar, who is spared only through the intervention of the brother’s mother in paragraph 244.<sup>23</sup> Then in paragraph 254, Bo’orchu and Muqali are present, not to restrain Chinggis Khan, but rather to separate his two sons, Jochi and Chaghatai, from killing each other. This is the passage concerning succession.<sup>24</sup>

Thus the question of who Chormaqan is remains. Despite the fact that the events in paragraph 260 were apocryphal, I do not believe that it reduces the position in the command structure of those three *qorchin*. Even though the event is fictional, the fact that the triplicated triplets appear, signifies importance. Chormaqan and the other two *qorchin* are figures of consequence within the *keshik*, otherwise they would not have been mentioned. Other commanders in the *keshik* are mentioned, yet they do not appear in this passage. It seems that the author of The Secret History is not only emphasizing the greatness of Chinggis Khan over the avarice of his sons, but also introducing the Mongol general, Chormaqan.

### *The Selection of Chormaqan as Commander*

This is the setting within which to examine the question of Chormaqan’s command. As has been demonstrated, the time-sequence in which Chormaqan was given his commission is inaccurate. There is no reason to doubt that Chinggis Khan

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid, 47. In verse form in the original.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid, 47-9.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid, “Secret History,” 30 (1984): 89.

did, in fact, order Chormaqaqan to move against Baghdad. The chapters concerning Chormaqaqan during Ögödei's reign seem to support this. There is no reference within The Secret History that suggest that Ögödei issued the orders, rather than Chinggis Khan. In paragraph 270, Ögödei sent reinforcements "in support of Chormaqaqan-qorchi (sic) who had taken the field against the Qalibai-soltan of the Baqtat people -- a people not dealt with by his father Chinggis--qahan."<sup>25</sup> In the same section, Ögödei also sent the expedition against Russia, yet refers to the earlier campaign of Subedei in that region which was ordered by Chinggis Khan. Then in paragraph 274, Ögödei received gifts from Chormaqaqan, who according to The Secret History, defeated the "Baqtat".<sup>26</sup> Ögödei, however, later issued orders for Chormaqaqan to move against Jelal al-Din, though this invasion will be discussed in another chapter. The point is, that The Secret History, never places Chormaqaqan's orders in the hands of Ögödei. The emphasis is on Chinggis Khan. Furthermore, the later sections of The Secret History, demonstrate that Ögödei did not diverge from any of Chinggis Khan's prior commands. In fact, to go against this would have been bordering on blasphemy.

To answer the question of why Chormaqaqan received the command, one must turn to the expedition of Subedei and Jebe against the Muhammad Khwarazmshah. In 1220-1221, these two generals pursued the Sultan to the Caspian Sea, where he died. They then received permission from Chinggis Khan to continue west on a reconnaissance mission. This took them through Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and then across the Caucasus into Russia. All along this journey, they repeatedly struck like lightning, plundering where it benefited them and routinely defeating armies, without the benefit of a supply line. Finally, after defeating an army of Russians at

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<sup>25</sup>Igor de Rachewiltz "Secret History," 31 (1985): 26.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid, 30-31.

the battle of the Kalka River in 1223, they returned east towards Mongolia, arriving there in 1225.

Something did occur in Baghdad during this expedition. Apparently the city of the Caliph was spared because an emissary of the Mongols, who without doubt was also there to gather military intelligence, came to the city. There, Caliph al-Nasir li-Din-Allah (1180-1125) received him in style, allowing him to observe the strength of the Abbasid army in reviews at Irbil, at Daquqa, and finally at Baghdad. According to the chronicle of Dhahabi, this display of strength frightened the Mongol envoy.<sup>27</sup>

Of course, this is from the Muslim point of view. The envoy was probably there to gather information. There is a likelihood that the Mongols may have been discouraged from attacking Baghdad. Although Subedei and Jebe certainly put many field armies to flight, it seems that they were more interested in making a survey of the regional powers rather than subduing them. Certainly the fortification of Baghdad was still enough to eliminate the idea of a quick sack. As for the fine army of Baghdad, the Caliph was spared from falling under the thumb of Muhammad Khwarazmshah due to a circumstance of weather rather than military might. While camping in the Sedabad pass, according to Houdas' transliteration, when he marched on Baghdad, Muhammad's army was trapped by heavy snows for three days and three nights. His losses were so high due to the weather that Muhammad was forced to abandon his campaign.<sup>28</sup>

Despite all of this, there does seem to be reason why Baghdad was chosen by the *qorchin*. The Mongols knew of its existence, albeit they may not have been able

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<sup>27</sup>Joseph de Somogyi, "Adh-Dhahabi's 'Ta'rikh al-islam' as an authority on the Mongol Invasion of the Caliphate," JRAS 4 (October, 1936): 601.

<sup>28</sup>Mohammed En-Nessawi, Histoire du Sultan Djelal ed-Din Mankobirti, translated by O. Houdas, (Paris: l'ecole des langues orientale vivantes, 1895): 36.

to discern that Baghdad was actually a city and not the name of a people. Secondly, all of the regions which Chormaqan later conquered, Subedei and Jebe had earlier passed through.

Chormaqan was selected to lead the Mongols against Baghdad because he had accompanied Subedei and Jebe on their epic journey. However, at this time, it is probable that Chormaqan was either a minor commander of a *jaghun* or perhaps a *mingghan* or merely attached to the command staff. Whether or not he ever entered Baghdad is left to debate at this time. The Mongols simply did not leave campaigns of conquest in new lands in the hands of inexperienced generals. Chormaqan, as a member of the *keshik*, was a veteran of campaigns in Khwarazm and North China, unquestionably, and perhaps in Hsi Hsia and Mongolia, as well. Though this is not supported by the sources, Chormaqan's other activities are also not recorded. This is not merely a case of conjecture but rather of logic.

Chormaqan died in 1241. Most Mongols began their career as warriors around the age of 15. If Chormaqan was born as late as 1200, then he certainly could have been in the last campaign in which Chinggis took part in Northern China. By the end of the Khwarazm campaign, Chormaqan would have been at least 23 years of age. Certainly, Chormaqan took part in Chinggis Khan's last campaign against Hsi Hsia in 1227. It is doubtful if Chinggis Khan would have allowed any new campaigns of great consequence to begin while he punished a recalcitrant vassal.

In addition to the practical experience, Chormaqan, as a member of Jebe's and Subedei's campaign in the west, had been in the territory and thus knew the geography of the region. Although Chinggis Khan had sent men into uncharted territories at the beginning of his rise to empire, he sent only his most capable generals on such campaigns. Jebe was sent after Kuchlug in Kara-Khitai; Jebe and Subedei commanded the force into the unknown west; Tolui was the only one of his

sons who was allowed to campaign completely on his own in Khorasan. The other sons, at one point or another, always were accompanied by either another brother, or by generals of reknown. Only in the instance of Jebe and Subedei were two generals of approximately equal rank sent on a single expedition. This was perhaps because of the type of expedition it was to be. Certainly, in the case of Chormaqan, he was given command because not only of his experience and capabilities, but also because he had seen the region as well as the opposing forces.

### *The Ethnic Origins of Chormaqan*

Now that Chormaqan's military origins have been established, it is appropriate to return to paragraph 260. In this, it is revealed that Qongqai is a Adargin and Qongqatar is a Dolonggir.<sup>29</sup> According to Pelliot and Hambis, the Dolonggir are a sub-tribe of the Jalair.<sup>30</sup> As for the ethnonym of Adargin, Pelliot and Hambis do not openly state that it is a Mongol tribe, but rather hint at this due to lack of corroborative evidence.<sup>31</sup> Chormaqan of the Ötegen, however, appears to be a more difficult case. According to Pelliot, the Ötegen are a form of *Ötagüi-boghol*.<sup>32</sup> The meaning which Pelliot gives for this is a hereditary slave or vassal. However, his transcription is erroneous as back vowels (a) and front vowels (ö and ü) cannot appear in the same word. Pelliot does offer more proper forms of *ötegüi*, which may mean old man or senior.<sup>33</sup> Pelliot's assumption is based on Rashid al-Din who wrote that *ötagüi-boghol* had become a tribal name in his time. Rashid al-

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<sup>29</sup>Igor de Rachewiltz, "Secret History," 30 (1984): 100.

<sup>30</sup>Paul Pelliot and Louis Hambis, Histoire des Campagnes de Gengis Khan: Cheng-Wou Ts'in Tcheng Lou (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1951): 164-165.

<sup>31</sup>Igor de Rachewiltz, "Secret History," 30 (1984): 57-8.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid, 86.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid, 85.

Din also commented that earlier, a multitude of ethnicities were called *ötagii boghol*.<sup>34</sup>

This simply does not coincide with what The Secret History provides. In Igor de Rachewiltz's transcription of the Mongolian word, he gives "ötegdei cormaqan-i baqtat irgen-tür qalibai-soltan-tur ayala'ulba".<sup>35</sup> This is simply *ötege* with the adjectival suffix added on, connoting possession. According to Lessing's dictionary, *ötege* means "bear".<sup>36</sup> Then, in the recent Inner Mongolian publication of The Secret History in old script Mongolian, it is the same.<sup>37</sup> While some of the letters are ambiguous, after consulting all possible spellings, *ötege* is the only option. Curiously, in the Cyrillic script version published in Ulaanbaatar, *ötög*, a Khalkha Mongolian form of "bear". Instead, they use a word which is not listed in the dictionaries, "üdgegiin Chormaqanig Baghdad ulcin Xalif cultan ayaluulav".<sup>38</sup> This leads to a new mystery. What does this "üdge" mean? Does it have a meaning or is it a phonetic transcription from the old script?

Contrary to all of this speculation, Major Raverty in his translation of Juzjani, lists Chormaqan as a Mangkut, Von Hammer lists him as a Jalair, and Rashid al-Din wrote that Chormaqan was a Sünit. On what authority the other two base their theory on, is unknown, however, Rashid al-Din's seems to be the most credible.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid, 86. Pelliot's transcription is apparently based on Rashid al-Din's rendering of the word into Persian.

<sup>35</sup>Igor de Rachewiltz, Index, 157.

<sup>36</sup>Ferdinand Lessing, et al, Mongolian-English Dictionary, 3rd ed. (Bloomington: The Mongolia Society, Inc., 1995): 646.

<sup>37</sup>Yekeminggatai Irinchin-u serkokelte, ed. Monggol-un Nigucha Tobhijin, (Xohxot: Öbör Monggol-un Yeke Sorgagoli-yin Kebel-un Kurii-e, 1987): 259.

<sup>38</sup>Sh. Gaadamba, Mongolin Nuuts Tovchoo, (Ulaanbaatar: Ulsiin Khevleliin Gazar, 1990): 233.

## Conclusion

There seems to be little reason to doubt that Chormaqan was, indeed, a Sünit Mongol as Rashid al-Din discussed Chormaqan in the section on the Sünit.<sup>40</sup> Although the encounter described in paragraph 260 is most certainly apocryphal, Chormaqan did receive command of an army before Chinggis Khan died. His position was secured due to his high rank among the *qorchin* within the *keshik*. Without this high rank, it is inconceivable that he would have had such access to Chinggis Khan, which The Secret History intimates. Chormaqan's position within the hierarchy was further increased by his probable experience during the campaigns against the Chin and during the invasion of the Khwarazmian empire. Although it is uncertain, it is likely that he also participated in Subedei's and Jebe's famous journey through the Transcaucasia and the Russian steppes. This would have provided him ample opportunities for experience, not only in combat, but also developing leadership. Finally, he would have knowledge of the terrain and the balance of power within the Transcaucasia.

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<sup>39</sup>Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols vol. III, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1988): 17. Howorth lists all three authors and their selection of Chormaqan's ethnonym. In Raverty's translation of Juzjani, his comments may be found on page 1109, however, he did not mention on what basis he had made this assumption. See Rashid ud-Din Fazlullah, Jami' at-Tawarikh, ed. Behman Karimi, (Tehran: Eqbal, 1984): 54. The passage concerning Chormaqan's tribal identity was translated for me from the Persian by Mr. Daood Moosa of Los Angeles.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

## Chapter 2: The Invasion of Iran

After the massacre of a Mongol sponsored trading caravan by the Khwarazmian governor of Otrar, the Mongols invaded the Khwarazm empire ruled by Muhammad Khwarazmshah II. This was a campaign of genius and of disaster. For this Muslim empire, it was an utter and total catastrophe, as this mighty empire attempted a static defensive against one of the most mobile armies the world has ever seen. Striking from several directions, the Mongols forced the Khwarazmian armies to remain on the defense. For the Mongols, it was a war which displayed the organizational genius of Chinggis Khan and the brilliance of his generals. Although Sultan Muhammad's son, Jelal al-Din, did attempt to hold off the Mongol attackers, his few victories only counted as lessons to the Mongol commanders as they relentlessly pursued him and his father. By 1223, the Khwarazmian empire was effectively destroyed, the Sultan had died as a ignominious pauper on an island in the Caspian Sea, and his valiant son, Jelal al-Din had fled into India with the Mongols on his heels, and all of Mawarranahr was effectively in Mongol hands.

The Mongols, however did not immediately take advantage of the ensuing chaos to incorporate Afghanistan or Iran into their empire. From the time of the Mongol withdrawal from Iran in 1223 until the time of the final campaign against Hsi-Hsia, the Mongols stabilized their control in Kara-Khitai and the Mawarrannahr. During this time, Jelal al-Din returned from India to regain control of what remained of his father's empire. Most of his efforts were concentrated in the West, attempting to subdue Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. Naturally, the reappearance of the charismatic Khwarazm sultan concerned the Mongols, as he was the only prince during the earlier invasion who had been effective against them. Eventually, the

Mongols mounted another offensive into Iran. As he went against his insubordinate vassal in Hsi-Hsia, Chinggis Khan ordered the governor of Khwarazm, the Kara-Khitan, Chin-Temur, to invade. Chin-Temur was stationed at Urgench in order to observe the developments in Iran. In 1227, he sent a small army commanded by “Tadjen Nouyen, Tatek Noueyn, Baqou Nouyen, Asen Toughan Nouyen, Yatmas Nouyen, Basour Noyen [sic]” and others in to Iran.<sup>41</sup> There was a battle in this year at Dameghan in which Ibn Athir relates that Jelal al-Din was victorious, however it is not certain if it was this Mongol army.<sup>42</sup>

At the cities of Rai and Dameghan, the Mongols drove out the Khwarazmian forces stationed there. Then, two thousand Mongols were sent to forage in Lur. These were ambushed and four hundred were captured. Jelal al-Din then turned them over to the people of Isphahan, where they were killed.<sup>43</sup> The decisive battle, however, was on 22 Ramadan 625/ 25 August 1228, when the Mongols located Jelal al-Din near Isphahan. In the ensuing battle, the Khwarazmian forces led by Uz Khan broke the Mongol left flank and pursued it. However, as the Mongols struck the Khwarazmian left flank and drove it into the center, a vassal and brother of Jelal al-Din, abandoned the field along with Djihan Pahlavan Elchi’s contingent.<sup>44</sup> Jelal al-Din was defeated, but not destroyed as the Mongols did not follow up, perhaps due to heavy losses.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Mohammad En-Nesawi, Histoire du Sultan Djelal ed-din Mankobirti, translated by O. Houdas (Paris: l’école des langues orientale vivante, 1895):224. It is uncertain which was the overall commander.

<sup>42</sup>Ibn al-Athir, Al Kamil fi al-Tarikh, Vol. XII, (Beirut: Dar Sadr, 1979): 306-307.

<sup>43</sup>Mohammed En-Nesawi, Histoire du Sultan Djelal ed-din Mankobirti, translated by O. Houdas (Paris: l’école des langues orientale vivante, 1895): 227.

<sup>44</sup>‘Ala-ad-din ‘Ata-Malik Juvaini, The History of the World Conqueror, 2 Vols. Translated by J. A. Boyle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958): 436-437. Also see G. D’Ohsson. Histoire des Mongols: Depuis Tchinguiz-Kha jusqu’a Timour Bey ou Tamerlan, 4 vols. (Amsterdam: Les Frères Van Cleef, 1834): 25.

<sup>45</sup>Ohsson, 27.

While this battle had no significant results for the Mongols in terms of territorial expansion, it did have some consequence. The main point was that they won and thus maintained their position of military supremacy. Secondly, the desertion of two leaders within the Khwarazmian ranks in conjunction with Jelal al-Din's defeat, ensured that military unity against the Mongols was impossible. Finally, Jelal al-Din was forced to maintain his focus in the West, away from the Mongols. Despite the defeat, he continued to resist them, albeit not with any effect in Iran.

The Mongols, however, did not forget about Jelal al-Din. Earlier, Chinggis Khan had directed Chormaqan to conquer the “Baqtat people and the Qalibai-sultan”.<sup>46</sup> Although The Secret History seems to indicate that these remained the orders which Chinggis Khan issued to Chormaqan, a variety of sources state that Ögödei, now Khan of the empire, burdened Chormaqan with an additional task with a very clear purpose. According to Rashid al-Din, “In the direction of Persia, unrest and insurrection had not yet abated, and Sultan Jalal al-Din was still active there. [Ögödei] dispatched Chormaghun [sic] Noyan and a group of emirs, and thirty thousand horsemen to deal with him”.<sup>47</sup> According to a much later Central Asian source, “Djournaghoun-Bek et Aitmas [sic]”, or Chormaqan and Taimaz were sent with thirty thousand troops.<sup>48</sup> Juzjani stated that Ögödei sent Chormaqan to Khorasan and Iraq, however with a much exaggerated force:

It consisted of about 50, 000 Mughals, and other races of Turkistan, and captives of Khurasan; and the number, which

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<sup>46</sup>Igor de Rachewiltz “The Secret History of the Mongols,” Papers on Far Eastern History 30 (September, 1984): 99-100.

<sup>47</sup>Rashid al-Din, The Successors of Genghis Khan, translated by J. A. Boyle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971): 33. Rashid al-Din apparently used Juvaini as a source for this section. See Juvaiji, p190.

<sup>48</sup>Aboul-Ghazi Behadour Khan, Histoire des Mongols et Des Tartares, translated by Petr I. Demaisons (Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1970): 146.

turned their faces toward ‘Irak, amounted in all, to about 100,000 horse.<sup>49</sup>

Other authors in Western Asia confirm that Chormaqan marched with thirty thousand troops and his target was Jelal al-Din. The Syriac chronicler, Bar Hebraeus wrote that “because Jelal Ad-Din Khawarazm Shah was at that time leaping all over the countries of Khorasan like a stag, [the khan] sent Sharmaghon Nawin [sic] with thirty (or, three) thousand men to that quarter of the world”.<sup>50</sup> Meanwhile Kirakos of Ganzak wrote that Ögödei placed an army

sous le commandement d'un grand personnage, nommé [Chormaqan], homme d'une intelligence profonde, hereux dans la guerre, qui eut pour instruction de ruiner et devaster l'univers et tous le royaume, et de ne pas revenir avant d'avoir fini de soumettre tous les peuples à leur domination.<sup>51</sup>

Chormaqan was deployed to Turkistan, where he marshaled his troops near Bukhara. At least fifteen different *noyans* were listed to be with him.<sup>52</sup> So in 1230, Chormaqan crossed the Amu Darya. Major Raverty in his translation of Juzjani, wrote that Chormaqan crossed the Amu Darya in 628-629 H., or about 1231-1232. He adds that it was in the same year that Tuli died which was 1232.<sup>53</sup> This

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<sup>49</sup>Minhaj Sinaj Juzjani, Tabakat-i-Nasiri, 2 Vols. translated by Major. H. G. Raverty (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1970): 1115-1117.

<sup>50</sup>Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography of Gregory Abu'l-Faraj, 2 vols. translated by Ernest A. Wallis Budge (Amsterdam: APA-Philo-Press, 1932): 394.

<sup>51</sup>Kiracos de Gantzac, “Histoire d’Armenie,” Deux Historiens Arméniens: Kiracos de Gantzax, XIII S., “Histoire d’Arménie, translated by M. Brousset, (St. Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1870): 116.

<sup>52</sup>These will be discussed according to their appearance in the sequence of events. A complete discussion of all of these *noyans* will appear in chapter 4.

<sup>53</sup>Major H. G. Raverty, ed. and translator Juzjani’s Tabakat-i-Nasiri 2 vols. (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1970): 1138.

contradicts what Juzjani, himself, wrote. According to Juzjani, “The Mughal Nu-yin, Jurmaghun [sic] was despatched [sic] in to ‘Irak in the year 626 H.’.<sup>54</sup> This is roughly equates to 1229/1230. Raverty was of the opinion that Chormaqan was “nominated to proceed, probably, but not despatched [sic] until the following year in which he crossed the Jihun or Amuiah [sic]”.<sup>55</sup> However, this does not correspond with the dates of other Muslim sources.

The *noyans* who accompanied him, as listed by the Armenian historian, Shamean, were Benal Noyan, Mular Noyan, Ghataghan, Chaghata, Toghta, Sunitha, Jola, Asutu, Baiju, Tutu, Khuththu, Asar or Aslan, Okota, Khoia, Khurunji, and Ghatapuga or Karabугha and Khunan.<sup>56</sup> Howorth cites other sources which list the commanders of the invasion force. “Stephen Orpelian mentions Charman, Chagatai, Arslan, Asavur (i.e. Yassaur) and Ghadagan [sic]”.<sup>57</sup> Howorth mentions that the The Georgian Chronicle lists Chormaqan, Chagatai, Yassar, and Baiju; each commanding a *tumen*.<sup>58</sup> Chin-Temur was also to accompany Chormaqan, but he, however, only went as far as Khorasan.

Initially, the Mongols met no opposition after crossing the Amu Darya. Thus they passed through Khorasan quickly, hoping to catch Jelal al-Din and destroy him.<sup>59</sup> In the Autumn of 1230, Chormaqan entered Mazandaran and wintered at Rai. He left a *noyan* by the name of Dayir in Khorsan with an army. To Dayir

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<sup>54</sup>Juzjani, 1109.

<sup>55</sup>Raverty, 1109.

<sup>56</sup>M. Klaproth, “Apercu des entreprises des Mongols en Georgie et en Armenie dans le XIIIe siecle,” JA XII (1833): 199-200.

<sup>57</sup>Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols: From the 9th to the 19th Century, Part III, The Mongols of Persia (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1888): 15.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid, 15.

<sup>59</sup>D’Ohsson, 47.

Noyan, Chormaqan gave jurisdiction over the province as well as an assignment to invade western Afghanistan. During this initial stage, Chormaqan also occupied the cities of Qum and Hamadan as well as most of Iran above the 32 parallel. Most of the regions in the north surrendered without a fight. Yet it should be stated that none of the contemporary sources remark on any resistance or what exactly the army under Chormaqan did. The Mongols, apparently, did not immediately campaign in the south. This was possibly due to the climate south of the 32 parallel, but those states did acknowledge Mongol suzerainty and sent representatives.<sup>60</sup> As for Chormaqan, he remained in Rai for two years, from which he directed the war against Jelal al-Din.

Meanwhile, Jelal al-Din was not inactive. Once he heard reports that Chormaqan had crossed the Amu Darya, he deputed the *wazir* Shams al-Din Yulduzchi to defend Giran and guard his harem. As for Jelal al-Din, he attempted to orchestrate an alliance with other regional powers.<sup>61</sup> However, he was in an awkward position. When Chormaqan entered Iran, Jelal al-Din was still recovering from his recent defeat in Rum in the year 626 H./ 1230. While he was campaigning in the west, Jelal al-Din made several powerful enemies. These included the Caliphate of both al-Nasir (1180-1225), who had been at odds with his father from the beginning, and then the Caliphate of al Mustansir (1226-1242). Of more importance was the hostility that arose between Sultan Jelal al-Din and the Sultan of Rum, 'Ala al-Din as well as the Ayyubid Sultan of Syria, Ashraf (1229-1237).

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<sup>60</sup>D. S. Benson, The Mongol Campaigns in Asia: A Summary History of Mongolian Warfare with the Governments of Eastern and Western Asia in the 13th Century, (Chicago: Bookmasters, Inc., 1991): 167.

<sup>61</sup>Rashid al-Din, 96.

After he sent Sharif al-Mulk to Giran, Jelal retired to Tabriz and sent word of the arrival of Chormaqan in Iran to the Caliph, as well as to the sultans of Syria and Rum. To them, he said:

If I am removed, you cannot resist them. I am to you as the Wall of Alexander. Let each one of you send a detachment with a standard to support me, and when the news of our accord and agreement reaches them, their teeth will be blunted and our army in good heart.<sup>62</sup>

It is interesting to note Jelal al-Din's comparison of himself with the Wall of Alexander. Just as the Europeans would later believe the Mongols to be the children of Gog and Magog, whom, according to legend, Alexander shut behind the Iron Gate, this concept seems to have been prevalent in the Islamic world as well.

However, neither sultans nor the Caliph were swayed by his words. Since his arrival in Western Asia, Jelal al-Din had continually been on the march, mainly in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. Still, he did once march against Baghdad and did, in fact, defeat the army sent against him. So the Caliph al-Mustansir could only smile on what Fortune brought to him. First, the Mongols had rid the Caliph al-Nasir of Muhammad Khwarazmshah. Then, the Mongols had bypassed Baghdad when they swept through in 1221-1222, destroying all that they encountered. Now, Jelal al-Din, more of a marauder than a king, was in fear, though the Mongols had only just crossed the Amu Darya. It was as if Divine punishment was about to meted out. As for Sultan 'Ala al-Din of Rum and the Sultan Ashraf of Syria, to be rid of Jelal al-Din's predations would be in their interests too. Or so they thought.

Juvaini notes that forces greater than the will of Man and politics were at hand. He wrote, "The powerful fortune and auspicious ascendant of the Emperor of

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<sup>62</sup>Juvaini, 452.

the World, Chingis-Khan [sic], threw their words into disagreement and changed the Sultan's hope into despair and disappointment".<sup>63</sup> Boyle, in a footnote believes this to be an error, since Chinggis Khan had died in 1227.<sup>64</sup> Juvaini, however, was well aware of this, as he recorded the history of Chinggis Khan, including the latter's death. This passage, I believe, was intentional. Juvaini was a member of Hülegü's entourage and accompanied him on the future il-khan's march to Baghdad.

Considering this, it is only natural that Juvaini, although a Muslim, would become familiar with some aspects of religion of the Mongol court. By this time, the cult of Chinggis Khan was present. It probably originated not long after his death and quite possibly during the funeral procession. His deeds were legendary and far beyond the scope of any of his contemporaries in the steppe. To be sure, Juvaini as a devout Muslim, could not have believed that Chinggis Khan's spirit actually interfered on behalf of the Mongols. Still, the Mongols may have attributed "divine" interference. In Mongolian religion, a spirit only has domain over an area where there are tribal members. In other words, it has no power outside a certain territorial boundary. Furthermore, power in the afterlife is similar to power during one's own life.

Chinggis Khan, as not only the Great Khan, but also the creator of the *Yeke Mongol* people, had power in their realm. This is further enhanced by the fact that Chinggis had been decreed by Heaven to conquer the world. Certainly, with these factors, his spiritual power extended far beyond the immediate area of his grave.<sup>65</sup>

Whatever the cause, divine or simple politics, Jelal al-Din failed to establish an alliance. The losses he suffered in Anatolia left him very weak and unable to

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<sup>63</sup>Juvaini, 453.

<sup>64</sup>J. A. Boyle, 'Ata Malik 'Ala-ad-Din Juvani's History of the World Conqueror 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958): 453.

<sup>65</sup>Dorji Banzarov, "The Black Faith, or Shamanism among the Mongols," translated by Jan Nattier and John R. Krueger, Mongolian Studies (????): 79.

oppose Chormaqan. His attempts illustrated the dire situation into which Jelal al-din had fallen. While at the Mughan plain in the later part of 1230, where it seems he normally wintered, he sent Yakub, the younger brother of Sultan Ashraf who was captured in the siege of Akhlat earlier that year, to ask for help from Ashraf.<sup>66</sup> Another sign of the deterioration of Jelal al-Din's power and prestige is seen in the fact that his *wazir*, Sharif al-Mulk, did not send an envoy to accompany Yakub.<sup>67</sup> Sharif al-Mulk apparently carried a grudge against Jelal al-Din over the management of the revenue. After moving Jelal al-Din's harem and treasury, Sharif al-Mulk led a revolt.

Naturally, Jelal al-Din put it down ruthlessly and executed his former *wazir*. After this the city of Gandzak in Armenia revolted. Again, Jelal al-Din put down the revolt. While he was there, he wrote another time, requesting assistance from Ashraf. This time, Ashraf agreed, but, the promised troops never were sent.<sup>68</sup> Still, Jelal al-Din continued his search for additional troops. In 1231, he sent to the city of Akhlat, a former victim of the sultan. His envoy was Nissawi, also his biographer, who asked Mozaffer Ghazi, a brother of Ashraf, as well as the princes of Amid and Mardin. In return for military assistance, Jelal al-Din offered territory to at least Mozaffer. Mozaffer refused, though, on the grounds that he would need permission from Ashraf. Furthermore, Mozaffer stated that his army was too small to be of any assistance. In addition, he would also need to give homage to the Sultan of Rum. Finally, he could not speak for Amid or Mardin, as they were not subject to him.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup>Howorth, 15.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid, 15. Jelal probably hoped that the release of Yakub would prompt Ashraf to send troops and that it should not be interpreted that Yakub was actually an envoy on behalf of Jelal al-Din.

<sup>68</sup>Howorth, 16-17.

<sup>69</sup>Howorth, 17.

Chormaqañ did not wait idly for Jelal al-Din. Since the Sultan did not come forth to meet the Mongols, Chormaqañ sent troops to find him.<sup>70</sup> After Jelal al-Din received word that Chormaqañ's army had crossed the Amu Darya, he moved from Tabriz to the Mughan steppe to organize his army.<sup>71</sup> He expected the Mongols to winter around Rai, but the Mongols, contrary to what Jelal al-Din believed, advanced rapidly, reaching the area of Zinjan, only one hundred miles from Jelal al-Din's camp.<sup>72</sup> Once Mongol troops reached the city of Sarab, Jelal al-Din apparently moved further north to Chirkebout.<sup>73</sup> There, at Chirkebout he spent much of his time in leisure and hunting. During this time, he once again wrote to Ashraf requesting help.<sup>74</sup> However, five days after Jelal al-Din reached the Mughan plain the Mongols arrived. Jelal al-Din made a frantic escape and fled to the mountain of Qaban in the Southeast of modern Armenia.<sup>75</sup> The Mongols apparently lost his trail, crossed the Araxes River and continued towards Gandzak before they

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<sup>70</sup>The following account of the pursuit of Jelal al-Din is based on the accounts of Nesawi and Juvaini. After comparing the two, and charting each on a map, the following is what I firmly believe to be the sequence of events that occurred. Comments on the parts which I deem erroneous will be footnoted at the appropriate event.

<sup>71</sup>En-Nesawi, 366. Juvaini, 452.

<sup>72</sup>En-Nesawi, 367.

<sup>73</sup>Juvaini, 453. According to Juvaini, at this point Jelal al-Din fled to Bishkin, which I have not been able to identify on any map. There the roof of the cave in which he camped, collapsed. Jelal al-Din did not take this as an ill-omen. I am of the opinion that Juvaini inserted this event as device showing that Heaven was on the side of the Mongols, despite his admiration for Jelal al-Din. Nesawi does not mention Bishkin or the cave. Nesawi on page 369 relates that he went to the fortress of Chirkebout, which I have not been able to locate.

<sup>74</sup>En-Nesawi, 372.

<sup>75</sup>Juvaini, 453. According to Nesawi, after the defeat at Chirkebout, Jelal al-Din fled southward towards the Mahan plain, which is located between the cities of Dinawar and Nehawand, south of Hamadan in Iran, where he wintered. This must be a mistake. Not only is it a considerable distance from the Mughan plain to Hamadan (more than 250 miles), but the Mongols were operating in the Southern portion of Iran. Kirmanshah and Fars would soon submit without fight, but Isphahan was under constant siege until 1236. Not even Jelal al-Din would flee right to the Mongols when he still possessed considerable support in Azerbaijan. Supposedly, the Mongols finally tracked him to here, upon which he fled to Hayzan in Arran.

headed south.<sup>76</sup> After this, the Mongols withdrew across the Araxes and back into Azerbaijan.<sup>77</sup> Meanwhile, the Sultan wintered in the environs of Urimiya and Ushnu.<sup>78</sup>

Juvaini described what happened once the Mongol troops returned to Rai where Chormaqan awaited:

The latter chided them roundly for turning back and abandoning their intensive search for the Sultan. At the very moment, he said, when such an enemy had lost his strength and the veils of concealment had fallen from him, how could they then give him respite and slacken the search. And he dispatched like lightning in his pursuit Taimas and other chief emirs with a band of vengeful Turks such as those who sought to avenge Afrasiyas upon Gurgin.<sup>79</sup>

According to Juvaini, Ögödei had selected Taimas to slay Sultan Jelal al-Din, saying “Of all these [noyans] it is thou that shalt deal the final blow to the Sultan.<sup>80</sup> Surely, this is an apocryphal remark, but still one of some interest. In 1231, Taimas penetrated the Mughan plain and into Arran causing panic in Gandzak and its environs.

At this time, Jelal al-Din had moved north to Hayzan, near the border of Shirvan.<sup>81</sup> With this event, it makes sense why the Mongols returned to Arran, rather than heading towards Amid, where Juvaini places Jelal al-Din after Urmiya.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>76</sup>En-Nesawi, 374.

<sup>77</sup>Juvaini, 453.

<sup>78</sup>Juvaini, 451.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid, 454.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid, 456.

<sup>81</sup>En-Nesawi, 376.

<sup>82</sup>Juvaini, 451.

With the approach of Taimaz, Jelal al-Din fled to a village En-Nesawi called Zibathera, which is Azerbaijan.<sup>83</sup> The Mongols seize control of much of Arran. Meanwhile, Jelal al-Din makes camp at a valley called Qarqaz, which does not appear on any maps. There, he received an ambassador from Taimaz. Originally, Taimaz sent the Al-Thahir al-Murid, a Muslim, to Fakhr al-Din Hamza Al-Nisaburi, the governor of Bailaqan, a city in the northeastern portion of Arran. Taimaz had hoped to gain the city's submission through diplomacy. However, the governor, al-Nisaburi, forwarded him to Jelal al-Din who proceeded to interrogate the envoy. When Jelal al-Din inquired about the troop strength which Chormaqan commanded, Al-Thahir al-Murid replied that when Chormaqan reviewed his troops at Bukhara, he had twenty thousand warriors. Jelal al-Din then executed the envoy, for fear that his men would be disheartened if they learned the numbers of the Mongols.<sup>84</sup>

After this, Jelal al-Din moved his headquarters to the city of Gandzak, which had rebelled.<sup>85</sup> Again, he is forced to flee with the approach of Taimaz. In the Spring of 1231, Jelal al-Din left Gandzak and by travelling through Kurdestan he reached the city of Akhlat.<sup>86</sup> The Mongols continued their pursuit, but were apparently unable to locate him.<sup>87</sup> From there, they withdrew northwards to Manzikirt.<sup>88</sup>

Jelal al-Din took this opportunity to continue south to the environs of Hani.<sup>89</sup> There he attempted to reach an alliance with the city of Amid, but was unsuccessful.

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<sup>83</sup>En-Nesawi, 381. Its exact location is unknown.

<sup>84</sup>En-Nesawi, 384.

<sup>85</sup>En-Nesawi, 392.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid, 396.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid, 400.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid, 402-3.

While there, Jelal al-din spent much of his time in leisure. Jelal al-Din wintered here, thinking that the Mongols would not invade until the spring, thus his army was spread to accomodate the pastures. Buqu Khan had been sent by Jelal al-Din to locate the Mongols. When Buqu Khan reached Azerbaijan, he found no sign of them. Thus he believed them to have returned towards Iraq and Iran. So, Jelal al-Din continued his festivities.<sup>90</sup> When he heard a rumor that the Mongols were in the vicinity, he dismissed it as a trick by the ruler of Amid.<sup>91</sup>

Appearing suddenly, Taimas and his army attacked. However, Jelal al-Din escaped, dispersing his court. Some of these fled to Irbil and then onto Ispahan. The Sultan headed to the Sufaye mountains after being denied refuge at Amid and Mayafariqin. Taimas divided his forces in order to pursue the Sultan. They were temporarily delayed when one of the sultan's generals, Orkhon, rode off with the sultan's banner as a diversion. The Mongols soon realized their mistake. One force followed Jelal al-Din to Akhlat and then to Erjish before losing him in the Sufaye mountains. Others went south towards Mardin, Nusaybin, Khabur, and Sinjar and even to Irbil before returning.<sup>92</sup> At Iribil the Mongols withdrew to Azerbaijan upon the approach of an army led by Mozaffer al-Din of Mosul.<sup>93</sup> All of this action did receive a considerable amount of attention in the south. Sultan Kamil of Egypt, the suzerain of the other Ayyubids in Syria, mobilized his army and marched to the border. In 1232, he reached the Euphrates. Then he went to Amid. However, by then, the Mongols had departed and Kamil withdrew.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>89</sup>Ibid, 403.

<sup>90</sup>Juvaini, 454-455.

<sup>91</sup>Howorth, 17-18.

<sup>92</sup>Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh, Vol. XII, (Beirut: Dar Sadr, 1979): 499-501.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid, 501.

<sup>94</sup>Benson, 168.

In the mountains, Jelal al-Din escaped the Mongols, but he was killed there by Kurds. However, according to Bar Hebraeus, it was an attendant wearing the Sultan's clothes who was killed.<sup>95</sup> Juvaini, however states that he was possibly murdered for his clothes by the Kurds. Someone in his retinue later recognized them on a Kurd in Amid. After the Kurd was questioned by the ruler of Amid, they executed him, and then buried a man thought to be Jelal al-Din.<sup>96</sup> After this, a variety of legends sprung up concerning the last Khwarazmshah.<sup>97</sup>

The victory over Jelal al-Din as well as the effortless conquest of Iran, Iraq al-Jami, Azerbaijan, the Mughan, and Arran, was aided by Jelal al-Din's behavior. Although he was a fearless leader and a great warrior, he never consolidated his position but continually attempted to expand his empire instead of preparing for the next onslaught by the Mongols.<sup>98</sup> Perhaps of equally great importance is that Jelal al-Din's defeat dispersed his army. Many of his warriors submitted to the Mongols, but others fled to Rum and Syria where they served as mercenaries, and when not employed, created chaos within these already turbulent regions.

Among the spoils of Jelal al-Din's death were the last vestiges of his empire. During this time, Chormaqan was not inactive. In 628 H./1231, Chormaqan secured the submission of Fars and Kirman. Ispahan held out until 1237. Chormaqan also received one of the daughters of Jelal al-Din, a girl of 2 years

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<sup>95</sup>Bar Hebraeus, 396.

<sup>96</sup>Juvaini, 459.

<sup>97</sup>Bar Hebraeus, 396. Bar Hebraeus wrote that the sultan wandered in disguise dressed in wool. Meanwhile, Juvaini confirms this legend, by adding that he wandered as a Sufi. Later, he was sighted in various places. Then in 1235-36, a man in the city of Ustundar in Mazandaran claimed to be the sultan. He was captured and examined by those familiar with the sultan, and then executed. The latest legend was that a party of Merchants were crossing the Amu Darya, and one claimed to the boatman that he was Jelal al-Din. The Mongols promptly seized him. The man continued to claim his identity even when threatened with death. So, he was executed.

<sup>98</sup>Rene Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, translated by Naomi Wlaford, (Rutgers: Rutgers University Press, 1970): 266.

named Terken. Chormaqan sent her to Ögödei, where she was brought up in the *ordo*. When Hülegü led his army to the Middle East in 1256, Möngke sent her with him to be given to an appropriate prince. She ended up in the court Badr al-Din Lu’lu’ of Mosul.

During the entire pursuit and eventual defeat of Jelal al-Din, Chormaqan remained in Rai. From there, he directed the course of the pursuit. Most historians of that era, as well as those of today, have focused their attention on this epic chase. Admittedly, for modern historians, they are restricted to what their sources say about his efforts. However, Chormaqan’s apparent lack of activity should be examined.

The most stalwart opponent of the Mongols in Western Asia up until the time of the Mamluk Sultanate, was Jelal al-Din. Chormaqan effectively removed him as a factor in the conquest of Iran. With Taimaz relentlessly pursuing the sultan, Chormaqan completed the conquest of Iran. After taking Rai and the northern areas, Chormaqan moved south, where he pitched his camp somewhere between Qum and Kashan.<sup>99</sup> By 1231, Chormaqan’s forces had also secured Hamadan.<sup>100</sup> From here, he sent armies to Fars, where the ruler, Abu Bakr submitted. Then another force gained the submission of Burak al-Khita-i who ruled Kirman.<sup>101</sup> These areas were not plundered by the Mongols afterwards and a yearly tribute was established.<sup>102</sup> In the east, Dayir, who apparently was subordinate to Chormaqan, gained the submission of Kabul, Ghaznin, and Zawulistan. Dayir, after a lengthy struggle, also subdued the region of Sijistan which is northeast of Sistan.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>99</sup>Juzjani, 1118.

<sup>100</sup>Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh, Vol. XII (Beirut: Dar Sadr, 1979): 496.

<sup>101</sup>Juzjani, 1119.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid.

Despite the relative ease at which Chormaqañ conquered Iran, he did not over extend his armies. In fact, by examining a map, it can be shown that despite its resistance, Isphahan became increasingly secluded. To the north, Chormaqañ made his headquarters. To the west, Hamadan and the rest of Persian Iraq was secured by the Mongols. Even further west was Azerbaijan, which was completely disrupted by the Mongols' pursuit of Jelal al-Din. To the South, Fars and Kirman had submitted to the Mongols. The Northeast, East where firmly under Mongol control, and the Southeast soon was under Mongol domination. Isphahan was secluded with only a narrow corridor towards the Caliphate in Irak 'Ajami. Some of the troops of Jelal al-Din did escape to Isphahan through this route, but not even this was safe as the Mongols made several probing attacks on Baghdad and its protectorates. Thus Isphahan fell, probably in 1237, despite resisting all attacks the Mongols made since the armies of Chinggis Khan crossed the Amu Darya in 1220.<sup>104</sup> J. A. Boyle established the date for the fall of Isphahan to be roughly 1237.<sup>105</sup>

During all of the Mongol conquests, the Mongols had a tendency to conquer and then continue forward after capturing a certain region. But, after completing, perhaps, a predetermined objective, the Mongol armies eventually withdrew to a territory recently conquered. In the case of the invasion of Europe, the Mongols withdrew from Hungary back to Russia. During Chinggis Khan's invasion of the Khwarazmian empire, the Mongols penetrated down into India, and if one accounts for Subedei and Jebe's reconnaissance, into the Caucasus. However, they pulled back behind the Amu Darya. In the instance of Russia, there are many theories

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<sup>103</sup>Ibid, 1119-1120.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid, 1227. Juzjani relates that Isphahan fell because of treachery.

<sup>105</sup>J. A. Boyle, "The Capture of Isfahan by the Mongols" Atti del Convegno Internazionale sul Tema: la Persia nel Medioevo, Rome (1971): 336.

which have arisen, some of which are supported by sources. While these have validity, I would propose another purpose.

While Chinggis Khan's conquests were often more of circumstance, revenge for offenses against Mongol traditions, the pursuit of enemies, etc, Ögödei's reign and thereafter was an era of planned conquest and domination. The Mongol method was one of preplanning, methodical destruction, and reconnaissance in force. As with the first Mongol irruption into the West, the invasion carried out by Chormaqan entered a new territory. They quickly destroyed all effective resistance if offered. Then, as with Chinggis Khan's earlier campaigns, they ruthlessly hunted down the ruler and symbol of resistance. In this case it was Jelal al-Din, whom the Mongols also remembered from prior experience as a dangerous adversary. In all of the campaigns, the Mongols relentlessly chased the rulers. Rarely did a king or sultan have an opportunity to rally his troops. In addition to the pursuit, often into territories where the main armies of the Mongols were not operating, the Mongols gained an opportunity to scout out the terrain for future conquests as well as create a "no man's land" of fear. The psychological effect of the Mongol invasions are well documented. It is not coincidence that both the Muslims, Eastern Christians, and Christendom believed that the end of the world was nigh. Thus while these factors were carried out, Chormaqan, in this instance, could pacify the immediate conquered territories as well as put an administration in place. Unfortunately, because of the destruction and the havoc caused by the marauding armies of the Mongols in the "unconquered" regions, the "conquered" regions were often neglected by period historians.

## Chapter 3: The Conquest of the Caucasus Regions

The death of Jelal al-Din left Chormaqan with numerous opportunities. First, it removed the principal opponent of the Mongols. Secondly, the pursuit of Jelal al-Din had allowed the Mongols to reconnoiter the rest of the Caucasus region beyond Azerbaijan, which was now firmly in Mongol hands. Finally, because of the predations of Jelal al-Din prior to the arrival of Chormaqan, much of Armenia and Georgia was in a weakened condition. Thus, the Mongols, if they so decided, could easily conquer these areas. Only days after the death of Jelal al-Din and the dispersal of his army, the Mongols did ravage the environs of Amid, Erzerum and Mayafarqin. However, this was not a campaign of conquest, so after satisfying their needs, the Mongols withdrew to Azerbaijan.

The Mongols then began to focus their attentions on Armenia and Georgia. Jelal al-Din had been dead for three months, although no one was certain if this was the case. In 1231, the Mongols in Azerbaijan moved towards Tabriz where they summoned the principal figures of the city. The chief *qadi* and the mayor went to the Mongols and agreed to submit and pay tribute, including fabrics which were sent to Ögödei Khan by Chormaqan.<sup>106</sup> In addition, some artisans were sent to Ögödei.

At the same time, Sultan Kamil of Egypt had moved to the Euphrates after hearing of the Mongol raids. While at Harran, he learned that the Mongols had withdrew from Akhlat. After capturing Amid with the assistance of Sultan Ashraf of Syria, his brother, and the Sultan 'Ala al-Din of Rum, he returned south in 1232, apparently confident that the Mongols were not a threat to his dominions.

Meanwhile, the Mongol advance forces wintered in the Mughan plain. Then in 1232, Chormaqan moved westward, after being occupied in Iran for two years.

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<sup>106</sup>Rene Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, translated by Naomi Walford, (Rutgers: Rutgers University Press, 1970): 262.

He moved from Rai, through Mazandaran into the Mughan Plain in 1233. Here Chormaqan made camp, where there was plenty of water, pasture, and game to hunt. He would return here each winter and then campaign during the summer.<sup>107</sup> During this time he organized some form of administration, thus allowing him and the majority of the army to campaign in the west.

There is a great deal of confusion concerning the date when the Mongols began their invasion of Transcaucasia. One modern historian, Galstyan believes that the invasion and the complete conquest of Arran, Armenia, and Georgia, took place in 1236.<sup>108</sup> This is based on the account of Step'anos, a bishop from Cilicia, or Lesser Armenia. Then Galstyan, mentions a date which was left in the personal bible of Vanakan Tavushec'i, who was the teacher of the historian Kirakos. This bible “which the Mongols had seized was also returned to Vanakan. He left his autograph in the Bible which indicates the precise date of the invasion of the Caucasus.”<sup>109</sup> Other authors, such as Kirakos date the invasion a year earlier to 1235.<sup>110</sup> Vartan dates it to 1233 or 1234.<sup>111</sup> Shamshean dates the invasion of Arran to 1234, and then the fall of Gandzak in 1235, after which the Mongols retired to the Mughan.<sup>112</sup> Then, according to Shamshean, the Mongols returned to invade all of

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<sup>107</sup>Kiracos de Gantzac, “Historie d’Armenie”, Deux Historiens Armeniens: Kiracos de Gantzac, XIII S., “Historie d’Armenie”; Oukhtanes D’Ourha, X S., “Historie en trois parties”, translated by M. Brousset (St. Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1870): 116.

<sup>108</sup>A. G. Galstyan, “The Conquest of Armenia by the Mongol Armies,” translated by Robert Bedrosian, The Armenian Review 27 (1975): 360.

<sup>109</sup>Galstyan, 360. I was not able to locate the text of Step'anos.

<sup>110</sup>Kiracos, 119.

<sup>111</sup>Vartan, “Extraite de L’Histoire Universelle de Vartan”, from “Les Mongols d’apres Les Historiens Armeniens”, translated by M. Ed. Dularier, Journal Asiatique 16 (1860): 282.

<sup>112</sup>M. Klaproth, “Des entreprises des Mongols en Georgie et en Armenie dans le XIII<sup>e</sup> siecle”, Journal Asiatique 12 (1833): 200.

Arran, Georgia, and Armenia in the year 1236.<sup>113</sup> Galstyan states that the Mongols conquered the entire region in a year, yet it appears that he did not consult Klaproth's article concerning Shamshean's chronicle, nor did he refer to Shamshean's original work.<sup>114</sup>

While I believe that the Mongols were fully capable of conquering a vast amount of territory within a year especially when one considers the number of commanders involved (at least 5 independent commanders), there are other factors. The Transcaucasia is a mountainous land which would certainly cut down the speed of the Mongols. Then the majority of the conquest came down to sieges. Although on numerous occasions, the Mongol armies quickly reduced great cities, such as Samarqand and later Baghdad and Aleppo, the Armenian accounts clearly state that several strongholds surrendered only after depleting their water and food reserves. These particular places will be discussed in the examination of the conquest itself. Thus, the dates of Shamshean seem more reasonable. Furthermore, the only date which Kirakos mentions for the invasion is 1235. To assume that this meant that all of the events mentioned took place within that one year is haphazard at best. The final reason why Galstyan's date for the complete conquest of the Transcaucasus is that there is a absence of other events in the sources. The only activities concerning Chormaqan, who was the military commander of the region, appear after 1239 in the regional sources. If one abides by Galstyan's date of 1236, then what did Chormaqan do in those intervening years? Galstyan does not mention this. Instead, after 1236, he leaps forward to 1242, when Baiju Noyan, Chormaqan's successor, began operations against the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum. Based on this, a comparative

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<sup>113</sup>Klaproth, 200.

<sup>114</sup>Galstyan, 360. After carefully examining his footnotes, I did not find any reference to either Klaproth's article, nor any name resembling Shamshean's.

method of dates should be applied when calculating the movements of the Mongol armies in Transcaucasia.

### *The invasion of Transcaucasia*

Chormaqan's first objective, as he moved into Arran, probably in the winter, in 1234, was the city of Gandzak. After a brief siege in 1235, he breached the walls with battering rams and catapults. Then they destroyed the city, massacring most of the population with the exception of some children and women.<sup>115</sup> The city itself remained in ruins for four years before the Mongols ordered it to be rebuilt.

Shamshean mentions that the Mongols after the siege of Gandzak returned to the Mughan plain, but other authors, such as Vartan and Kiracos do not mention this.

Thus, after the sack of Gandzak, Chormaqan, in accordance with Mongol strategy, held a *quriltai* in which he and his commanders planned the next step of the invasion. After establishing the targets of the attack, Chormaqan divided his army into several columns. Thus the Armenians, and Georgians would not be able to concentrate their forces as it would leave the rest of the country open to the flying columns of the Mongols. Gandzak was the perfect launching point for invasion into Armenia and Georgia. By crossing the Kura River to the north, the Mongols could either continue northwest and sack Tiflis and the rest of Georgia, or by going southeast, they could invade Shirvan along the Caspian Sea. Also from Gandzak, by riding west, they would be able to strike many Armenian cities, including Kars and Ani. Chormaqan's force may be divided into three strike forces. One thrust into the Kura valley, led by Mular. The second, led by Chormaqan attacked Armenia, while the third force invaded Georgia under Chaghatai Noyan.<sup>116</sup> Two other corps,

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<sup>115</sup>Vartan, 282. Kiracos, 116-117.

led by Jola and Yissaur headed Southeast, deep into Arran and the eastern regions of Armenia. Again there is a conflict of dates. Shamshean placed the invasion of Arran, Georgia and Armenia in the year 1236, but not until the year 1238 are any cities captured. What happened between 1236 and 1238 is not mentioned by Klaproth. At best, one may hazard the idea that the Mongols were still moving their troops to the target areas, yet this is an unsatisfactory answer. A possible explanation will be offered at the end of this chapter.

According to Shamshean, in the year 1239 Mular Noyan invaded the district of Shamkor, which was ruled by Vahram near Gandzak.<sup>117</sup> Vahram had an opportunity to stop the vanguard of Mular, however he did nothing. At Shamkor, Mular ordered the attack and filled the ditch surrounding the city with fascines. The defenders promptly burned these. According to Kirakos, Mular then ordered each of his soldiers to fill their *deels* with dirt and empty it into the moat. Soon Mular was able to breach the wall and the population was massacred.<sup>118</sup> From there, Molar proceeded against the other cities governed by Prince Vahram. Tuerakan, Ergevank, Tavush, Kac'apet, Kavazin, Gag, and Mac'naberd all fell before him. A force under Ghataghan Noyan subjugated the cities of Gardman, Charek, Kedabek, and Varsanshod.<sup>119</sup> With the complete subjugation of his kingdom, Vahram had no option but to submit to the Mongols in 1239.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>116</sup>Douglas Benson, The Mongol Campaigns in Asia: A Summary History of Mongolian Warfare with the Governments of Eastern and Western Asia in the 13th Century, (Chicago: Bookmasters, Inc., 1991): 170-171.

<sup>117</sup>Klaproth, 200. The name of the ruler is mention in Grigor of Akanc, "The History of the Nation of the Archers", translated by R.P. Blake and R.N. Frye, HJAS 12 (1949): 297.

<sup>118</sup>Kiracos, 119-120.

<sup>119</sup>Klaproth, 201. In this article, Mular took Shamkor while Ghataghan captured Kedabek and Varsanshod. Vartan lists the same on page 283. Kiracos lists Ghataghan captured Charek and Kedabek first. The rest of the listed places fell afterwards. With those which Mular listed, it is clear in what order they fell as he simply progressed towards the west until he finally took Kavazin. I would suggest that Mac'naberd fell first due to its proximity to Gandzak.

<sup>120</sup>Klaproth, 202.

The subjugation of Georgia began in 1238 with the capture of Lorhe and the surrounding environs by Chaghatai Noyan and Toghta Noyan, his subordinate. Lorhe was a very rich city and the center of Shahanshah's, the local governor, power. Upon the coming of the Mongols, Shahanshah fled with his wives and children and hid in some caves, leaving his father-in-law in charge. Unfortunately, the father-in-law did not succeed in preventing the Mongols from seizing Lorhe.<sup>121</sup> Toghta, then, laid siege to Gaian where *Metawar*, or Prince, Avak had fled. Avak was the son of the great Constable Ivaneh, who attempted battle with Subedei and Jebe in 1220 and also sought to halt Jelal al-Din. Toghta Noyan surrounded the fortress with his own wall and then proceeded to send emissaries to Avak. The *metawar* attempted to buy off Toghta and also offered the Mongol general his daughter. Toghta accepted this offer but on the condition that Avak come in person. Avak balked at this. Thus the siege continued. Eventually water supplies fell short. In a curious demonstration of clemency, the Mongols allowed people to leave Gaian, but they were not allowed to return. Furthermore, those who left the fortress were then ordered to persuade their families to desert the fortress. Eventually this tactic forced Avak to surrender. He was then sent to Chormaqan who, at this time, was camped at the northwestern edge of Lake Sevan, to submit.<sup>122</sup>

Toghta and Chaghatai, then proceeded to take Dumanise and Shamshvilde before moving northward against Tiflis. Tiflis was captured by Jelal al-Din five years earlier and had been unfortified since then. When the armies of Chaghatai and Toghta came, Queen Rusudan fled her capital and went to Kutaise. She left "Goj, son of Mukha, in charge of the capital, with orders, if the enemy should appear, to set fire to Tiflis, except the palace and the quarter called Isanni".<sup>123</sup> However, Goj

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<sup>121</sup>Kiracos, 124-125.

<sup>122</sup>Klaproth, 201. Kiracos, 126.

panicked and burned the entire city. Then the Mongol army proceeded up the Kura valley and devastated the districts of Sametzhky and Jawakhety. During the invasion of the province of Sametzhky, its ruler, Ivaneh, sought permission from Queen Rusudan to be allowed to submit to the Mongols and be spared from further disaster. The queen acquiesced and upon the submission of Ivaneh, Chaghatai relented in plundering the province.<sup>124</sup> They did not cross the mountains in pursuit of Queen Rusudan.

Chormaqan, who was preparing for the invasion of Armenia, received Prince Avak with honor at his camp at Lake Sevan in 1238. He accepted Avak's submission with the promise that the *metawar* would supply the Mongols with tribute, in addition to participating in their campaigns. Avak's involvement began immediately in the company of Chormaqan as the Mongol general moved southwards in 1239.<sup>125</sup> Chormaqan's first target in Armenia was the capital city, Ani. This was a very strong and prosperous city which seems to have escaped the earlier forays of Subedei and Jebe as well as Jelal al-Din. Chormaqan sent envoys to the city in an attempt to gain its submission peacefully. The city elders, however, could not surrender the city without obtaining the permission of Shahanshah, who ruled it and who was already in hiding from Chaghatai's attack on Lorhe. This delay gave the populace an opportunity to revolt, and the envoys were slain. After this violation of the sacrosanctity of his envoys, Chormaqan ordered the assault. Using many catapults, the walls were quickly breached and then Mongols captured the city. The people were then divided and massacred.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>123</sup>Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols: From the 9th to the 19th Century. Part III: The Mongols of Persia, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1888): 25.

<sup>124</sup>Howorth, 32.

<sup>125</sup>Klaproth, 202.

<sup>126</sup>Kiracos, 127-128.

Upon hearing of the destruction at Ani, the city of Kars immediately offered its submission. Chormaqn, however, apparently was not in the mood for this. The Mongols attacked and captured the city. Upon the completion of the conquest of Armenia, north of the Araxes river, Chormaqn issued orders for people to return to their homes.<sup>127</sup>

In the district of Artsakh or Karabagh, a Mongol force commanded by Jola, brother of Chormaqn ravaged the country.<sup>128</sup> Jola captured Khatchen which caused Prince Hasan Jelal, nephew of Ivaneh who led the Georgians against Subedei and Jebe, to submit in 1238 after having previously resisted a Mongol assault at Hohanaberd. Jola accepted his surrender, and in turn, increased Hasan Jelal's territory. From that point, Khatchen was spared from further attacks and the Armenian general sent tribute and participated in the Mongols' campaigns.<sup>129</sup>

Meanwhile, in 1238 Yissaur Noyan also went southward from Gandzak and had surrounded Hrashkaberd in the district of Siwnik. This was held by the prince Ulikum Orbelean. Yissaur realized he would be unable to take it by force and so sent envoys. He presented two very clear options: starve or make peace. Ulikum Orbelean accepted the terms of surrender and submitted in 1239.<sup>130</sup> Yissaur gave the Armenian prince many gifts and also made him a general. Ulikum Orbelean remained loyal to the Mongols until his death at the siege of Mayafarqin, due to illness or poison.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>127</sup>Howorth, 31.

<sup>128</sup>Klaproth, 201. According to W. Barthold, An Historical Geography of Iran, translated by Svat Soucek (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984): 29, in the latter half of the Middle Ages, the region of Arran was called Karabagh. He also notes that there was a road which led from the city of Ardabil, on the southern edge of the Mughan, to the town of Karabagh which may have been Bailaqan.

<sup>129</sup>Klaproth, 201.

<sup>130</sup>Klaproth, 202.

After the conquest of the Caucasus region was completed in 1240, Prince Avak was sent to Ögödei.<sup>132</sup> According to Kirakos, Avak wanted to go on his own volition in order to gain favorable terms from the Great Khan. Ögödei received him with honor and rewarded him with a Mongol wife. Avak was sent back with orders to be reinstated to his lands and help reduce those who resisted.<sup>133</sup>

The Mongols accomplished their conquest of Armenia and Georgia relatively easily and quickly. If one abides by Galstyan's calculations, the campaign took less than a year.<sup>134</sup> Yet, the entire campaign was a series of sieges. Most of the records of the conquests are reduced to a list of cities which fell, but there is enough evidence, especially in the capture of Gaian, Hohanaberd, and Hraskaberd, that many of the fortresses daunted the Mongol's siege ability. These only fell after negotiation and when supplies were exhausted. Despite this, it seems to have been a fairly easy conquest. First, the entire region was severely weakened from previous invasions. In 1220, a Mongol army under Subedei and Jebe defeated the Georgians in battle, and in addition to plundering the countryside for supplies. Then in the late 1220s, Jelal al-Din only ceased his war against Georgia when the Mongols reappeared in Iran. Thus Georgia was spared for another few years but after a destructive war.

Another major factor was that the *metawars* hid in their fortresses. This may have been because the previous catastrophes had left them short of men to field an army. In addition, the Mongols had a psychological edge over the Georgians and Armenians in that the latter groups had been consistently defeated in the field by

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<sup>131</sup>Howorth, 22-23. Howorth offers the suggestion that Ulikum was poisoned by the Georgian prince Avak.

<sup>132</sup>Klaproth, 202

<sup>133</sup>Klaproth, 202.

<sup>134</sup>Galstyan, 362.

Jelal al-Din and the Mongols under Subedei and Jebe. Thus the *metawars* tried a new tactic. However this often failed due to a shortage of water.<sup>135</sup> This, in turn, may have been the reason behind Chormaqan's decision to campaign in the summer rather than the winter.

Finally, there is the strategy which the Mongols used during this campaign. In accordance with normal Mongol strategy, they operated in several columns. Thus they were able to prevent one prince from sending aid to another. No one could afford to send troops when it seemed attack on their own holdings was imminent. Another key tactic that the Mongols used was the princes who submitted to them.<sup>136</sup> By using them, they could easily obtain the surrender of at least the fortresses and cities which that particular prince held. In addition, a vassal prince would also be of assistance in helping the Mongols' negotiations with the other princes to join them. It is also important to note that the Mongols, despite the rewards they heaped upon those who surrendered, did not completely trust their new vassals. Thus Prince Avak and others accompanied the Mongols in the conquest of Armenia and Georgia. With the prince there, it gave the Mongols an opportunity to check the certainty of their loyalty, and also to keep them in sight.

Finally, there also appears to have been a sense of fatalism among the Armenians and Georgians. According to Grigor of Akanc:

The wise princes of Armenia and Georgia realized that God was giving power and victory to them (the Tat'ars), to take our countries, thus they became obedient to the Tat'ars, and agreed to give the tribute known as mal and t'agar and to come out to them with their cavalry where ever they (the Tat'ars) led them.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>135</sup>Howorth, 25.

<sup>136</sup>Grigor, 303-305.

<sup>137</sup>Grigor, 297.

The Mongols apparently felt satisfied with the loyalty of the Armenians and Georgians upon the completion of the conquest, for they retired to the Mughan plain. Still, one *noyan*, Qara Buka, was left behind to raze all of the fortresses.

It is interesting to note that the Mongols did not pursue their “tidal wave” method of conquest in Georgia. Normally the Mongols would have pursued the ruler until they, the rulers, either were killed or escaped beyond their reach. Queen Rusudan did flee to the more inaccessible reaches in the mountains of Georgia, but certainly, the Mongols would have pursued her. Perhaps they did not as the eastern portion of Georgia quickly fell into their hands. Furthermore, Queen Rusudan also signed a treaty at the request of Tamghuz Aka, who was deputed to collect taxes in Georgia, by Ögödei. The queen signed a treaty on the condition that the Mongols would not attack.<sup>138</sup> Thus, Queen Rusudan recognized the suzerainty of the Mongols while maintaining rule over a much reduced kingdom. The eastern portion, or that which the Mongols conquered, became another tributary vassal paying 50, 000 pieces of gold per year.<sup>139</sup> Furthermore, at this time, the Mongols were active in the conquest of Russia and perhaps felt that since she had submitted and now surrounded, she was not a threat to their security.

The conquest of Georgia and Armenia did not escape the notice of Europe. John de Plano Carpini recorded what he learned of Chormaqan’s expedition. In listing the Mongol commanders, he called Chormaqan “Cirpodan” and wrote that he was “still beyond the sea fighting against certain sultans of the land of the

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<sup>138</sup>Howorth, 33.

<sup>139</sup> Kalistrat Salia, History of the Georgian Nation, translated by Katherine Vivian, (Paris: L’Academie Francais, 1980): 208-209. In Christopher Dawson, ed., The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, translated by a nun of Stanbrook Abbey, (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955): 31, Plano Carpini lists that the unconquered portion of Georgia would pay 40, 000 yperpera per year.

Saracens, and others who are beyond the sea".<sup>140</sup> Plano Carpini seemed aware of the Mongols ability to fight wars on many fronts as he wrote, "Occodai Chan (sic) sent Ciropodan with an army to the south against the Kergis and he defeated them in battle".<sup>141</sup> John de Plano Carpini states that this occurred simultaneously and in connection with the invasion of Russia. Then Chormaqan proceeded south against the Armenians. While crossing a desert he was forced to fight monsters with one hand and one foot. Chormaqan prevailed and the monsters submitted to him.<sup>142</sup>

In Grigor of Akanc's The History of the Nation of the Archers, there is a rather interesting story concerning Chormaqan. According to Grigor, who was not an eyewitness of the invasion, there were three Mongols who led the campaign. These were Chormaqan, Benal, and Mular.<sup>143</sup> After a some time, two of the captains decided that they needed to attack Georgia and Armenia again. Chormaqan, however, opposed this plan which was discussed during their *quriltai* in the Mughan plain. According to Grigor, Chormaqan said, "There has been enough plundering and killing in the country; let cultivation remain".<sup>144</sup> However, the matter was not settled that night. All retired for the evening. The next day, Benal and Molar "who had counseled evil" were found dead.<sup>145</sup> Chormaqan was alive.

Chormaqan was then sent to Karakorum. According to Grigor, he was judged by Chinggis Khan, but as Chinggis Khan had been dead since 1227, Grigor

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<sup>140</sup>Dawson, 27.

<sup>141</sup>Dawson, 31. Dawson believes the Kergis to be Circassians rather than the Kirghiz.

<sup>142</sup>Dawson, 31.

<sup>143</sup>Grigor, 297.

<sup>144</sup>Grigor, 299-301.

<sup>145</sup>Grigor, 301.

must have meant Ögödei. Chormaqan related his story, which was verified by witnesses. Then the great khan said:

That which the two chieftains counseled was not pleasing to God; because of this they met sudden death. You, however, because of your good advice, did not die. It is the will of God *that we* take the earth and maintain order, and impose the (y)asax, *that they* abide by our command and give us tzghu, mal, t'aghār, and ghp'ch'ur. Those, however, who do not submit to our command or give us tribute, slay them and destroy their place, so that the others who hear and see should fear and not act thus.”<sup>146</sup>

Then the khan ordered Chormaqan to return. In addition, Chormaqan was given a wife whom Grigor calls “Aylt’ana Xat’un” or more properly Altan Khatun.<sup>147</sup> According to Grigor, Altan Khatun was a wife of Chinggis Khan. It is more likely that this is a wife of Ögödei, although she may have been one of Chinggis Khan’s wives whom Ögödei included among his own. After this Chormaqan held another *quriltai* in which the conquered lands were divided into three parts: north, south, and middle. Armenia and Albania were considered as part of the middle territory. This will be discussed further in the following chapter concerning the government.

This section of Grigor’s chronicle is fascinating in that it raises one very important question: why was Chormaqan displayed in so favorable a light? Certainly, Chormaqan during the conquest did not demonstrate any excessive generosity. Kars, although it offered submission was destroyed. He did accept the surrender and vassalage of several princes, but then he ordered them to march in his armies against their fellow princes. Grigor’s manuscript is dated at 1271 A. D., so

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<sup>146</sup>Grigor, 301. All italics and parentheses are from the translation by Blake and Frye. I have substituted “gh” for the greek gamma which appeared in tzghu, t’aghār, and ghp'ch'ur. In the latter, I also substituted “ch” for a “c” marked with a diacritical.

<sup>147</sup>Grigor, 301.

there should not be any influence of patronage within it. As important as the question of favoring Chormaqan, why were Benal and Mular defamed?<sup>148</sup> Unfortunately, at this time, there seems to be no answer to these questions. Still, the fact that this apocryphal story does appear, suggests a greater importance for Chormaqan than previously considered. Certainly, these kind words were not said on behalf of his leadership of the campaign. Perhaps, during the examination of the government of Chormaqan, more light can be shed on this.

### *Against Baghdad*

Chormaqan did move against Baghdad, which was the target of his original directives. However, Baghdad, as it will be shown, does not appear to have been the focus of Chormaqan's energies at anytime. In accordance with the "tidal wave" method of conquest, while Chormaqan stabilized control in Azerbaijan and also invaded the Caucasus region, he protected the southern flank by attacking Baghdad.

During the siege of Gandzak, the Mongols attacked Irbil and captured it, although the citadel withstood the assault. Many of the citizens of Irbil were massacred.<sup>149</sup> The Mongols eventually withdrew after tribute was given.<sup>150</sup> Where ever they went, the Mongols left a wake of devastation.<sup>151</sup> From here, the Mongols then apparently headed south and overran the northern areas of Irak al-Arabi. This naturally placed Baghdad on the defensive and a *jihad* was declared by the Caliph. An army was then sent out against the Mongols. At Jebal Hamrin, near the city of Takrit on the Tigris River, the Mongols were defeated. According to Howorth, this

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<sup>148</sup>I could not locate a date for the death of either Mular nor Benal.

<sup>149</sup>Al-Dahabi, *Kitab Duwal al-Islam* (*Les Dynasties de L'Islam*), translated by Arlette Negre, (Damascus: Institut Francais de Damas, 1979): 233.

<sup>150</sup>Howorth, 22.

<sup>151</sup>Al-Dahabi, 232.

caused another division of Mongols at Jaferiya to withdraw.<sup>152</sup> Al-Dahabi wrote that the garrison of Baghdad under Amir Baklak, numbering 47, 000 men attacked a force of ten thousand Mongols. Baklak broke the Mongol ranks, but was killed. His death caused the Muslim army to break and flee. Unfortunately, the site of the battle is not mentioned.<sup>153</sup>

The last action against the Caliphate and the Muslim states in the Jazira that occurred during the era of Chormaqan was at Mayafarqin. In 638/ 1240-41, an envoy arrived. He delivered a message to Malik al Muzaffer Ghazi from Ögödei Khan of Khans, and the representative of God on earth. Malik al Muzaffer Ghazi and all of the princes in that region were ordered to submit to the Mongols and raze the walls of their fortresses.<sup>154</sup> Malik al-Muzaffer Ghazi did not comply, but Mayafarqin did not fall until the arrival of Hülegü.

### *Connections with the Invasion of Russia*

Returning to problem of dating the invasion of Armenia and Georgia, one must also return to Galstyan's article. He connects the invasion of Armenia and Georgia with the invasion of Russia. In the *quriltai* which Ögödei held at Karakorum in 1235, he gave the order for a large army led by Batu and Subedei to move west.<sup>155</sup> At the same *quriltai*, Ögödei also sent Oqotur and Mönggetü "in support of Chormaqan-qorchi".<sup>156</sup> Mönggetü eventually led two *tumens* on the

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<sup>152</sup>Howorth, 22.

<sup>153</sup>Al-Dahabi, 236.

<sup>154</sup>Al-Dahabi, 242.

<sup>155</sup>Igor de Rachewiltz, "The Secret History of the Mongols", PFEH 31 (1985): 26-27.

<sup>156</sup>Ibid, 26.

Indian frontier. After he died, Oqotur as second in command took over.<sup>157</sup> While Chormaqan moved westward, it is obvious that to do so he had to take the bulk of the army with him. Mönggetü and Oqotur assisted in the invasion by garrisoning southeastern Iran and Afghanistan in the environs of Ghazni, among other places.<sup>158</sup>

Galstyan believed that because, in his opinion, the invasion of Transcaucasia took place in 1236, which coincided with the beginnings of the invasion of Russia west of the Volga River, the two were connected.<sup>159</sup> By determining this, Galstyan actually discredits 1236 as the year in which the Mongols completed their conquest of Transcaucasia. At this time, the Mongol armies in the Russia steppes were only beginning operations. Furthermore, it wasn't until 1238 that the Mongols moved upon the Russian cities. Of more importance, in December 1239, Möngke subjugated the Alans to the north of the Caucasus mountains.<sup>160</sup>

If the campaign in the Transcaucasia region and the one in Russia were connected, then certainly, the Chormaqan, in accordance to the time schedules which the Mongols used during their campaigns, would not have conquered that area in 1236. Instead, in 1238, the Mongols in Transcaucasia began their campaign by spreading out. This is the same time that Batu's armies moved upon the Russian cities. This also clarifies why the Mongols did not pursue Queen Rusudan when she fled. She was trapped, it was simply a matter of time before she would submit and become a vassal of the Mongol Khan.

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<sup>157</sup>J. A. Boyle “The Mongol Commanders in Afghanistan and India according to the Tabaqat-i Nasiri of Juzjani”, Islamic Studies II (Karachi, 1963): 242.

<sup>158</sup>Minhaj Sinaj Juzjani, Tabakat-i-Nasiri (A general history of the Muhammedan dynasties of Asia), translated by Major H. G. Raverty, (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corp, 1970): 1152-1153.

<sup>159</sup>Galstyan, 360-361.

<sup>160</sup>Grousset, 265.

The house of Juchi, which Batu was the head of, controlled the western realms of the empire. When Chinggis died, this was basically the Kazakh steppe. With the Russian campaign, it expanded to the Carpathian mountains. Yet, there are several incidents which suggest that it extended south. Part of the long quarrel between Berke, khan of the Kipchak Ulus from 1257-1267, and Hülegü, first Il-khan of Persia from 11255-1265, was over the lush pastures of Arran and the Mughan steppe. While the Caucasus mountains make an easily definable border, the Golden Horde felt that Hülegü was encroaching upon their territory when he made it his headquarters in 1258. The argument made by the Golden Horde was that their territory was as far as the Mongols had gone west. This apparently included the expedition of Sübedei and Jebe. As they had also traveled through Russia, the Golden Horde khans seemed to include the Transcaucasia region, which was truly the starting point of the expedition by Sübedei and Jebe beyond the Khwarazmian campaign.

Juzjani seems to support this argument. In two passages which seem to have been overlooked by historians, he defines the realm of Batu:

Chingiz Khan installed him in the place of his father, and all the states of the tribes of Turkistan, from Khwarazm, Bulghar, Bartas, Saklab, as far as the boundaries of Rum, came under his sway.<sup>161</sup>

Then concerning the rule of Batu, Juzjani wrote:

Out of every country of I-ran which fell under the jurisdiction of the Mughals, he [Batu] had a specified assignment, and his factors were placed over such portions as had been allotted to him, and all the Grandees and leaders of the Mughal forces were

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<sup>161</sup>Juzjani, 1164. I could not identify who the Bartas or Saklab are. If I would hazard a guess, the Bartas=Bashkir and Saklab=Saks.

obedient unto Batu, and used to look upon him in the light of his father Tushi (sic).<sup>162</sup>

Thus it seems that Chormaqan, while an independent commander since 1230, was now at least nominally under Batu. The Armenian sources do not mention Batu in any conjunction with Chormaqan and who ruled the region. These sources are explicit in that Chormaqan was the person in charge. Thus it seems doubtful if the Golden Horde exercised any authority over the Transcaucasia region other than nominally. Yet, to be sure, they did exercise some influence in the region which was respected by the local commanders. One of the most consequential events was upon the death of Queen Rusudan. Baiju, who at that time in 1246 was the commander of the Mongols in the Transcaucasia, sought to place David Lasha, the nephew of the queen, on the Georgian throne. Batu intervened though, as Queen Rusudan's son, David Narin, was in his court and under his protection. The matter was only settled by the emperor, Guyuk Khan, who awarded each David with a separate realm within Georgia.<sup>163</sup> Evidently, Batu had enough authority to intervene in the Transcaucasia, but not enough control to assert his authority. Still, one must bear in mind the hostility between Guyuk and Batu. Even if Batu had wished to place David Narin on the throne, Guyuk perhaps simply countermanded the order out of spite.

### *Conclusion*

The conquest of Transcaucasia was perhaps the crowning point of Chormaqan's career. Iran fell easily with but a few engagements. Transcaucasia, on the other hand, was one of stubborn resistance by a people who had endured a

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<sup>162</sup>Juzjani, 1172.

<sup>163</sup>Grousset, 350.

previous Mongol invasion, and then the marauding attacks by Jelal al-Din.

Although, the Mongols defeated them easily enough, the Armenian and Georgian princes apparently demonstrated enough valor for the Mongols to make them generals within the Mongol army.

In addition, the Transcausasia campaign clearly demonstrates the Mongols strategy. First, by striking Gandzak, the Mongols captured a strategically and important city. Then they held a *quriltai* to plan the conquest of the same region. At the same time as the sack of Gandzak, an army struck towards Baghdad. While this did not yield any result of consequence, it did distract the Caliphate from the Mongols' true intentions. Then the Mongols divided into several columns, which struck at all of Georgia and Armenia. This prevented the Georgian and Armenian *metawars* from concentrating their forces, if indeed, they had the manpower to field an army of any size. Without the interference of a field army, the Mongols either quickly overcame the defenders of the strongholds, or simply waited the *metawars* into submission. Through this Chormaqan acquired a sizable amount of territory for the empire. The region between the Araxes and the Kura river was now under direct Mongol control. To the north of the Kura, part of the country was under the control of Queen Rusudan, who eventually became a vassal through negotiation, while the other half was under Mongol control. Now, the Mongol empire border the Caliphate, a few city-states with connections to the Caliphate and the Ayyubids in Syria, and the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum. With this annexation, the Mongols acquired additional auxiliaries who would be active participants in the campaigns in Rum, against the Caliphate, and the eventual invasion of Syria.

As for the involvement of the Golden Horde or Kipchak Ulus, despite the timing of the campaigns, and the statements of Juzjani, the question is still not answered. During Chormaqan's lifetime, Batu never intervened. Yet it should be noted that as Chormaqan died in 1241, Batu was campaigning for the majority of

that time. Furthermore, the regent Toregene and then the Khan, Guyuk, were both hostile towards Batu. It is doubtful if they would have allowed him to have Iran and Transcaucasia in addition to his vast domain in the Kipchak steppe. Thus, until more evidence comes to light, the only answers to this question are merely speculation.

## Chapter 4: The Governorship of Chormaqan

The territory which Chormaqan conquered was not under the direct rule of any member of the *altan uruq* or imperial family. He governed it himself, “on behalf of all branches of the family”.<sup>164</sup> This territory was strictly an area under military jurisdiction and one in which a bureaucracy had yet to be established by the Mongols. The evidence suggesting that Batu was the actual ruler of this region is too vague to confirm Batu’s dominion. In addition, most of Iran was conquered before the *quriltai* of 1235, in which Ögödei Khan ordered the expedition into Russia. Azerbaijan was firmly under Mongol control by 1232. Finally, when Chormaqan completed the conquest of Transcaucasia, Batu had yet to return from Hungary.

### *The Division of Territory.*

It is clear that Chormaqan’s establishment of a governing apparatus was based on a military hierarchy. Grigor of Akanc recorded that Chormaqan divided the Transcaucasia region into three districts (north, south, and central) among 110 chieftains.<sup>165</sup> Presumably, these chieftains included all levels of commanders from the *jaghun* (hundred) to the *tumen* (ten thousand) commanders. Grigor also states that the inner territory consisted of Armenia and Albania, or rather Arran. It was divided between “thirteen chieftains who divided the countries of the Armenians and Albanians, highland and lowland, among themselves”<sup>166</sup>. Grigor listed the following men:

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<sup>164</sup>Douglas S. Benson, The Mongol Campaigns in Asia: A Summary History of the Mongolian Warfare with the Governments of Eastern and Western Asia in the 13th Century, (Chicago: Bookmasters, Inc.): 171.

<sup>165</sup>Grigor of Akanc, “The History of the Nation of the Archers”, translated by R. P. Blake and R. N. Frye, HJAS 12 (1949): 303.

“Asut’u Nuin (Noyan), who was the companion of the Khan, C’aghatay, who was surnamed Khan, then Sanit’ay, still another little C’aghatay, Bachu Nuin, whom they appointed vice-commander of all the armies, Asar Nuin, Xut’tu Nuin, T’ut’tu Nuin, Awgawt’ay Nuin, Xojay Nuin, Xurumci Nuin, Xunan Nuin, T’enal Nuin, and Angurag Nuin”.<sup>167</sup>

This is a rather curious list as there are fourteen names rather than thirteen. Furthermore, the list is filled with other problems. First, the Chaghatai whom, Grigor records as being surnamed Khan, certainly is not the son of Chinggis Khan. Chaghatai was, at this time, in China. After 1235, Chaghatai b. Chinggis Khan was in Karakorum with Ögödei Khan. This is a frequent mistake by many of the later authors, but contemporary authors, such as Kirakos, were able to distinguish between the Chaghatai b. Chinggis Khan and the commander who accompanied Chormaqan. Boyle explains this the best:

In Blake and Frye’s translation we read :  
‘[Chaghatai], who was surnamed Khan, then Sanit’ay’. The translators, and apparently Cleaves also, took *Sanit’ay* to be the name of a separate person, but in fact the meaning of the passage would appear to be something like this: ‘[Chaghatai], who was called [after] the Khan [i.e. Chaghatai] and then Sanit’ay.’ As we shall see, Grigor was mistaken to the person: it was the other ‘little [Chaghatai] whose name was changed to *Sanit’ay* (i.e. *Sönitei*) after the death of their great namesake. As for ‘big Chaghatai,’ i.e. Chaghatai the Elder, as Rashid al-Din calls him....in 1239 he captured the Armenian town of [Lorhe]; he was assassinated some ten years later by Isma’ili *fida’is*.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>166</sup>Grigor, 303.

<sup>167</sup>Grigor of Akanc, 303. All spellings are from the transcriptions of the translators, with the exception of C’aghatay where I replaced the Greek gamma with a (gh) and the (ch) in Baichu replaces a (c) with a diacritical mark. This was due to a technical necessity.

<sup>168</sup>J. A. Boyle, “Some Additional Notes on the Mongolian Names in the History of the Nation of the Archers”, Researches in Altaic Languages (Budapest, 1975): 36-37.

Following this, there is Bachu or Baiju. Whether he received this position at this time or perhaps held it from the beginning is uncertain. It is certain, however, that when Chormaqan died, Baiju became the overall military leader. As for the other commanders listed, most seem to be the ones who were with Chormaqan from the beginning. Based on the list in Grigor's work and that of Shamshean we find Benal or T'enal, Chaghata or C'aghatay, Sanit'ay or Sunitha, Asut'u or Asustu, Bachu or Baichu, T'ut'tu or Tutu, Xut't'u or Khuththu, Asar, and Xurumci or Khurunji. Thus nine may be accounted for of Grigor's thirteen and Howorth's nine. On Howorth's list are: Mular, Jula, Tughata, Ogota, Khola or Khoga, Karabуга, and Ghataghan, C'aghatay, to whom Grigor attributes the title of Khan, Awgawt'ay, Xojay, Xunan and Angurag. There is a possibility that Howorth's Khoga is actually the Xojay to which Grigor refers.<sup>169</sup>

Karabуга is mentioned earlier by Grigor as the captain who was left to mop up the resistance in Georgia and Armenia.<sup>170</sup> Mular, according to Grigor, is dead along with Benal, both of whom died mysteriously in the *quriltai* which Grigor described. Thus Benal cannot be the T'enal which Grigor later lists.

Whatever the number or listing of the commanders, it does seem fairly certain that the Armenians and Georgians, did not fully comprehend the organization of the Mongols. It is improbable that Chormaqan organized his rule by dividing the territory into north, south, and middle. Mongol organization was based on north, south, west, east, and middle. At the very least, a center, with a right and left wing. This (north-south-middle) orientation may have been the case if Chormaqan's camp faced east, back towards Mongolia.

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<sup>169</sup>See the appendices concerning the names of the commanders in the various sources.

<sup>170</sup>Grigor, 297.

Grigor wrote that Chormaqan established his headquarters at Gandzak, while modern historians, for logistical purposes believe it to have been near the Mughan steppe along the Araxes river.<sup>171</sup> Both seem to be reasonable. Gandzak, once rebuilt, was in a central position to rule over Transcaucasia. Meanwhile, the Mongol cavalry could freely nomadize in the Arran and Mughan grasslands.

In Georgia, the Mongols apparently divided the population into eight *tumens*. These were under the command of the Georgian feudal lords who swore allegiance to the Mongols. But, for unspecified reasons, this division did not endure.<sup>172</sup> Meanwhile in the southern portion of Iran, the atabak of Fars, Abu Bikr and Burak, the rulers of Gawashir and Kirman had also surrendered to Chormaqan. Their surrender came during his invasion of Iran, when he went south from Rai to the environs of Qum and Kashan. Some of his troops went into the districts of Fars and Kirman. A treaty was concluded which established a fixed amount of tribute from these states. Juzjanj wrote that after that, these regions were spared from devastation.<sup>173</sup>

### *Taxes and Tribute*

The nature of the tribute, as well as that which the other regions provided for their new overlords, seems to be fairly typical. Grigor of Akanc mentions what he

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<sup>171</sup>Grigor, 303. Rene Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, translated by Naomi Walford (Rutgers: Rutgers University Press, 1970): 347. Grousset states that Chormaqan's headquarters was on the lower Kura river and the lower Araxes, in the Arran and Mughan steppes. Certainly, this would be an ideal area in which to nomadize. Benson, being the less reliable writes that Chormaqan nomadized between the Mughan plain on the south side of the Araxes river and Berdaa on the north side.

<sup>172</sup>Kalistrat Salia, History of the Georgian Nation, translated by Katherine Vivian, (Paris: L'Academie Francais): 210-211.

<sup>173</sup>Minhaj Sinaj Juzjani, Tabakat-i-Nasiri (A general history of the Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia) 2 Vols., translated by Major H. G. Raverty (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1970): 1118-1119.

calls the various forms of tribute, *mal* and *t'agħar*. Furthermore, the vassal lords would provide cavalry when the Mongols went on campaign.<sup>174</sup> Later, Grigor wrote that during the trial of Chormaqan before the Khan, the Khan states that the duty of the conquered was to obey the commands of the Mongols and to give “tzghu, mal, t'agħar, and għp'ch'ur”.<sup>175</sup> And if they did not, they were to be destroyed.

The nature of these forms of tribute seems to be fairly standard throughout the empire. According to Cleaves, the Armenian “ghp’ch’ur” was the more familiar “qubcir”.<sup>176</sup> “T’agħar” is the Turkic word *tagħar*.<sup>177</sup> The Mongolian word *mal* was not corrupted in the written form by the Armenians. As for “tzghu”, Cleaves identifies it as a Turkic word transcribed as either *turghou* or *touzghou*.<sup>178</sup>

The basic meaning of each, in terms of tribute and taxes, is fairly straightforward. *Mal* in Mongolian means livestock although it, in some cases, it referred to property.<sup>179</sup> Thus, this was normally paid in kind, although goods were also acceptable. Being a horse-archer army, the Mongols were always in need of extra horses, and although the ethnic Mongols probable preferred the Mongol pony, maintaining enough animals for their method of warfare was always a priority. The *qubchir* tax normally was a levy imposed on property, although on occasion it was placed on animals, without any apparent specialization.<sup>180</sup> First it was a tax on

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<sup>174</sup>Grigor, 297.

<sup>175</sup>Grigor, 301. The spellings have been altered in the following, (gh) replaces the Greeks gamma used in Blake and Frye’s transcription and (ch) replaces the diacritically marked (c).

<sup>176</sup>Cleaves, “Names and Terms in the History of the Nation of the Archers,” HJAS 12 (1949): 436-437.

<sup>177</sup>Ibid, 438-439.

<sup>178</sup>Ibid, 442.

<sup>179</sup>Smith, John Masson, Jr., “Mongol and Nomadic Taxation”, HJAS 30 (1970): 51.

<sup>180</sup>Ibid, 53.

pasture land, in which one out of every one hundred animal was collected. Then it was paid by townspeople but by money rather than livestock.<sup>181</sup> The *taghar* to which Grigor of Akanc refers was a measurement often used for grain but there is some speculation that it was a general tax in kind, but not for animals nor land.<sup>182</sup> According to Petrushevsky, however, this was similar to the ‘*alafa ‘ulufa* tax which was a collection of food and fodder for the military units in a given district. With the *taghar*, it was paid only in grain.<sup>183</sup>

The form of tribute known as *touzghou* was a special tax which was used to collect gifts specifically for the Great Khan back in Mongolia.<sup>184</sup> Chormaqan certainly need a tax like this to fulfill the demands of Ögödei. Once Ögödei learned of the wealth of Iran, he ordered:

Chormaqan-qorchi shall reside at that very place as chief of the garrison troops. Every year he shall cause people to deliver yellow gold, nakh-fabrics, brocades and damasks of gilded thread, small and large pearls, fine western (= Arab) horses with long necks and tall legs, dark brown “elö’üt” (? Bactrian) and humpback “kichidut” (? Arabian) camels, pack-mules and riding mules, and he shall send them to Us.<sup>185</sup>

It is currently held that Chormaqan was indeed a *de facto* ruler of most of Iran as well as the Transcaucasia region. Then, through the machinations of civil administrators as well as the concern of Ögödei Khan, Chormaqan’s power and

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<sup>181</sup>I. P. Petrushevsky, “Socio-Economic Conditions of Iran under the Il-Khans” in the *Cambridge History of Iran: The Saljuq and Mongol Periods*, ed. J. A. Boyle, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968): 530.

<sup>182</sup>Cleaves, 438-439.

<sup>183</sup>Petrushevsky, 533.

<sup>184</sup>Petrushevsky, 533. Petrushevsky also mentions that this was called *pishkash* and *sa’uri*.

<sup>185</sup>Igor de Rachewiltz, “Secret History of the Mongols”, *PFEH* 33 (1985): 30-31.

sphere of influence was greatly curtailed. Certainly, this is what the sources imply. Yet, when this data is analyzed in relation to other events within the empire, this perceived truth appears to be erroneous.

The events which reveal the true nature of events involve four principal participants: Chormaqan Noyan, general and conqueror of Iran and Transcaucasia; Chin-Temur, governor of Khwarazm; Dayir Noyan, a Mongol general who invaded Afghanistan, and was possibly subordinate to Chormaqan; and Korguz, a civil administrator sent by Ögödei Khan to oversee the collection of taxes in Chormaqan's territory.

### *The historical background*

At the outset of Chormaqan's invasion of Iran, Chin-Temur, governor of Khwarazm, received an edict from Karakorum, "to proceed to Khurasan with the army of Khorazm (sic) and assist Chormaghun (sic) in the subjugation of that country".<sup>186</sup> Rashid al-Din wrote that Chin-Temur was the governor of Khurasan and Mazandaran.<sup>187</sup> This is unlikely as both of these regions were unconquered. He had been left by Juchi, son of Chinggis Khan during the destruction of the Khwarazmian empire as a *shahna* or governor. It is probable that he became the governor of Khurasan and Mazandaran only after Chormaqan conquered them. The events which transpired clearly demonstrate this.

Chormaqan conquered Khurasan swiftly in 1231, as it still had not recovered from Tolui's campaign during the destruction of the Khwarazmian empire. According to Major Raverty, Chin-Timur was sent back to Khurasan when Chormaqan moved deeper into Iran. The reason for this was to deal with two

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<sup>186</sup> Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juvaini, The History of the World-Conqueror translated by J. A. Boyle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958): 532.

<sup>187</sup> Rashid al-Din, The Successors of Genghis Khan, translated by J. A. Boyle, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971): 51.

lieutenants of Jelal al-Din named Qaracha and Yaghan Sonqur, who caused a great deal of turmoil in Khurasan.<sup>188</sup> Chormaqan also sent a captain named Kalbad, but once the allies of Jelal al-Din were defeated, Kalbad returned to Chormaqan, while Chin-Temur remained.<sup>189</sup> Juvaini is more graphic in his description of the troubles in Khurasan once Chormaqan left it. “Chormaghun (sic) had left Khurasan in a state of turmoil. Some places which he captured he placed with basqaqs, others had not submitted.”<sup>190</sup> Still other areas had rebelled. Then, “the scum and rabble would gain the upper hand so that an area which had been pacified and subdued would relapse into chaos because of these troubles and disturbances”.<sup>191</sup> Chin-Temur, according to Juvaini, received the submission of many places peacefully and showed kindness. Those which did not surrender, he captured by force.<sup>192</sup>

At some point, probably when Chin-Temur returned to Khurasan, Chormaqan placed a *noyan* representing each of the four houses of the Mongols at Chin-Temur’s disposal. Representing Ögödei was Kül-Bolat, who became an important figure under Chin-Temur. This may also be the Kalbad to whom Juzjan refers. The line of Juchi was represented by Nosal. The house of Chaghatai had Qizil Buqa as their delegate, and the house of Tolui, had Yeke.<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> Ala-ad-Din ‘Ata-Malik Juvaini, The History of the World-Conqueror, translated by J. A. Boyle, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958): 483-484.

<sup>189</sup> Major H. G. Raverty, translator, Minhaj Sinaj Juzjani Tabakat-i-Nasiri (A General History of the Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia), (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1970): 1116-1117. Rashid al-Din, 51. In Rashid al-Din’s work, Kalbad is called Kül-Bolat, which is what Juvaini also uses. However, it seems to be unclear if Kül-Bolat or Kalbad really returned to Chormaqan as he is later sent by Chin Temur to Ögödei.

<sup>190</sup> Juvaini, 483.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid. Also see Rashid al-Din, The Successors of Genghis Khan, translated by J. A. Boyle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971): 51.

<sup>192</sup> Juvaini, 483.

<sup>193</sup> Juvaini, 482. Rashid al-Din, 57.

The two amirs of Jelal al-Din created enough turmoil that Ögödei received word of it. In response, Ögödei sent Dayir Bahadur and an army from Badghis, in Eastern Iran, to restore order in such a way that disorder never again occur.<sup>194</sup> Juvani wrote that Dayir's orders were severe:

Such as had [hitherto] escaped the sword were to be cast upon the wind of annihilation, no one was to be left alive in the lands of Khurasan and their dwellings and habitations were to be flooded with water so that no remains or trace there of might survive.<sup>195</sup>

Meanwhile, Chin-Temur had sent Kül-Bolat to Nishapur to deal with Qaracha. The result was that Qaracha was routed.<sup>196</sup> Dayir, was half way to Khurasan when he received word that Kül-Bolat had defeated Qaracha and had driven him out of the region. Then Dayir heard that Qaracha was in Sistan, so Dayir followed him there. After a siege of two years, Sistan fell.<sup>197</sup> While at Sistan, Dayir sent a message to Chin-Temur stating that he was in control of Khurasan by virtue of the command of Ögödei, and that Chin-Temur should withdraw.<sup>198</sup> Chin Temur replied:

The report of a rebellion by the people of Khurasan was false. How can so many lands and peoples be destroyed on account of Qaracha's crime. I will send a message to Qa'an to report on the situation and then proceed according to his command.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>194</sup>Juvaini, 485. Rashid al-Din, 52.

<sup>195</sup>Juvaini, 485.

<sup>196</sup>Juvaini, 484.

<sup>197</sup>Juvaini, 485. Rashid al-Din, 52.

<sup>198</sup>Ibid, 485. Rashid al Din, 52.

<sup>199</sup>Rashid al-Din, 52. Juvaini, 485.

At this point, Chormaqan intervened. He ordered Chin-Temur and his amirs to join him, with their armies. Furthermore, they were to leave Khurasan and Mazandaran to Dayir Bahadur.<sup>200</sup> Chin-Temur apparently no longer felt he was under the command of Chormaqan and refused. After he consulted his advisors, Chin-Temur sent Kül-Bolat, “who was one of the confidential attendants of the Emperor of the Face of the Earth, should go taking with him some of the emirs of Khorasan [sic] who had already submitted”.<sup>201</sup>

These events occurred in the year 1232-1233, when Taimaz was pursuing Jelal al-Din and Chormaqan was headquartered in Rai.

Ögödei was pleased by the embassy of Kül-Bolat and said:

During all this time since Chormaghun [sic] went and conquered so many countries he has sent no malik to us, whereas Chin-Temur, though his territory be of small extent and his resources few, has served us thus. We approve of him and have placed the governorship of Khurasan and Mazandaran firmly in his hands. Let Chormaghun and the other emirs relax their hold thereon.<sup>202</sup>

Thus Chormaqan’s territory, which extended from the Amu Darya in the northwest to the Persian Gulf in the south, to the Zagros Mountains in the south west, and to the Araxes River in the north west, was greatly reduced. Benson offers his own interpretation to these events. Chin-Temur claimed a right to rule Khurasan and Mazandaran due to conquest dating back in 1227. Chormaqan disagreed. However, Ögödei overruled, and gave Chin-Temur a separate command. This was done partially, according to Benson, to check Chormaqan’s power. Although

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<sup>200</sup>Juvaini, 485-486. Rashid al-Din, 52.

<sup>201</sup>Juvaini, 486. Rashid al-Din, 52.

<sup>202</sup>Ibid, 486-7. Rashid al-Din, 52.

intriguing, it is unlikely, as it is clear that until Chormaqan, the Mongols did not have any armies situated in Khurasan.

The second reduction of Chormaqan's power began in 1235, with Chin-Temur's death. There was a brief power struggle between Chin-Temur's son, Edgu-Temur and Korguz, a Uighur, who was the chamberlain to Chin-Temur. Edgu-Temur was supported by Kül-Bolat and Nosal, the prime military figure in Chin-Temur's dominions. However, Korguz had the support of Chinqai and Ögödei, so he inevitably became the victor in that political struggle. Then Korguz received a *jarligh*, or edict, from Ögödei "to administer affairs of state and public business, and the disposal of petitions proceeded in accordance with his wishes".<sup>203</sup> Furthermore, "whatever countries were conquered by Chormaghun's (sic) forces [to the west] of the Oxus were all entrusted to him".<sup>204</sup> Korguz then made his headquarters in the city of Tus.

Rashid al-Din offered a simplified version of what happened after Korguz received the emperor's order. "After much disputation with the emirs of Chormaghun (sic), he took control of those countries in accordance with the decree and fixed taxes".<sup>205</sup> However, Juvaini's more detailed account provides a more lucid depiction of what occurred after Korguz's secretaries arrived:

When they arrived in those regions they had many disputes with Chormaghun's (sic) commanders, and finally they took over those territories from them and fixed the taxes. For [until then] each province had been held by a noyan and every town by an emir, and they had been content to levy but a small portion of the taxes for the Divan and used to seize the

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<sup>203</sup>Juvaini, 499.

<sup>204</sup>Ibid, 499.

<sup>205</sup>Rashid al-Din, 74.

remainder for themselves. It was all taken from them and [considerable] sums were drawn upon them.<sup>206</sup>

Thus Chormaqaqan's power over taxation was reduced. Yet, does this account accurately reflect what happened? The answer to this question is yes and no. While these events certainly occurred, what is questionable is whether or not the primary author had a bias. To this, I must say that Juvaini had a very apparent bias against Chormaqaqan. Yet, perhaps this bias is not merely a personal one as Juvaini undoubtedly never met Chormaqaqan, as the latter died in 1241. Juvaini, in much of his account, writes with a bias against the military elite and with a preference with the civil governors, such as Korguz, Chin-Temur, and latter Arghun. Certainly, the generals tended to be destructive, and in order to fulfill their military plans, they required large amounts of resources, especially in livestock, recruits, and raw materials. There can be no doubt that the commanders also profited from this. Thus when the civil administrators took control, the military elite would naturally be displeased. Now the question arises, was awarding of Chin-Temur and later Korguz an effort by the imperial court to curb the power of Chormaqaqan as many historians contend? The answer to this is in the analysis of the material in relation to similar events throughout the empire.

### *Transition of power through conquest*

Paul Buell in his study of the early Mongol ruling establishment of China noted that the chiliarcy or the *mingghan* was the first ruling establishment which the Mongols utilized.<sup>207</sup> It was the basic unit of organization in early Mongol

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<sup>206</sup>Juvaini, 500-501.

<sup>207</sup>Paul D. Buell, "Kalmyk Tanggaci People: Thoughts on the Mechanics and Impact of Mongol Expansion", Mongolian Studies 6(1980): 47.

government, both for taxes and for military levies. Over time, this changed as the empire expanded and became increasingly complex. According to Buell, the most important institution which the Mongols ruled through was the *tanma*, or as Buell defines it, “a special military force, comprised of selected chiliarchies from the total Mongolian levy and sent into conquered areas to secure and hold them, and if possible, expand Mongolian power and influence”.<sup>208</sup> Chormaqan’s force in Iran was such an organization and then Grigor of Akanc wrote that the Mongol force under Baiju stationed in Azerbaijan was also a *tanma*.<sup>209</sup> Buell further demonstrates that the *tanma* was always established on the fringes of the empire, literally on the border between nomadic and sedentary cultures.<sup>210</sup> From here, the Mongols could launch further attacks. Of course, over time, the structure of the empire changed as regions became more stabilized. Thus, *daruqachi* or governors, such as Korguz, would be sent in accompanied by *bikikchi* or secretaries.<sup>211</sup> The *daruqachi* or *basqaq* “controlled the activities of [the local elite], collected taxes and was endowed with military might”.<sup>212</sup> Eventually, an administrator known as the *yeke jarquchi* (great or high lawgiver, one who decrees) gradually replaced the *tanma* commander.<sup>213</sup>

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<sup>208</sup>Buell, 45.

<sup>209</sup>Grigor, 337. The term Grigor uses is t’emayc’ik’. Clearly, it is a corruption of the *nomen actoris* tanmaghci in the Mongolian language. Cleaves also discusses this term in his “The Mongolian Names and Terms in The History of the Nation of the Archers by Grigor of Akanc”, *HJAS* 12 (1249): 439-442.

<sup>210</sup>Buell, 45.

<sup>211</sup>George Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953): 220. The *daruqachi*, *basqaq*, and the *shahna* are the same post. The first term is Mongolian, the second Turkic, and the third is the Persian term.

<sup>212</sup>Petrushky, 509.

<sup>213</sup>Buell, 47.

This seems to be the situation in connection with Chormaqan, Korguz, and Chin-Temur. Furthermore, it is what allows the “tidal wave” form of conquest. While an advance force caused a power vacuum in the neighboring regions, the *tanma* ruled the core of the recently conquered area. Gradually, it was converted to a civil and bureaucratic government along the lines which Buell suggests. The power vacuum and disturbances which the advance forces created in the outlying regions, allowed this transition to occur. Thus while Dayir was invading Afghanistan and southeastern Iran and Chormaqan conquered western Iran and sent pursuing forces after Jelal al-Din, Chin Temur established a formal bureaucracy. This is not to say that the military governors liked the fact that their power was reduced. It seems natural that they would protest if only to prolong their positions or negotiate for compensation. By the time that *daruqachi* and the *bikichi* arrived, the conquered territory was relatively stable. Thus the main difficulty was if local commanders were reluctant to relinquish their power. However, once accomplished, only a garrison was needed to ensure that the laws were enforced and taxes collected. To be sure, the majority of the garrisons would be local infantry, but a mobile horse-archer cavalry reserve would be present to deal with any major problems. In fact it was the core of the *daruqachi*’s army. According to Vernadsky, “each [basqaq] had a small group of Mongol and Turkish soldiers at his disposal around which he had to build up a mobile detachment to preserve order and discipline in his district”.<sup>214</sup> This in turn, allowed for the majority of the army to move on to the next conquest. Thus, when Korguz appeared, Chormaqan moved his headquarters from Rai to the Mughan plain region, where after he conquered it, it was in need of a *tanma*. Furthermore, Chormaqan’s position was in accordance to what Buell observed in the data concerning Muqali’s *tanma* in China. Chormaqan’s

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<sup>214</sup>Vernadsky, 220.

force in the Mughan and Arran steppes, were shielded from any encroaching groups by the Georgian and Armenian princes who submitted to them, just as Muqali's army was by local Han princes, as well as Jurchen and Khitan generals.<sup>215</sup>

### *Conclusion*

Chormaqan's governing apparatus was fairly simple and designed strictly to meet the needs of the military. As seen in the case of the Armenian and Georgian princes, in addition to tribute and taxes of various types, they were also required to provide troops for the Mongol armies. In addition, Chormaqan had to maintain the *touzghou* which was sent back to Ögödei Khan back in Mongolia. The rest of the taxes maintained the Mongol forces within the region. As the territory which Chormaqan conquered became pacified and stabilized, his military government was replaced by a civil government. This was more highly structured and involved the census. Although the bulk of the military was shifted from occupying the conquered territory, the new *daruqachis* still maintained sufficient military authority to enforce the will of the Khan. During situations in which the local *daruqachi* was unable to maintain control, a military commander was sent in at the head of the regular Mongol army to restore order. Needless to say, the damage caused by the army was often as much as what the rebels caused. There also tended to be considerable enmity between the civil and military leaders, a constant which seems common in any society. Historians have often portrayed Chormaqan as an almost independent ruler, but it should be apparent that his power was not so much reduced, by transferred in a natural progression of the Mongol empire.

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<sup>215</sup>Buell, 46.

# Chapter 5

## Chormaqaqan and the Mongol Military

As in any era, the success of a general depends on certain variables. Perhaps the most important of these is the army he commands. At the time of Chormaqaqan's various campaigns, the military of the Mongols was possibly the finest in terms of men, organization, and in the tactics and strategies they were deployed in. While various auxiliaries were used from vassals and allies, the core component of the Mongol army was the horse archer.

All males between the age of 15 to around 60 who were capable of bearing arms were eligible for military service.<sup>216</sup> The rigors of daily living in the harsh climate of Mongolia prepared the nomads well in terms of endurance and fortitude. Trained from youth to be expert horsemen and archers, the nomads of Mongolia were well prepared to be warriors. By the thirteenth century, nomad horse archer armies already possessed a long history of success. Yet, the one which Chinggis Khan created perfected this form. He added the essential element which separated the Mongols from their peers: discipline. This was the essential element which enabled him to overcome the assortment of tribal confederations and alliances which he faced prior to becoming the ruler of all Mongolia. While other armies would disintegrate in order to loot the dead and baggage of an enemy in flight, Chinggis Khan ordered his armies to wait until victory was complete:

If we conquer the enemy, we shall not stop to plunder; if the victory is complete, that booty will be ours in any case and we will share it among ourselves. If we are forced by the enemy to retreat, let us turn back to the point where we began the attack. The men who do

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<sup>216</sup>H. Desmond Martin, "The Mongol Army", JRAS (1943): 53.

not turn back to the point where we began the attack  
will be cut down!<sup>217</sup>

This disciplined soldier was then given a high rate of mobility. Each trooper had a string of three to five horses. This allowed him to exchange mounts when one tired, and moreover, if one was slain, the Mongol trooper had replacements. In sedentary armies, this simply was not possible. Horses were simply too expensive to maintain to allow each cavalryman to have more than one, especially the large horses necessary to carry an armored warrior.

The Mongols themselves, in order to maintain their mobility, were lightly armored compared to many of the armies they faced. Their armor, for the most part, consisted of lacquered or boiled leather, which mainly covered the upper body. A helmet was also part of their accoutrement. Other types of armor, such as chain mail, did appear, but it was not as widespread among the Mongols due to the weight.

The armament of the Mongols was centered on the bow. This was a double recurve composite bow, made of layers of sinew, horn, and wood. Each warrior had more than one, probably attached, in a special quiver, to their saddles on each horse in addition to quivers of arrows. The bow itself possessed an incredible amount of penetrating power.<sup>218</sup> In addition, the soldiers carried sabres, maces, axes, and sometimes a short spear with a hook at the bottom of the blade. Other supplies, such as rope, rations, files for sharpening arrows, etc. were also carried. This made the soldiers of the Mongol army a self-sufficient unit, able to function independently of supply lines. Thus they were not hampered by a slow moving baggage train, allowing them to make the rapid marches that so characterized Mongol warfare.

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<sup>217</sup>Igor de Rachewiltz, "The Secret History of the Mongols," PFEH 13 (1976): 46-47.

<sup>218</sup>H. Desmond Martin, "The Mongol Army", JRAS (1943): 52.

Their organization was also an old tradition of the steppe: the decimal system. The Mongol army was built upon a squad of ten (*arban*). Ten of these would then compose a company of a hundred (*jaghun*). The next unit was a regiment of a thousand (*mingghan*). Most of the commanders listed in the contemporary sources were leaders of a *mingghan*. The equivalent of the modern division was a unit consisting of ten thousand (*tümen*).

The organization was simple, but sensible. This could also easily applied to new conscripts from vassals, or even forcibly conscripted troops from among the conquered. Yet, it is one thing to have organized units, but quite another to have them operate with any amount of efficiency. This is why the discipline of the Mongol army was such a key factor. The tactics which the Mongol army used, such a caracole technique in which the soldiers advanced, shot, then wheeled back in order for the next rank to fire, demanded unit integrity.

Unit integrity was achieved through the battue, or hunt. During the battue, the army would form lines which often stretched for miles. These ranks would then begin to envelope an area, forcing the game into the ring. The Mongols would then tighten their ranks, so that the circle continued to shrink. The objective of this was not to allow any animal to escape. A incredibly high degree of organization, communication, and cooperation was necessary for this task. Without it, points of rendez-vous could not be established, gaps would eventually appear in the ranks, and inevitably confusion would result. Only a disciplined army, with a high degree of unit integrity and command structure could accomplish this task.

Before invading a territory, the Mongols made extensive preparations in a *quriltai*. At this meeting it was decided not only how the upcoming war would be conducted, but also, which generals would participate in it. In The Secret History of the Mongols this is demonstrated on several occasions.<sup>219</sup> The Mongol meanwhile

would have been accumulating intelligence on their opponent. According to Martin, this was the first step of the preparations of war. Only after this was obtained, would there be a declaration of hostilities. Then, during the *quriltai*, units would be called up. Points of rendez-vous were established, and mobilization was begun.<sup>220</sup>

According to Sinor:

Mongol strategy at its best was based on a very careful planning of the military operations to be performed, and the essence of it lay in a very rigid timetable to which all Mongol commanders were expected to adhere strictly.<sup>221</sup>

Although the planning of the campaign was a major component, the Mongol generals still maintained a high degree of independence. Thus they were able to complete their objectives on their terms, but they still had to abide by the timetable. This allowed the Mongols to coordinate their movements and concentrate their forces at prearranged sites.

The Mongols had a set method of invasion which varied only slightly from campaign to campaign. First the Mongol army would invade in several columns. Often it was three pronged attack, consisting of an army of the center and then two flanking forces. The flanking forces in some cases went into neighboring territories before rendez-vousing with the army of the center. This was the case of the invasion of Hungary, when armies were sent into Poland to distract the Polish army, the Teutonic Knights, as well as the Bohemian army from joining the Hungarians. All of these columns were covered by a screen of scouts who constantly relayed information back to their mother column. In addition, because of their pre-planned schedule as well as the scouts, the Mongols not only marched divided, but were also

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<sup>219</sup>Igor de Rachewiltz, "The Secret History of the Mongols," *PFEH* 33 (1986):

<sup>220</sup>Martin, 58.

<sup>221</sup>D. Sinor, 240.

able to fight united. Furthermore, because of their forces marched in smaller concentrations, the Mongols were not impeded with columns stretching for miles. They used their mobility to spread terror to the effect that rarely were their opponents ever really prepared to concentrate their forces when the enemy appeared everywhere.

The use of a many pronged invasion also fit into their preferred method of engaging the enemy. The Mongols preferred to deal with all field armies before moving deep into enemy territory. This was very practical. Reaching this goal was rarely difficult as not only was the enemy usually seeking to meet the Mongols before they destroyed an entire province, except in the case of the Khwarazmians. Furthermore, the use of columns with its screen of scouts gathering intelligent would able the Mongols to locate the enemy armies much more rapidly than one army wandering around. In addition, since the Mongols, could usually unite their forces before the enemy was cognizant of all of the different invasion forces, the Mongols were better able to conceal their troop strengths. This also meant that an embattled force could receive reinforcements or, in the advent of defeat, they could be avenged.

By concentrating on the field armies, this meant that the strongholds had to wait. Of course, smaller fortresses or ones they could surprise easily were taken as they came along. Among the best examples of this was in the Khwarazmian campaign. The smaller cities and fortresses were taken before the Mongols eventually captured Samarkand. This had two effects. First, it cut off the principle city from communicating with other cities, where they might expect aid. Secondly, refugees from these smaller cities would flee to the last stronghold. The reports from these cities and the streaming hordes of refugees not only reduced the moral of the inhabitants and garrison of the principle city, but it also strained the resources.

Food and water reserves were taxed by the sudden influx of refugees. Soon, what was once a formidable undertaking became easy.

The Mongols were then free to lay siege without interference of the field army as it had been destroyed. Smaller forts and cities could not harry the Mongols who either foraged or were out on other various missions during the siege. Most importantly, the many columns and raiding forces, prevented the main cities from being effective in assisting its smaller neighbors before hand as to do so in any strength, would leave it open to attack. Finally, the capture of the outer strongholds and towns, provided the Mongols more siege experience as well as raw materials in the form of labor to either man the siege machines, or to act as a human shield for the Mongols.

It was also not uncommon for defeated troops to be recruited into the Mongol army. The most common method of preventing mutiny at a critical moment was to simply divide the new recruits into the already existing units. This preventing them from being a cohesive force, and it helped maintain unit integrity in the already existing formations.

Then came the task of destroying any hopes for an opponent to rally. This was carried out by harrying the enemy leader until they dropped. Chinggis Khan first carried this out in the wars of unification in Mongolia. In his first few encounters, he did not do this and it returned to haunt him. After that, it becomes a familiar tale. In Khwarazm it was the flight of Muhammad to the Caspian Sea with Jebe and Subedei in pursuit. In the south of that empire, Chinggis Khan himself pursued Jelal al-Din to the Indus and later sent more troops after him. Then in Europe, King Bela IV received no breathing room after the disaster at Mohi.

By being constantly on the move, the enemy leader was unable to serve as a rallying point for his armies. They too would have to keep moving to find him. In many reports, the enemy leaders were only a few steps ahead of the Mongols. This

also offered an opportunity for the Mongols to acquire new intelligence on other lands, as it was only sensible for the fleeing king to run in the opposite direction of the Mongols. The pursuing forces then could wreak havoc in new territories. Their presence made it advisable for local powers to keep their forces at home rather than going to help their overlord. In many instances, the Mongol, when they encountered a local army, would defeat it while avoiding the strongholds. Again, the method of destroying a field army before laying siege. The most important aspect of these flying columns that went in pursuit, is that they destruction they made as well as the fear they spread, created a buffer between the territory in which they were in and the one in which the main army was subduing.

In all instances the Mongols did this. In the Khwarazm invasion, the Mongol forces conquered Mawarranahr, then Tolui devastated Khorasan, Chinggis Khan campaigned in Afghanistan, and into India. Meanwhile, Subedei and Jebe entered Iran. However, at the end of the campaign, the armies withdrew, leaving a holding force in Mawarannah. While this was done, the former state of Kara-Khitai was annexed into the empire. Mawarannah was then annexed at a later date. Then in Chormaqan's invasion of Iran, it quickly succumbed. However, he sent a flying column into Azerbaijan, Arran, and Armenia in pursuit of Jelal al-Din. Thus while he laid the foundations for rule, the only effective resistance was far to the west and then it too was destroyed. Then Taimaz withdrew from Armenia. Only after a few years passed did Chormaqan invade Armenia and Georgia in full force with a few probes towards Baghdad.

In Batu's invasion of the West, after all of Russia succumbed, the Mongols pursued the fleeing Kipchaks into Hungary. A force was sent into Poland and into Bulgaria. These too forces created enough chaos to prevent any alliance with the Hungarians. Then after the Hungarians were defeated, the Mongols even raided into Germany when the Mongols withdrew. The Germans were convinced that these

raids were a full scale invasion. So, the Mongols were able to incorporate the vast Russian territories and the Kipchak steppes into the empire without worrying of the threat of attack from Hungarians, who prior to the invasion had one of the strongest armies in Europe, or the Germans. For the Germans to bother the Mongols, despite the organization of anti-Mongol crusades, they had to cross Hungary, now a desolate land. Even Hülegü's invasion of the Middle East followed this pattern. The occupation of Syria and Palestine was more of a buffer while the Mongols absorbed their conquests of the 'Ismaelis and Baghdad. To be sure, Syria was seen as a conquest, however, the impending civil war between the khanates was of much more importance to Hülegü than the addition of Syria to the empire.

The tactics used, whether in the field or during a siege, focused on two aspects: fire-power and mobility. Military historians often speak of the great success of the English with their longbows at Agincourt or Crecy, but almost a century prior to Crecy, the Mongols had on several occasions demonstrated the advantages of concentrated firepower over any opponent. Not only did a withering hail of arrows break a charge of armored knights, but it also could pin units to a particular location. During siege operations, the Mongols still relied on concentrated firepower. At the siege of Aleppo, Hülegü used twenty catapults against the Bab al-Iraq alone (Gate of Iraq). In Juzjani, there are several episodes in which the Mongols constructed hundreds of siege machines in order to surpass the number which a defending city possessed. While Juzjani surely exaggerated, the improbable high numbers which he used for both the Mongols and the defenders does give one a sense of the large numbers of machines used at a single siege.

Mobility was vital for the Mongols to carry out the caracole technique. By advancing, firing, wheeling, and retreating, the Mongol warriors left themselves open to a possible counterattack. Only due to the unit integrity, and mobility (i.e. number of horses involved) permitted the Mongols to do this technique. Other

tactics, such as encircling the enemy as the Mongols did during the battue hunt, could only be achieved with a high degree of mobility. Perhaps of most importance, it allowed the Mongols to withdraw and then reappear unexpectedly. This made it almost impossible for their opponents to accurately report on the movements of the Mongol armies.

What separated the Mongol armies from their contemporaries was based on discipline. Without discipline, the Mongols could not have perfected the system of steppe/horse archer warfare which had existed for centuries. Nomads since the Scythians and Hsiung-nu based their armies and method of war on mobility and the bow. The Mongols, however, perfected it, allowing them to conquer the entire steppe land of Eurasia. While Prof. Smith may dismiss this accomplishment as simply being a victory over other tribes, one must remember, these are the tribes from which the Khitan, the Jurchen, and the mighty Seljuk armies came. Horse archers from the steppes were a desired element in every sedentary army stretching from China to Egypt. The Mongols perfected the system by adding the strict discipline that allowed them to overcome other nomads who also relied on the key factors of mobility and the bow. After overcoming the nomads of the Eurasian steppes, the victories over sedentary armies seem less astonishing.

## Conclusion

In 1230, the Mongol empire stretched from approximately Lake Baikal in the North, and the frontiers of Korea in the East to the Volga river in the West. To the south, Mongol control stopped at the Huang Ho river in China and the Amu Darya in Central Asia. Chormaqan Noyan changed these borders and incorporated more territory into the Mongol army than any other Mongol general, while using fewer troops. By the year 1240, due to Chormaqan's efforts, the Southern border was now the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf. The empire now bordered the Zagros mountains and only a few miles from the Tigris River in the Southwest. The Mongols under Chormaqan also incorporated the entire Transcaucasia region into the empire, bringing the western border to the edge of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum.

Chormaqan, although often given only a cursory comment in most histories of the Mongols, was a general whose achievements were only surpassed by Muqali, Jebe, and Sübedei. Chormaqan Noyan rose through the ranks of the *keshik* as a member of the *qorchi* regiment of that bodyguard. He apparently held a high enough rank that he could speak freely to his overlord, Chinggis Khan. Eventually, he won the right to lead an army. Mustering an army ranging between thirty to fifty thousand men, Chormaqan invaded Iran.

While he accomplished this, he directed one of his subordinates, Taimaz, to hunt down the last Khwarazmshah, Jelal al-Din. This task was accomplished. Then, Transcaucasia was reduced.

Although The Secret History of the Mongols indicates that Baghdad was Chormaqan's target, he only directed raids of little consequence against the Caliphate. Instead, he completed more important directives. The first of which was the destruction of Jelal al-Din's power. Jelal al-Din was killed during his flight

from the Mongols, and his army was dispersed across the Middle East, where it never posed a threat to the Mongols again. Then, as a result of the downfall of Jelal al-Din, Chormaqan secured the valuable pastures of the Mughan and Arran plains. These were situated to allow the Mongols to strike into the Transcaucasia region as well as into Persian Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Iran, should the need arise.

Essentially, what Chormaqan did was conquer, where ever the Mongol ponies had rode. He conquered the regions which Jebe and Sübedei had passed through. Baghdad was not one of those areas. While his conquests did extend beyond the areas that the two great generals passed through, they were geographically connected. Baghdad was not. Nor was it a threat to the establishment of Mongol power, as was Jelal al-Din. Feints were thrown at Baghdad, but never did Chormaqan make a concentrated effort against the Caliphate. It is quite possible that he simply did possess enough troops to do so. Yet, his conquests made it possible for Hülegü to destroy the Caliphate. Chormaqan also brought the border of the empire to adjoin that of the Seljuks, providing Baiju Noyan an opportunity for his greatest victory at Köse Dagh in 1243.

The territorial results of his campaign are quite clear. Yet, there are other results due to Chormaqan's activities. One of which would entice Christendom for approximately a century. Chormaqan's conquest of Transcaucasia gave the Mongols their first true Christian majority province, and one which was known in Europe. As many of the Armenian and Georgian princes became generals within the Mongol ranks, there was a sizable Christian contingent in the Mongol army in Western Asia. The idea of an alliance between the Mongols and Christendom stirred the imagination of many Popes who were eager to crush the Muslim powers between them.

Chormaqan apparently treated the Christians well. This should come as no surprise as the Mongols rarely let religion influence their political and military goals.

Under him, it seems that the Christians benefited. He even had two brothers-in-law who were Christians.<sup>222</sup> However, Chormaqan could not be everywhere at once. Thus his subordinates could pillage the Christians and Muslims.<sup>223</sup> It is doubtful if Chormaqan, despite the religion of his brothers-in-law, displayed any favoritism between religions. There does not seem to be any indication in the Muslim records that Chormaqan, himself, persecuted the Muslims. All of his actions seem to have been that of a general: purely military in nature.

Apparently his subordinates did share this. Yet before condemning the other generals to religious persecution, it should be mentioned that they were probably plundering for their own benefit and not out of any religiously inspired malice. Still, the Christian felt as if they were being persecuted. The situation was brought to Ögödei's attention probably during the audience of Prince Avak although Pelliot believes that the Nestorian priest, Simeon Rabban 'Ata addressed the Khan in person. As a result, Ögödei sent a Simeon Rabban 'Ata to the region in 1240-41. Under Chormaqan's protection, Simeon built many churches and preached Nestorian Christianity throughout the Transcaucasia region.<sup>224</sup> Furthermore, he alleviated Christian persecution.

The idea that Chormaqan was not hostile towards Christianity carries over to his rule. Grigor of Akanc always displays Chormaqan in a favorable light. In one instance, Chormaqan attempts to halt the other Mongol commanders from plundering Armenia again.<sup>225</sup> Then, on another occasion, Grigor refers to

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<sup>222</sup>Paul Pelliot, Les Mongols et la Papaute, (Paris: Librairie Auguste Picard, 1923): 51.

<sup>223</sup>Ibid. Pelliot included the Muslims. I sincerely doubt that Chormaqan, despite the religion of his brothers in law, had any particular preference. I have not come across any mention that he persecuted Muslims.

<sup>224</sup>Igor de Rachewiltz, Papal Envoys to the Great Khans, (London: Faber and Faber, 1971): 113.

<sup>225</sup>Grigor of Akanc, "The History of the Nation of the Archers," translated by R. P. Blake and R. N. Frye HJAS 12 (1949): 299-303.

Chormaqañ as “sage”.<sup>226</sup> Unfortunately, there exists nothing of what Chormaqañ did other than what is connected to his military ventures.

In either 1240 or 1241, Chormaqañ apparently suffered a stroke as he was struck mute and was paralyzed.<sup>227</sup> Baiju Noyan would eventually take over command in 1242, but Chormaqañ’s wife, Altan Khatun, ruled as regent during the interregnum.<sup>228</sup> Grigor wrote that he left two sons. One, Shiramun, was fond of the Christians and was a great warrior. The other, Bawra, was of bad character and eventually executed by Hülegü.<sup>229</sup> Although Altan Khatun is the only wife of Chormaqañ who is named, and indeed, perhaps his only wife, he apparently had another son. After Chormaqañ’s brother, Jola, captured Hohanaberd, the daughter of Prince Jelal, Rhouzan, was married to Chormaqañ’s son Poughan (Bugan?).<sup>230</sup>

So, what was Chormaqañ? According to Peter Jackson, Chormaqañ was nothing but a simple soldier “with little concern or aptitude for administrative responsibilities”.<sup>231</sup>

It should be clear that this wasn’t the case. First, Chormaqañ was a general whose main duties were to defeat the enemies of the Mongols. He spent most of his ten year command doing so. He did establish an administration. It was based on the *tanma* system, which was suited for military control. Much of Jackson’s criticism is based on Juvaini’s accusations. It should be remembered that Juvaini had a considerable dislike for the generals. Furthermore, most of the excesses were

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<sup>226</sup>Ibid, 319.

<sup>227</sup>Pelliot, 51. \_

<sup>228</sup>Grigor, 317.

<sup>229</sup>Grigor, 319. Why Bawra was executed is, apparently, not known.

<sup>230</sup>M. Klaproth, “Des entreprises des Mongols en Georgie et en Armenie dans le XIII<sup>e</sup> siecle”, Journal Asiatique 12 (1833): 201-202.

<sup>231</sup>Peter Jackson, “Cormagun”, Encyclopedie Iranica (1993): 274.

committed by his subordinates. While Chormaqan was certainly the over all commander of the military in the region, his generals were in charge of their own districts. This is not an apology for Chormaqan, but merely a statement of fact. If Chormaqan, himself, had been so corrupt, certainly, he would have received more commentary from the contemporary sources. Furthermore, as the conquests moved on, a more elaborate system of administration replaced the *tanma*. With this came more elaborate taxes and tighter fiscal control. This meant that there were also fewer of the military elite present seeking to enrich themselves or fulfill their military needs as the bulk of the army moved to the frontiers.

In conclusion, this study has been an examination of not only Chormaqan's identity, but the events which he was involved in. While, I hope to have answered several questions, many more remain. Hopefully, the examination of many of the other Armenian sources will reveal more details. It is also hoped that more can be learned from other Persian or Arabic sources which may contain data on this enigmatic general.

## Appendix A: Time-Line of Events

1162/7 Birth of Temuchin.

1200 'Ala' al-Din Muhammad II, becomes Sultan of the Khwarazmian empire.

1206 Chinggis Khan ruler of the tribes of Mongolia.

1207 Boroqul sent against the Qori-Tumet in the North of Mongolia.

1209 First invasion of Hsi Hsia.

1211 Chinggis Khan invades Northern China, the Chin Empire.

1218 Jebe conquers Qara Khitai

1219 Chinggis Khan invades the Khwarazmian empire.

1220-1221 Jebe and Subedei pursue Sultan Muhammad Khwarazmshah II.

1220 Mongols commanded by Jebe and Subedei defeat Georgian army.

1221 Perhaps fictional meeting of Chinggis Khan, his sons, generals, and the three qorchni while pursuing Jelal al-Din.

1221 Jelal al-Din defeated at the Indus River.

1221/22 Envoy from Jebe and Subedei in Baghdad.

1223 Russian princes defeated by Subedei at the Kalka River.

1223 Mongols withdraw to Mawarranahr. End of Khwarazmian campaign.

1223 Chinggis Khan returns to Mongolia.

1225 Subedei reaches Mongolia.

1227 Chinggis Khan dies during the final campaign against Hsi Hsia.

1227 Army sent by Chin Temur into Iran. Battle of Dameghan.

1228 Battle of Isphahan. Indecisive victory for Mongols over Jelal al-Din.

Mongols withdraw to Mawarranahr.

1229 Ögödei b. Chinggis Khan elevated to the Mongol throne.

1230 Jelal al-Din defeated by the Seljuks of Rum and Sultan Ashraf of Syria.

1230/31 Chormaqan leaves Bukhara and crosses Amu Darya.

1230/31 Chormaqan enters Mazandaran, occupies Rai.

1230 Jelal al-Din winters in the Mughan plain. Attempts alliance with cities of Akhlat and Amid against the Mongols.

1231 Pursuit of Jelal al-Din begins. Mongols led by Taimaz attack him at Jelal al-Din's camp in the Mughan. Jelal al-Din flees to Gandzak.

1231 In the spring, Jelal al-Din flees Gandzak and goes to Hany.

1231 After final Mongol assault by Taimaz, Jelal al-Din flees. His army is dispersed.

1231 Jelal al-Din killed in mountains by Kurds.

1231 Chormaqan has finished securing submission of Fars and Kirman in Southern Iran.

1231 Tebriz submits to the Mongols

1232 Sultan Kamil reaches the Euphrates. Eventually withdraws.

1232 Chormaqan leaves Rai and goes to Mughan plain.

1232/3 Chormaqan conquers Khurasan. Events between Chin Temur, Chormaqan, and Dayir.

1233 Chormaqan and army moves in Arran. Gandzak falls.

1233 Mular invades Shamkor. Chaghatai and Toghta capture Lorhe. Prince Avak surrenders to Toghta.

1233 Queen Rusudan fled from Tiflis. Goj, who was in charge of Tiflis, burned city.

1233 Ani captured by Chormaqan. Kars attempted to surrender but stormed by Mongols. Rest of Armenia submits to the Mongols.

1234 Chin Empire falls to the Mongols.

1235 Chin Temur died.

1235/6 Mongols capture Isphahan after a long siege.

1237-42 Invasion of the Russian steppes, principalities, and Eastern Europe

1241 Mongol victories at Liegnitz and Mohi.

1241 Ögödei Khan dies.

1241-1246 Regency of Toregene

1240/41 Chormaqan dies.

## Appendix B

### Glossary of Terms

Altan Uruq	The Golden family. This terms refers to the family and descendants of Chinggis Khan.
Basqaq:	See Darughachi.
Bichikchi:	A secretary or clerk in the service of the imperial government.
Darughachi:	A governor, or one who uses the state seal. The darugachi possessed the right to collect taxes and also had military authority.
Deel:	The robes worn by Mongols. Fastened on the right side.
Ghp'chur:	See Qubchir.
Jaghun:	A unit of one hundred men.
Jarligh:	A command or decree.
Jarghuchi:	One who administers the law. This was an administrator who replaced the tanma commander with the establishment of a civil administration.
Keshik:	The body guard of the Khan. It also functioned as a training center for commanders.
Mal:	Refers to a tax imposed mainly on livestock, but also on property.
Metawar:	A Georgian or Armenian nobleman.
Mingghan:	A unit of one thousand men.

Noyan:	A commander or noble in the Mongol military hierarchy.
Ötagü-boghol:	Term used by Paul Pelliot referring to a hereditary slave or vassal. Perhaps the ethnic origin of Chormaqan.
Qadi:	An Islamic judge.
Qorchi:	An archer or quiver-bearer. Also a member of the chilarchy of the keshik by the same name. Plural form: qorchin.
Qubchir:	Tax normally levied on property and occasionally animals.
Quriltai:	A meeting or conference of the Mongols. Used by the military to discuss plans for an upcoming campaign, elect a new Khan, etc.
Shahna:	See Darughachi.
Taghar:	A general tax in kind, but not normally associated on animals or property. Also a measurement of grain.
T'aghār:	See Taghar.
Tanma:	A military force in the Mongol army, composed of select groups. It was sent to occupy a region which was conquered and expand their control, if possible.
Touzghou:	A special tax which may have been used to gather tribute specifically for the Khan in Mongolia.
Tumen:	A unit of ten thousand men.
Turghou:	See Touzghou.
Tzghu:	See Touzghou.
Wazir:	A minister in a Muslim state.

Yekke Mongol: The Great Mongols. This is the designation which Chinggis Khan gave to the confederation of tribes he united.

## Appendix C: The Names of the Mongol Commanders listed by Armenian Sources

<u>Grigor</u> <sup>232</sup>	<u>Kirakos</u> <sup>233</sup>	<u>Shamshean</u> <sup>234</sup>	<u>Vartan</u> <sup>235</sup>	<u>Mongolian</u> <sup>236</sup>
C'awrman	Dcharma-Qan	Tchamaghoun	Tcharmagh'an	Chormaqan
Mular (Molur)	Molar	Moular	Molar	Molughar
Benal	Not listed	Penal	Not litsted	Bainal
Ghara Bugha	Qara Bahadour	Gharabougha	Not listed	Qara Buqa
Asut'u	Not listed	Asouthou	Not listed	Asutu (Asutai)
Ch'aghatay	Dhaghatai	Sonitha	Not listed	Sünitei (Sanit'ay)
Ch'aghtay	Tchaghata	Tchaghata	Djagatai	Chaghatai
Bach'u	Batcho	Batchou	Batchou	Baiju
Asar	Israr	Asar (Aslan)	Not listed	Yasa'ur
Xut't'u	Qouthou	Khouththou	Not listed	Qutughtu???
<u>Grigor</u> <sup>237</sup>	<u>Kirakos</u> <sup>238</sup>	<u>Shamshean</u> <sup>239</sup>	<u>Vartan</u> <sup>240</sup>	<u>Mongolian</u>

<sup>232</sup>R. P. Blake and R. N. Frye, “The History of the Nation of the Archers by Grigor of Akanc”, HJAS 12 (1949): 297 and 303.

<sup>233</sup>M. Brousset, “*Histoire d'Armenie*,” Deux Historiens Arméniens: Kiracos de Gantzax, XIII S., “Histoire d'Arménie”; Oukhtanès D'Ourha, X S., “Histoire en trois parties”, (St. Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1870): ???.

<sup>234</sup>M. Klaproth, “*Apercu des entreprises des Mongols en Georgie et en Armenie dans le XIIIe siecle*,” JA XII (1833): 199, 200, 202.

<sup>235</sup>M. Ed. Dulaurier, “*Les Mongols d'après les historiens arméniens: Extrait de l'histoire universelle de Vartan*”, Journal Asiatique 13 (Octobre-Novembre 1860): 282, 283, 287.

<sup>236</sup>These are based on F. W. Cleaves, “*The Mongolian Names and Terms in The History of the Nation of the Archers*” in The History of the Nation of the Archers by Grigor of Akanc”, HJAS (1949): 400-443, and J. A. Boyle, “*Some Additional Notes on the Mongolian Names in the History of the Nation of the Archers*”, Researches in Altaic Languages, (Budapest, 1975): 33-42. There are a few exceptions. The spelling of (Oghotai) is mine, based on the transcription of Blake and Frye. Also, Toghta and Chol or Zol are my own entries.

T'ut'tu	Thouthoun	Thoutou	Not listed	Tudtu
Awgawt'ay (Oghotai)??	Not Listed	Okotha???	Not listed	Ögödei
Xojay	Not Listed	Khoia	Not listed	Khwaja (Qoja)
Xurumch'i	Not Listed	Khourhoumdji	Not listed	Qurumsi
Xunan	Not Listed	Khounan	Not listed	Ghunan
T'enal	Not Listed	Not listed	Not listed	Tainal
Angurag	Not Listed	Not listed	Not listed	Engküreg
Not listed	Ghataghan	Ghadaghan	Gh'adagh'a'	Qataqan
Not listed	Toughata	Toughata	Tough'ata	Toghta
Not listed	Not Listed	Djola	Not listed	Chola?? (Zol??)

<sup>237</sup>R. P. Blake and R. N. Frye, “The History of the Nation of the Archers by Grigor of Akanc”, HJAS 12 (1949): 297 and 303.

<sup>238</sup>M. Brousset, “Histoire d’Armenie,” Deux Historiens Arméniens: Kiracos de Gantzax, XIII S., “Histoire d’Arménie”; Oukhtanès D’Ourha, X S., “Histoire en trois parties”, (St. Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1870): ???.

<sup>239</sup>M. Klaproth, “Apercu des entreprises des Mongols en Georgie et en Armenie dans le XIIIe siecle,” JA XII (1833): 199, 200, 202.

<sup>240</sup>M. Ed. Dulaurier, “Les Mongols d’après les historiens arméniens: Extrait de l’histoire universelle de Vartan”, Journal Asiatique 13 (Octobre-Novembre 1860): 282, 283, 287.

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