


Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics




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Scope

The aim of the Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics (EGP) is to further the study of and teaching on the cultural, social, ethnic and (geo-)political characteristics, processes and developments in different areas of the world, at universities, institutes and colleges in and outside the Netherlands. The association's journal *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* is above all intended to elicit analytic debate by allowing scholars to air their views, perspectives and research findings—with critical responses from others who may hold a different view or research approach. One can submit manuscripts—main articles (peer-reviewed), critical responses (published peer-reviews), short articles and/or book reviews—to info@ethnogeopolitics.org. At www.ethnogeopolitics.org one can find information about the association's foundation, founding (editorial) board members, aims, activities and publications—and particularly the freely downloadable copies of the journal's issues.

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



Table of Contents

Page 5	<i>Editorial</i> Legal and Geopolitical Implications of US Unilateral Withdrawal from the Nuclear Agreement Babak Rezvani
Page 8	Situating Ethnogeopolitics and Reflecting upon its Developments Babak Rezvani
Page 9	<i>Special Article</i> Этногеополитический выбор россиян в 2018 (The ethnogeopolitical choice of Russians in 2018) Марат Ильясов (Marat Iliysov)
Page 12	<i>Main Article</i> Relations between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan in the context of interaction between geopolitical systems of the South Caucasus and South Caspian region Anton Ikhsanov
Page 23	<i>Main Article</i> 实事求是—“Seek Truth from Facts”: The East Turkistan Islamic Movement and the Uighurs in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China Jennifer Loy
Page 40	Key recommendations on the paper ‘“Seek Truth from Facts”’ Anonymous reviewer
Page 41	The Main Drivers of Conflict among the Uighur (and Other Minorities) (Editorial Note) Babak Rezvani
Page 42	Author's Response Jennifer Loy
Page 44	<i>Dorsey's Column</i> The Rise, Fall, and Rise Again of the Politics of Middle Eastern Soccer James M. Dorsey
Page 51	<i>Guest Column</i> Dutch Defence Ministry keeps bumbling Jeroen Stam



*** Call and Guidelines for Contributions ***

Our journal is ready to receive manuscripts from now on also contributions in Russian, German, Spanish and other non-English languages. The Editorial Board does not apply a strict wordlimit, but we prefer full-fledged research articles of no more than 10,000 words. We also welcome short analytical articles, book reviews, review essays, and opinion pieces.

Regular contributors may get a guaranteed space in future issues of our journal, with a recognisable header like 'Dorsey's Column' for James M. Dorsey's contributions from the Summer 2017 issue onwards. It does not necessarily mean that we approve everything that these contributors may say. The contributors themselves are responsible and accountable for their statements.

Furthermore, we welcome contributions for special issues on common themes, like the one on Human Security in our Winter 2015 issue. The association EthnoGeoPolitics is willing to (re)publish special issues in book form—and publish monographs and other major manuscripts in book form as well.

Research essays—particularly so-called 'Main Articles'—undergo rigorous peer-review i.e. judgments from at least two peer-reviewers. Extensive (book) review essays that have undergone such (peer-)review as well, are also considered and named as Main Articles.


We also welcome and publish open comments i.e. critical responses—particularly those of peer-reviewers—in order to encourage feedback and debate. These responses can be anonymous if the commentators wish so. Still, we encourage reviewers and other commentators to publicise their names under their contributions, as the latter will thus become better citable, referable and indexable as sources and publications.

Of course we at the Editorial Board decide whether or not to publish (excerpts from) peer-reviewers' comments, based on considerations of utility and usefulness for ongoing debate. However, publishing no peer-reviews and comments does not mean that these do not exist; thus some peer-reviews are not published because their comments have been addressed by the author in his or her contribution. To reiterate, Main Articles have undergone generally two or more peer-reviews.

The Editorial Board may publish some of the later comments on published contributions as critical responses (maximum 3,000 words) in one or more subsequent issues of the journal. Extensive critical responses with source references may be published as full-fledged, separate research articles.

For each submitted manuscript, please supply your full name, academic and/or other professional titles and affiliations, office and/or home address and other contact details, as well as your research specialisms and any major publications. Please submit manuscripts and contact details at www.ethnogeopolitics.org/contact-2, or to info@ethnogeopolitics.org.

See for more details on the submission process of main articles, critical responses and other manuscripts www.ethnogeopolitics.org/publications. We therefore encourage and welcome your contributions, ranging from articles to transparent reviews and comments on these articles.



Editorial

Legal and Geopolitical Implications of US Unilateral Withdrawal from the Nuclear Agreement

Babak Rezvani

After several years of negotiations, and almost five years of sanctions imposed on Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed between the USA, Iran, China, Russia, the UK, France, Germany and EU on 14 July 2015, which was intended to lift the economic sanctions against Iran. The multilateral agreement was sanctioned legally and enforced by a United Nations Security Council resolution.

The JCPOA, commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, followed an “Iran Nuclear Deal framework for the Final Agreement” that was reached on 10 April 2015 in Lausanne, Switzerland, which in turn followed a preliminary agreement on a Joint Plan of Action reached in November 2013 in Geneva, Switzerland. However, on 8 May 2018 US President Donald Trump announced that the USA withdrew from the deal.


The other parties to the agreement have subsequently announced they would remain committed to the deal, even though the EU countries had not yet lifted all sanctions imposed on Iran (see figure 1). However, the USA announced that it would impose sanctions on those companies that trade with Iran; they will be fined in the USA and may not trade with the USA. Legally a unilateral withdrawal from a United Nations Security Council resolution is not even possible.

The USA may get lawsuits if it imposes secondary sanctions on companies. Although the US unilateral withdrawal from the deal is a violation of international law as it violates a multilateral agreement confirmed by a United Nation Security Council resolution, the geopolitical reality in the world is different and may predict many problems.

In reality, even before their withdrawal, the Iran Nuclear Deal was not honored by the USA as it proceeded with sanctions against Iran even after the deal. However, after their unilateral withdrawal from the deal it is not certain what the consequences will be for international trade with Iran.

By accepting the JCPOA Iran gave up its 20 percent and 5 percent enriched uranium and heavy water, destroyed its heavy water reactor in Arak and reduced and agreed upon a 3.5 percent upper limit for uranium enrichment. In order to make a nuclear warhead one needs a substantial amount of around 90 percent enriched uranium. Iran had spent a lot in order to build up its nuclear technology, which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed was designed for civilian purposes. Yet Iran has wasted so much money and given up almost all in return for the deal. From the beginning, the USA did not fully honor its agreement and imposed new or renewed the existing sanctions.

Nevertheless, it will be very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to impose secondary sanctions




on *all* companies. The sanctions cannot target the Iranian military as its technology is mainly domestic, and as it may buy also from Russia and China. The military industry of China and Russia do not sell primarily to the USA, and therefore secondary sanctions on them is meaningless.

Figure 1: The JCPOA and World Powers ¹




The JCPOA and World Powers



All the other parties to the Iran nuclear agreement have maintained that they will remain a party to this agreement which is the result of years of negotiation and therefore do not wish to replace it by a new deal. The fact that there is no credible commitment from the Trump Administration does not invite the other signatory parties to make a new deal. Six countries plus the European Union made a deal with Iran. A deal, by which Iran gave away almost all of its nuclear (enrichment) technology, yet the sanctions were not relieved fully and at the end Trump unilaterally withdrew its support.

However, given the fact that the Iranian market is smaller than the American market, many companies may exit the Iranian market in order not to get steep fines or legal procedures from or against the US government.

Thus the new American sanctions will mainly, and perhaps even only, target civilians. A lot of people will die due to a renewed shortage of medicines. Aircrafts will crash once again due to their surpassed longevity and lack of (spare) parts. And probably bad food full of palm oil will be sold with high prices to Iran, and people will get cancer. Briefly, it is to be expected that these sanctions will have hardly if any impact on the Iranian military industry and will target civilians in an inhumane way, even much worse than the previous sanctions did.




Already before the final deal of JCPOA, our journal (2014 Vol.2, No.1) has dedicated a special section on discussions about it in which experts with diverging views wrote about a possible future deal and its geopolitical implications. We invite now everyone to contribute for a prospective special section on the US withdrawal from the Nuclear Deal and its possible humanitarian and geopolitical implications.


Babak Rezvani, Editor-in-Chief August 2018

Endnote

1. The unedited outline map is from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:World_map_-_low_resolution_chain_test.svg.

NB: do you have any comments on the editorial? Please send these to info@ethnogeopolitics.org, or through the contact form at www.ethnogeopolitics.org.






Situating Ethnogeopolitics and Reflecting upon its Developments

Babak Rezvani

This short exposé is a precursor and 'teaser' of a much more elaborate discussion by the author on the evolution of Ethnogeopolitics as a multi-faceted and multidisciplinary field of studies, which will appear soon in this journal.




Ethnogeopolitics is a new concept, indicating an emerging multidisciplinary field of research. Ethnogeopolitics is a type of Geopolitics in which in addition to traditional political, strategic and economic factors, attention is paid also to cultural factors. Association for the study of EthnoGeoPolitics and its journal *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* intend to offer a venue for relevant research papers, analytic discussions and debate, and hence contribute to the development of Ethnogeopolitics as an academic (sub-)field.

Association for the study of EthnoGeoPolitics is not affiliated with and does not necessarily endorse the ideas of certain streams of thought, such as those of Russian ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and his associates (who write the term with a hyphen, i.e. Ethno-geopolitics).

However, Russia—and the Post-Soviet Space in general—is undeniably an important area of the world where ethnogeopolitical thoughts and policies have been prevalent. Ethnogeopolitics and ethnogeopolitical analyses are fairly close to “subversive Geopolitics” and particularly close to the French school of “*Géopolitique Interne et Externe*” of Yves Lacoste and his associates. Nevertheless, a typification of Ethnogeopolitics remains the subject of its further development as a (sub-)discipline which needs to be discussed more elaborately.

Reflecting upon, discussing and debating about the current developments of Ethnogeopolitics as a (sub-)discipline are among our journals' prospective goals. Therefore, we welcome contributions of policymakers, thinkers and scholars from all relevant academic (sub-)disciplines, and invite them to contribute to its development.

Dr. Babak Rezvani, Chairman of the Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics and Editor-in-Chief of its journal, is a Research Associate at the Universities of Amsterdam and Nijmegen, the Netherlands. bkrezvani@gmail.com.



Special Article

Этногеополитический выбор россиян в 2018 (The ethnogeopolitical choice of Russians in 2018)

Марат Ильясов (Marat Iliyassov)

Abstract in English This article in Russian presents and analyses the Russian Presidential elections of March 2018. The analysis particularly focuses on the electorate and reelection of President Vladimir Putin and the reasons behind this continuing choice and support. The article divides this electorate into three groups, each of which are presented through the lens of ethnogeopolitics. Each of the defined groups has its own set of justifications of their choice; however, the article finds a common denominator that unites all three groups as one that votes and keeps voting for Putin.


Очередные выборы президента России состоялись в марте этого (2018) года. Результат был легко предсказуемым - Владимир Путин получил мандат на следующие шесть лет. Масс-медиа отреагировала на это по-разному. Кто-то просто отметил, что Путин стал вторым, после Сталина, долгосрочным лидером страны; кто-то обозначил этот выбор россиян как знаковый и подтверждающий правильность курса; а кто-то объяснил это безальтернативностью выборов.

Каждый по-своему прав в своей оценке. Долгосрочность правления Путина, безусловно, частично подтверждает правильность его курса. Голосов добавляет и сравнительная стабильность ситуации. Как выразилась одна избирательница весьма пожилого возраста: Путин хороший царь, он нам пенсию дает. Что же касается остальных кандидатов, там не все так ясно. Так что лучше синица в руках, особенно для поколения 90-х, которые еще помнят годы хаоса, нищеты, и унижения, когда столица ядерной супердержавы получала гуманитарную помощь из стран Запада.

Большинство недовольных Путиным - это молодежь двухтысячники. Этот растущий протестный электорат уже проявил себя на разных митингах, организованных в течении последних двух лет. Уже одно то, что они не помнят времени без Путина в Кремле их раздражает. Однако, они пока не составляют критическую массу, способную поменять ход событий.

Так или иначе, Путин набрал более 75 процентов от голосовавших. За что же голосовало это абсолютное большинство? Можно с уверенностью сказать, что большая составляющая решения избирателей зависела от Кремлевского этногеополитического курса. Что же именно привлекает в нем россиян и каким он им видится? Не вдаваясь в глобкий анализ, Российскую этногеополитику можно разделить на три взаимосвязанных поля.

Первое – это глобальное поле. Этим полем, в основном, интересуются эксперты и дипломаты. Если первые и могут позволить себе критику и проголосовать не лояльно,



вторые связаны обязательствами по отношению к правительству, что в большинстве случаев означает автоматический голос в коробку Путина. В любом случае, количество этого электората не составляет большого процента.

Что же касается массового электората, о достижениях дипломатов на стратегических рубежах этногеополитики он знает примерно следующее. За время правления Путина, страна снова приобрела уверенность в себе, позволяющую ей бряцать перед носом у Запада, который как был, так и остался главным врагом или недоброжелателем.


Это недоброжелательство выражается в санкциях, которые тем не менее, помогли развиться собственной экономике. Ценовое выражение упомянутого развития не в пользу правительства, зато страна возвращает свою державность. Другими словами, избиратели согласны затянуть пояса потуже, но зато гордиться твердой позицией несогласия по практически всем вопросам в Совете Безопасности ООН.

Новые, пока скорее виртуальные, разработки в военной сфере, которые призваны обеспечить военный паритет, обеспечивают базис обывательской гордости. Обращение Путина перед выборами, сопровождаемое фильмом о новом супероружии Кремля, продемонстрировало, что годы правления не прошли безрезультатно, что Россия возвращает себе былую мощь, или выражаясь языком политической элиты, встает с колен. Не важно являются ли эти достижения достижениями на самом деле или нет, важно то, что электорат в них верит.

Эта вера подкреплена победными реляциями на тактическом и операционном полях. Несмотря на то, что присутствие России в странах бывшего третьего мира скорее чувствуется благодаря частным инициативам, чем структурной политике, потери на тактическом поле уравнивает Сирийский вопрос. Российский избиратель видит там мощь Российского оружия и принципиальность Кремлевской политики, цели которой хотя и ясно не обозначены, но дают ощущение мощи страны, которая не боится Запада, у которой свои цели и задачи, отличные от Западных или Восточных. Россия - самостоятельный игрок на мировом поле. Это достижение Путина.

То же самое происходит на операционном этногеополитическом поле. Ближние рубежи России все еще рассматриваются большей частью населения как своя территория. Даже если исключить родственные связи, количество русскоязычного населения, привычные курорты и т.д., ментальность сформированная Советским Союзом не позволяет выделить эти территории в отдельные страны. Кто это делает - он враг. Поэтому разрекламированная защита интресов Москвы в бывших союзных республиках (в интересы входит: не допуск враждебных сил на территорию этих стран и противодействие политике гравитации в какую-либо сторону, кроме России) массово приветствуется обывателем.

Тут наблюдается определенный парадокс. С одной стороны электорат поддерживает внешнеполитический курс и его напористость, с другой стороны этот курс усиливает ксенофобские настроения в стране, а значит противодействие внешней политике. Отношение к жителям Средней Азии, Кавказа, и Восточной Европы в России, характеризуется несколько устарелым, но все еще актуальным лозунгом "Хватит




кормить Кавказ” (Азию или Украину), и презрительными определениями мигрантов. Другими словами, интеграция упомянутых стран приветствуется только в том случае, если не будет наплыва мигрантов. Однако, одно неизбежно влечет другое. Поэтому, объяснить этот парадокс можно следующим: мигранты это неизбежное зло, которое нужно терпеть ради выживания и укрепления страны, как проповедует политический дискурс.

Таким образом, можно сказать, что интеграционные проекты (может несколько измененные или обновленные), которые были инициированы после распада Советского Союза и в начале правления Путина, остаются популярной среди электората этногеополитикой России.


Подводя итоги можно сказать, что российский электорат поддерживает существующую этногеополитику Москвы на всех трех полях. Последние, несмотря на связь между собой, имеют определенные границы и значимость, которая увеличивается с приближением этнополитической игры к границам России. Поэтому интеграционные проекты (может несколько измененные или обновленные), которые были инициированы после распада Советского Союза и в начале правления Путина, остаются наиболее определяющими для Российского электората.

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NB: do you have any comments on Ilyasov's article? Please send these to info@ethnogeopolitics.org, or through the contact form at www.ethnogeopolitics.org.



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Main Article

Relations between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan in the context of interaction between geopolitical systems of the South Caucasus and South Caspian region

Anton Ikhsanov

Introduction


The transformation in the global economy and the political balance of power has led to the need to review some of the existing concepts of international relations, which in fact has previously blocked integration processes, while the current situation provides more possibilities for further interaction between individual states. In this regard, special attention should be paid to the relations between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan—countries that are situating at the intersection of several geopolitical “spheres”: the Greater Caucasus, Central Eurasia, the Greater Middle East and the Caspian geopolitical system.

This situation makes both countries the objects for geopolitical influence originating from several sources (Alekseev 2013: 637) which try to put a pressure on the rapidly developing process of the intensification of the relations between these two states. However, this concept and the first results of this interaction is supported by a number of strong extra-regional players who have their own interests in the region.

Joint economic projects as the basis of relations between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan

According to research conducted by Farhad ‘Attayi, a researcher of the Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Turkmenistan is a rentier economy country and the main source of its income is the rent obtained from the exploitation of natural resources. The countries of this type—as, first of all, the Persian Gulf countries—are divided into two types according to the specifics of their foreign policies. The first type concerns small states, in which the main task of foreign policy is the safeguarding of the security of export supply routes of their hydrocarbons to the consumer markets.

The second type includes medium and large countries, establishing profitable contacts with major geopolitical players and whereby they thus get the opportunity either to dictate their conditions in the location of the region or at least to make these conditions more favorable for their own business and other interests. Turkmenistan, in accordance with the point of view of ‘Attayi, after coming to power of Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov, redefined the concept of foreign policy (‘Atay, Shadzha’yi, 1389). The new President declared the expansion of international relations of the country as the main task of his foreign policy doctrine. This idea became a reason of deepening of the cooperation between Turkmenistan and the UN, EU, US, China and a number of Asian and European countries (*Politics* 2007: 105-126).



Political activity of Ashgabat carried out in accordance with the task to diversify hydrocarbon supply via all available methods—from pipeline transportation method to export substitution—thus justified itself: indeed, Turkish researchers pay close attention to the existence of a relationship between this process and the economic growth in Turkmenistan (Berber, Birdişli 2012: 44; *International relations* 2011: 371).


It is also important that Turkmenistan is involved in the processes of creating transit corridors and infrastructure with access to the regions of the world that do not adjoin directly to the Caspian region. This is primarily the TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) project. It was launched in 1993, but then Turkmenistan refused to participate in this agreement (*International Relations* 2011: 365-366).

Now the situation has changed, and there is a clear comprehension that for countries of Central Eurasia there are only two possible ways of developing relations with the EU—through Russia and through the South Caucasus and Turkey—and the selection of the second option makes principle the question of the development of cooperation with Azerbaijan for all Caspian basin and Central Eurasian states.

For Turkmenistan, one of the first steps in this direction was the settlement of debt for natural gas agreement with Azerbaijan. The debt was paid off in 2008. This situation has led to further development of bilateral relations with Azerbaijan. According to some experts, this improvement of relations with Azerbaijan strengthened the position of Ashgabat in the negotiations with Moscow, making possible for Turkmenistan to achieve growth in the higher price of gas supplied to Russia (Berber, Birdişli 2011: 44-45).

In 2010, at the summit of the Caspian states a number of joint agreements on security issues, as well as an ecological framework agreement, were adopted for the first time between all basin countries (which was attributed by experts to the aggravation of the situation around Iran) (Pritchins 2013). Since 2008 the growth of trade between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan had begun, and in 2012 among the Central Eurasian states, Turkmenistan was the second trade partner of Azerbaijan (Turkmenistan also had strong economic relations with all Caucasus states). This country conceded the first place only to Kazakhstan, whose exports (not only hydrocarbons but also grain) is based on trade ways through the port system of Georgia and Turkey (Tsertsvadze 2012: 3). This factor was a powerful incentive for the development of the Trans-Caspian transit corridor, which includes sea transport and rail lines (Baliev, Berezin 2012).

Turkmenistan began drafting its own Trans-Caspian corridor, based on the conception of Trans-Caspian pipeline, which can become a key element of this project. In the system of its external relations, Turkmenistan develops its own participation in international organizations, which helps this country to avoid escalation of disputes in the course of relations with other countries, including Azerbaijan. This is reflected in the implementation of ESCAP (the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) line joint projects, for example, infrastructure and telecommunications (*Profound study* 2014). A survey conducted in 2013, devoted to the prospects of integrating the interaction between the former Soviet republics, showed the presence of the supporters of such interaction in both countries (*Integration Barometer* 2013).



We can assume that one of the reasons for a presence of the supporters of bilateral interaction in both countries can be tied to the presence of Azerbaijani Diaspora in Turkmenistan (it is rooted there for a long time, since the end of the 19th century AD; however, in the 1990s a part of it repatriated to their homeland). This Diaspora was formed during the incorporation of Turkmen lands into the Russian Empire by the developing of a ferry line and railway system. Large numbers of Azerbaijani migrants can be dated by the beginning of the 20th century (Azerbaijanis movement in Persia and the escape of its participants to the Russian Empire) and the middle of the 20th century (common work on gas and oil fields).


It should also be noted that the connection between Azerbaijan and Georgia, where numerous Azerbaijani Diaspora have been living, was in the 2011–2012 period a leading link among the countries of the former Soviet Union on the accumulated joint direct investment (*Monitoring* 2013: 34).

Experts called Azerbaijan “the leader of the South Caucasus”. The government of Azerbaijan carried out a serious program of economic reforms (Turan 2009), and has overcome the world economic crisis of 2008–2010 and subsequent stagnation in 2011 (Friedman 2012). Accordingly, it can reasonably be regarded as one of the regional centers of power. Evidence of this new awareness and self-confidence can be found in the persistent attempts of Azerbaijan to replace the Minsk Group on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by the UN forces, and the significant growth of the military budget of the republic.

In this context, one should pay attention to the interpretation of Azerbaijan’s active participation in the organization of multipurpose transport corridors of Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan built by French experts. According to these experts, one of the political goals of Azerbaijan is exerting pressure on Armenia (*Atlas* 2011: 210–211).

In this regard, the formation of the local alliance between Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus region is of interest for geopolitical studies specialists. This alliance strengthens the position of its members in two ways—in their relations with Russia, the EU and the US, and on the regional political scene. The most likely scenario of further “extension” of its integration potential on the other coast is an intensification of interaction with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on a more advanced level. Both of these states are major players in Central Eurasia and periodically have been named as a possible candidate to take part in regional integration.

Their movement in this direction is facilitated by the fact that Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan cooperate in the framework of various strategies of creation of the “new Silk Road” project through the Caspian region, which is expressed in the joint railway projects, and active cooperation on the level of diplomatic missions of the countries placed in major seaports of the Caspian Sea, including Baku (Baliev, Berezina 2012). In particular, Kazakhstan, due to the fact that it has obligations to the partners in the agreement on the Eurasian Economic Union project, is interested in the use of these projects to obtain greater benefits from existing arrangements with the neighbors (*Atlas* 2011: 208–209).



It should be stressed that Azerbaijan's and Turkmenistan's joint projects are primarily economic. But it should be mentioned that in the post-Soviet republics economic interests are closely intertwined with the political.

Obviously, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have their sights set on diversifying their own business activities and economic systems. For Azerbaijan it is growth of the investment flow, strengthening cooperation within the region as an insurance against Iran and Russia, countries with large-scale navy flotilla in the Caspian Sea. For Turkmenistan, it is a transit "exit" outside the region, which can be viewed as a counterbalance against the growing economic influence of China (Cutler 2013; Zhukov, Reznikova 2009: 14). These projects have the potential to strengthen the position of Azerbaijan in the geopolitical space of the South Caucasus and thus exert pressure not only on Armenia, but also on Iran, which is worried about the pro-Western orientation of Azerbaijan.

As for Turkmenistan, the benefit of the implementation of bilateral projects with Azerbaijan will be, firstly, a factor for further increase of its influence in the regional dimension; secondly, will provide greater guarantees for investors; and thirdly, will be an additional "plus" in the case of realization of its intention to join the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Moreover, we should not forget that both countries have increasingly been incorporated into the system of international economic relations, which inevitably entails growing influence of outside forces on this bilateral relationship.


Interests and actions of external actors

Turkey is one of the first countries that expressed its interest in the establishment of full-fledged relations with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. However, the period of the end of the 1990s–early 2000s was recognized by the Turks themselves as a period of trial and error (Aydın 2012: 216).

The ideological component of Turkish policy caused the rejection of this by a part of the elites of Central Eurasia. For example, during the 1990s Turkey was expected to occupy the niche left by Russia, while this country was focused on overcoming the crisis in its economy and internal politics. Some authors call this time a period of the struggle between Turkey and Iran for dominance in Central Eurasia (see Zhukov, Reznikov 2001). An example of a successful Turkish activity in Central Eurasia in the 1990s can be considered the emergence of Turkish schools throughout the region (Demidov, 2002: 73-74).

Subsequently, the Turkish policy was reconstituted. Its economic component enhances this. The desire of the Central Eurasian countries to increase their own welfare by the access to the European markets with their need of hydrocarbons objectively creates the possibility for Turkey to use its position as a bridge between Europe and Asia to benefit from it, both economically and politically. The result is obvious: activation of Turkish policy in the Caspian region, Turkey's influence in the growth of the South Caucasus.

An impressive display of this influence is a long and successful lobbying of the pipeline project Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan (BTC) which also received the support of the United Kingdom



and the United States (Starchenkov 2003: 155-168). BTC is the first transit artery bypass of Russia in the former Soviet Union, and even before its completion, Starchenkov noted that the project will bring more political dividends than purely economic ones. At least, the project has contributed to the convergence of the participants. It expresses it in:


- the increase of mutual investment;
- forming of a common position on the protection of the BTC, which does not prevent each country i.e. participant of the “pipeline” Union to emphasize “their” risk sources (for Turkey the main danger is the Kurdish movement; for Georgia it is Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the Javakheti Armenians; for Azerbaijan it is the Armenian threat in general);
- the emergence of new forms of cooperation (the creation of the unified energy system, the system of military cooperation, etc.).

It should also be noted that in relation to the events taking place in Ukraine, members of the alliance have expressed a common position based on the protection of the principle of territorial integrity and have expressed support for the mutual recognition of the inviolability of the territorial integrity of all members of the Union (Georgia, 2014). Thereafter, the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan have expressed mutual support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Turkey, 2014).

Getting back to the BTC project, we should recall that it is geographically and geopolitically connected to Central Eurasia. Back in 2006, Kazakhstan started exporting its oil through the BTC. In 2010 Turkmenistan joined BTC, on the background of the difficulties of the Azerbaijani side with the development of its own fields. That was a path how Turkmenistan got a good opportunity to gradually increase its stake in the filling of the pipeline (*Transportation* 2014).

In 2011, in Izmir, was organized a meeting of the Strategic Cooperation Council at the highest level (Yüksek Düzeyli, *Stratejik İşbirliği Konseyi*) between Azerbaijan and Turkey. It was attended by representatives of a number of joint ventures, including those of Petkim Petrochemical Company, 60% of which was owned by Azerbaijani SOCAR state oil and gas company. The following year, a similar event took place on the territory of Azerbaijan in the city of Gabala, and one of its deliberations was the development of relations with Turkmenistan. Güntay Şimşek, an analyst of the newspaper *Habertürk*, suggests that in this meeting could be worked out approaches how to create a relation with Turkmenistan based on the work on joint energy projects and security issues in the Caspian region (Şimşek 2012).

Indirect evidence in favor of these hypotheses can be considered the fact that during the presidency of Berdymukhammedov communication between the Turkish and Turkmen business structures have become more extensive and more diverse. In many ways due to its growth and the specialization of the most industrialized region of Turkmenistan, Balkan province, was changed. Now it is not only the center of mining and processing of petrochemical raw materials, but also a major transport hub with a significant role of the coastal strip: on it stretches the railway line of the east branch of the “North-South” transport corridor; furthermore, passenger and freight terminals have been created there (*Regions* 2012: 119).



It should be noted that the Prime Minister of Turkey at that time, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, personally participated at the opening ceremony of the construction of a trade terminal in the city of Turkmenbashi. The opening of Turkmenistan consulates in all the port cities of the Caspian Sea, the planned synchronization of activities at the new port in Baku and Turkmenbashi and revitalization of the ferry service between the ports of the Caspian Sea (Olja-Turkmenbashi and Baku-Turkmenbashi), is also noteworthy. At the same time, the re-equipment of the Turkmenbashi oil refinery, construction of enterprises in the coastal village of Kyyanly are justifiably considered evidence of the growing desire of Turkmenistan to develop a policy towards Europe—again, through the Caucasus and Turkey.


It is worth noting that in addition to the symbolic elements of cooperation, such as joint participation of the heads of the two states in various ceremonies or the use of the slogan “one nation—two states” (*tek millet iki devlet*) and “Turkmenistan—homeland of our ancestors (fathers)” (*Atavatanımız Türkmenistan*), closer Turkish-Turkmen cooperation are expressed in numbers: 44% of the total value of Turkish overseas projects now falls on Turkmenistan (Minister, 2013).

Overall, the Turkish policy in the region should be regarded as a factor conducive to strengthening the integration trends in it, as well as a framework for enrichment of bilateral relation between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. In addition to traditional methods such as visits of government officials at various levels, it now includes an exchange of experts and training in Baku (as it was during the Soviet period) of national cadres for the Turkmen oil and gas sector, and the development of joint plans for the creation of the Trans-Caspian transit way (Turkmen students, 2014; University, 2015).

At the same time, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation, are the major players in the Caspian region that seek to prevent the strengthening of the influence of other external forces on the situation in this region. This explains their strong reaction to any use of the undivided part of the sea for economic projects, in particular, the Trans-Caspian pipeline (Abdutalibi: 1378). On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation have the most numerous fleets in the Caspian Sea and a policy of modernization and increasing of the number of navy vessels.

Global events in which they are actively involved—the situation in Syria and Ukraine—have impact on their interaction in the framework of the Caspian region by consolidating the positions of both states on common issues. But regardless of what comes to the fore of the international agenda, there is, however, mainly on a theoretical level, the possibility of competition between all players in the Caspian Sea as probable hydrocarbon suppliers for the Southern Energy Corridor projects.

In particular, the Islamic Republic of Iran at one time considered the European Union (EU) as a potential alternative supplier of hydrocarbons (Byrczek 2010). Another example is the discussion between the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan regarding the cost of hydrocarbons, thereby temporarily complicating relations between these countries which have led to changes in Ashgabat policy within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—to intensify relations with Ukraine and Belarus as well as a reversal in the direction of China (*Investment potential of Turkmenistan* 2011: 50).



However, we must bear in mind that in a situation of potential and actual competition between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have different start positions. The first acts and considers itself as an essential geopolitical bridgehead with access to the Middle East, a policy that has a stable support of Turkey. Yet the second country is forced to maneuver between the interests of the major players in an effort to provide a more developed basis for security of pipelines and investment flows (*Investment potential of Uzbekistan* 2013: 69-70). This strategy is embodied in the special doctrine of neutrality by Turkmenistan (*Foreign Policy* 2010).

However, the good-neighborly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan—and among themselves—are deemed by Iran a vital necessity. This country is interested in the presence of a relatively safe zone on or near its Northern borders.


Likewise, Russia's foreign policy is closely intertwined with the interests of Russian businesses (Braterskiy 2012: 212-229), first of all, state-owned companies. And these subjects of international economic relations provide further interaction with abovementioned countries on the basis of mutual benefit, one of the examples of which is a business relationship the Russian Lukoil company with Azerbaijani companies. On the whole, it can be summarized that Iran and Russia are interested in a constructive cooperation with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, but within the framework of the local geopolitical system.

Conclusion

The deepening of relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan is very likely. There is a strong economic base and support of third-party players, above all Turkey and the EU, for such development. The present conception of foreign policy introduced by Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to provide an active search for profitable partners in the CIS (Ukraine and Belarus), bypassing Russia, should be noted with particular attention. It is unlikely that this experience has been in vain; most likely, it will push for further rapprochement between these two states, as well as to the development of bilateral and multilateral economic, political and military relations with other countries, many of which are ready to support political initiatives of the leadership of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan (for example, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in Central Eurasia and Georgia in the Transcaucasus).

The expansion and deepening of economic relations in the South Caucasus has already led to a total restructuring of the entire geopolitical system of the Caucasus—the creation of the alliance between Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan. Such a scenario could be possible in Central Eurasia as well; however, its implementation requires not only strong-willed decisions on the management of the region, but also the right choices regarding the global political and economic conditions and time frames.

Going back to the two Caspian states, whose relations are the subject of this article, we note that during the 2 April 2014 visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan in Azerbaijan, the desire of both countries to develop relations in the framework of international organizations and actively develop the issues of mutual interest was affirmed.



This event confirms the growing interest of the two countries to deepen and expand cooperation between them.

At the same time, let us not forget that the trend towards further convergence of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan can cause mismatched reactions from other outside actors, whose interests intersect in the Caspian Sea region, and the reactions could be mismatched, at least some of them.

Postscript

It is noteworthy that this article is based on the report made for the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in 2013 and was later published in Moscow as a part of the digest “Big Caucasus: Perspectives of development” in 2015. Since 2015, the interaction between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan has continued to increase.

For instance, in 2017 the Azeri side once more used the tripartite format (Turkey-Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan) for the negotiations connected to the discussions over the interaction in the spheres of transit, energy and humanitarian relations. After this Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan signed numerous agreements (Signing, 2017).

The activity of Azeri administrators during the organization of the 2017 Asian Indoor and Martial Arts Games in Ashgabat was also remarkable. The opening of Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway system was also tied to the mentioning of the potential role of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in future transit projects in Eurasia.


This year could be remarkable for the history of all the Caspian basin countries. The agreement on the status of the sea is awaiting the signature during the next all-Caspian countries' summit in Kazakhstan, potentially taking place at the end of the summer—at the beginning of Autumn 2018.

The final agreement and the opening of the Turkmenbasy seaport terminal should be the starting point for a new period of relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. This will be important for the further development of transnational and transregional cooperation by and between the two countries, and should be a relevant topic for further analytic explorations.

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
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
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
After more than nine years since its inception, the new owner of the Mayflower Bookshop in Leiden (www.themayflowerbookshop.nl) decided to move the nicest bookstore in town from its original premise at Hogewoerd 107 to Breestraat 65 during 2015 in order to expand its size and repository. During late 2016, the bookshop moved again, to the current address Breestraat 142.



Breestraat 142, Leiden, the Netherlands (© Mayflower 2016)



Often book presentations, lectures and poetry recitals held



Main Article

实事求是——“Seek Truth from Facts”¹

The East Turkistan Islamic Movement and the Uighurs in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China

Jennifer Loy

Abstract *The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a separatist terrorist organization² within the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), a province of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Their main goal is to create a caliphate from lands in Central Asia and Western China. China, however, is doing all it can to prevent this from happening. A major focus of this paper is derived from the scholarly text, The ETIM: China’s Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat, written by J. Todd Reid and Diana Raschke. I intend to add onto the international knowledge of ETIM since the book’s publication in 2010 and to give recommendations for China’s next steps. The first section of the paper offers background information on China and the ethnic Uighur people. The second section tells of a brief Uighur-Xinjiang-PRC relationship. The next two sections are on terrorism in China pre and post-9/11. The fifth section contains research completed since 2010. The final part of this paper is composed of recommendations for China’s government and how to best approach both the Uighurs and ETIM in the future.*


Keywords: East Turkestan Islamic Movement, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China, Turkestan Islamic Party, terrorism, counterterrorism

Introduction: *Heqiqet égilidu, sunmaydu*—“A fact might be distorted, but it will never change”³



The People’s Republic of China is the third largest country in the world and encompasses 9.6 million km². This vast land holds a multitude of geographical features such as the Himalayas, the Tibetan Plateau, the great Gobi and Taklimakan Deserts, steppes, grand rivers, and fertile soils. Although the ethnic Han comprise approximately 92% of the people, its 55 minority groups are just as diverse as the land. Among these people are the Uighur⁴ (pronounced “WE-gur”)

and they make up the largest minority in China. They predominantly live in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), in China’s westernmost province. Unlike the Han, they speak a



Turkic language and are typically Muslim. The Uighur history is complex for a couple of reasons. As Uighur historian Kahar Barat (2009) explained, “There is a phenomenon particular to Central Asia significant to world history that has been neglected by the historian community: in the two millennia from the Xiongnu to the Manchu, pastoral-nomadic powers of the grasslands and settled city-state powers existed in parallel” (para. 27). The former predominantly colonized the region while the latter established city-states and ruled. Uighurs today could possibly trace their lineage to a variety of groups including the Göktürk (a Turkic nomadic people), Húihú Uighur ⁵, Tocharian (an Indo-European people), Kipchak (a Turkic nomadic people), or the Mongols.


Several kingdoms and later Khanates controlled various regions. Another intricacy involves religion—depending upon the time period, they were either Buddhist or later Muslim. To classify the Uighurs as one ethnicity with one history would be incorrect.

The Göktürk controlled much of Central Asia during the 6th century CE. They were a tribal people and not completely unified. Two centuries later, the Húihú Uighurs, a group among the Göktürk overthrew the leadership and ruled under the Uighur Khanate. They originated in the Orkhan River Valley in what is Mongolia today. Further Húihú Khanates ruled until the Mongols invaded in the 13th century. These groups were predominantly Buddhist, although there were remnants of Tengrism i.e. local monotheistic and animist beliefs (Fergus and Jandosova 2003: 91). This was a lucrative time as the Chinese Silk Road was gaining in prominence.

The significance of the Silk Road is almost immeasurable in contemporary monetary and commodity value. At its height during the Tang Dynasty (618-907), China welcomed its Golden Age in art and literature; foreigners from Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East were abundant in Silk Road cities; and religious acceptance was at its best. Xian was the historical starting point of the Silk Road. As it travelled west, it stopped in several oasis locations in what is in current day Xinjiang. Without the Uighur stops, people, culture, and the spread of Buddhism, the Han would not have been as successful.



Islam spread into Central Asia in the 9th-10th centuries, although pockets existed centuries before. Barat



(2009) explained, “Islam first came through Kashgar via peaceful methods, through arriving missionaries, later, when expanding from Kasghar to Khotan, Turpan, and other places it was spread through holy war, brought with the sword” (para. 15).

Rival city-states vied for power and were eventually conquered by the Mongols. Although the Ming (1368-1644) defeated the Mongols in China proper, the Chagatai Khanate ruled the Xinjiang region through the 16th century (Millward and Perdue 2004: 27-62). Eventually, the Mongol elite assimilated into Turkic life (Barat 2009, para. 17). Religion may have changed, but their Turkic roots remained strong.


Uighur lands were finally subjugated by the Manchurian Qing Dynasty (1760-1912). In addition, the people were also pawns of the British and Russian “Great Game” of gaining land and leading to further international conflicts and scrutiny. The Opium Wars allowed for Christian missionaries to spread their beliefs inland and numerous foreign ports opened along the coastline; the devastating Taiping Rebellion killed millions of Chinese and allowed for more foreign influence. Chinese Muslims rebelled against Qing rule in addition to the millions already doing so; “In the second half of the 19th century a series of sizeable uprisings swept through Xinjiang, which culminated in establishment and existence in 1865-1878 of a theocratic state of Yettishar...with [the] capital in Kashgar City” (Babayan 2011: 14). In 1884, the Qing Dynasty fully incorporated the western territories as Xinjiang Province.

Being fully incorporated within China created significant tensions that are prevalent today. Throughout history, the Uighurs may have been conquered by different khanates, but their Turkic ethnicity remained important—even to the Mongols. Separatist movements began, but did not gain momentum until the collapse of the Qing.

According to Bhattacharji (2012), “Turkic rebels in Xinjiang declared independence in October 1933 and created the Islamic Republic of East Turkistan...” (Battachari 2012: para. 3). However, a year later, as China suffered through another civil war, the Nationalists under Jiang Jieshi ⁶, reabsorbed it into the Republic of China. In 1944, they tried again with assistance from the Soviet Union, and the Second East Turkistan Republic was formed. Reed and Raschke (2010) wrote that Uighur leaders died in a plane crash on their way to Beijing to discuss sovereignty (Reed and Raschke 2010: 114). When Mao Zedong and the Communists won in 1949, Xinjiang became part of the People’s Republic of China, and the Second East Turkistan Republic was no longer in existence. The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) was established in 1955.

一失足成千古恨，再回头已百年身——A single slip may cause lasting sorrow” ⁷

The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is significant to China for several reasons. First and foremost because it is the PRC’s furthest borders, it is of utmost strategic importance. It is bordered by eight countries (from East to West/Southwest: Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India). Historically, it found itself within the confines of the Cold War. There were Muslim Soviet satellites in Central Asia; Pakistan, was an often militarily-controlled and corrupt nation; India is the world’s largest democracy and major US ally; in addition, it bordered the proxy war in Afghanistan.



When Communism in some of these countries fell together with the Soviet Union, these newly formed nations succumbed to military rule and feigned democracy. Mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan formed al-Qaeda and the country was overpowered by the Taliban. India and Pakistan have been enemies since the Subcontinent gained independence in 1947; they tested nuclear weapons in 1998, and the latter has supported and still supports numerous terrorist organizations; their continuous disagreement over Kashmir remains as well. For the PRC to maintain its firm grip over all its land, peace and stability are necessary for Xinjiang.

The province is also important for its vast economic resources. In 1954, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Company (XPCC) was created to build agricultural settlements in the region. Its goal was and is to both grow and protect. For more than fifty years, Han migrant workers moved to XUAR for these numerous opportunities. Reed and Raschke (2010) stated, “Xinjiang’s abundant natural resources—including oil, natural gas, coal, copper, and gold—have been a keystone of China’s economic growth strategy since then-President Jiang Zemin announced the ‘Great Western Development’ economic initiative in 1999” (Reed and Raschke 2010: 10).


Jiang Zemin later created the “Open up the West” and “Go West” government sponsored programs as well (Bhattacharji 2012: para. 6). Seven years later, the XUAR is still an economic powerhouse. “Shokrat Zakir, chairman of the regional government, said Xinjiang’s GDP increased by 7.2 percent year-on-year in the first half of 2017, higher than the national level of 6.9 percent...This year alone, more than 50,000 companies have been established or set up branches in Xinjiang” (Zhao 2017: para. 2, 4). This is a dramatic increase that will bring both wealth and people to the region.

Independent from Chinese control, Uighur grievances partly stem from their vast economic resources, religious differences, environmental concerns, and human rights issues. The XPCC, or *bingtuan* “still serves as a paramilitary force, keeping order and managing prisons, and as an industrial group running farming, land reclamation, and construction projects” (Reed and Raschke 2010: 19). The *bingtuan* is predominantly made up of Han Chinese, not Uighur.

According to the 2006 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 840 positions were open and only 38 went to minorities; 26 went to Uighur men and an additional “six positions are available for Uighur or Kazak men, while three positions are open for Uighurs, Kazaks, or Kirgiz of either sex” (para. 3-4). It is clear the Han Chinese dominate the *bingtuan*, not the locals whose land it is on.

Communism as a rule has no belief in a deity or deities. Nevertheless, if it does not threaten the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is allowed. Reed and Raschke (2010) wrote, “Beijing frequently conflates Uyghur Islam with separatism and regulates the practice of Islam more strictly in Uyghur Xinjiang than elsewhere in the country” (as cited in Armijo 2006). Children under 18 years of age are not allowed to practice religion, and adults are not allowed to teach them (Reed and Raschke 2010: 23).

In 1996, XUAR was even limited in the number of people making the mandatory *hajj* to Mecca (Dillon 2004: 90). Other Muslim minorities, such as the Hui, are granted more



freedom, but they also speak Mandarin and are typically more Sinified (Reed and Raschke 2011: 22). Clearly there is a prejudice against the Uighur.

Uighurs are anxious about their environment for many reasons. First, it appears that the PRC is only concerned with removing valuable natural resources, and not its effects. Thus “Unfettered development in the energy and agricultural sectors raises serious questions about environmental sustainability and preservation” (Reed and Raschke 2010: 26).

Another worry is the region’s limited water supply as more people migrate and more businesses are developed; its dry, desert climate already produces a low water table. With an increasingly important cotton industry, more water is also used for irrigation, as well as pesticides (Reed and Raschke 2011: 27). Local Uighur farmers feel threatened by this.

Finally, the only nuclear site in China is in Lop Nor, located in the southeastern part of XUAR. Dozens of nuclear tests occurred and more than 300 of them were stronger than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima; cancer rates are higher here than anywhere else in China (Buncombe 1998: para. 8, 15). The once pristine Silk Road landscapes of the Uighur are reportedly disappearing.


Human rights issues have always been a concern since the communist nation was established. According to Reed and Raschke (2010), “Uyghur advocates accuse the PRC of widespread and long-term human rights abuses in Xinjiang, particularly in connection with the ‘Strike Hard, Maximum Pressure’ campaign launched there in 1996” (Reed and Raschke 2010: 27). The two authors continue to explain that this is a specific campaign targeting separatists within XUAR. Indeed, “The campaign...has used mass arrests, hundreds of executions, restrictions on both religious and secular organizations, torture, and general curtailment of human rights to suppress most visible Uyghur opposition” (Starr and Fuller 2003: 21). This is just one example of the hundreds of abuses suffered by the Uighur at the hands of Beijing.

枪杆子里面出政权—“Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”⁸

Reed and Raschke (2010) describe at least 25 Uighur militant groups operating in Xinjiang, predominantly pre-9/11, although there are a few mentioned after al-Qaeda’s 9-11 terrorist attacks against and inside the US. Each Uighur militant group is simply explained in terms of their political beliefs, propaganda, and violent acts, if any.

Important to note, however, is the fact that Beijing is quite selective in what the Western world has learned or been able to learn of these groups: “In general, PRC officials and media outlets have focused closely on the ETIM since about 2002 and report little new information about other militant groups” (Reed and Raschke 2010: 35). As in their text, this paper will focus solely on the modern version of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)⁹ and its effects on China since 1997.

The ETIM is viewed by numerous countries as a violent separatist organization that seeks to create an Uighur-controlled East Turkistan incorporating the XUAR, as well as “parts of



Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan” (Xu, Fletcher and Bajoria 2014: para. 3). Hasan Mahsum, an ethnic Uighur, created the group in 1997 and made it what it is today—a jihadist terrorist group.

Reed and Raschke (2010) explained that ETIM would do whatever it took to expel the Han Chinese from the XUAR, as they are “infidels” and “invaders” (Reed and Raschke 2010: 50). Its grandiloquence sometimes closely mirrors the Uighur expressions of resentment, causing great alarm in Beijing. ETIM differs from most other jihadist organizations in that it is focused solely on the PRC and not Western nations at this time.


Before 9/11, ETIM was somewhat known by Russian and Chinese media sources. Between 1990 and 2000, it was mentioned in various Eastern newspapers (Reed and Raschke 2010: 46-47). The concerning connection was discovered by a Russian newspaper when it “reported that Osama bin Laden had pledged funds to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and ETIM during a 1999 meeting in Afghanistan” (Xu, Fletcher and Bajoria 2014: para. 2). This affiliation is what eventually solidified the Sino-American relationship in the War on Terror in 2001 and subsequent years.

ETIM is a descendant of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), which was a more benign group that formed in 1940 under the direction of “Abdul Azeez Makhdoom, Abdul Hameed, Abdul Hakeem, and other scholars” (Reed and Raschke 2010: 47). It had various leaders, a couple of different names, and had violent interactions with the PRC; Hasan Mahsum organized it into a more violent group with ties to al-Qaeda.

Thus “In September 1998, ETIM moved its headquarters to Kabul, Afghanistan, taking shelter in the Taliban-controlled territory” (Stratfor Worldview 2008). The group established a training camp in the Tora Bora mountains from approximately November 2000 to October 2001 (Reed and Raschke 2010: 48).¹⁰ This movement allowed for a stricter training in jihadist ideals, both religious and militant in nature. Violent tactics were acquired, and propaganda was spread throughout Xinjiang.

Han antipathy eventually spurred violent separatist behavior in Xinjiang. Seemingly, much of this, however, cannot be traced to a particular group: “Although the Xinjiang authorities began to publicly acknowledge anti-state violence in Xinjiang in the mid-1990s, they generally suggested that it was carried out only by ‘a handful of separatists’ and stressed that the region was stable and prosperous” (Human Rights Watch 2005: para. 65). As tensions rose, Beijing cracked down on the region and closed schools and mosques. ETIM was becoming more violent as rights were stripped away from the Uighurs and Beijing was now blaming them for specific attacks. Reed and Raschke (2010) list several pre-9/11 attacks:

- A February 4, 1999 robbery and murder in Urumqi. At least five people were killed (as in the PRC’s Information Office of the State Council, 2002);¹¹
- A March 17, 1999 attack on a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) convoy in Changji City, 40 km west of Urumqi (as found in Stratfor, 2008);
- A June 18, 1999 murder of a police officer in Xinhe County in western Xinjiang (as found in (Xinhua, 2003);
- A December 14, 1999 murder in Moyu County, in southwest Xinjiang (as found in China Daily, 2003).¹²



It was the coordinated attacks on American soil on 11 September 2001 that cemented ETIM's existence as a terrorist organization.

一分耕耘， 一分收获——“Sow thin, reap thin”¹³

The post-9/11 War on Terror was felt worldwide, but especially in those regions that potentially harbored jihadist terrorists. The United States rapidly garnered international support to fight al-Qaeda, and China was quick to respond.

Washington DC was in an interesting position when it came to Chinese support—they needed the latter's assistance in fighting terrorism, but were wary of human rights abuses in XUAR:


The United States has taken a moderate approach, placing the ETIM on two terrorism blacklists—one for finance and one for immigration—and lobbying for its inclusion on a UN blacklist, but keeping the narrow group off the State Department's high-profile list of FTOs [Foreign Terrorist Organizations] (Reed and Raschke 2010: 98).

A US blacklist still deems a group terrorist, as ETIM clearly is, but incorporates other disadvantages as well. For example, the US Department of Treasury added both ETIM¹⁴ and leader, Abdul Haq¹⁵ to its Office of Foreign Assets Control Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. This froze his assets as well as his financial interactions with ETIM. The organization was placed on the Terrorist Exclusion List in April 2004, which restricts international travel. Finally, at the behest of several states, the UN placed ETIM on its own terrorist blacklist (Reed and Raschke 2010: 104).

In addition to its violence within China, ETIM's international affiliations have also condemned the group. The Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the UN claimed that a “Turkestan Army” trained under Mahsum in Afghanistan: “This ‘Army’ has a special ‘China Battalion’ with about 320 terrorists from Xinjiang. The battalion is under the direct command of Hasan Mahsum's deputy Kabar” (Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN 2001: para. 19). When their camp was destroyed by American forces, ETIM moved to Pakistan. “ETIM members have been captured or killed in Pakistan from 2002 to at least 2009” (Reed and Raschke 2010: 77). They have also been operational in Chechnya, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan (Gunitskiy 2009).¹⁶

As with many jihadist terrorist organizations, ETIM is notorious for its use of the internet. The main media site was called *Islam Awazi*, and translated into English it means “Voice of Islam.” It is now defunct, as with many of their established URLs. They also once had a YouTube channel and several videos (Reed and Raschke 2010: 78-79). When accessed in November 2017, the page stated the account was “terminated due to multiple or severe violations of YouTube's policy on violence”.¹⁷

Mahsum's role was discussed in the testimonies of 22 Uighurs that were captured and sent to the United States' Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp ('GTMO'). Their stories also shed light on the organizational strategies of ETIM. All were allegedly members of ETIM, when in



reality, “at a minimum, all of the GTMO Uyghurs either lived at an ETIM training camp, lived at an ETIM safe house, or admitted to belonging to the ETIM” (Reed and Raschke 2010: 73).

Some claim they went to the Tora Bora Mountains to learn fighting techniques to use against China; some were on the run from Beijing, others claimed they were doing business outside of China and ended up in the camps (US Department of Defense 2004).¹⁸ They did see Mahsum at the camp in Afghanistan, they trained only for a few days, and eventually fled when US troops began their bombing campaign. Although many detainees claimed they were willing to fight against China, the US released them to various countries. The PRC was not one of these countries out of fear for their safety.

Reed and Raschke (2010) also list the terrorist activities of ETIM post-9/11. The events before the 2008 Beijing Olympics include:

- A May 2002 failed plan to bomb the US Embassy at Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (Reed and Raschke 2010: 62);
- An August 8, 2005 bombing in Fuzhou—in which ETIM claimed responsibility three years later;
- A March 7, 2008 attempted plane crash. A woman tried to start a fire in the bathroom shortly after the flight left Urumqi. The plane landed safely a couple of hours later (Ibid: 63);
- A March 13, 2008 bombing in Guangzhou. Seven died and 30 were injured (as found in Xinhua, 2008);¹⁹
- A May 5, 2008 bombing in Shanghai in which three were killed and 12 were injured (Ibid: 63);
- A May 7, 2008 bombing in Longwan Village, Zhejiang Province. Nineteen people were killed and 45 were hurt;
- A July 21, 2008 bombing in which two busses were attacked. One person was killed in each and 10 and four were injured respectively (as found in Reuters, 2008).²⁰


There was a series of four attacks in August 2008 in which ETIM claimed responsibility. These were:

- An August 4 stabbing attack on policemen in Kashgar. Sixteen died and another 16 were injured (Reed and Raschke 2010: 65);
- An August 7 shooting of a security guard (Ibid: 65);
- An August 8 bombing of a police convoy in Xinjiang—this was the same day as the Opening Ceremonies. Nine people were killed (Ibid: 65);
- An August 10 series of bombings. Sources vary with the number of bombs and the locations, but it was clear that two died and many were hurt (Ibid: 65);
- An August 12 stabbing of four security guards in Kashgar; three of them were killed.

China’s reaction was hard and swift, especially since they were already in the international spotlight of the Olympic Games. Reed and Raschke’s investigation of ETIM was quite thorough. However, it is seven to eight years old; there is already much more to examine. The following sections detail people, events, and ideas since 2010 and recommendations for how the PRC should proceed with counterterrorism strategies.

Findings Since Reed and Raschke’s Publication

In 2006, Uighurs who years earlier fled to Afghanistan and Pakistan reinvented the Turkestan




Islamic Party (TIP) (Xu, Fletcher and Bajoria 2014: para.4).²¹ Some sources consider this a splinter terrorist organization under the ETIM umbrella. Jacob Zenn (2014) claimed that “the TIP has approximately 300–500 militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also a network in Turkey and possibly Central Asia” (Zen 2014: para.3). He continued by describing the role of the TIP as one for Uighurs living and traveling abroad (Ibid; para.4).

Its leader, Abdullah Mansour, has connections to al-Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and oversaw their jihadist newspaper, Islamic Turkistan. In it he listed grievances against Han Chinese in the XUAR, and compared Xinjiang to other struggling regions, such as Kashmir and Syria (Zenn 2014: para 5).²² TIP's connections with the IMU is worrisome.

Thus “Abu Zar al-Burmi [is] a prominent anti-Chinese jihadist leader in Pakistan [who] has led to Xinjiang gaining more attention among jihadists” (Zenn 2014: para.6). In various YouTube videos and sermons, he preached about China being the enemy and praised any violence against the PRC.

There have been several ETIM/TIP publications and attacks since the 2010 publication of Reed and Raschke's *The ETIM: China's Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat*. The list shown below has been compiled from several sources:

- In July 2011 there were two separate attacks against XUAR government officials. The first involved a police station in Hotan where four were killed. The second was a knife attack in Kashgar, in which 12 died and more than forty injured (Xu, Fletcher, and Bajoria 2014: para. 18).
- An October 28, 2013 car crash at Tiananmen Square that killed five and injured 38. This was the first time Uighurs used violence in the nation's capital (Global Terrorism Database 2017).
- An April 30, 2014 double suicide bombing attack in Urumqi. Besides the two bombers, at least one other died and at least 70 were injured (Ibid);
- There were two attacks on July 28, 2014 in Xinjiang. “In addition to 59 assailants, 37 people were killed, and 13 others were wounded across attacks” (Ibid);²³
- On December 19, 2014, TIP published pictures of Uighur soldiers in Syria—including women and children (Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor 2017);
- On March 12, 2015, TIP released a video honoring fallen Uighur militant members who were fighting in Syria (Ibid);²⁴
- On April 30, 2015, TIP released a video claiming responsibility for taking over In Idlib, Syria, a strategic town to the fighting (Ibid);²⁵
- On November 30, TIP “released a video featuring a message from Syria-based Saudi cleric Sheikh 'Abdallah Al-Muhaisini, who urges Uyghur Muslims in East Turkestan (Xinjiang) to remain steadfast in face of China's oppression, and to wage jihad against it” (Ibid);
- On May 2, 2016, TIP published an article praising Uighurs' roles in Syria and encouraging their efforts against China (Ibid);
- On August 26, 2016, TIP released a video urging Uighurs not to travel abroad, but to stay and fight in China (Ibid);
- An August 30, 2016 suicide bombing at the Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. Three others were wounded (Global Terrorism Database 2017, June);²⁶
- On March 6, 2017, TIP published an article seeking “to raise awareness among Arabic speakers for TIP's struggle against the Chinese government and to recruit jihadis for this struggle by calling upon jihadis throughout the world to attack Chinese targets” (Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor 2017);
- On June 15 and August 17, 2017, TIP released videos calling for jihad against China (Ibid).



A serious concern is TIP's involvement in the unrests and/or armed conflicts in foreign nations, especially the war in Syria. Uighurs have joined the former al-Qaeda affiliate al-Nusra Front to fight Assad's regime (see Appendix A). For instance, "TIP controls Jisr al Shoghur, Idlib province, Syria [and the estimated strength is] 10,000-20,000 including entire families" (TRAC 2017: para.1).

Militant Uighurs have been discovered in Southeast Asia as well. According to Soliev (2016), Uighurs were arrested in September 2014 when they were trying to connect with Mujahidin Indonesia Timor, an organization that pledged allegiance to Islamic State. On August 5, 2016, Indonesian police arrested five people who were associated with the TIP-funded terrorist group, Katibah GR (Soliev 2016: para.1).

Just recently, ISIS and TIP released two videos targeting citizens of the XUAR to take up arms. The first was released on the ISIS website called *Furat Media*. Botobekov, in his article entitled, "Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Take Aim at China" described the 30-minute video:

A bearded Uyghur militant wearing camouflage and surrounded by jihadists speaks in Uyghur promising to wage a "holy war" to the bitter end until sharia law has been spread throughout the world ... and addresses the authorities of Beijing, "Oh, you Chinese, who do not understand what people say! We are the soldiers of Allah, will make you understand Islam with the tongues of our weapons. We will come to you to shed blood like rivers and avenge the oppressed." After that, he brutally decapitates a prisoner dressed in red, who is hanging upside down. (Botobekov 2017: para.7, 9)


In contrast, the TIP video was not violent; being an al-Qaeda affiliate, they condemn the gruesome beheadings of ISIS. Clearly ETIM/TIP are major security concerns for the People's Republic of China (PRC) today. The following concluding section details recommendations for Beijing as they proceed with deterring terrorist attacks in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

Conclusion: 父债子还—"A new generation can right the wrongs of the old" / "The debts of the father are the debts of the son" ²⁷

The Tiananmen Square attacks of October 2013 forced China to face up to a new level of terrorism—one in which the Han capital was purposefully attacked. Knowing that "the PRC has zero tolerance for separatist movements ... and suppressing separatism is a matter of national security," (Reed and Raschke 2010: 86), Beijing is at a significant crossroads.

Xinjiang's independence is not a realistic possibility; therefore, other viable options must be considered. These include: a gradual loosening of censorship, an acknowledgement of their denial of human rights in the XUAR; and steps to make amends, and transparency in terms of the PRC's stance on the ETIM.

Beijing passed the nation's first counterterrorism law on December 28, 2015 and it has provided some controversy as well—especially since the XUAR is the only provincial government to implement it. The US Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent



Extremism explained part of the law in brief:

The Central Military Commission's ability to authorize ... punishment of news media that report counterterrorism operations without approval from government authorities ... deletion of terrorism-related audio and video material from the internet ... and edicts to eliminate "religious extremism," including the "education and transformation" of terrorist offenders using "authentic" religious teachings (2016: para.38).

The PRC is willing to do whatever it takes to maintain its control over its borders, but more importantly its citizens. Although their might is unwavering, so it seems is ETIM/TIP's determination to survive and continue its separatist campaign(s). Beijing must be willing to make changes in favor of the Uighurs, otherwise their status quo will remain unchanged, and little will be solved.

Authoritarian nations, regardless if they are modernizing or implementing capitalist policies, still maintain strict control over information flows, or at least try to do so. The so-called "Great Firewall of China" is the nation's primary internet censorship tool. Since numerous jihadist organizations utilize social media to recruit supporters and promote their rhetoric, the PRC should use the internet to truly discredit terrorism, jihadism and other forms of extremism, and display what Beijing is doing to promote the well-being of Uighurs in XUAR.

A few years ago, the PRC used television to discredit TIP. Thus "On June 20, 2014, Chinese Central Television (CCTV), the state broadcaster, released a 24-minute documentary on the connection between online terrorist propaganda and terrorist training videos and the terrorist attacks within China" (Gohel 2014: 19). There are a couple of problems with this release.


First, the Chinese people are already subjected to CCP propaganda all the time, so they might not view this with any caution.

Second, by airing this video, credence was given to ETIM/TIP, when Beijing's position of the organization wavered for decades. Educational programs about the violence and extremism of terrorists is fundamental in their demise and can be promoted via both the internet and television. This way the public will not disregard their importance as typical propaganda.

Several ETIM/TIP attacks in the last four years have been political in nature or coincided with an important governmental event. The October 2013 attacks at Tiananmen Square occurred in front of the portrait of Mao Zedong and nearby a plenary session was planned for the CCP (Gohel 2014: 16). The April 2014 attack took place on the same day President Xi Jinping was in the region to discuss counterterrorism (Blanchard 2014: para.1).

It does not take much expertise to conclude the fact that XUAR is unhappy with the current political state of China. Urumqi is the provincial capital, as well as the hub for terrorist activity in the region. The PRC can use Urumqi as a significant player in counterterrorism measures.

First and foremost, Beijing needs to understand the complex history of the Uighurs. They are a Turkic people, speak a Turkic language, and have a vast and separate political, religious, and social history. They are very different from the Han, and allowing Han migratory policies



has created multifaceted issues within Xinjiang. Once this past is acknowledged and celebrated, then understanding separatist and terrorist apprehensions can be addressed. Consequently, “Counter-terrorism efforts must be combined with economic growth and proper settlement of regional conflict” (Cui 2013: para.9). The policymakers in Beijing need to recognize the present discriminations found in daily life and why the Han way will not work. Corporate ethnic allotment percentages, especially those of the *bingtuan* i.e. XPCC should be significantly raised for the local Uighur.

Second, the PRC should continue to maintain an overt surveillance system within the city of Urumqi. No one likes being watched, but closed-circuit cameras are already present in hundreds of cities worldwide. This can help prevent regular crimes in addition to terrorist activities.

Third, implement educational and vigilance programs like those successes with the Muslim community in Dearborn, Michigan, United States.²⁸ When the people feel safe and trusted, they will be less likely to support dangerous behaviors.


Since 2016, Beijing has enacted several absurd bans in XUAR that are ultimately a catalyst for separatist ideals. For instance, “The XUAR Regulation on De-extremification, adopted at the 28th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 12th People’s Congress for the XUAR on March 29, sets out much broader proscriptions that will have lasting effects on the Uyghur community” (Irwin 2017: para.7).

Common Muslim names, such as Muhammad and Medina, as well as 27 others have been put on a forbidden list. Irwin (2017) continues to state that beards had to be trimmed to a proper length to not appear to be a Muslim extremist (Irwin 2017: para 1, 10). No other autonomous region or ethnic group within the PRC is subjected to such treatment. These religious rights’ violations need to stop. If the Uighurs are viewed in a different light, perhaps they will feel less threatened and less willing to have separatist inclinations.

To maintain international credibility with its counterterrorism partners, the PRC needs to be clear on its stance on ETIM/TIP. Numerous experts have proven Chinese flip-flopping over a variety of topics throughout the years. Reed and Raschke (2010) have mentioned it as well; thus “The Chinese government emphasizes ETIM activity and the general threat of Uyghur separatism when those emphases serve the state’s interests more than silence on the subject” (Reed and Raschke 2010: 93).

Even before the 9/11 attacks, Beijing wavered its position on the terrorist group. Another example of this is before and after the Beijing Olympics. China has an image to uphold (whether realistic or not) within and outside of its borders. To appear strong and ready to take on the Olympics, Beijing did not credit ETIM with as many violent incidents as they did after the games.

This governmental laxity could lead to confusion, apathy, and possible disdain among international alliances and audiences. In the 2017 world of instant media and “fake news”, providing the correct explanations needs to be consistently applied. Transparency of ETIM/TIP is a must for two reasons. First, it will serve to initiate more trust between the Chinese citizens and the government. This is a relationship that would only benefit both sides. Second, it will warn ETIM/TIP that Beijing is serious about protecting its objectives all





the time. This recognition will also help Chinese citizens realize the concern and could lend to more participation in civilian vigilance programs.

Presented are what the PRC might consider are some harsh recommendations. Still these should help to provide a unique opportunity to produce substantial economic gains and correct major historical misunderstandings and violations in the fields of religion and human rights. The PRC must take a hard look at itself and consider what is most important to the nation. As the concluding section's subtitle suggests, there could be a positive or negative connotation to how the PRC chooses to deal with countering terrorism in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

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
Appendix





Endnotes

1. Mao first used this phrase, but it became a solidified statement under Deng Xiaoping's rule. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Chinese_quotations.
2. Terrorism as I see it is often political in its purpose and exposes the public to fear, whether in words or violent actions.
3. This is a Uighur proverb meaning "a fact might be distorted, but it will never change." Retrieved from <http://nstar.blogcu.com/uyghur-maqal-temsilliri-uyghur-proverbs-3/127823>.
4. They are also known as the Uigur, Uyгур or Uyghur.
5. According to Barat, Húihú is Old Chinese and represents the people who were Buddhist. Today, Uighur is used and represents those who are Muslim.
6. Also known as Chiang Kai-shek using the Wade-Giles spelling system.
7. This is a Chinese proverb meaning "a single mistake can lead to unending sadness." Retrieved from https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Chinese_proverbs.
8. This was a quote of Mao declared in 1927 when he realized that the Chinese Civil War between the Nationalists and Communists was imminent. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Chinese_quotations.
9. Also known as the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIP), as found in Thomas Joscelyn's article entitled, 'The Uighurs, in Their Own Words' (2009).
10. This testimony came from captured Uighurs held at the US's special prison camp at Guantanamo Bay, known as the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp (GTMO).
11. When this site was accessed on November 5, 2017, it was no longer in service (Ibid June 19, 2018).
12. Ibid. Yet when this site was last accessed on June 19, 2018, the site appeared to be in service.
13. This is a Chinese proverb which translates to "Sow thin, reap thin. You get out, what you put in." Retrieved from https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Chinese_proverbs.
14. ETIM was added on the list in September 2002.
15. Abdul Haq was added on the list in April 2009.
16. When this site was accessed on November 5, 2017, it was no longer in service and the CDI has since partnered with Project on Government Oversight (POGO). See <http://pogo.org/strauss/>.
17. <https://www.youtube.com/user/tipawazi>.
18. When this site was accessed on November 5, 2017, it was no longer in service. When it was again accessed on June 19, 2018, one is directed to the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff Freedom of Information Act Requester Service Center.
19. When this site was accessed on November 16, 2017, an error message stated, "The connection has timed out."
20. When this page was accessed on November 16, 2017, an error message stated, "File or directory not found."
21. Jacob Zenn, in his China Brief, "Beijing, Kunming, Urumqi and Guangzhou: The Changing Landscape of Anti-Chinese Jihadists," stated TIP began in 2008 (2014: para.8). TRAC also claimed the same (2017: para.2).
22. To be clear, some sources use TIP and ETIM interchangeably, whereas the organizations themselves typically specify responsibility for various attacks.
23. No group claimed responsibility, but the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) claims that sources point to ETIM.
24. The Middle East Research Institute (MEMRI) has data of several of these videos.
25. MEMRI has data of several videos discussing strategy in Syria.
26. No group claimed responsibility, but START claims sources that point to ETIM.
27. This is a Chinese proverb which loosely translated has two meanings. The positive is "a new generation can right the wrongs of the old generation", while the negative is "the debts of the father are the debts of the son." Retrieved from https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Chinese_proverbs.



28. See Michael Hirsh's article, 'Inside the FBI's Secret Muslim Network' (2016).

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
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
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
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
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Key recommendations on the paper ‘ “Seek Truth from Facts” ’

(Critical Response to Jennifer Loy’s “ “Seek Truth from Facts”: The East Turkistan Islamic Movement and the Uighurs in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China”)

After a keen perusal of the paper there are certain key recommendations that I would like to make. The paper does present itself as a great narrative which does not fail in capturing the attention of the readers in general and can have an appeal across several sections, not just



academicians and policy makers but also professionals. The author has made a very sincere effort to bring to the fore the complexities of the relationship between the Chinese and the Uighur people.

Yet the paper can be further enhanced if the author can investigate further, from a strongly grounded historical perspective (by also citing several stronger sources), on questions such as Who are the Uighur? On the other hand this investigation can also help to answer questions with regards to how it is not only a political conflict but also an ethnic conflict. There are ethnographic essays on the Uighur which the author can refer to in order to substantiate his or her argument.

While definitely there is a stress on the religious aspect of the conflict, it should also be noted that in several cases it is ethnicity which lies at the fulcrum of the splinter which has been the cause for a volatile conflict. For example the monolithic worldview of the Arabs as a single homogenous entity stands challenged by examples of people such as Tariq Aziz who was a Christian and so was George Habbash, who was a Marxist Palestinian revolutionary of Christian origin.

Therefore given the core concerns of a new emerging discipline such as ethnogeopolitics, I would recommend that any papers submitted to the journal present an account of the ethnographic reality in detail. Possibly there are no contradictions, but whether there are or were any in any historical period before the emergence of Islam, is another question.

My understanding of Central Asia is that there are layers of meanings when it comes to understanding the nuances of its diverse societies and the Uighur are representative of the same. I am sure that with editorial intervention the paper would be much better than what it is now, indeed can turn into a brilliant paper. Still, the current paper does throw light on the dominant perception of the present conflict in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.


The author is certainly capable of adopting the abovesaid recommendations if he or she agrees with them and is willing to do so, as he or she clearly has a deep knowledge about the history of the discussed areas. The author indeed discusses a historical phenomenon across a vast region. Therefore, the relatively short paper cannot fulfil such a task in full. However, I am aware of the limitations in word limit and other conventions of publications. This paper deserves publication given that a few salient points are addressed or corrected. Despite certain shortcomings, I recommend the publication of this paper.

- Anonymous

The Main Drivers of Conflict among the Uighur (and Other Minorities)

(Editorial Note to Jennifer Loy's "Seek Truth from Facts": The East Turkistan Islamic Movement and the Uighurs in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China")

The review has formulated really scholarly arguments that may be of use to the author. In my understanding, the Uighur's conflict main driving engines are twofold: religion, and related to



this center versus periphery issue. Ethnicity rests on denominators such as language and religion. While language is not a likely engine of creating conflicts, it is still a source of identity.

In the context of China, Muslims as a whole are put in the periphery. The Uighur as the largest group is more active and more visible in formulating grievances. A remarkable group are Hui; they are Han Chinese who are Muslims. On the one hand they are in the periphery based on their religion and their geographical location (the East and South coast are the center of China); on the other hand they are Muslims who remain loyal to the Chinese state.

Indeed, I have heard from Uighur nationalists of Pan-Turkic rather than Islamic-centered orientation, that the Hui comply with China and oppose the Uighur independence movement. It may be so, but I still wonder the credibility of such claims. The Hui may not be attracted by the Uighur Pan-Turkic movements but still be aware and aggrieved by their peripheral position in China.

Another issue is the perception of discrimination versus the real policy of discrimination. The Chinese policy on the regional languages and religions is self-reportedly very liberal. However, it is regulated and this makes it politicized.

In cases the state does not intervene at all, a more relaxed situation may be created. In this case, the facts are that Western China is less economically developed and is less invested by the Chinese state to develop it. On the other hand, and this is one of the main strengths of our new 'multidisciplinary discipline' of ethnogeopolitics, geographic facts are compelling.

In this regard demography in and of its own already has a heavy influence on the perception of discrimination among the Uighurs and other Muslims, by the dominant Han non-Muslim population. Hence the latter's influence on the politics and economy of China, is a multiple of times larger than that of any other groups, with or without any intended discriminatory policy targeting these minorities. I hope these editorial comments can be of use to the author's present and future endeavors as a scholar.


- Babak Rezvani, Editor-in-Chief

Author's Response

I would like to emphasize and state here that the reviewer's and editor-in-chief's published comments concern my original(ly submitted) paper of November 25, 2017. The version that is published here concerns a revised one that I resubmitted on May 8, 2018. The revisions mainly are in response to the reviewer's and editor-in-chief's comments, and hopefully assuage at least some of their concerns.

- Jennifer Loy

NB: do you have any comments on Jennifer Loy's article and/or the Critical Response, the Editorial Note and the Author's Response to these? The other peer-reviews remain anonymous and unpublished. Your comments may be published as follow-up Critical Responses in one of the next issues if you wish so, under your name or anonymously. Please send these to info@ethnogeopolitics.org, or through the contact form at www.ethnogeopolitics.org.



(Announcement)

My forthcoming Expert Cartoon publication Caspar ten Dam

THE EXPERT



In recent years, I have once more been producing cartoons and other illustrations (see e.g. www.ctdamconsultancy.com and <https://stripkunst.wordpress.com>; my authorship ("Copyright C. ten Dam") must stay visible in small-scale and large-scale reproductions. For any commercial, large-scale use, my prior permission is required). Thus examples of my new cartoon character the "(Terrorism) Expert" have been reproduced in multiple issues of our journal *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* of which I am the executive editor.

Soon, with details to be announced on our website www.ethnogeopolitics.org and in the next issue(s) of our journal, a comic book will appear containing a selection of my Expert cartoons from 2015 and 2016 (some of which already appeared in our journal) and other cartoons and illustrations of mine as well. This forthcoming publication (see for a teaser the picture below) intends to celebrate the 7th anniversary of our Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics—and to kickstart its publishing house, *EGP Publishers*.

The Expert


A strange academic
world we (have to?)
live in!



Cartoons by
Caspar ten Dam

Special publication
celebrating the
7th Anniversary of
the Association for the
Study of
EthnoGeoPolitics

A publication of the Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics
Amsterdam The Netherlands



Dorsey's Column

The Rise, Fall, and Rise Again of the Politics of Middle Eastern Soccer

James M. Dorsey

Edited remarks at "The Beautiful Game? Identity, Resentment, and Discrimination" conference at the Center for Research on Antisemitism, Berlin, 12-13 April 2018

Introduction

The virtually continuous role of soccer as a key player in the history and development of the Middle East and North Africa dating back to the late 19th century seemed to have come to an abrupt halt in 2014 as the Saudi-United Arab Emirates(UAE)-led counterrevolution gained momentum, the Saudi-Iranian regional rivalry accelerated, and the political rift in the Gulf initially manifested itself.


The long and dramatic history of the Middle Eastern intersection of sports and politics took a backseat as the fallout of the popular Arab revolts of 2011 unfolded. In contrast to other parts of the world in which rulers and politicians at times employed sports as a tool to achieve political goals, sports in general and soccer in particular had been a virtually continuous player in the Middle East in terms of nation, state and regime formation; assertion of national identity; the struggle for independence; republicanism vs monarchy; ideological battles; and fights for human, political, gender and labour rights.¹

Soccer in the Middle East and North Africa had repeatedly demonstrated its potential as an engine of social and political change—not necessarily the lovey-dovey kind of building bridges and contributing to peace, but more often than not divisive and confrontational.

That was evident with the role of soccer in the 1919 Egyptian revolution²; the struggles for nationhood, statehood and independence of Jews³, Palestinians⁴ and Algerians⁵; the quest for modernity in Turkey and Iran⁶; the 2011 popular revolts⁷; post-2011 resistance to a UAE-Saudi-inspired counterrevolution⁸; the awarding by world soccer governing body FIFA (*Fédération Internationale de Football Association*) of the 2022 World Cup hosting rights to Qatar⁹; and ultimately the battle for regional dominance between Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as the Gulf crisis that since June 2017 has pitted a UAE-Saudi-led alliance against Qatar.¹⁰

The Gulf crisis put an end to a period starting with the crushing of student protests with militant soccer fans at their core against the military coup in Egypt in 2013 that brought Mr. Al-Sisi to power in which the sport no longer seemed a useful prism for analyzing developments in the Middle East and North Africa. The subsequent crackdown turned Egyptian universities into security fortresses and seemed to have largely silenced the ultras i.e. militant soccer fans.¹¹

The first round of the Gulf crisis in 2014 began when Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar's capital Doha for a period of ten months¹²; the



escalating war in Syria; the rise of Saudi Arabia's King Salman and his son, Mohammed bin Salman, and the changes they introduced in Saudi Arabia; the escalation of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry and its associated proxy wars in Syria, Jemen and until recently Iraq; and the initial phase of the second round in the Gulf crisis with last year's imposition of a diplomatic and economic boycott of Qatar: all these events have reinforced a sense that soccer is no longer a working prism for analysis of events.

More recent developments: soccer re-emerging as a political and social factor

A number of more recent developments have however reversed the sense that soccer has ceased to play any transformative role in the region. One is the re-emergence of soccer in Egypt as an important player despite the crackdown on the anti-Sisi protests. Mr. Al-Sisi has repeatedly tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to forge links with the ultras while the ultras in past years despite the repression again have emerged as one of the few groups willing to stage protests. Scores of protesters have since been sentenced to prison, many remain detained awaiting trial.¹³


Enlisting the support of soccer represented by the Egyptian Football Association and major clubs for his re-election in the Spring of 2018, Mr. Al-Sisi has utilized soccer as a key tool of gaining popularity and even legitimacy, by associating himself with something the country is crazy about and that evokes deep-seated, tribal-like emotions.¹⁴ Egypt's qualification for this year's World Cup like that of several other Arab teams, cemented the renewed role of soccer in Egypt and the other qualifying countries.

Similarly, Saudi soccer diplomacy in Iraq has earned the kingdom brownie points. Soccer, despite the Gulf crisis, has moreover proven to be the wedge that has driven change and significant reform of the labor regime in Qatar. The changes fall short of what human rights groups, international trade unions and the International Labour Organization (ILO) wanted to see. Nonetheless, the changes amount to far more than a cosmetic facelift.¹⁵

Last but not least, soccer, and particularly the Qatar World Cup, is an important arena in the increasingly overt public relations battle between the Gulf state and its detractors, particularly the United Arab Emirates.¹⁶ In addition to playing an important role in the politics of the region, Middle Eastern soccer has in the past three years highlighted the hypocrisy of the insistence by world soccer body FIFA that good governance should ensure its separation from politics. The current endorsement system and practice of a host-country candidate by a football association and/or clubs makes a mockery of a division of sports and politics. So do FIFA decisions regarding venues and choice of referees for competition matches involving teams of the Middle East's feuding states.¹⁷

Politicized soccer and kindred games vis-à-vis autocrats in history

The political role of soccer is rooted in the politics of sports that goes back to 5th century Rome, when support groups identified as the Blues, Greens, Reds and Whites in the absence of alternative channels for public expression acclaimed a candidate slated to be installed as



Rome's emperor in games dominated by chariot racing. Much like modern-day militant soccer fans or ultras, they frequently shouted political demands in between races in a bid to influence policy.¹⁸

In doing so, the Romans set a trend that has since proven its value as well as its risk. In today's modern world, soccer pitches, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, were frequently viewed as barometers of the public mood and indicators of political and social trends. They also were platforms for the public venting of pent-up frustration and anger as well as grievances.

Like Rome, the Byzantine empire also served as an early example of the impact of fan power. That was most evident in the 532 AD Nika revolt, the most violent in Constantinople's history, when the then dominant Blues and Greens rioted for a week, destroyed much of the city, sacked the Hagia Sophia, and almost succeeded in forcing the Byzantine emperor Justinian I to vacate his throne.¹⁹


The identification, through patronage and micromanagement, of modern-day Arab autocrats with soccer emulates the Romans' use of games and sports to solidify their power. The Greens and the Blues and their fans in fifth-century-AD games were the Roman predecessors of today's Middle Eastern and North African soccer fans who expressed similarly deep-seated passions.

Arab autocrats, however, unlike their Roman predecessors, were determined to prevent soccer clubs from becoming arbiters of political power. In contrast to the Romans, giving fans and the public a say in the choice of a leader would be unthinkable in contemporary autocratic Arabia. It would have to give the public a degree of sovereignty and undermine the position of the ruler as the neo-patriarchic, autocratic father in the words of Palestinian-American scholar Hisham Sharabi, who characterized autocracies in the Middle East and North Africa as expressions of neo-patriarchy.²⁰

Soccer was the perfect tool for neo-patriarchic autocrats. Their values were the same values that are often projected onto soccer: assertion of male superiority in most aspects of life, control or harnessing of female lust, and a belief in a masculine God. The game's popularity, moreover, made it the perfect soft-power tool to wield transnational sporting influence in an era of decolonization followed by a Cold War in which sporting powers like the United States and the Soviet Union were focused on the Olympics rather than the World Cup, and it continues to serve this purpose in subsequent globalization.

As a result, neo-patriarchy framed the environment in which militant soccer fans turned the soccer field into a battlefield. Arab autocrats, such as the toppled Egyptian and Tunisian presidents Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, had no intention of risking a repeat of Justinian I's experience.

Theirs was a world in which there could be no uncontrolled public space, no opportunity for the public to express itself, voice grievances, and vent pent-up anger and frustration. They could suppress most expressions of dissent, such as underground music. Musicians were intimidated, imprisoned, or refused entry into the country, with by and large little or no public response. Labour activism was brutally repressed.



The soccer pitch, however, like the mosque, were venues for the deep-seated emotions they evoked among a majority of the population and could not simply be repressed or shut down. The mosque proved easier to control. The pulpit was subjected to government supervision; clerics were state employees. Security forces successfully confronted more militant, politicized Islamists.²¹

Soccer pitches were not that simple. Fans, particularly militants, who described themselves as ultras and viewed club executives as representatives or corrupt pawns of a repressive regime and players as mercenaries who played for the highest bidder, were cut from a different cloth. They understood themselves as their club's only true supporters, and as a result believed that they were the real owners of the stadium. In staking their claim, the fans emerged in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco as the most, if not only, organized force willing and able to figuratively and literally challenge the regime's effort to control all public space.


Co-optation and repression of the soccer stadium

The fans' claim positioned soccer as both a threat and an opportunity for Middle Eastern and North African autocrats. The threat was an increasingly fearless, well-organized, highly politicized, and street battle-hardened force that attracted thousands of young men who were willing and able to stand their ground against the security forces. In doing so, they were publicly challenging the state's authority.

Long deprived of the option to simply close down the contested public space, autocrats like Mr. Hosni Mubarak in Egypt were forced to respond with a combination of co-optation and repression. Alongside heavy-handed use of security forces, they sought to identify themselves with the game, the region's most popular form of popular culture, by basking in the success of national teams and major clubs and exploiting neo-patriarchal attitudes by showering players with expensive gifts and the ruler's attention, while at the same time denouncing the ultras as criminals and thugs.²² That pattern continues to this day, buffeted by significantly stepped-up repression and in the case of Egypt the virtual closure to the public of stadiums for much of the past seven years ironically made possible by the 2011 revolt.

Co-optation potentially creates significant opportunity for the autocrat, no more so than at times of major international competitions like the World Cup. Identification with one of the country's most popular and emotive pastimes offers the autocrat the prospect of harnessing it to polish his often tarnished image.

Co-optation also provides an autocrat with an additional peg for favourable media attention that could help distract attention away from or overshadow criticism. Finally, it enables autocrats to manipulate public emotions at given moments and rally the nation around them, as the Mubaraks did against Algeria in late 2009.



The Middle East and soccer today: utilized chaos, contestation and (lack of) dreams and prospects

In many ways the Middle East of today is not the Middle East of a decade ago. Arab autocrats recognize that their efforts to upgrade autocracy and embrace economic and social reform coupled with increased repression, are contested if not contradictory. Fortunately for them, the mayhem in the region seems to work in their favour. The wars and the other forms of violence invoke nationalist and other useful, manipulable emotions and invoke fears that popular protest could lead to chaos and anarchy. Yet, discontent is simmering just below the surface much as it did in the run-up to the 2011 revolts—and the soccer pitch is often where it rears its head.

The mayhem in the Middle East and North Africa is not exclusively, but in many ways, due to autocrats' inability and failure to deliver public goods and services. That is true not only for the region's autocratic Sunni-Arab majority but also for Iran, and Tunisia, the Arab revolt's one and only relative success story to date.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman appears to be holding out a dream for his kingdom. But that dream increasingly is being shattered in Yemen, and at home has yet to produce more than greater freedoms for women and opportunity for entertainment. Autocrats in the Middle East and North Africa are about upgrading and modernizing their regimes to ensure their survival, not about real sustainable change.


Human rights activist and former Tunisian president Moncef Marzouki was asked in a *Wall Street Journal* interview why it was not only those who lacked opportunity and felt that they had no prospects and no hopes, but also educated Tunisians with jobs who had joined the Islamic State. His answer was: "It's not simply a matter of tackling socioeconomic roots. You have to go deeper and understand that these guys have a dream—and we don't. We had a dream—our dream was called the Arab Spring. And our dream is now turning into a nightmare. But the young people need a dream, and the only dream available to them (was) the caliphate".²³

Mohammed bin Salman has come closest to creating a dream. For now, it remains a dream on which he has yet to deliver. Much of the Middle East does not have a dream.

A court ruling in 2015 in Egypt since the rise of Mr. Al-Sisi as the new autocratic President in 2014, banned ultras groups as terrorist organizations. A similar attempt failed in Turkey. Yet, the scores of arrests in Egypt demonstrate that the ultras are alive and kicking. Said a founder of one Egypt's original ultras groups that played a key role prior to the rise of Mr. Al-Sisi: "This is a new generation. It's a generation that can't be controlled. They don't read. They believe in action and experience. They have balls. When the opportunity arises, they will do something bigger than we ever did".²⁴

Conclusion

In sum, soccer resistance in the Middle East and North Africa may be down but not out. For the time being at least, autocratic rulers retain the upper hand and use the sport to enhance their



grip on power, ironically aided and abetted by FIFA. Yet, it is that very approach to the sport that also has positioned and sustained it as a potential or even actual platform for protest and resistance.


The jury is out on whether autocratic efforts at reform will produce sustainable results. The record so far is mixed at best. If there is one group at the ready if reforms fail, it is likely to be soccer fans.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg's Institute for Fan Culture, and co-host of the New Books in Middle Eastern Studies podcast. James is the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title as well as Comparative Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa co-authored with Dr. Teresita Cruz-Del Rosario, Shifting Sands. Essays on Sports and Politics in the Middle East and North Africa and China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom. jmdorsey@questfze.com

An earlier version of the article appeared at [http\[s\]://mideastsoccer.blogspot.nl/2018/04/the-rise-fall-and-rise-again-of.html](http[s]://mideastsoccer.blogspot.nl/2018/04/the-rise-fall-and-rise-again-of.html)


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NB: do you have any comments on James Dorsey's article? Please send these to info@ethnogeopolitics.org, or through the contact form at www.ethnogeopolitics.org.



Guest Column

Dutch Defence Ministry keeps bumbling

Jeroen Stam

This article was first published in Dutch, on www.novini.nl – August 25th, 2018.

Translation by M. G. Bakker, journalist mg_bakker@columnist.com.

Not many ministries in The Netherlands can boast as many blunders as the Ministry of Defence. The department is under a, seemingly, never ending siege. Even setting things right seems to fail constantly.

Substandard food quality in army canteens, a debatable change of command at Eindhoven Air Base, a navy diver who perished on Curaçao, corrupt fleet managers, two soldiers killed in Mali due to faulty equipment, a sexual harassment case at a military base and a fatal accident on the Ossendrecht shooting range.

It is but a modest enumeration of scandals within the Dutch Armed Forces over the past few years. Minister Jeanine Hennis and Chief of Defence Tom Middendorp were compelled to resign in October last year. Hennis was re-hired by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) shortly thereafter, as a lieutenant colonel. Middendorp became aide-de-camp to King Willem-Alexander, for 'services rendered'.


Everybody makes mistakes—making amends however, is key. The MOD even fails there. Having received the pink slip, a regular employee, responsible for a swath of mistakes and unable to set things right, will as a rule not be hired by any comparable company. Let alone be re-hired by his or her former employer.

It is not quite a recent development, let alone incidental—the inadequate handling of accidents and scandals. The carcinogenic dangers of chromium trioxide were already known in 1973, according to the Institute for Public Health and the Environment. Survivors and surviving relatives of the airplane crash in the Irish Sea in 1981 declared late last year that the Ministry still had not coped with the disaster satisfactorily. And Srebrenica veterans still feel left out in the cold, two decades on.

Fairy tale

The Srebrenica massacre is, beyond doubt, one of the most tragic episodes in the Dutch Armed Forces' history. The Muslim enclave in former Yugoslavia was supposed to be protected by Dutchbat troops, when, on July 11th 1995, it was overrun by the Serbian troops of general Mladić. Consequently, the largest war crime on European soil since World War II was perpetrated. The death toll of the genocide amounted to about 8,000 casualties. An ill-defined mandate, flawed preparation and insufficient weaponry—these are but a few of the reasons the mission failed. It became a national trauma in the Netherlands.

Veteran Remko de Bruijne was there, in 1995, serving as a private 1st class: "For weeks we had been aware the enclave would fall. Every day we would report troop movements from Serbia



to Srebrenica. The Serbian government claimed these were nothing but exercise manoeuvres. I was 20 at the time, just out of training, but in my opinion this fairy tale seemed rather far-fetched. Exercises during wartime? War isn't exactly an exercise, now is it? The troop movements were referred to our operations room in Potočari and they reported it all to the higher echelons in Zagreb. Unfortunately nothing was done about it and we all know how it ended."

Amidst the raging hostilities, operational conditions on the Dutchbat base were far from ideal. 'Near our compound there were heaps of white asbestos, out in the open', recounts De Bruijne. "After a shower of rain it was washed all over the terrain. We were ordered to clean it up, without any protective clothing—I still have pictures of this. Also, there was a barrel with nuclear radiation emanating from it. An official document stated the MOD didn't want personnel and the home front 'to worry about this particular fact'."

Sceptical


Time and again news emerges regarding the controversial way in which the MOD has handled the aftermath of the tragedy. De Bruijne: "Minister Hennis, Prime Minister Rutte and Chief of Defence Middelburg attended a Dutchbat III meeting in 2014. They made all kinds of promises, concerning rehabilitation and psychological assistance. It all amounted to zilch. I am rather sceptical when it comes to the promises made by the MOD and the powers that be, as are countless Dutchbat veterans. For the past 14 years I have been engaged in legal battles with the Ministry. I have encountered obstruction, false promises and all kinds of procedural tricks."

The MOD says in a statement: "Members of Dutchbat have experienced a most difficult time and some among them, sadly, have subsequently suffered afflictions. The Ministry offers care and support: There are services for which they can apply. Also, veterans have been able to make use of the 'debt of honour'-settlement. Any veteran experiencing residual damage can contact us. We will look into cases individually and as speedily as possible."

De Bruijne is not impressed: "Of course one can ask for support, however, in practice all requests will be rejected. You have to undergo several examinations by MOD medical staff and they of course aren't exactly keen on making way for financial compensation." In addition, the ex-soldier noticed the Ministry has lost significant data regarding the fall of the enclave: "The Srebrenica work order: Gone. Documentation with reference to graves on the compound: Lost. The infamous film roll [made and handed in by Dutchbat-lieutenant Ron Rutten that reportedly showed Serb war crimes. Ed.]: Destroyed." Minister Bijleveld denies the latter: "The MOD has not withheld any footage. All photographic evidence has been handed over to the Yugoslav Tribunal and the Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, which published the report Srebrenica: a 'safe' area in 2002."

Discredited

According to author Edwin F. Giltay, Bijleveld's response is not convincing. "The sources mentioned in my book *The Cover-up General* have made a credible case to the contrary. They




assert footage has actually been withheld.” His non-fiction thriller was prohibited by the courts in 2015, in a case instigated by a former MOD-employee who claimed the facts were made-up.

When asked, Minister Bijleveld declares: “In the book fact and fiction are indeed intertwined.” Nevertheless: The Court of Appeal in The Hague overturned the book ban, resolutely. It ruled its accuracy is not in doubt. “I do not have any views on that,” says Bijleveld.

In the past, Mr Giltay has been branded as ‘completely loopy’ in an official report made public by the MOD. The incumbent Minister denies endorsing the report: “The MOD has never spoken about Mr Giltay in this fashion.” The document, however, has never been recounted and is still publicly available.

Having been discredited by the Ministry is one thing—Giltay thinks there are bigger fish to fry: The covering up of the truth about Srebrenica. “The Ministry never quite developed admitting mistakes. Unlike certain film rolls.” De Bruijne adds: “They prefer to keep everything under wraps, lest damages claims will ensue. Neither justice nor truth are relevant to them.”

Jeroen Stam (45) is a freelance author from The Hague. He has taken a keen interest in the Srebrenica aftermath and has published about the subject on news website Novini.



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Military intelligence scandal uncovered in Dutch book




A general sporting three stars on his uniform, commissioning a private spy to nose around in a commercial company. And this is not just anyone: it's the general's own wife. A tribal war within the Dutch Military Intelligence Service, with unsuspecting citizens being victimized. One would expect such a *modus operandi* in North Korea, not in the Low Countries. However, this is what author Edwin F. Giltay experienced — he vividly describes the saga in *The Cover-up General* (Dutch: *De doofpotgeneraal*).

In his book Mr Giltay depicts the rather transparent conduct of secret service agents infiltrating at the internet provider where he was assigned. Initially a spook tried to recruit Mr Giltay as a military analyst. At the same time however, she herself was being monitored. At the root of this tug-of-war within the Military Intelligence Service was the infamous film roll of Srebrenica depicting war crimes, which was misdeveloped by the Dutch Armed Forces. The recruiting officer intended to make public the footage on the film wasn't at all lost — information that would no doubt have undermined the standing of a certain triple-star general.

The Cover-up General delineates this espionage scandal fervently. Mr Giltay recounts the absurd consequences in great detail.

In November 2014, *The Cover-up General* was published in Amsterdam. One year after publication — when it was already sold out — the book was banned. A judge prohibited Edwin F. Giltay to reprint, distribute and even promote his book. The censorship verdict was front page news in the Balkans, and met with anger and disbelief everywhere.

However, the verdict was resolutely overturned on 12 April 2016. A second, revised edition of *The Cover-up General* by Blauwe Tijger Publishing returned on the market in September 2016.



€19.50 including delivery in the Netherlands and Belgium

De doofpotgeneraal
Edwin Giltay
Epilogue Hans Laroes

Book banned: 21 December 2015
Ban lifted: 12 April 2016
Second, revised edition including eight new chapters published in September 2016 by Blauwe Tijger

Paperback with flaps
263 pages




'A good observation of a sad struggle within the army command'
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



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'The Court rules the accuracy by which Edwin Giltay wrote the book, is not in doubt'
Court of Appeal The Hague

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