


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
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Scope

The aim of Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics (EGP) is to further the study of and teaching on the cultural, social, ethnic and (geo-)political characteristics, processes and developments in different areas of the world, at universities, institutes and colleges in and outside the Netherlands. The association's peer-reviewed and open-access journal *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* and our new publishing house *EGxPress* are above all intended to elicit analytic debate by allowing scholars to air their views, perspectives and research findings—with critical responses from others who may hold a different view or research approach. One can submit manuscripts—main articles (peer-reviewed), critical responses (published peer-reviews), short articles and/or book reviews—to info@ethnogeopolitics.org. We charge no fees for any of the submitted and/or published manuscripts. See www.ethnogeopolitics.org about the association's foundation, founding (editorial) board members, aims, activities and publications—and particularly the freely downloadable copies of the journal's issues and the individual contributions in each issue. From Volume 7 onwards, the pagenumbers are to be continuous from one issue to the next within every yearly volume.



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




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
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We welcome and publish open comments i.e. critical responses—particularly those of peer-reviewers—in order to encourage feedback and debate. These responses can be anonymous if their authors wish so. Still, we encourage them to publicise their names under their contributions, as the latter will thus become better citable, referable



and indexical as sources and publications.

Of course we at the Editorial Board decide whether or not to publish (excerpts from) peer-reviewers' comments, based on considerations of utility and usefulness for ongoing debate. Thus the absence of published peer-reviews and comments does not mean that these do not exist; thus some peer-reviews are not published because their comments have been addressed by the author in his or her contribution. To reiterate, Main Articles have undergone generally two or more peer-reviews.

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
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We thus welcome your contributions, ranging from articles to transparent reviews and comments on these articles.

Addendum: from Volume 7 onwards, the pagenumbers are continuous from one issue to the next—as evident in the current issue.



Editorial


Tribal Kinship Identities in Present-day Societies: Proposals for Ethnogeopolitical Research

Caspar ten Dam

Introduction

Our Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics (EGP) deems it high time to further research on the oft-neglected role of ethnic and kinship bonds in present-day societies—not just the self-professed traditional or tribal ones, but also and above all the so-called modern or developed ones. With this in mind, our association is currently constructing proposals on two interrelated research projects for which we will seek (crowd)funding in collaboration with my own research consultancy ¹ and with affiliated and like-minded scholars and academic bodies:

- a) an overarching project A on “Survival and Saliency of Extended Families, Clans and other Kinship Groups in Present-day Societies: A Survey of Current Research and Urgently Needed Research” (preliminary title);
- b) a more particular project B on “Challenges of EU Enlargement in South-East Europe and Beyond given the Oft-Neglected Role of Ethnic and Kinship Bonds” (preliminary title). ²




This Editorial presents some of the more developed parts of both research proposals under construction by me and other board-members of EGP, so as to generate interest and feedback—and hopefully collaboration and funding—among the readers.

We will inform you of further developments on both projects—and hopefully publish the first substantial findings from these projects—in our journal *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* (FEGP) and eventually through our publishing house *EGxPress*, be it in future Editorials, full-fledged articles in e.g. the journal's 'Developments in the field' section, or in edited volumes and other book publications.

Kinship Groups in Present-day Societies

Despite industrialisation, urbanisation and (de)colonisation, many present-day societies, be they formerly tribal or still (partially) tribal, appear to retain many traditions having to do with extended families, (sub-)clans and other kinship groups more often than not adhering to 'pre-modern' customary laws. Paradoxically, their adherence to 'old' values—however much contemporary ignorance, manipulation and brutalisation disfigure these in times of war and (relative) peace—leads to the same "conflict of the aggressive impulses .. with the moral norms" Talcott Parsons discerned in Western societies (Parsons 1947: 169).

Thus the 'warrior' and 'carer' roles of Western men and women, particularly in America and Germany before WWII and the post-WWII gender emancipation, resemble those of e.g. Pashtuns, Chechens and




Albanians in societies that still seem to be partially or wholly tribal.

Despite observed differences between and within 'traditional' societies with large, integrated families-and-occupations and 'modern' societies with nuclear families segregated from the workplace, one could argue that males in both types of societies must live up to similar expectations. Arguably both types of societies—or at least some groups and communities within these societies—celebrate “physical prowess, with an endemic tendency toward violence” (Parsons 1947: 174)—even against authorities that impose these norms.

On the other hand, many or most once-tribal groups, communities and entire societies seem to be overtaken or even obliterated by 'modern' i.e. industrial and post-industrial trends. Still anthropological, ethnographic, sociological and other research on the saliency of tribal societies in general and extended families, (sub-)clans or other kinship groups in particular, appear to be dispersed and sketchy to date at best.

This proposed research project seeks to bring such research and the newest findings together under a single roof, in order to offer mutually reinforcing insights on why and how any surviving tribal kinship groups continue to exert influence and play distinctive roles in different regions of the world. Consequently, it seeks to clarify any gaps in current knowledge and thus offer advice on urgently needed research on such kinship groups—and the impact these may still have on or within even so-called 'modern' societies.



Kinship Identities within the EU and candidate states in the Western Balkans


Ascertaining the most salient ethnogeopolitical factors—i.e. “cultural, social, religious, ethnic and (geo-)political characteristics, processes and developments”³—within both the European Union (EU) and possible or actual accession candidates to the EU is crucial in assessing the prospects of both established and future EU member states to become and well-functioning EU member states.

Understanding these factors is arguably most crucial regarding the aspiring accession candidates in South-East Europe or the Western Balkans, that is to say Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia. This proposed research project intends to answer the following primary questions:

- How do the cultures i.e. norms, beliefs and practices including geopolitical cross-border alliances of ethnicities, clans, extended families and other kin groups in South-Eastern Europe affect the chances and prospects of further EU enlargement by states from that region?
- To what extent if any are policymakers in Brussels and current EU member states aware and knowledgeable about the ‘tribal’, ‘pre-modern’, ‘patriarchal’ and/or ‘patrimonial’ cultures and alliances within potential and/or actual EU candidate states in South-Eastern Europe—and within the current member states for that matter?

Enlargement fatigue toward the Western Balkans


The EU already has enlarged significantly after the end of the Cold



War, with the biggest-ever enlargement with ten new member states including Slovenia in 2004, followed by Bulgarian and Rumania in 2007 and Croatia in 2013 (European Commission, *European Union explained: Enlargement*, 2015). Yet since then the enlargement process with any new membership candidates has stalled, mainly due to enlargement fatigue and reluctance within the EU and among some member states—despite optimistic assessments and statements by EU agencies (see e.g. *European Commission, EU enlargement*, 2018).

Thus as recently as October 2019 the EU for the third time, after failing to reach unanimity in June 2018 and June 2019, halted the official start of membership talks with North Macedonia and Albania mainly due to opposition from particularly France and the Netherlands. These and some other member states argued that Skopje and Tirana had to do more to fight corruption and strengthen the rule of law before these talks could even begin. Paris, The Hague and some other member-state capitals also demanded “changes to the EU enlargement process” including a “stronger role in accession talks” for the current member states in reviewing and monitoring the achievements of the accession candidates toward fulfilling the pre-conditional *acquis communautaire* i.e. cumulative body of binding EU laws. ⁴

In early February 2020 the European Commission responded with a report in which it basically acceded to and adopted these demands. It remains to be seen whether the disappointed accession candidates in the Western Balkans—and the majority of member states disappointed with the delayed enlargement due to fears of rising geopolitical influence of Russia and China in the region because of it—would readily embrace these additional conditions as well.




At first sight, the prospects of further EU enlargement to the Western Balkans mainly concerning states arisen from the Former Yugoslavia appear to be slim. Already well over a decade ago Ronald D. Asmus noted the “enlargement fatigue .. thanks to stumbling institutional reforms and the mounting expense of integrating new EU members. It was widely assumed that the western Balkan states (Albania and the former Yugoslav republics) would all eventually join the EU and NATO, but even that can no longer be taken for granted” (Asmus 2008: 96).

Indeed, “the 2004–2007 enlargement turned out to be more challenging than many thought, in part because it had a major impact on the institutional structure of the EU and the change in mood among citizens and politicians within the EU” (Verdun *et al.* 2011: 368; see further on more or less reluctant accession approaches by different EU member states e.g. Koktsidis *et al.* 2014; Wunsch 2017; Töglhofer & Adebahr 2017).

Be that as it may, if ethnogeopolitical factors are ignored or misunderstood, any further EU enlargement with these western Balkan states will be even more challenging and troublesome or even more unlikely. Moreover, such ignorance and misunderstanding of these factors after any such enlargement may even endanger the unity, fabric and strength of the EU itself in the more distant future.

Conclusion: Relevance of the Research Projects

The proposed research projects A and B are highly relevant and sorely needed, as relatively little research is being done on ethnogeopolitical




factors—such as tribal, clannish and other ethnic structures and cross-border alliances—characterising and affecting past, present and future societies in general (project A) and EU accession candidates in particular (project B).

Thus to date most attention and consequent research, insights and gathered knowledge about these countries and societies concern their socio-economic, judicial and political-system characteristics—including the legacies of (post-)communism and the halting development of democracy and civil society vis-à-vis corruption and patrimonialism, and the interrelated challenges and proposed policies for the EU itself and its enlargement (e.g. Albi 2005; Blockmans 2007; Bache 2010; Rupnik 2011; Schwarz 2016; Elbasani & Šabić 2018).

While such ‘classic’ factors are significant in themselves, their proper functioning is often inadequately grasped or ill-understood, as analysts and policymakers within both the EU institutions and established EU member states have tended to neglect ethnogeopolitical factors such as ethno-patrimonialism and tribal, clannish and other sub-ethnic and sub-national identities and alliances.

Even analysts acknowledging ‘problematic’ national, ethnic and regional or local identities and norms within both current and prospective EU member states (e.g. Noutcheva 2009; Freyburg & Richter 2010; Ker-Lindsay *et al.* 2017), generally fail to detect sub-ethnic and sub-national kinship identities and norms affecting or even underpinning the overarching identities and norms in any of these states.




Such kinship identities and alliances often account for the appropriation by particular extended families, clans or larger tribes and ethnic groups of 'hollow' state bodies, electoral processes, political parties, business companies and other power structures and organisations.

Actually, these appropriations may account for the oft-observed or (mis)perceived patrimonialism, corruption and zero-sum politics that appear to undermine the functioning of nascent democracy, civil society, market economy and equitable (re)distribution of incomes and resources across the populations of the prospective EU member states.

On the other hand, analysts and policymakers equally ignore or are oblivious of the possible beneficial effects that ethnic and sub-ethnic identities and alliances may have on the EU accession and incorporation processes. For instance, family, sub-clan and clan identities appear to be more salient on the local and regional level than the oft-constructed, artificial national identities.

Therefore, these communities and their identities need to be properly understood, acknowledged, respected and utilised i.e. involved and consulted, in order to help villages and other localities to comprehend the challenges and properly use the opportunities that EU membership on the national level could offer them as well.

Caspar ten Dam, Executive Editor February 2020



Endnotes


1. See CTDam Consultancy, www.ctdamconsultancy.com.
2. The current focus of proposed project A is on the challenges and opportunities for potential and actual EU accession candidates in South-Eastern Europe, i.e. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Kosovo and Serbia.
3. Citation from www.ethnogeopolitics.org (main page).
4. Gjeraqina Tuhina & Rikard Jozwiak, 'EU Proposes Greater Role For Member States In Enlargement Process' *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty* (RFE/RL) 4 February 2020, www.rferl.org/a/eu-proposes-greater-role-for-member-states-in-enlargement-process/30417114.html (incl. quotes). See further Rikard Jozwiak, 'EU Ministers Fail To Approve Official Accession Talks With Albania, North Macedonia' *RFE/RL* 15 October 2019, www.rferl.org/a/eu-no-official-accession-talks-albania-north-macedonia/30218294.html.

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
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
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
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by Fred Rohde (photography) & Caspar ten Dam (texts)




SREBRENICA COMMEMORATION & Marš Mira 2015 - 2018

The photobook *Srebrenica Commemoration & Marš Mira 2015–2018* is available in print for just € 20 (incl. average € 5 postal charges). Later this year it will become available in pdf at www.ethnogeopolitics.org/publications.

This photobook (64 pages, ISBN: 978-90-75568-34-9) shows a selection of photos taken by Fred Rohde of the annual Srebrenica commemoration on 11th of July in The Hague, the Netherlands in the period 2015-2018. It concerns the second book publication of our publishing house *EGxPress Publishers*.

You can order a full print-copy of the photobook by transferring **€ 20 (VAT-free)** to **EGP's Bank account: NL83 INGB 0752 458760 BIC: INGBNL2A** T. a. o. Servet Sahin, Amsterdam, with a reference to "photobook Srebrenica"—please email your postal address to info@ethnogeopolitics.org so we can send a print-copy to you.



Main Article—Developments in the field

Ethnogeopolitics: Scholarly Fashion or Emerging Discipline?


Jeffrey Kaplan

An excerpt of this article already has appeared in the journal's preceding Autumn 2019 issue—as a Third Critical Response to Babak Rezvani's "Understanding Ethnogeopolitics and its Developments", the maiden contribution in the journal's new 'Developments in the field' section.

Introduction

With the publication of Mark Bassin's article "The emergence of ethnogeopolitics in post-Soviet Russia" in 2009, the English-speaking academic world was presented with a novel term for the study of Geopolitics. Even for those not directly interested in the Russian academic scene, the article's abstract was intriguing:

A prominent UK-based political and historical geographer analyzes ethnogeopolitics, a new trend in Russian political discourse that is distinguished by the primary role it assigns to ethnicity (rather than the nation-state) as a geopolitical factor—i.e., recognizing formal (often poly-ethnic) ethno-national groupings on their respective ethnic spaces as important "geopolitical subjects" in their own right with a certain autonomy in world politics. After




defining and otherwise setting out the differences between ethno-geopolitics and the more mainstream school of Russian geopolitics emerging after the disintegration of the USSR, the author proceeds to assess the extent to which ethno-geopolitics is shaping current Russian geopolitical thought in two critically important arenas: (1) Russia's relations with other great powers at the global level and (2) the dynamics of ethnicity (and inter-ethnic relations) within its own boundaries as well as in neighboring states (Bassin 2009: 131).

The academic study Geopolitics had heretofore been dominated by such disciplines as Political Science, International Relations, Area Studies and the like. The addition of an ethnographic approach fits perfectly into Russian and Soviet history, making its origins in that region logical enough.

The ethnic distribution of the peoples of the Russian and Soviet empires were of critical importance to the health and ultimate survival of the polity, while the forcible redistribution of populations based on ethnic considerations was a marked feature of the early Soviet state in particular (Pohl 1999).¹

That the importance of an ethnic component to the study of Geopolitics globally is vital would seem obvious based both on a daily perusal of the headlines and on developments in other fields.

In my own more recent work in Terrorism studies for example, a transnational trend which I call the New Tribalism suggests that there are multiple forms of tribal association active in both the turn toward terrorist violence, and in ameliorating these very trends.




Moreover, so powerful is the trend toward communities of blood and nation that virtual tribalism is ranging from the radical right to groups emerging in the Middle East, Africa and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and its former satellite states in Eastern Europe to name but a few places (Kaplan & Costa 2014: 13-44; Kaplan 2010).

More recently, Marc Sageman offered the “bunch-of-guys” thesis, which was a catchy way of saying identity-based terrorism. Again, ethnic affinity, by blood or the stuff of dreams, is at the heart of the matter (Sageman 2008, 2017).

In this Terrorism studies is no different from other fields of the social sciences. In a globalized world, interdisciplinary approaches are both necessary and inevitable. Change takes place in the world with such rapidity that narrow disciplinary approaches are futile in academic settings and extremely dangerous in the real world.

Witness the relative ease with which Russia was able to influence the 2016 American presidential elections in favor of Donald Trump by simply adapting elements of classical tradecraft utilizing such chestnuts as agents of influence and false flag operations, a revamped version of the Active Measures disinformation campaign that the Soviets developed after 1948 and employed throughout the Cold War, and a mastery of social media (Shultz & Godson 1984 (Ur text on Active Measures); Abrams 2016 (use in post-Soviet Russia); Kaplan 2017). ²

The success of the Russian campaign in the US has been replicated with varying degrees of success in a number of other countries as well. Even a dominant military strategy of the day, Hybrid Warfare, is a




multifaceted basket of tactical approaches which no one specialty could hope to master (see e.g. Gunneriusson & Bachmann 2015; Giegerich 2016).³

The academy however, moves at a more stately pace than does the world of state and non-state actors. The universities are the ones that must produce graduates equipped with the knowledge of not only what they know, but of greater import, *what they don't know* and must rely on specialists from other fields in order to devise solutions to the multifaceted challenges faced by their nations. This however, has never been a strong point in the halls of academe.

The Academic response

Those who have toiled in the halls of European academe will have quickly come to the realization that the academia is to varying degrees stately, to remarkable degrees conservative, and that its tenured faculty—especially those holding endowed chairs—can be disconcertingly territorial.

New approaches to established fields may be tolerated to a degree as the inevitable peccadillo's of junior faculty members who, if all other duties are done, may be allowed to teach a specialty course every few years. US universities, if perhaps not as stately, are largely the same: locked into disciplinary boxes, conservative and composed of senior faculty members who are every bit as jealous of their territorial imperatives as their European colleagues.




This is not to say that interdisciplinary approaches are alien to the academic world. I was a product of the committee system at the University of Chicago, which is a long established interdisciplinary tradition. Many other US universities boast similar interdisciplinary programs. While European universities lag behind in the creation of interdisciplinary units, there are increasing countervailing currents in this direction. In a fascinating article detailing the emerging trends in higher education in what the authors term an Emerging Global Model (EGM), they state:

The changing academic landscape contributes to the complexity of the internal organization of EGM institutions. In recent years, research universities have expanded substantially, often desiring to become more comprehensive and more integrated by adding new programs to existing departments, establishing professional schools, launching new research centers, and encouraging interdisciplinary units (Mohrman *et al* 2008: 13).

This trend is only beginning however. Much more is needed, as the “growth of interdisciplinary studies means shifting money and people from traditional departments to new centers. The expectation of diversified financing means that leaders often spend more of their time on fundraising than on academics” (Ibid: 14).

In Terrorism studies, there was no greater boon than the events of 9/11. From the bare handful of recognized terrorism scholars that existed before that date, a veritable flood of ‘academic experts’ emerged full-blown, sprouting in seminar rooms and talk shows like mushrooms




after a Spring rain. The small stream of dissertations on the topic soon turned into a flood and universities vied with each other to hire their own terrorism specialists.

From the killing fields of Kampuchea in the 1970s, the camps and battlegrounds of the wars in the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s or the murderous violence from such as the Lord's Resistance Army in the Africa of today, the need for a viable cultural component to the field of Geopolitics could not be more clear or more pressing. But none of these conflicts represents the sort of existential threat to the West that 9/11 and all that followed constituted, and so there exists no similar pressure to produce seemingly from whole cloth a field that could help policymakers and journalists alike to make sense of the seemingly unexplainable.

Concluding remarks

The field of Ethnogeopolitics will remain for some time to come a somewhat fashionable subset of larger disciplines. But that it has perhaps a brighter future is indicated by several very positive trends.

The Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics, founded in 2010-2011 in the Netherlands, was a very promising start. Its original brief however, was focused on Eurasia.⁴ This had the benefit of identifying research institutes and universities with which to establish cooperative relations, but at the same time limited its scope geographically. At this stage, Ethnogeopolitics as a field was not yet ready to go fully beyond its origins in Russia and the Former Soviet Union.




The launch of the Association's journal, *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* in 2013 marked a turning point however. Its premier issue in Spring 2013 boasted articles not only related to the FSU, but on Turkey and Nepal as well.⁵ Subsequent issues expanded both the geographic scope of the field but increased its depth and interdisciplinary focus.

However, while the journal is peer-reviewed and charges no publication fees, it is open-access, which older and more hidebound scholars will find questionable. It is a model that remains controversial in academe, which some tenure committees find acceptable and others (including every committee on which I have served) simply do not.

In sum, the future of the field is still very much in flux. The journal *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* and the quality of the academics surrounding it speaks of a very bright future. Indeed, each subsequent issue of the journal shows a remarkable growth of Editorial staff, moving far beyond the first issue's triumvirate of Babak Rezvani, Caspar ten Dam and Servet Sahin. All three are to be congratulated on their pioneering work and on the vision that both their association and journal evince.

I believe that with this start, Ethnogeopolitics as an emerging field and discipline will have a vital place in the social sciences and humanities in particular; I hope that I can in a small way be a part of that development.


Prof. Jeffrey Kaplan is the author or editor of 20 books and over 70 articles and anthology chapters on religious violence, millenarianism, terrorism



and oppositional religious movements. His most recent monograph is Apocalypse, Revolution and Terrorism: From the Sicari to the American Revolt Against the Modern World, which was published by Routledge in 2019. He has also published the career retrospective Radical Religion and Violence: Theory and Case Studies, as the first volume in the Routledge Distinguished Author series. He is Book Review Editor for the peer-reviewed journal Terrorism and Political Violence. He is currently a Professor at Habib University in Karachi, Pakistan.
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Endnotes

1. In this, the Soviets were hardly alone (see e.g. Kaufmann 1998).
2. See further on Cold War development of Active Measures: Select Committee on Intelligence, US Senate, "Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns," 30 (2017): www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-115shrg25362/html/CHRG-115shrg62.htm. United States Information Agency, "Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost: A Report to Congress by the United States Information Agency," (1988), <http://insidethecoldwar.org/sites/default/files/documents/Soviet%20Active%20Measures%20in%20the%20Era%20of%20Glasnost%20March%201988.pdf>.
3. There is a growing body of literature on hybrid warfare, the best of which comes from various military research centers in Europe and the US. For our purposes, a brief but relevant introduction would be Håkan Gunneriusson & Sascha D. Bachmann, "Russia's Hybrid Warfare in the East: Using the Information Sphere as Integral to Hybrid Warfare," *Georgetown journal of international affairs* (2015):



- www.researchgate.net/publication/277953401_RUSSIA%27S_HYBRID_WARFARE_IN_THE_EAST_USING_THE_INFORMATION_SPHERE_AS_INTEGRAL_TO_HYBRID_WARFARE.
4. See www.ethnogeopolitics.org/about-us/.
 5. *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* 1:1 (Spring 2013), www.ethnogeopolitics.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ForumEthnoGeoPoliticsVol1No1SpringMay2013.pdf.

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
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
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
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
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Islamophobia and Racism in Germany and France: EUROSOR-Online Study

Rodolfo Valentino & Stuart Kisitu


The two subsequent contributions in this journal concern German and Spanish texts of the same article regarding an EUROSOR (Independent European Sociological Research) study conducted and translated by the authors themselves.

I. Classism and Social Protectionism

Classism and social protectionism have been sufficiently studied as social phenomena by sociologists. To the question of how the members of a supposed “class”, “social environment” or “common lifestyle” “sniff” each other or identify themselves, would answer the German sociologist Norbert Elias and his French colleague Pierre Bourdieu: very simple, by the “Social Habitus”.

Elias defines it as common habits in the thinking, feelings and actions of members of the same figuration (a network of dependence due to the conviction of a supposed belonging and social solidarity), which leads directly to a similar or identical “social personality”.

Bourdieu enters more into “plastic details” and defines the “habitus” as the person as a whole: his appearance, his lifestyle, his language (code),




clothes and taste, so the habitus becomes an immutable defect that consciously or unconsciously activates the “racist” or “classist” strategies of a “social protectionism” to defend the interests of the supposed “class”. We are facing a social dilemma that is reinforced by the fact that individual errors or deviant behaviors quickly become a social stigma, which can practically no longer be removed.

II. Islamophobia and Racism in Germany and France

In both countries, there is a growing Islamophobia and a phobia against people with a “Southern” or Non-European appearance, which our team wanted to investigate in an online survey. Most of the respondents in our study speak of clearly Islamophobic expressions they hear every day in the workplace, at school or on the street: so do 78% of the French and 63% of the Germans, and above all 83% of the East Germans with the lowest rate of “foreigners”.

Many politicians also comment negatively on Islam in the respective countries and regard it as a danger to the “*Volksgemeinschaft* (national community)”. This is what 32% of the respondents in France and 61% in Germany have heard. East German respondents stand out again with a rate of 87%. Islam is considered as a danger to the entire plural society the by 65% of the French and 53% of Germans. We find the lowest value in East Germany with 27% which indicates that simply the plural society is already a risk and a “failed experiment” for them.

Many respondents want a religion-free school or university and a society-wide headscarf ban (F = 83%, D = 72% [East Germany = 91%]).




At least 61% of the French and 68% of the Germans spoke out against the construction of new mosques. Again, the East German value surprises with 91% and testifies to massive resistance, although there are few mosques there.

III. Outlook—Conclusion

“After some right-wing extremist and ‘patriotic’ parties have entered the national parliaments in many European countries, Islamophobia has become socially acceptable for the political and middle class milieu in European societies, causing widespread Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism in France and Germany”, explains the sociologist Rodolfo Valentino. “It is only necessary to repeat prejudices and stereotypes often enough to establish them as resentments against Muslims, but also against other minorities.”

A side effect is the phobia against people with a South European or “Southern” appearance assuming through their appearance that they are Muslims; thus it becomes a negative label and leads directly to discrimination. It is also quite problematic that the nationalist and ultranationalist parties consider themselves patroness of Christianity. Here we need a social debate on religious symbols and religious plurality.

This is the conclusion of an online study that was realized on December 27, 2017 by EUROSOR (Stuart Kisitu, Dr. Rodolfo Valentino) in Santander (Spain), not representative, but with a significant social relevance, in which a total of 672 people of Christian religion or of no



religion in Germany and France were interviewed.

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An earlier version of the article was produced in 2018 with co-author Stuart Kisitu under the auspices of Independent European Sociological Research (EUROSOR; www.facebook.com/eurosor).

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
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
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NB: do you have any comments on Valentino and Kisitu's article? Please send these to info@ethnogeopolitics.org, or through the contactform at www.ethnogeopolitics.org.



Islamophobia und Rassismus in Deutschland und Frankreich: EUROSOR-Online Studie

Rodolfo Valentino & Stuart Kisitu


The preceding contribution in this issue of our journal concerns the English text of the same article regarding an EUROSOR (Independent European Sociological Research) study conducted and translated by the authors themselves.

I. Klassismus und Sozialprotektionismus

Klassismus und Sozialprotektionismus sind als soziale Phänomene von der Soziologie zur Genüge untersucht worden. Auf die Frage, wie sich die Angehörigen einer vermeintlich gleichen "Klasse", eines ähnlichen "Sozialmilieus" oder eines gemeinsamen "Lebensstils" gegenseitig "riechen" oder identifizieren, antworten die "Klassiker" der Soziologie wie der deutsche Soziologe Norbert Elias und sein französischer Kollege Pierre Bourdieu: am (sozialen) Habitus.

Elias definiert den "sozialen Habitus" als gemeinsame Gewohnheiten im Denken, Fühlen und Handeln, die Mitgliedern einer Figuration (ein Abhängigkeitsgeflecht aufgrund von gedachter und vermuteter Zugehörigkeit und Solidarität) eigen sind und dadurch eine ähnliche "soziale Persönlichkeitsstruktur" aufweisen.

Bourdieu geht stärker ins "plastische" Detail und definiert den *Habitus*




als Gesamtpaket einer Person: ihr gesamtes Auftreten, ihr Lebensstil, ihre Sprache (Sprachcode), ihre Kleidung und ihren Geschmack. Die Klasse und somit auch der Habitus wird nicht selten als unveränderbares „Sozialmakel“ angesehen und aktiviert bewusst oder unbewusst „sozialrassistische“ oder klassistische Strategien des „Sozial-Protektionismus“ zum Erhalt der vermeintlich eigenen „Klasse“. Ein soziales Dilemma, das noch mal dadurch verstärkt wird, dass Fehltritte oder abweichendes Verhalten rasch zum Sozialstigma werden, das man praktisch nicht mehr abstreifen kann.

II. Islamophobia und Rassismus in Deutschland und Frankreich

In den beiden Ländern lässt sich eine wachsende Islamfeindlichkeit und eine Südländerphobie bemerken, denen unser Team in einer Online-Befragung auf den Grund gehen wollte. Die meisten Befragten unserer Studie sprechen von eindeutig islamfeindlichen Äußerungen, denen man im Alltag am Arbeitsplatz, in der Schule oder auf der Straße tagtäglich begegnet: so 78% der Franzosen und 63% der Deutschen, wobei in Ostdeutschland der Anteil mit 83% am höchsten ausfällt.

Auch viele Politiker äußern sich in den jeweiligen Ländern negativ über den Islam und betrachten ihn als Gefahr für die „Volksgemeinschaft“. Das haben 32% der Befragten in Frankreich und 61% in Deutschland gehört. Ostdeutsche Befragte glänzen hier wieder mit einem Anteil von 87%. Als Gefahr für die gesamte plurale Gesellschaft sehen ihn 65% der Franzosen und 53% der Deutschen.




Der niedrigste Wert in Ostdeutschland deutet mit 27% eher darauf hin, dass man bereits die plurale Gesellschaft als “misslungenes Experiment” deutet.

Viele der Befragten wünschten sich ein religionsfreie Schule bzw. Universität und ein gesellschaftsweites Kopftuchverbot (F=83%, D=72% [Ostdeutschland=91%]). Gegen den Neubau von Moscheen äußerten sich immerhin 61% der Franzosen und 68% der Deutschen. Auch hier überrascht wieder der ostdeutsche Wert mit 91% und zeugt von massiven Widerstand, obwohl hier die wenigsten Moscheen stehen.

III. Ausblick—Konklusion

“Nachdem einige rechtsradikale und “patriotische” Parteien in vielen europäischen Ländern in die Nationalparlamente eingezogen sind, ist die Islamfeindlichkeit für die politische und soziale Mitte in den europäischen Gesellschaften salonfähig geworden. In Frankreich und Deutschland hat sich dadurch eine Islamophobie und ein antimuslimischer Rassismus breit gemacht”, erklärt uns der Soziologe Rodolfo Valentino. “Man braucht Vorurteile und Stereotype nur oft genug zu wiederholen, damit sie sich als Ressentiments gegen Muslime, aber auch gegen andere Minderheiten etablieren.”

Eine Begleiterscheinung ist hier ganz klar die Südländerphobie, weil man über das Aussehen eines Menschen auf seine Religions- und Kulturzugehörigkeit schließt und ihn schlichtweg wegen eines südeuropäischen oder südländischen Aussehens negativ etikettiert



und diskriminiert. Außerdem ist es problematisch, wenn sich rechtsradikale und 'patriotische' Parteien als Schutzpatrone des Christentums hochstilisierten. Hier tut eine gesellschaftliche Debatte um religiöse Symbole und Pluralität Not.

Zu diesem Ergebnis kommt eine am 27. Dezember 2017 abgeschlossene nicht repräsentative, aber dafür sozial relevante Online-Studie des "Independant European Sociological Research EUROSOR" (Stuart Kisitu, Dr. Rodolfo Valentino) in Santander (Spanien), bei der insgesamt 672 Menschen mit christlicher oder keiner Religionszugehörigkeit in Deutschland und Frankreich interviewt wurden.


Dr Rodolfo Valentino is Director of the European Institute of Studies on Migration, Social Inclusion and Intercultural Learning (IEM), Bonn, Germany (<http://bimev.de>).

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
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
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


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Islamofobia y Racismo en Alemania y Francia: Estudio Online de EUROSOR

Rodolfo Valentino & Stuart Kisitu


The preceding two contributions in this issue of our journal concern the English and German texts of the same article regarding an EUROSOR (Independent European Sociological Research) study conducted and translated by the authors themselves.

I. Klasismo y Proteccionismo

El clasismo y el proteccionismo social han sido suficientemente estudiados como fenómenos sociales por sociólogos. A la pregunta de cómo los miembros de una supuesta misma “clase”, “un ambiente social” o “estilo de vida” común “se huelen” entre sí o se identifican, responderían el sociólogo alemán Norbert Elias y su colega francés Pierre Bourdieu: muy simple, a través del “Habitus Social”.

Elias lo define como hábitos comunes en el pensamiento, los sentimientos y las acciones de miembros de una misma figuración (una red de dependencia debido a la convicción de una supuesta pertenencia y solidaridad social), que conduce directamente a una “personalidad social” parecida o idéntica.

Bourdieu entra más en “detalles plásticos” y define el “habitus” como la persona en su totalidad: su apariencia, su estilo de vida, su lenguaje




(código), ropa y gusto. Así que el habitus se convierte en un defecto inmutable que activa conscientemente o inconscientemente las estrategias “racistas” o “clasistas” de un “proteccionismo social” para defender los intereses de la supuesta propia “clase”. Estamos ante un dilema social que se ve reforzado por el hecho de que los errores o comportamientos desviados se convierten rápidamente en un estigma social, que prácticamente ya no se puede quitar.

II. Islamofobia y Racismo en Alemania y Francia

En los dos países, hay una creciente islamofobia y una fobia a personas con apariencia sudeuropea o “sureña”, que nuestro equipo quería investigar en una encuesta en línea. La mayoría de los encuestados en nuestro estudio hablan de declaraciones claramente anti-islámicos que escuchan el 78% de los franceses y el 63% de los alemanes, con una proporción más alta de 83% en la Alemania del Este, donde menos musulmanes hay, a diario en la vida cotidiana o sea en el trabajo, en la escuela o en la calle.

Muchos políticos también hacen comentarios negativos sobre el Islam en los respectivos países y lo consideran un peligro para la “comunidad Nacional”. Esto es lo que han escuchado el 32% de los encuestados en Francia y el 61% en Alemania. Los encuestados de Alemania Oriental vuelven a brillar con un porcentaje del 87%. El 65% de los franceses y el 53% de los alemanes en la encuesta ven el Islam como un peligro para toda la sociedad plural. El valor más bajo en Alemania Oriental indica con un 27% que ya la sociedad plural en sí es considerada como un “experimento fallido”.




Muchos encuestados desean que las escuelas y las universidades estén libres de símbolos y valores religiosos y que se prohíba el uso del velo islámico en todas las áreas de la sociedad (F = 83%, D = 72% [Alemania Oriental = 91%]). El 61% de los franceses y el 68% de los alemanes se pronunciaron en contra de la construcción de nuevas mezquitas. Una vez más, el valor de la Alemania Oriental sorprende con el 91% y atestigua una resistencia masiva, aunque haya pocas mezquitas aquí.

III. Perspectiva—Conclusión

“Después de entrar algunos partidos nacionalistas y ultranacionalistas en muchos países europeos a los parlamentos nacionales, la islamofobia se ha vuelto socialmente aceptable para el centro político y las clases medias europeas. En Francia y Alemania se han extendido el racismo en sí y en especial el antimusulmán”, nos explica el sociólogo Rodolfo Valentino. “Sólo es necesario repetir los prejuicios y estereotipos con la suficiente frecuencia para que se puedan establecer como resentimientos contra musulmanes, y también contra otras minorías.”

Un efecto secundario es la fobia contra personas con apariencia sudeuropea o “sureña” suponiendo a través de su aspecto que se trata de musulmanes, así se vuelve una etiqueta negativa y lleva directamente a la discriminación. Además es bastante problemático que los partidos nacionalistas y ultranacionalistas se consideren los patronos de la cristiandad. Aquí hace falta un debate social sobre los símbolos religiosos y la pluralidad religiosa.



Esta es la conclusión de un estudio online que se realizó el 27 de diciembre de 2017 por EUROSOR (Stuart Kisitu, Dr. Rodolfo Valentino) en Santander (España), no representativo, pero con una relevancia social significativa, en el que se entrevistaron un total de 672 personas de religión cristiana o de ninguna religión en Alemania y Francia.

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
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
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Main Article


To Purify a Language: The Turkish Case

E. Tonyukuk Ersoy

Abstract Since the language reforms from the Tanzimat period, many initiatives were taken to decrease the gap between the Turkish people and their language. In addition the problem became more complex after the adoption of many loanwords, especially from French. Discussions regarding one of these changes, the purity of the language, created a group which was and still is against the use of foreign words in Turkish and another which supports this process. This article discusses the views of these two groups.

Loanwords can be explored as a general subject, but the focus here will only be on loanwords in Turkish. The main reason for this is the fact that languages are not the same and have their own systems. So, research concerning this subject requires a different approach.

Another important point is to know the relation between the language which borrows and the language which it borrowed or perhaps still borrows words from. The great majority of loanwords in Turkish comes from another language family. Hence the linguistic distance between French and Turkish is greater than the distance for example between French and German. The gaps between the systems of these languages are also more different.




Keywords: loanwords, Turkish language, purifying, language reform, vowel harmony, enrichment.

Özet 'Bir Dili Özleştirmek: Türkçenin Durumu': *Tanzimat'a dek uzanan Türk dil devriminde, Türk ulusu ile dilinin arasında bulunan kopukluğu gidermek için birçok girişimde bulunuldu. Özellikle Fransızcadan gelen birçok ödünç sözlüklerin yanında sorun daha da karmaşık duruma geldi. Bu gelişmelerden biri olan Türkçenin özleştirilmesi ile ilgili tartışmalar, bir yandan yabancı kökenli sözcüklerin kullanılmasına karşı olanlar, diğer yandan da yabancı sözcüklerin kullanımını destekleyenleri oluşturdu. Bu yazıda bu iki öbeğin görüşleri ele alınacak.*

Ödünç sözcükler genel konu olarak ele alınabilir ancak burada işlenecek olan Türkçede bulunan ödünç sözcükler. Bunun en önemli nedeniyse dillerin hepsinin kendi düzenlerinin olması. Dolayısıyla, bu konuda da başka biçimde ele alınmalı.

Bilinmesi gereken bir başka önemle konu ise, ödünç sözcükleri alan ve ödünç sözcüklerin alınmış olduğu ya da hala alındığı dille ilgili ilişkisi. Türkçede bulunan ödünç sözcüklerin büyük bir bölümü başka dil ocağından gelmekte. Bundan ötürü, Fransızca ile Türkçe arasında olan dil bilimsel iraklık, örneğin Fransızca ile Almanca arasından olan iraklıktan çok daha büyük. Bu dillerin (Türkçe ve diğerleri) arasında olan düzen gediği de daha ayrımlı.

Açık sözcükler: ödünç sözcükler, Türk dili, özleştirme, dil devrimi, ünlü uyumu, zenginleştirme.



Introduction


When coming into contact with new concepts or ideas, words from other languages may be adopted. Words for new foods, habits and inventions can enter a language. Sometimes a loanword is adopted or a new word generated from the original language (Tekin 1983: 526).

Another reason for adopting foreign words is emulation. This occurs especially in modern times. The influence of media and people's attitude facilitate using words from other languages. I argue that a contemporary example of this is English, which is very popular in many countries.

Ever since the foundation of the Republic, reforms on linguistic questions played an important role in Turkey's nation-building. Discussions on language reform naturally took place among linguists and even Atatürk himself joined in and took part in language reform (Lewis 1999: 45-50) of which purification was a component. This struggle between proponents of loanwords and purists continues today in Turkey.

The focus will be on the use of words of Turkish origin and loanwords in the Turkish language as used in contemporary Turkey and not in other Turkish speaking countries. This must be mentioned because the Turkish language is spoken widely outside of modern Turkey.

Turks have borrowed words from other languages since ancient times when they came into contact with civilizations such as the Chinese, Mongolians, Sogdians and Indians (Sanskrit) (Gözütok 2008: 18).




Large-scale borrowing started after Islamization. Many Arabic loanwords, mainly through Persian, entered into Turkish this way. After the 15th century (Gözütok 2008: 19) the entrance of Arabic and Persian loanwords increased rapidly as Arabic was the language of the Quran and Persian the language of literature (Birgören 2013: 301).

Loanwords from French largely entered Turkish during the Tanzimat period (1839-1876). France was the nation with which the Ottomans had the most contact (Savaş 2010: 54). French loanwords influenced the Turkish language especially in the fields of language and literature (Yağlı 2012: 234-249).

Towards the end of the 19th century, a new approach to the Turkish language was developed in the Ottoman Empire. During the Tanzimat period many reforms were undertaken in the fields of economy, law, military and education. This period also marks the start of attempts about reforming the spoken and written language (Erciyas 2010: 1187).

One idea was to replace the Arabic alphabet (Özgür 2011: 225-229), which was adopted as part of the Islamization of the Turks (c. 10th century), with the Latin. Simultaneously the idea of purging the Turkish language of loanwords, which also had been periodically suggested before the Tanzimat, but had actually started after this period, was put forward (Kahya 2008: 312).

Reform of the Turkish language was needed because the written language of the Ottoman Empire was increasingly different from that spoken by ordinary Turks. Ottoman intellectuals were also concerned with this and sought to change the language. Their intention was to




form a new written language, one much closer to spoken Turkish (Erciyas 2010: 1187).

Bringing the written and spoken languages together also produced changes in vocabulary. The journal *Genç Kalemler* took the initiative to reform the language (Akalin 2011: 3). These changes, which were about the purifying of the Turkish language, effected both words and their suffixes. This initiative was embraced by some prominent writers, while other objected (Savaş 2010: 55-56).

In order to create a society compatible with the Western powers, Turks had to reform many fields. Changes in language were part of a much greater social change for Turks. In addition to the fact that the Latin alphabet was much more practical and appropriate for the Turkish language, it was also a sign of turning towards the West and all of its leading developments.

During the reforms, the Turkish language received special attention. It represented the Turkish people and had to be modernized, which must be understood as Turkifying the language. Like the Turkish people, the Turkish language had to eliminate all foreign influences in order to recover its own value and importance.

One of the reforms of the new movement regarding language was the replacement of loanwords. The changes in Turkish have since created two groups regarding language purism, which can broadly be described as the proponents of using loanwords in Turkish and those who oppose this, the purists. To comprehend both groups, here their opinions and motives will be reviewed.



Discussion


Turkified

The discussion starts with the objections of the proponents about replacing loanwords with original Turkish words. They state that most loanwords have already attained a place in Turkish and should be seen as Turkified. The proponents argue why to replace these words with the original Turkish words if these are already are Turkified.

To understand the purists' position it is necessary to understand something about the Turkish language and its system. A small part of Turkey—where the great majority speaks Oğuz Turkish, which is also known as West Turkish; and also is spoken in Azerbaijan, northern Iran, northern Syria and Iraq, North Cyprus, in the Balkans, and in the Crimea (Ercilasun 2004: 433)—borders and forms a part of Europe. However, the linguistic distance between Turkish and the majority of European languages is great.

The same can be said about the linguistic distance between the Turkic languages and Arabic and Iranian languages, even though Iran as well as Iraq and Syria (both Arabic speaking) border Turkey as well. Farsi or Persian is an Indo-European language, like most European languages. The Arabic languages belong to the Semitic language family.

Turkic languages belong to the Ural-Altaic language family (Golden 1988: 16). They are spoken throughout great parts of the Eurasian continent and the Middle East (Johanson 2001: 4). That the Turkish peoples are so widely spread has to do with their nomadic past.



Another important reason was their use of horses which provided the opportunity to cover great distances, that helped spread the language.

The language families from which Turkish has drawn most of its loanwords, Arabic, Persian and French, not only have different vocabularies, but also different and varying language systems. We must first examine the Turkish language (part of the Turkic language group) and its principal differences from the Semitic (Arabic) and Indo-European (Persian and French) languages.

Turkish words have a stem which is almost always easily identifiable. The stem does not change with inflection. Suffixes added to the stem create a new meaning for the word. Here are several examples which are made up of nouns as well as verbs:

Nouns:

göz (eye)

gözetim (surveillance)

gözetlemek (peek)

gözlük (glasses)

gözlükçü (optician)

gözlükçüler (opticians)


gözükmek (appear)

etc.

Verbs:

beklemek (to wait)

beklenilmek (be waited for)



beklenmek (be supposed to / to be expected)

beklenti (expectation)

bekletmek (to keep waiting)


bekleyiş (waiting)

etc.

In these typical examples the stem does not change. The system of stem and suffix is the same for nouns as well as for verbs. This means that loanwords cannot have a stem in the Turkish language, because they left their roots in the language whence they came and the words cannot have new roots in the language to which they moved (Özakıncı 2008: 106).

Knowing the meaning of the stem is very important and in learning the Turkish language one must understand how the formulas are applied. Because the loanwords do not harmonize the Turkish language system, they have to be learned, instead of understood by extrapolation. This does not mean that there is no need for new words. On the contrary, the Turkish language is fortunate to have a system which makes it possible to create dozens of new words with extant stems.

The fact that many loanwords already have been replaced by Turkish words must not be forgotten. This shows that loanwords can indeed fall out of use to make place for new or existing Turkish words. Old loanwords like *muallim* (teacher), *mecmua* (magazine), *tayyare* (plane), *garp* (west) have fallen almost completely out of use and have made place for newly created Turkish words; these loanwords are no longer in use and almost forgotten. Currently the Turkish variant of these words are used.



Absorbed

In accordance with this, proponents of using loanwords claim that many words are already been absorbed into Turkish. They maintain that these words are used by speakers of Turkish and should be seen as Turkish words. They consider that in time loanwords can be seen as native vocabulary.

Is it a fact that not all words used in Turkish are originally Turkish. Some loanwords made their way into Turkish a very long ago, and it is not easy, although not impossible, to replace them with original Turkish words. Some examples of these include the words *selam* (originally Hebrew, but came to Turkish via Arabic) and *zaman* (Arabic). Nowadays many suffixes are placed after these two words, even if doing so violates vowel harmony (see below) and lacks the flexibility of originally Turkish words:

selam (greeting)

selam**lama**¹ (salute)

selam**lamak** (to greet)

selam**lanma** (to be saluted)

selam**lanmak** (to be saluted)


selam**laşmak** (to greet each other)

selam**lık** (distinction of men and women in a house)

selam**sız** (without greeting)

zaman (time, date)

zama**ndaş**² (contemporaneous)




zaman**ında** (on time)
zaman**la** (with time)
zaman**lama** (timing)
zaman**lamak** (to schedule)
zaman**lı** (timely)
zaman**sız** (untimely)

These words have acquired an important place in the Turkish language. It also seems that they really are productive ³, because they are constructed in the same way as original Turkish words. Nevertheless, they are not as productive as originally Turkish words. Some of the words like *selam* and *zaman*, which acquired Turkish suffixes, are formed with other original Turkish words. Turks use other words for these situations. The reason for this is that some Turkish speakers utilize some cases differently.

For example, instead of the word *selametlemek* ⁴ Turks use the stem *uğur* (luck) and say *uğurlamak* (see off; literally 'to wish someone, who is going, good luck and say goodbye'). The result is that verbs or nouns which are conjugated according to the standard rules of Turkish have a much longer history and are more productive (there can be created more words with the stem and words can have a broader meaning) than loanwords. Because speakers of Turkish generally do not know the exact meaning of loanwords, their emotional content will never be that of the words whose meaning is known.

Another very important aspect of Turkish is the rule of vowel harmony.



The Turkish language has eight vowels and these are split into two groups: front and back vowels. A single word cannot consist of vowels from different vowel groups. Suffixes are therefore constructed according to the rule of vowel harmony.


This is not a feature of Indo-European and Semitic languages. By replacing original words or the created words with loanwords the system of vowel harmony, so typical and characteristic for Turkish, is damaged.

This last example also shows another way of how Turkish works. Turkish has very specific rules for using suffixes. Suffixes create new words and that is why they are very important. An example can be given with the suffix *-Cİ* which is used to create names of professions:

<i>ayyakabı</i> (shoe)	—> <i>ayyakkabıcı</i> (shoe seller/shoemaker)
<i>balık</i> (fish)	—> <i>balıkçı</i> (fisher/fisherman)
<i>deniz</i> (sea)	—> <i>denizci</i> (sailor)

Loanwords in general do not adapt to the Turkish language system and are treated as grammatical exceptions. More exceptions create more damage to the system. For example, many loanwords do not acquire the suffix *-Cİ* and because of this they cannot conform to the rules of this suffix.

This creates many difficulties and confusions for the language itself as well as for foreign students learning Turkish. Those who have learned about the suffix *-Cİ*⁵ and see loanwords like *manav* (greengrocer),




berber (hairdresser), *doktor* (doctor), *memur* (officer), *marangoz* (carpenter) or *kasap* (butcher) become confused and understandably have difficulties learning these exceptions. Not surprisingly, Turks themselves sometimes incorrectly use the suffix *-Cî* with loanwords like *manavcî*, which is grammatically incorrect.

There is also a suffix from the Persian language with the same meaning. This is the suffix *-Dar* and is used in some words like *taraftar* (supporter), *emektar* (veteran). The function of this suffix is the same as *-Cî* but is only used with some words.

The same example can be given with the suffix *-kî* which also comes from Persian. This suffix does not conform to the rules of Turkish grammar because one of the basic things in the vowel harmony rule of Turkish is that the capital *E* in suffixes has always two forms. According to the last vowel of the word, to which it is related to, the *E* will become an *a* or an *e*. The capital *İ* has always four forms. According to the last vowel of the word, it will become an *ı*, *i*, *u* or an *ü*. But the suffix *-kî* is an exception and has just one form, namely the *i*. It will also be *ü* when the word ends with the vowel *ü*, like *bugün* (today). The *İ* in this suffix will never be an *ı* or an *u*.

Another example can be given with the ending *-at*, which is a suffix from the Arabic language. This is a suffix which does not adapt to the rule of vowel harmony at all. So, a word like *gidiş* (go), which ends with a front vowel, will be *gidişat*. Just as the word *hayvan* (animal) which ends with an back vowel, it will become *hayvanat*.

There are more examples like these in which one can see that the




exceptions, which are almost only with loanwords, create difficulties for the system of the Turkish language.

Not all Turkish suffixes follow the rule of vowel harmony. In some case there are exceptions with Turkish suffixes. These are the suffixes *-İyor*, *-(y)ken*, *-gil*, *-leyin*, *-(İ)mtrak* (Türk Dil Kurumu 2012: 6) and *-(y)Ebil*. These suffixes do not conform completely to the rule of vowel harmony. Suffixes whom have their origin in other languages and do not conform or conform completely to the rule of vowel harmony are; *-ane/âne* (Banguoğlu 1995: 161), *-dar*, *-kâr*, *-ki*, from Persian; *-at*, *-en*, *-et*, *-i/î* (Banguoğlu 1995: 161), *-iyet* from Arabic and *-ist*, *-izm*, *-ör*, *-er* from French. It should also be mentioned that these suffixes cannot applied to all words, but usually go with certain words.

Communication

Proponents of accepting loanwords into Turkish offer another reason to do so: communication. In their view, the prime function of language is communication. If there is no problem with communication, then why the need to purify? Purification of the language itself causes problems, argue the proponents. As long as there is no problem in communication, the only problem is caused by them who are trying to purify the language.

Purists of the Turkish language see this approach as a very naïve attitude towards the language. Language is not only about communication, but must be seen in a broader sense. Language is the way we express ourselves, convey our dreams, and converse with




someone who speaks the same language. It is the way we express our ideas and communicate our emotions. Changing words can also be understood as changing emotions. These emotions are the result of using these words for many centuries, like customs acquired very important meanings through the generations. It is not the use which is important; emotions make them important and valuable.

The same can be said about words, which preserve the connection from the past with the present. Words have a history and thus their meanings are filled with emotions. If a word does not generate any emotion, then it no longer has a function; it is a dead word. These days, speakers of Turkish express themselves by using many new loanwords. These loanwords have mostly come through the media and are used because they are popular. Due to their recent history in the Turkish language they contain no emotional value. Some examples are the words like *pasaj* (passage), *şov* (show) and *şok* (shock).

Another example in this context is the word *reçine* (resin) which is of Greek origin (Türk Dil Kurumu 1998: 1849). It has no connection with Turkish and therefore is a strange word for its speakers. One of the Turkish equivalents for this word is *ağaç sakızı*. The words *ağaç* (tree) and *sakız* (gum. The last *-ı* of *sakızı* is an accusative suffix) are familiar for the speakers of the Turkish language. Since there is a known connection, it is easier to learn, remember and use it.

Again, another example is *tahrip*, which is of Arabic origin (Türk Dil Kurumu 1998: 2115). The Turkish synonym is *yıkma* (demolition). For speakers of Turkish the stem *yık-* is familiar and there are dozens of words which are constructed with this stem.




All of that which has been mentioned above creates problems for good communication. Otherwise there is communication with no underlying emotions. By giving preference to vocabulary from one's own language there is no question of miscommunication. This will have the effect that one gives back the true value to the language and by this the continuity from the past to present will be maintained.

Extent

Another proponents' criticism is the extent of purification. According to proponents, purists want to replace every single loanword. They believe that this kind of radical change is not only for linguistic purposes, but for another motive. What about proverbs and idioms? These are already well established in Turkish and cannot be changed. The same can be said about old songs and poems.

Perhaps some linguists want to purify the Turkish language because of different reasons. But what matters is whether purists' motives are in accordance with linguistics. Furthermore, no language can be purified totally and purists know this. Yet where possible, purists prefer existing Turkish words to loanwords.

Purists, on the other hand, claim loanwords have no boundaries. Every day new loanwords enter the Turkish language. In Turkey it is very common to say *bye* or *bye bye* when leaving someone. For sure, no single Turkish speaker will claim that *bye* is a Turkish word. This and many other loanwords are used because they are modern. This word is a good example that demonstrates that proponents see no limits to




using loanwords. Should one accept all these new loanwords, Turkish would acquire a striking different appearance.

Another example is the word 'relax', which nowadays in Turkey is used in hamams for the cool down. It is a strange way of use, because normally it would mean something like a cooling room where one can relax. The Turkish users of this word have no idea about the meaning of it. These kinds of words are unknown to most Turkish users, because they are from another language and another language family. But anyhow they take a single meaning of a word they have heard and start using it.

Thus 'pet shop' is another good example. In Turkey only inhabitants of large cities know that a pet shop is a store where domestic animals or goods of these animals are sold, even they do not know the exact meaning of the word itself. There are many examples like these: including *dizayn* (design), *hobi* (hobby), *laptop* (laptop), *milenyum* (millennium).

Some loanwords were so infrequently used that they only appear in poetry, proverbs and idioms. These are lost loanwords and these words have no other meaning for speakers of Turkish. Except in very rare cases, they are not used anymore. Obviously, there can be no change in proverbs, idioms and poems, otherwise its meaning and value would disappear. Some examples of these include:

Zemheride ⁶ *kar yağmadan kar yağması iyi.*
Gafil ⁷ *avlamak.*



This is an example of a poem:

Şecaat arzederken merd-i kıpti sirkatin söyler. ⁸
Gelen ümeraya ⁹ *karşı gidiyor.*

This is an example of a song, entitled 'Bin Cefalar Etsen Almam Üstüme' ¹⁰ which is still often listened to:

Kula gölge ise Allah'a ayan ¹¹

Or the song 'Açma Zülüflerin Yellere Karşı' which also is till listened to:


Bülbül fığan ¹² *eder güllere karşı*

And here is an example of loanwords used in idioms:

Takdire şayan ¹³ (admirable)
Rezil rüsva ¹⁴ *olmak* (to be ashamed)

The meaning of most of these words are not known to the general user. These words are almost never otherwise used by Turkish speakers except in this context. Far more infrequently we find Turkish variants of Turkish idioms whose meaning is not generally known. The word *idiğü* can be given as an example:

Ne idiği (idiğü) belirsiz? ('having an unknown descent'; in a negative way.)




On the one hand, there are many Arabic loanwords whose original meaning is no longer known. After the reform of the Turkish language and since the start of the Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti (the former name of the Türk Dil Kurumu, 'The Turkish Language Society'), many of these Arabic loanwords were replaced by Turkish words.

On the other hand, many French loanwords entered the language and now account for more than 10% of Turkish vocabulary (Kahya 2008: 320). In other words, there has been a switch from one language to another as the primary borrowing source. Additionally, Turkish sometimes offers different words to describe one thing or object.

For example, three words can be used for 'face': the Arabic loanword *surat*, the Persian loanword *çehre* and the Turkish word *yüz*. Another example is the French loanword *detay* (detail), infrequently used the Arabic loanword *teferruat* or the Turkish word *ayrıntı*. The last example is the French loanword *provokasyon* (provocation) which is often used over the Arabic loanword *tahrik* or the Turkish word *kışkırtma* (Kahya 2008: 322). Because, in addition to the existing Arabic and Persian loanwords, many French loanwords have entered the last decades in Turkish, thus there are more of these kinds of examples.

Because of the rapid increase of French loanwords they now outnumber all others with the exception of Arabic. The growth of French loanwords can be also seen also in the Türk Dil Kurumu Sözlüğü (Dictionary of the Turkish Language Association). The number of French loanwords in the 1955 edition was 2,482. In the 2005 edition it increased to 4,645 (Savaş 2010: 55). This explains the oddity that in Turkish there are three options for some words. Clinging to a particular




word, without knowing its meaning, and not wanting to change it, purely for the fact that it is used for example in an idiom or a song, prevents the user to come to the deep understanding of the word. As a result, there can be no conscious use of the word and the value remains superficial.

Enrichment

Proponents see loanwords as an enrichment for languages and therefore also for Turkish. They believe it is foolish to go against this very positive phenomenon and intervene only because these words are not original Turkish. They also believe such intervention is unwise and unnecessary. They wonder how one can regard enrichment as negative.

Purists see something else in the meaning of the word enrichment. For them, enrichment does not mean taking words from other languages. If this is the way to enrich a language, then one should take as much as possible loanwords; not only from Arabic, Persian and French, but also from other languages around the world. Thereby, it cannot be understood as true enrichment. Thus the definition must be formulated all over again.

For purists there can only be enrichment of the language if new words are created from Turkish words. Variety and versatility are the ingredients for enrichment. Here there are examples of loanwords of which most people think they do not have any Turkish equivalent. One of them is the loanword *hafif* (light), which comes from Arabic. This



word has the next variants in Turkish:

yeğni (Türk Dil Kurumu 1998: 2424), *yeñik* (Kaşgarlı 2005: 684), *yenlik* (Emiroğlu 1989: 232), *yefin*, *yegli*, *yegnik*, *yeğil*, *yeğinik*, *yeynik*, *yiğni*, *yüngül*, *yénik* (Clauson 1972: 950)


Another one is the word *balkon* (balcony), which is a French loanword:

arka, *artırma*, *artuma*, *aşıra*, *bakacak*, *çelki*, *çıcartma*, *çıkartma*, *dizme*, *günlük*, *ilerkaç*, *kaklık*, *kaş*, *sayatüstü*, *seki*, *serbenek*, *serem*, *seren*, *sergi*, *soğukluk*, *sundurma*, *tarma*, *üfürük*, *yağlaman*, *yatak*, *yazla*, *yellik* (Derleme Sözlüğü 1993: 4237), *ayazlık*, *çıkma*, *gezinti* (Türk Dil Kurumu 1998: 758)

Remember, these are the words which are used only in Turkey. The equivalent for these words in other Turkish languages are not even mentioned.

Loanword assimilation can create grammatical situations which are foreign to Turkish. A word like *puzzle* (puzzle) contrasts with the system of the Turkish language for three reasons. Firstly, the *u* and the *e* in this word create no vowel harmony. Secondly, the use of multiple consonants is directly after each other. Finally, given its pronunciation the declension must be a back vowel. Now it is a front vowel and that is not in line with the vowel harmony. This kind of forms are strange, because the way they are made up are against the rules of creating Turkish nouns or verbs.

Such pronunciation is absolutely contrary to how Turkish verbs are



conjugated and nouns declined and can also be seen in other loanwords like *saat* (clock, hour), *kontrol* (control), *sehayat* (journey), *hal* (condition), and *alkol* (alcohol). According to the rules of vowel harmony, these words need an ending with back vowels, but in reality this does not happen and these words acquire an ending with a front vowel.

Exact meaning

A further argument by proponents of loanwords in Turkish is that newly created words do not fully replace the exact meaning of loanwords, as purists claim. Proponents maintain that these words do not sustain any emotion and any value. According to proponents, purists want to eliminate loanwords from Turkish because these words are not originally Turkish.

With its innumerable suffixes the Turkish language makes it possible to improvise new words and give them new meanings. The same is done with many new words in languages like French and English. They have used the stem of old Latin and Greek words to create words which are used and accepted including:


tele —> **telephone**

photo —> **photocopy**

Or they use a Latin prefix and give a new meaning to the word, like:

to start —> **restart**

mediate —> **intermediate**



Loanwords cannot have any meaning if their exact meaning is unknown. It is like the difference between knowing something and being conscious of it. Most old loanwords are from Arabic and Persian. French loanwords do not have a long past in Turkish (Ersoy 2006: 205-219). Arabic and Persian loanwords replaced Turkish words¹⁵ and attained a place within the language.


Logically, if loanwords can replace Turkish words then the opposite is also possible. Thus besides the so-called improvising of new words, there is also a form of a correction. Below there are some loanwords which are compared with their Turkish equivalents.

When a Turkish word is substituted, native speakers usually think it is an improvised word, but sometimes it is a word that was set aside for a long time. For instance the word *aşk* (love) is a loanword which replaced a Turkish word *sevi* at some point in the distant past (Clauson, 1972: 787).

The same is done with the word *siyah* (black), which is an Arabic loanword for *kara*. The word *kara* existed for many centuries in Turkish and is also a common word within the world of Turkish speakers. *Kara* can be seen in old and new Turkish, in literature, mythology, and in personal and place names. This cannot be said of *siyah*. It has no stem and no profound meaning in Turkish.

Aktivite (activity) is a French loanword replacing the Turkish equivalent *etkinlik*. This is a quite new word and was created with the stem *et-*, which has existed for a very long time in Turkish.

These kinds of loanwords are very new in Turkish. Because these




loanwords have entered the language recently, the statement about replacing is unjustified. On the other hand, the made-up word is very typical for Turkish and this is in fact the way new words are created. While nothing like in *aktivite* can be recognized by a Turkish speaker, *etkinlik* easily can, even as a new word. There are dozens of examples like these.

The striking thing about some loanwords is the way they are used, like by Turkish speakers. Arabic and Persian loanwords, for example, are two languages which do not belong to the same language family. Even if there is nothing logical, still there are words in Turkish which are made up by words of these languages. The way they were made and used in Turkish created strange forms. For example:

The loanword *beddua* (curse) is made up by *bed* (Persian), which means 'bad', and *dua* (Arabic), meaning 'pray'. Turkish synonyms include: *ilenme*, *ilenç*, *kargaw*, *kargış*, *karğaç*, *karğav*, *karğış*, *karış*, *karkış*, *karnıkada*, *karnıkara*, *karvuş*, *qargış*. As can be seen, most of these are constructed using the stem *kar-* or *ilen-*.

Another example is *hastane* (hospital) which is formed from two words: *hasta* (Arabic), meaning 'ill', and *hane* (Persian), meaning 'house'. This is an unusual construction from two unrelated languages. The Turkish synonym can be easily constructed by putting together the words 'sick' and 'house'. Synonyms for 'sick' include: *sağır*, *samarıklı*, *sayır*, *sayrı*, *sayru*, *sergin*, *seyru*, *sökel*, *şaşkın*, *şayru*. The Turkish word for 'house', which is still in use, is *ev*. Thus there are enough choices to create a Turkish word for 'hospital' which can be understood and recognized.



There is another important fact about loanwords. The proponents of using loanwords often do not know what the correct meaning is of the loanword in the original language. This is not surprising because in general they do not speak these languages. That is why they do not know that loanwords have not always had the same meaning as used in Turkish.


For instance, the Arabic word *kafa* means nape in Arabic, but in Turkish it is an equivalent for *baş* (head) (İşler 1977: 76). The same is true for the word *gül* which is 'flower' in Persian and 'rose' in Turkish.

In Turkish some words are also incorrectly used. For instance the Arabic word *acayip* (wonders) has a connotation in Turkish and is also used as a synonym for 'strange' or 'weird' (Korkmaz 2007: 108). Another example is the use of the Arabic plural. Some words are already plural but without knowing this, the word is made plural again in Turkish.

The result is that new a double plural form is created, like the word *tatbikat* (mock battle) (Korkmaz 2007: 126). There are more examples of this type of incorrect usage because of a lack of knowledge about the language from which the word is borrowed.

The last example is the use of verbs from Arabic. Most of these words themselves are verbs, but in Turkish *etmek* (do, make) is often placed behind the loanword to form a verb, so a double verb like *teklif etmek* (to offer) or *muayane etmek* (to examine) is created.

The same form is nowadays created and used especially by third generation Turks living in Western Europe. For instance, in the




Netherlands it is very common to hear verbs like *afspraken yapmak* (to make an appointment) and *aanmelden yapmak* (to sign up). The words *afspraken* and *aanmelden* are already Dutch verbs. By putting *yapmak* (do, make) after the loanword a double verb is created, resulting in a new and strange verb form.

Before making any claims about loanwords one must have more knowledge about the language from which the loanwords are taken. Experience has shown that proponents typically fall short here. In general they approach this often emotionally and follow the mainstream.

Engage

Yet, another statement made by proponents of using loanwords in Turkish is that other languages do not engage in purification. They indicate mainly on English. If others like in English, according to them, do not purify their languages, Turkish should not do it either. Turkish will remain static and will not move forward into modernity.

This oft-recurring statement by proponents must be clarified by the purists. First, the statement that other languages do not purify their languages is false. There are movements even in Europe to eliminate English loanwords (Brian 1989: 60-62). Secondly, there is no clarity when talking about other languages. The differences between languages of the same language family are less than languages of other language families. That is why it is much easier for a language to borrow words from another language of the same language family.




For example, English has acquired dozens of original French words. French has in its turn many words from Latin, Greek and German origin. In practice, borrowing words for English from French does not create difficulty. English has the necessary basis for assimilating French words. It does not have a system which works with stem like in Turkish. It also does not have a vowel harmony system. Because of this, admitting words for English from any other language does not create that much difficulty. They are just new words, like many others in the language and will be learned. They do not affect the system as a whole the way loanwords do in Turkish.

In summary, purifying loanwords from Turkish is not dependent on other languages. Anything that is being or will be done, must only be done in favor of Turkish. Also, this has nothing to do with development or modernity.

Existing words

In conjunction with the point above, proponents of using loanwords in Turkish also oppose replacing existing words with original Turkish ones. They believe there is no need for this. By so doing unnecessary effort is made for words which are already well known. Thus people must learn words for things they already have words for. This makes things needlessly difficult. In fact, this way of purifying a vocabulary is not natural and can be called a decree by the purists. It creates a generational gap between speakers.

When we are dealing with loanwords and original Turkish words, it is




important to understand that original Turkish words make up part of the Turkish language system. Loanwords create a problem for this system. This is why there is a need for Turkish words instead of loanwords according to purists.

Many Turkish words have needlessly been replaced at different periods in the past. These were words which replaced existing Turkish words and had to be learned. That cannot be said of all words, but some words are so simple for Turks because they have existed for many centuries. Adopting loanwords for these words was absolutely unnecessary.

Examples include *sene* (year), *lazım* (necessary), *hayır* (no), *beygir* (horse), and *kaos* (chaos). Even though words for these were already in Turkish, they were replaced by loanwords from other languages. These are the loanwords which must be learned because they are strange and completely foreign to the Turkish language system.

Throughout different periods Turks took loanwords from different languages which dominated certain fields. Arabic loanwords entered due to domination and Islamization of Turks, Persian loanwords were taken largely from poetry, Italian loanwords in the field of maritime activity, English loanwords, especially American English words, because of developments in the fields of technology, military, politics and of course, Hollywood.

Nowadays, as in other languages, loanwords in Turkish have increased with the growth of mass media. This increase of loanwords through mass media is one of the reasons that a gap has grown between




generations and not due to the replacement of loanwords by Turkish ones. Urbanization is also responsible for the increase of loanwords. There is an enormous gap between generations that moved from villages to cities. City life changes people's lives, their way of speaking and their vocabulary. Many villagers who left their homes around the ages of twenty or thirty had to learn simple concepts, like the names of days and months. Before villagers used other names for these.

Children of city dwellers receive an education which gives them far more opportunities than before. For instance, these children get to know things that their parents did not know. They have access to a lot of information through different means like internet. They also get in contact with people who have different backgrounds.

Replacing loanwords do not create a gap between generations. The gaps which are created are the result of loanwords themselves. Most people of the new generation who do not want to exchange loanwords for Turkish ones, are not aware of this fact.

It is also not true that replacing loanwords with Turkish ones constitutes interference by purists in the natural development of the language. TV programs, news broadcasts, movies, soaps, prominent people like politicians and celebrities, newspapers and especially the education system controls the way Turkish is developing.

Words like *star* (star), *ful* (full), *stor* (store), *flaş* (flash), *terapi* (therapy), *tişört* (T-shirt), *emosyonel* (emotional), and *konfirme* (confirm) are not words that have been used for generations. These words were not even known to those now older than thirty or perhaps forty years old.



There is a way to prevent the causes which create problems for the speakers. The natural way is to let people create their own words for loanwords. Another way is how the Türk Dil Kurumu (TDK) has Turkified loanwords before they became accepted in Turkish.


The problem here is that loanwords have to be Turkified on time, otherwise it become hard to changes the loanwords. Examples for words whore are successfully Turkified and today being used are *bilgisayar* (computer), *belgegeçer* (fax), and *yazıcı* (printer).

It is also very important to know that those who control mass media will have a great influence on Turkish for it can have a great influence by using such words a lot which is a kind of propaganda. This applies to both Turkish words and loanwords.

Conclusion

It seems that the disagreement between proponents of using loanwords in Turkish and purists will continue because language is used by everyone and therefore almost everyone has an opinion about it. It is not so that developments in one language must be followed by speakers of another. Every language has its own development.

In line with this, the fact that there are different language families means that every language is in some way different. Turkish cannot be changed according to changes or developments within other languages which belong to other language families. Each language must be handled differently, especially concerning loanwords.




Words are very essential for a language, because they are the building blocks of a language. They are very important in the sense that they have a value and have a binding for the users of it. They also have a story and only can have a story when they have a past. The existence of loanwords in the Turkish language is too short to have any emotional worth. Frequently they are used because others started using it.

While some loanwords do have a history, it is obviously much shorter than those of Turkish words. As a result, these loanwords can be felt; they have some perceptible worth. The other side of the coin is that, as we have seen, Turkish is not restricted to those who live in Turkey. Changes in words in Turkish create a new way for the rest of its journey. Any change in Turkish, spoken in Turkey, can create confusion for other Turkish speakers in other countries and areas.

Even if we only consider Oğuz Turkish, any change can have important consequences for its speakers. In other words, this can lead to miscommunication between Turkish speakers of the same branch of the Turkic languages because the word no longer has a common stem. The new word is strange and it has no stem in Turkish. It therefore also has no connection with the past or with other Turkic languages and replaces an already existing word or is something completely new. This is the way purists approach different subjects; regarding the best way of letting the language function according to its system.

Obviously it is a fact that language is a living thing and naturally that it is moving on. But that does not mean that the language changes itself. It changes by the hands of society. The way a language alters largely




depends on the policy in the country, its education, the media and of course the users of the language themselves. Because of its system of stems it is easy for a language as Turkish to maintain continuity. While the language undergoes a lot of changes, the changes of the stems of words are limited.

In Turkish certainly many new words can be created with the stem, as it is done in languages such as French and English in a similar way. Indeed, in Turkish it is the stem of the word of the language in which the user gives an indication of the meaning.

Since the Tanzimat period there have been many developments in the language, including the purification of the loanwords. Many loanwords are replaced by words of Turkish origin. Today there are still discussions between the proponents and the purists about this subject, although to a lesser extent.

A fact is that the language no longer is as it was a century ago. In a lifetime speakers of Turkish developments can have enough examples of words that were different than when they were younger. The number of these words will be more for those who not only moved from the village to the city, but also for those who have moved from one city to another city. Even now there can be seen changes in words.

On one hand words of Turkish origin are used, but especially loanwords from English enter more and more in Turkish. This has mainly to do with emulation, the influence of the media and people's behavior.




Turkish is a language with strict rules and few exceptions. And because of the way it is composed, it is often a language that must be understood, rather than just to be learned. But because of the many exceptions, which are usually caused by the loanwords, Turkish is losing this characteristic of it. Loanwords have no connection with the original Turkish words. This makes these words having to be learned, without having any overlap with existing words.

An additional factor is that because of changes such as loanwords, the degree of intelligibility is less and less between the Turkic languages. As a result, these languages do not grow towards each other, but rather grow apart.

The question is whether any change in the language is a result of need. This must not be interpreted on the change of the meaning of a word in the language, which is possible in itself. A word which always was very normal, can have a negative meaning in time. But we do not indicate this.

However, the changing of a language, such as the adoption of loanwords, for any reason whatsoever, is not absolutely necessary. Replacing the existing words or also using the loanwords besides these, damages a language like Turkish. That does not necessarily have to be so for another language, but it does apply to Turkish.

Until now, many loanwords have been introduced, while there were all Turkish words for these already. We have also seen that Turkish is also suitable for creating new words. There are many examples.




Language Scientists can therefore have many reasons to purify the language, especially when it comes to Turkish. It is important that everyone adhere to the principle that discussion about language cannot be disparaged.

Every change within a language will affect the speakers of it. Those who have dedicated themselves to this subject have a great responsibility to make changes in a language. This applies both to those who want to purify the language, and those who want to go against the purifying endeavor. After all, words are not just words. They have a certain value for the speakers in question. Replacing a word with a past, replaces more than the word itself.

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Endnotes

1. The markings indicates Turkish suffixes.
2. Ibid.
3. This means many conjugations can be made with this stem.
4. A word which is used very rarely.
5. This suffix has multiple functions. The function here is to create a profession. It is also used for those who are associated with a particular deed.




6. *Zemher* is an Arabic loanword which is a noun and means ‘the dead of winter’. The Turkish word is *kara kış*. The *-de* behind *zemher* is a locative.
7. *Gafil* is an Arabic loanword which is a noun and means ‘inattentive’. The Turkish word is *aymaz*.
8. In this sentence only *-ederken* in ‘*arzederken*’ (verb), *-in* in *sirkatin* (first part of the genitive construction) and *söyler* (verb) are Turkish. All the other words and suffixes are not Turkish. The meaning is ‘While the male gypsy is telling his valor, he tells his theft’.
9. The Arabic loanword *ümera* which is a noun, is a plural form for the word ‘gent’.
10. [www.turkuler.com/sozler/turku bin cefalar etsen almam ustume.html](http://www.turkuler.com/sozler/turku_bin_cefalar_etsen_almam_ustume.html)
11. Besides the word *Allah*, also the noun *ayan* is a loanword. *Ayan*, which is a noun of Arabic origin means ‘apparent’. The sentence can be translated as ‘If it is a shadow for the servant, it is known for God’.
12. This is a Persian loanword and means ‘moan’ or ‘groan’.
13. The noun *şayan* is a Persian loanword and means ‘worthy’.
14. The noun *rüşva* is a Persian loanword and means outrageous.
15. Most loanwords from Arabic or Persian also exist in Turkish, except words which are new such as those in connection to religion.

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
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
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
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NB: do you have any comments on Ersoy’s article? Please send these to info@ethnogeopolitics.org, or by contactform at www.ethnogeopolitics.org.



Main Article

On Some Aspects of Unemployment in Iran: Problems and Recommendations


Izabella Manukyan

Abstract The article focuses on social-psychological aspects of the consequences of unemployment in Iran and its management mechanisms. With the population being over 80 million people, Iran's current unemployment rate is 12.10%, the youth representing a considerable proportion of it. The research accentuates on such processes as the loss of knowledge, the loss of professional skills and social significance, proving that the longer Iranians stay unemployed, the more these problems deepen.

Data about Iran's weak capacity to retain talented youth and about the fraction of Iranian women involved in the country's labor force are shown to prove the complexity of the population's full employment. Absolute and relative indexes of unemployment in Iran and the trend line forecast of the number of unemployed Iranian people are being analyzed.


Introduction

At the end of 2017 Masoud Nili, the leading economist and economic advisor to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, gave an interview, where he mentioned unemployment as a serious challenge for Iran.¹ Annually




the government creates more than 750.000 jobs. However, according to the latest data of the Statistical Center of Iran, about 3.2 million people are considered to be unemployed. After the Islamic Revolution of 1979 a baby-boom in Iran led to an increase of population (see Graph 1).²

Graph 1. Population of Iran



The rate of unemployment in Iran in the second quarter of 2018 reached 12.10%,³ and Iranian youth represents a considerable proportion of this percentage (28.30%).⁴ If these young people do not find jobs in the near future, they will become a huge problem for Iranian pension funds. The unemployment of Iran leads to poverty in both rural and urban regions of the country. According to the World Bank's latest research (of 2014), about 8 million people spend less than \$5.50 daily, and 200.000 people spend only \$1.90 per day in Iran.



Another important cost of unemployment is the structural damage done to an unemployed worker who loses his professional skills annually and (what is even worse) gets a psychological trauma that affects his mental health. Unemployment leads to the loss of the feeling of social significance (so-called “social crisis”) and fosters the growing sense of inequality.


To understand the process of unemployment in Iran it is worth analyzing some key absolute and relative indexes.⁵ The calculations of the indexes are shown in the Table 1.

Table 1. Absolute and relative indexes of unemployment in Iran

Year	The number of unemployed people	Absolute incrementation		Relative growth		Rate of increase	
		basic	chain	Basic (in %)	chain (in %)	basic (in %)	chain (in %)
2009	2.731.655	-	-	100	-	0	-
2010	3.311.852	580.197	580.197	121	121	21	21
2011	2.590.305	-141.350	-721.547	95	78	-5	-22
2012	2.682.526	-49.129	92.221	98	104	-2	4
2013	2.910.191	178.536	227.665	107	108	7	8
2014	2.254.413	-477.242	-655.778	83	77	-17	-23
2015	2.728.323	-3.332	473.910	100	121	0	21
2016	3.329.133	597.478	600.810	122	122	-22	22
2017	3.153.613	421.958	-175.520	115	95	-15	-5

Absolute basic increment

In the years of 2010, 2013, 2016 and 2017 the rates of unemployment were higher than the rate of 2009. We may say that ten years after the economic crisis of 2008 Iran still has not overcome the problem of unemployment.



Absolute chain increment


A serial increase of unemployment can be seen in the years of 2012-2013 and 2015-2016, but if we visualize these data, there will be a line of constant increases and decreases. One positive conclusion is that the rate of unemployment was reduced in 2017 by 175,520.


Relative basic growth (in %) and Relative chain growth (in %)

The highest relative basic growth of unemployment (in the period of 2009-2017) was witnessed in 2016, and in 2017 the chain relative growth shows a reduction of unemployment (as well as the absolute chain increment of 2017).

The values of the basic rate of increase (in %) and the chain rate of increase (in %) are also shown in Table 1. The average growth rate of unemployment in Iran is equal to 102%. This shows that the rate of unemployment grows up to 102% in average. The trend line of unemployment of Iran is shown in Graph 2.

Graph 2. Unemployment rate of the population of Iran aged 15 and above





With the reliability of 41% (R^2 equal to 0.0413) the linear trend line in the graph above shows the predictable number of unemployed people in the interval of 2,900,000 - 3,100,000.


Unemployment and related economic challenges

Iran's economy is going to face one more challenge in the near future. The problem is that university entrants do not choose humanities or the social sciences as their profile education. Profiles are mostly related to engineering, manufacturing, constructing, business, medicine and healthcare fields. As the statistics shows, in the spring of 2017, only 20% of university entrants (about 184,000 of 930,000) were admitted to humanities faculties. This warning sign may lead to an academic crisis: even if new workplaces are created annually, the country will have a small percentage of professionals from the humanities.

Basically, no kind of study is carried out by the government, universities or the Statistical Center of Iran to determine the status of job market in terms of different fields; so the students choose their field of study without having any knowledge of its future employment prospect.

There are no considerable data on job market status, job vacancies, student admission status, job seekers' future employment prospect, and other key information of this kind, so the choices are not based on market demands.⁶ Students choose profiles of education in accordance of their interests.


If we look through the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 2017-2018,




we may see that Iran was ranked 104th (out of 137 countries) in the component “capacity to retain talent”. This means that the country does not have special mechanisms of attracting talented residents, including youth, in various profitable and useful projects. With an average monthly net salary of 18 million rials (430 dollars) it is hard for young people to get married and create families. This leads to the rise of average marriage age, and according to the Statistical Center of Iran, it has been increased by three years (28 for men and 23 for women).

Iranian women have a high literacy rate and they enter universities in practically the same number as Iranian men do. However, as you may see in Graph 3, the percentage of Iranian men who participate in labor force is four (and in some years, five) times higher than the participation of women. Note that the percentage of women who worked in 2011-2012 strictly declined from 33% to 17% in 2013 and remained like that with slight fluctuations until 2017.

Graph 3. Labor force participation of Iranian people






On February 7, 2016, at a national conference titled “Women, Moderation and Development” President Hassan Rouhani said: “Iranian women should play a significant role in politics and other fields. We should believe in women’s presence and capabilities and know that our country’s women can have roles in science, knowledge, economy, politics, and arts just like men”.⁷

However, in the year 2017 the number of employed women was raised only by 0.2% (from 17 to 17.2). The rights of Iranian woman are limited: the way she gets dressed or gets involved in political and sports life; the amount of freedom she gets during her marriage or divorce period—everything is strictly controlled.

Nonetheless, Iran rejects any allegations that it is discriminating against women, saying it follows Sharia law.⁸ So, there is a considerable number of women and young people who are not involved in the labor force of Iran. What Iranian economic policy should do is to concentrate on the strengthening of the workforce from these two categories. Long-term unemployment among adults may lead to destructive consequences; however, unemployed youth might cause even more harmful repercussions.

Another negative consequence of unemployment in Iran is the mass migration of the youth. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the emigration of educated Iranians abroad has increased remarkably; every year, from 150,000 to 180,000 people leave the country behind, which is equivalent to a whopping 150 billion dollars’ worth of capital.⁹




Young people migrate to get education abroad and have a chance to stay and work there, though the process of migration consumes lots of time for potential migrants, as every migrant has to solve all legal issues with the embassy of the country where he wants to migrate to.

Conclusion

Long-run poverty, social crisis, the loss of knowledge and professional skills of unemployed Iranian people can be considered as the most negative repercussions. These impacts deepen and lead to serious problems that encompass state and private sectors. This includes an academic crisis: the lopsided privilege of students learning engineering, manufacturing or medicine, above those who study social sciences or fields in the humanities.

To solve this problem, the government should increase the number of those who study disciplines in the social sciences or humanities by offering full-funded scholarships for young people who have a wish and mental potential to study, but cannot pay for education. The Iranian government's capacity to retain talented youth is not high, and this makes the problem of employment guarantees more complicated.

The state sector should guarantee that newly graduated students will be offered jobs corresponding to their professions. To make it happen, the government should conduct a thorough analysis of the local job market and inform potential students about the results of the research. Thus, a considerable portion of state budget should be invested into the education of young talents, especially from urban areas of Iran for



them to get an opportunity to choose future professions based on the needs in the Iranian job market.


Concurrently, jobless people lose the feeling of social significance, and their educational qualifications become obsolete. To avoid these problems, the government should open centers of mental health improvement, as well as develop re-qualification centers for unemployed Iranians.

The participation of Iranian women in the labor force is low, but at the same time there is a high rate of females who have received bachelor and master's degrees there. As a result, a vacant seat that could have been occupied, on a long-run period, by a potential worker in the Iranian job market, who would bring income to the country's economy, is taken by a woman who will probably not work after getting married. It is worth increasing the scores needed for a female to get a fully-funded scholarship in order to avoid the waste of the state budget that will not be recouped after the woman's graduation.

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
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Main Article


The short Azerbaijani-Karabakh War of 2-5 April 2016: Political Containment Instruments aimed at the Opposing Parties in the Conflict

Nelli Baghdasaryan

Abstract The article discusses the international community's response to the April War of 2016—the renewed escalation in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone. It also explores the instruments designed to contain the opposing parties in the conflict. It considers, most particularly, the principles of international law which guide relations between states, namely, the principle of refraining from threat or use of force and the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of states.

The positions of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship, the Group's participating states, and other countries concerned with the conflict are also addressed in the article. The article discusses separately the *modus operandi* of opposing parties in the conflict in response to the measures designed to refrain the conflicting parties from violence.

Key words: Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict, April War, OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, principle of territorial integrity, principle of refraining from threat or use of force, principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples




Introduction

The research focuses on the so-called April War of 2-5 April 2016 between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Artsakh i.e. Nagorno Karabakh, as a milestone in the Azerbaijani-Karabakh “creeping conflict” ever since the Azerbaijani-Karabakh war of 1991-1994 ended with the signing of the 1994-1995 trilateral unlimited-in-time ceasefire agreements between the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan.

On 2-5 April 2016 the Azerbaijani side launched a large-scale offensive along the entire Line of Contact between the armed forces of the Artsakh Republic and the Republic of Azerbaijan, using heavy military equipment, artillery and combat aviation.

The study was laid down during the April War and in the months following it, and runs in line with the logic of the period. It provides the political overtones of the April War, focusing on the application by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairmanship of the fundamental principles of international law as mechanisms of political containment of the conflict. It is noteworthy that the international community largely prioritized the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force. The *modus operandi* of political counterbalances is also characteristic of the period under consideration.

The diplomatic processes following the April War of 2016 in the Republic of Artsakh i.e. Nagorno Karabakh fall well within the “non-declassified diplomacy” format (a number of diplomatic issues have so far been secret and not open to the public).




It is noteworthy that this new escalation in the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict and surge of violence in April 2016—involving artillery and other heavy-fire exchanges leading to hundreds of military and civilian wounded casualties and dozens of fatalities on both sides (estimates vary), i.e. between the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army and the Azerbaijani armed forces—has once again demonstrated the challenging nature of the conflict. The perennial risks connected to it, include the counterbalancing ambitions and attempts of both geopolitical and regional actors regarding regional developments.

The states, having taken over the role of mediators, aside from the very objective of conflict resolution, aspire to advance their own geopolitical interests, re-establish theatres of interest i.e. zones of influence, and keep pace with the race for regional influence in the geopolitical rivalry. Thus, trying to interpret these processes through geopolitical frames, we could state that the level of interest stems from the domestic political and foreign policy priorities of the mediator states in question.

After the 1994 ceasefire, the unprecedented large-scale offensive unleashed by the Azerbaijani side at the night of April 1 to April 2, 2016, and subsided in the afternoon of 5 April was an obvious attempt to bring the conflict back on the agenda. It is also worth mentioning that the response of the international community to the April hostilities was immediate.

The calls to the warring parties emphasized the principles guiding relations between participating states as established by international law, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of




the United Nations, namely, adherence to the principles of refraining from the threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, and respect for the territorial integrity of states (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1975).

The principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples are also accepted *pari passu* by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship together with the afore-mentioned principles within the conflict resolution format.

It is remarkable that if the first two principles had almost proportionate significance and were applied on an equal basis, the principle of territorial integrity in international law was applied with deliberation and caution, given its possible comparative-relative expression in conflict resolution. In the political processes following the April War the afore-mentioned principles of international law had different applications by mediator states with regard to the parties in the conflict.

Principles of International Law in instruments of political containment of the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict

The principle in international law of refraining from the threat or use of force, which reads that states should refrain in their mutual relations as well as international relations from any acts constituting threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and that no threat or use of force should be employed in resolving disputes (Organization for Security and Co-operation in




Europe, 1975), was reflected interestingly enough in April and post-April political developments.

The actions of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship and the international community overall were confined to alleviating the polarisation between the opposing parties in the conflict, seeking ways to establish contact between them and resolve the conflict, realising that polarisation between the two sides could complicate international mediation and reflect declining lack of trust in it. Consequently, the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force was applied to the parties.

Thus, considering the April and post-April political processes we can conclude that the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force and that of peaceful settlement of disputes became the key political containment leverage aimed at the parties to conflict in the *modus operandi* of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs.


On 2 April 2016 the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs—the then Ambassadors Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, James Warlick of the United States of America, and Pierre Andrieu of France—issued a joint statement on the events surrounding Nagorno Karabakh, voicing deep concern over the reported large-scale ceasefire violations along the Line of Contact (hereafter referred to as “LoC”) in the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict zone, and urging the sides to stop shooting and take all the appropriate steps to stabilise the situation on the ground. In their statement the Co-Chairs also reiterated that there is no alternative to a peaceful negotiated solution of the conflict (Press Release by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, 2016).



On 2 April 2016 then OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Germany's Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier expressed concern over the military escalation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone and the casualties, including among civilians, pushing for the sides to end hostilities immediately and respect the ceasefire in full. Steinmeier ruled out a military solution to the conflict and urged the sides to show the necessary political will to return to the negotiations table in the framework of the Minsk Group (OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Steinmeier, 2016).

On 5 April 2016 representatives of the OSCE Minsk Group countries (Russian Federation, the United States of America, France, Belarus, Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Turkey), as well as the incoming Austrian OSCE Chair for the year 2017 and the Serbian OSCE Chair in the year 2015, issued a joint statement strongly denouncing the military flare-up of violence along the LoC in the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict zone and calling on the sides to cease forthwith using force. In their statement they also welcomed the Russian, American, and French Co-Chairs' plans to undertake direct consultations with the opposing sides (Statement by Representatives of the OSCE Minsk Group countries, 2016).

On 5 April 2016 a Russia-mediated verbal agreement was reached at a meeting between the then chief of General Staff of Armenia and chief of General Staff of Azerbaijan held in Moscow to halt military actions and enact an immediate ceasefire in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone under the trilateral ceasefire agreement of May 1994 (NKR Defense Army, 2016).




On April 5 a special meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council started in Vienna to discuss the escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone. At the meeting, US Ambassador James Warlick—at that time one of the three Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, representing the three Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group—and Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office, Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, informed the 57 OSCE participating states about the developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, welcoming at the same time the reports of the cessation of hostilities and urging the opposing sides to respect the ceasefire.

The OSCE participating states considered the escalation deeply worrying and expressed their commitment to facilitate a peaceful settlement (OSCE participating States discuss recent escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, 2016).

Following the 5 April 2016 Vienna meeting, the then OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs and Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk travelled to Stepanakert, the capital of the Artsakh republic i.e. Nagorno-Karabakh (Meeting with the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, 2016).

The 16 May 2016 Vienna meeting embarked on by then US Secretary of State John Kerry to bring then President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev to the negotiation table to discuss the advancing of a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict was a milestone in the April and post-April political-diplomatic processes.




Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov, then US Secretary of State John Kerry, and then France's State Secretary for European Affairs Harlem Desir, Ambassadors representing the co-chair countries of the OSCE Minsk Group, and the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office also partook at the discussion.

At the meeting, the Co-Chairs insisted on the importance of observing the 1994 and 1995 ceasefire agreements. They agreed to strengthen peace monitoring and finalize an OSCE investigative mechanism. They also agreed to the expansion of the existing office of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and on a next round of talks to be held aimed at resuming negotiations on a comprehensive settlement (Joint Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016).

The 20 June 2016 trilateral meeting of the then Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian Presidents in Saint Petersburg could be seen as another far-reaching Russian initiative following the 5 April 2016 verbal agreement as a result of measures undertaken under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship. The Saint Petersburg meeting echoed the agreements reached at the May 16 Armenian-Azerbaijani meeting in Vienna aimed at the stabilization of the situation in the conflict area, and it was agreed to increase the number of international observers in the conflict zone.

The three Presidents mentioned the importance of their regular meetings and reached an agreement to continue them in the same format in addition to the activities carried out by the Co-Chairs of the




OSCE Minsk Group (Meeting with Serzh Sargsyan, 2016; In Saint Petersburg Presidents of Armenia, 2016).

Unlike the Vienna process, the outcome of the meeting was not presented to the Co-Chairs until after the meeting. This is among the specific features of the Russian *modus operandi*, once again showcasing its pre-eminence among the Co-Chair states, taking over the negotiation process, seeking to set itself as the *de-facto* leader of the negotiation process (Baghdasaryan 2017: 28-33).

On 8 December 2016 an OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs-brokered meeting between then foreign minister of Armenia Edward Nalbandian and foreign minister of Azerbaijan Elmar Mammadyarov took place in Hamburg. A joint statement by the heads of delegation of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries adopted at the 23rd Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council followed, condemning strongly the use of force or the threat of the use of force and reiterating that there is no military solution to the conflict. The head of delegation appealed to the sides to confirm their commitment to the peaceful resolution of the conflict as the only way to bring real reconciliation to the peoples of the region.

The statement referred to the agreements reflected in the joint statements of the 16 May summit in Vienna and the 20 June summit in Saint Petersburg, as well as the core principles of the Helsinki Final Act, namely, refraining from threat or use of force, respecting territorial integrity, and equal rights and self-determination of peoples (Joint Statement by the Heads of Delegation of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries, 2016).



It should be mentioned that in all the statements issued by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship and in the *modus operandi* of the latter aimed at the containment of the parties to the conflict in the April and post-April period, the principle of refraining from threat or use of force and that of peaceful settlement of disputes are prioritized.


In their separate statements and initiatives, the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs remained adherent to the adopted principles and mechanisms. Thus, the discourse principles of each of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs and the political containment mechanisms adopted by them are here examined in separate formats.

Principles of Refraining from Threat or Use of Force and of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the Russian mediation efforts

In the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict settlement, Russia acts both as a participant in the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship format and as a separate player. Russian mediation actions are bent on furthering its own gains in the South Caucasus region as the region is of primary importance to the Russian Federation's larger goals and ambitions, securing enduring influence in the region and global reach, as well as having political leverage over the conflicting parties.

Thus, Russia's new foreign policy agenda prioritizes the interaction of leading power centers as a basis for addressing global challenges jointly (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016).

Arguably, Russia as a major power advances its counterbalancing mechanisms. The Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict is just another




platform for Russia to apply counterbalancing mechanisms over the other co-chairing countries, especially the USA.

I posit that Russia's active role is also conditioned by an in-depth awareness of regional realities and issues; consequently, Russia pushes for ending the stalemate regarding Nagorno-Karabakh in a peaceful manner rather than waiting for a possible or likely escalation and conflagration in the foreseeable future, which would be detrimental to Russia's interest and even internal security.

As at all the stages of the conflict resolution, at the renewed stage of escalation in 2016 Russia showed enduring involvement in both April War and post-April political developments. In this regard, President Vladimir Putin's statements on the flaring up of hostilities on the Nagorno-Karabakh LoC, urging both sides to ensure, as a matter of urgency, full cessation of hostilities, to comply with the ceasefire regime and exercise restraint, are important (*Putin prizval nemedlenno prekratit' ogon' v Nagornom Karabakhe*, 2016).

Following President Putin's statement, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov spoke on the phone on 2 April 2016 with Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Elmar Mammadyarov and then Foreign Minister of Armenia Edward Nalbandian, calling on them to take all the necessary steps to end the violence (Press release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's, 2016).

Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova delivered remarks on 2 April 2016, expressing Moscow's official concern over the serious aggravation of the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict




zone and urging the parties to show restraint (Statement by Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, 2016).

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his then U.S. counterpart John Kerry in a phone conversation on 4 April 2016, agreed to intensify the efforts of Russia, the United States and France, as Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, to assist in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and condemned attempts of external players to fuel up the confrontation in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone (Press release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's statement, 2016).

Vladimir Putin held telephone conversations on 5 April 2016 with President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and then President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan, urging both sides to ensure, as a matter of urgency, full cessation of hostilities and compliance with the ceasefire regime. He also noted that Russia would continue to take essential mediation steps to normalise the situation. The Russian leader stressed the imperative of resuming talks between Yerevan and Baku within the OSCE Minsk Group format (Telephone conversations with Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan, 2016).

Interestingly, in an article entitled "Russia Styles itself Lead Mediator in Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict", the British *Reuters* press agency commended the role of Russia in reaching a ceasefire. It is also noted that the conflict in the South Caucasus, a strategically pivotal region, poses danger and could have the most tragic consequences for the region. Western countries, according to the article, "view South Caucasus as a strategically-important corridor through which Caspian Sea oil and gas can be exported to world markets. The route bypasses




Russia, thus reducing Moscow's stranglehold on energy exports from the former Soviet Union". The article holds on the idea that a resumption of war could not be dismissed (Russia styles itself lead mediator in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 2016).

In the interviews of the Russian Foreign Minister, the style of acknowledging the championing role of Russia as chief mediator is apparent. Thus, in the 4 May 2016 interview to *Rossiia Segodnya* Lavrov said:

"We are continuously in contact with both parties. President Vladimir Putin personally joined this effort when the violence surged. I spoke on the telephone with my counterparts. We talked about this with Secretary of State John Kerry, because Russia, the United States and France are co-chairs the OSCE Minsk Group and engaged in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. We discussed this topic in Moscow with French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault, as France is a member of the Three. To be sure, the most important thing is to avoid any new casualties, stop any violations of the ceasefire, and develop effective measures and mechanisms for this. The presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan subscribed to these five years ago, when then [Russian] President Dmitry Medvedev gathered them together. They spoke in favour of creating a mechanism for investigating incidents and for confidence-building and instructed the OSCE to do this. The OSCE drafted a project with various options. But regrettably it stalled at this stage in 2012. Today we would like to the parties to revert to the project discussed back then" (Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's interview with *Rossiia Segodnya*, 2016).

Therefore, I argue that the preceding descriptions and observations




convincingly show that in the April War and post-April 2016 political and diplomatic processes, Russia was never found lacking in upholding the fundamental principle in international law of refraining from threat or use of force and that of the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Steps Taken by the U.S. Co-Chairs

The United States' intervention in the Syrian crisis in 2016 and its focus on the preparation for the U.S. presidential elections were compelling preconditions for this OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair country to limit itself to mediation functions and advocate diplomacy to secure a binding peace resolution strictly within the format of the OSCE Minsk Group.

The U.S. response to the unprecedented escalation of April 2016 in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone was immediate, though. Then U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry condemned, in the strongest terms, the large-scale ceasefire violations along the Nagorno-Karabakh LoC which have resulted in a number of casualties, including civilians. He urged the sides to show restraint, avoid further escalation, and strictly adhere to the ceasefire.

Kerry also called for talks to resume on a comprehensive settlement of the dispute under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, and reiterated that there is no military solution to the conflict. He also restated the commitment of the United States as a Co-Chair country to work with the sides to reach a lasting negotiated peace (United States Condemns Ceasefire Violations Along Nagorno-Karabakh Line of Contact, 2016).




However, there is no evidence to suggest that Kerry contacted directly either Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov or then Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian.

U.S. Department of State Spokesperson John Kirby, in his turn, commented on the development of the situation surrounding the conflict, getting back to the Vienna meeting, he pointed out that the USA had always been interested in seeing a peaceful solution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, in seeing the tension de-escalate and violence stop and the parties start to work towards a better outcome through political dialogue and discussion (John Kirby, Spokesperson, Daily Press Briefing, 2016).

After embarking on the Vienna meeting, the USA expressed willingness to arrange for another meeting as part of its responsibilities as OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair. On 1 June 2016, John Kerry had phone conversations with then President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, reiterating U.S. support for substantive talks that can lead to a comprehensive settlement under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs (Secretary Kerry's Calls With President Sargsyan of Armenia and President Aliyev of Azerbaijan, 2016).

The Saint Petersburg meeting having taken place, the undertone of the U.S. statement was a somewhat a blow to Russian mediation efforts, and the statement should be viewed as a means for the USA to promote its regional interests and to understate Russian mediation efforts to some extent.




Within the context of the April military realities, the U.S. official position had a direct influence on the NATO stance. In a doorstep message on 8 July 2016, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced, in particular, that they would address the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh in the communique of the NATO Summit in Warsaw (Statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the start of the NATO Summit in Warsaw, 2016).

In an earlier statement issued on 5 April 2016, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg hailed the cessation of hostilities along the Nagorno-Karabakh LoC and the verbal agreement reached between the parties in the conflict, and urged the sides to respect the ceasefire, show restraint as well as prevent new escalation.

Stoltenberg also noted that NATO supports the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group and reiterated that the parties need to go back to the negotiation table and find a comprehensive settlement under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairs, as there is no military solution to the conflict (Statement by the NATO Secretary, 2016).

It is noteworthy that NATO's pre-April stance on the conflict did not step outside the application of the territorial integrity principle. Thus, this could also be viewed as a counterbalancing position as opposed to the Russian ambitions to be the only actor in the conflict settlement. And in the face of NATO one could detect the USA seeking for counterbalancing (Baghdasaryan op.cit.: 29-30). At this stage of the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict settlement, the U.S. stance applied also to the NATO official position with an emphasis on the peaceful settlement principle.




France as an OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair and its containment strategy on the April War

France called for peace on the very first day of the renewed outbreak of hostilities in April 2016. The then French President François Hollande reiterated in a 2 April 2016 statement that there can be no other solution [to the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict] than a peaceful and negotiated one and reaffirmed the commitment of France to a peaceful settlement of the conflict (*François Hollande déplore profondément les graves incidents survenus au Haut Karabagh qui ont fait plusieurs victimes*, 2016).

A French Foreign Ministry and International Development spokesman issued a statement on 2 April 2016 calling on the parties to observe the ceasefire and for an immediate return to the negotiation table (*Conflit du Haut-Karabakh–Appel au respect du cessez-le-feu*, 2016).

The French official position on the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict escalation, as appears evident to us, differed; France did not associate the conflict escalation with external regional factors. Both in its 2 April and 5 April statements, France hastened the negotiations towards a peaceful settlement (*Haut-Karabagh–Entrée en vigueur du cessez-le-feu*, 2016; *Haut-Karabakh–Q&R–Extrait du point de presse*, 2016).

By taking part at the 16 May 2016 Vienna “3+2” meeting on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, France got the opportunity to reconfirm its position on the issue. In an official statement issued by the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, France hailed the outcomes of the Vienna-hosted top level talks over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement,



which helped resume the dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan following the 2-5 April clashes (*Arménie/Azerbaïdjan–Réunion "3+2" sur le Haut-Karabagh*, 2016).


In a 5 July 2016 press briefing, the representative of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs announced that France was ready to host the forthcoming meeting on Nagorno Karabakh (*Haut Karabakh–Q&R–Extrait du point de presse*, 2016). And this can be viewed as an OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair country's obligation and initiativeness manifestation.

The role of France as an OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair country in the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict settlement and its awareness of the issue must be acknowledged. In fact, in the April War and post-April political developments, France focused on the principle of refraining from threat or use of force and that of the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Focus on Principle of Territorial Integrity in statements of other participating states in the OSCE Minsk Group

At the renewed stage of escalation in the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict zone, Turkey stood out with its active engagement and implicit calls for mediation conditioned by tension in Russian-Turkish relations in 2015-2016, implying in the context support to Azerbaijan and counterbalancing Russia (Mayilyan 2016: 296-299).

The Turkish side embraced the escalation of the conflict as an opportunity to re-establish its role in the region on the one hand, and




to polish its perpetuated negative image in the Syrian crisis on the other hand.

Turkey accentuated supporting Azerbaijan. On 2 April 2016, during the opening ceremony of the Turkish-American Culture and Civilization Center, answering a question on Turkey's support of Azerbaijan with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan vowed to back Azerbaijan in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict "to the end" and added:

"We are faced with such incidents because the Minsk Group underestimated the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, which has been under occupation for many years. If the Minsk Group had taken fair and decisive steps over this, such incidents would not have happened. However, the weaknesses of the Minsk Group unfortunately led the situation to this point. May Allah assist our Azerbaijani brothers!" (Turkey will support Azerbaijan to the end, 2016).

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued on 2 April 2016 a press release on the uptick of clashes on the LoC and the Azerbaijan-Armenia borderline, voicing support to official Baku, condemning the artillery fire launched by Armenia against Azerbaijan, which affected also the civilian population, inviting Armenia to observe the ceasefire and put an end to the clashes referring to the UN Security Council resolutions on Nagorno Karabakh:

"For about a quarter century, Armenia has been occupying one-fifth of Azerbaijan's territory. Unless this occupation comes to an end and Armenia abandons its aggressive stance, unfortunately, the risk of experiencing similar clashes will continue. In this regard, we reiterate




our call on Armenia to put an end to the occupation in peaceful means in line with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. As a member of the OSCE Minsk Group, established for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkey will continue to support the efforts for reaching a just and lasting solution within the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan” (Press Release Regarding the Clashes on the Line of Contact and on Azerbaijan-Armenia borderline, 2016).

It is noteworthy that the position of Turkey in the April War was not firm owing to the Turkish foreign policy priorities (Baghdasaryan op. cit.: 31-32).

The Republic of Belarus was among the first to respond to the April outbreak of clashes. Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko called for dialogue between the parties to the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh. The issue was discussed during telephone talks of President Lukashenko with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and then Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan. The President of Belarus expressed concern over the clashes in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone (Telephone talks with presidents of Azerbaijan, 2016). Byelorussia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement of 2 April 2016 highlighted the following:

“As the Minsk OSCE Group member state, Belarus continuously advocates for a peaceful de-escalation of the conflict in compliance with generally recognized principles and norms of international law, primarily on the basis of the respect and maintenance of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of the countries, as well as in line with relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the OSCE decisions.” (Statement by the Ministry of



Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus in connection with the events regarding Nagorno Karabakh, 2016).


The position of the Republic of Belarus could be explained in view of the strong political and economic ties between Belarus and Azerbaijan.

Focus on Principle of Territorial Integrity in statements of other states beyond the OSCE Minsk Group

Among the appeals backing Azerbaijan, the Ukrainian response is worth mentioning. In particular, in the 5 April 2016 comment by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the aggravation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Ministry expressed deep concern over the escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It called on all parties and the international community, foremost the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, to pursue all necessary measures for an “immediate ceasefire, de-escalation of the conflict and continuation of the peaceful resolution of the conflict, based on the fundamental principles and norms of the international law.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine comment on the aggravation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 2016)

It was also highlighted that Ukraine supports a sustainable political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, based on “full respect of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders.” (Ibid).

The Ukrainian response stems in this particular case from the tension in Russian-Ukrainian relations and accusations addressed at the Russian side with regard to violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine.




Other states similarly expounded pro-Azerbaijani positions on the conflict. Thus the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan issued a statement on 5 April denouncing Armenia for “the continuous artillery firing by Armenian forces deployed along the Line of Contact, violating the ceasefire.” It was also noted that “Pakistan always stands by fraternal and friendly Azerbaijan.” (Pakistan expresses concern over escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh, 2016).

Response by Organization of Islamic Cooperation to the Azerbaijani-Karabakh War of April 2016

The Azerbaijani side made strenuous efforts to move the April War to the theatre of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), thus artificially creating a religious-political context for the principle of territorial integrity. Then OIC Secretary General Iyad bin Amin Madani at the 13th Islamic Summit of the Heads of State of the OIC Member States, spoke of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and expressed deep concern over its escalation, which he considered a result of the Armenian long-standing occupation of the Azerbaijani lands.

The OIC summit reiterated its “principled position on condemnation of the aggression of the Republic of Armenia against the Republic of Azerbaijan,” and urged for “immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia from the Nagorno-Karabakh region and other occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” The conference also called for the resolution of the conflict “on the basis of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the internationally-recognized borders of the Republic



of Azerbaijan.”


Paragraph 16 and paragraph 17 of the final communiqué of the summit are entirely devoted to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, which is viewed as aggression on behalf of the Armenian side, failure of the Armenian side to comply with the four UNSC resolutions, violation of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan i.e. occupation of the Azerbaijani territories by the Armenian side; in contrast, the Azerbaijani side's military operations are viewed as defensive actions to defeat these Armenian attacks and ensure the security of the Azerbaijani people.

The conference emphasized the need of establishing a Contact Group on the aggression of the Republic of Armenia against the Republic of Azerbaijan within the OIC at the level of Foreign Ministers and to convene its first meeting on the margins of the Istanbul Summit.

The described statement is dangerous in nature if we consider it in the context of religious-political conflicts active throughout the world, as the issue tends to be shifted artificially to this religious-political context. On the other hand, it demonstrates the spiraling atmosphere of Armenophobia in Azerbaijan, and the statement can be viewed as an outcome of efforts undertaken by the Azerbaijani side.

Conclusion: *Modus Operandi* of the Conflict Parties relative to the Containment Measures

Given the descriptions, examples and analyses given above, we can conclude the following:




- The *modus operandi* of Azerbaijan in the April War was incompatible with Point 4 in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter which reads: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (Charter of the United Nations/UN Charter).


Taking into account the given that Azerbaijan evidently initiated the attacks in April 2016, there is an attempt by the Azerbaijani side as a party to the conflict to escape responsibility for the use of force. Azerbaijan, a UN member state, grossly violating all its international commitments and accompanied with violations of international humanitarian law, unleashed a large-scale military aggression against Artsakh i.e. Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2016 and violated the 12 May 1994 trilateral ceasefire agreement signed between Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia (the latter was a co-signatory as it was directly and more deeply involved in that earlier, longer-lasting war).

And on 11 April 2016 Azerbaijan distributed official letters at the UN and the OSCE in an attempt to pin blame of launching military operations on the Armenian side and to question the validity of the 12 May 1994 trilateral ceasefire agreement, advancing instead the 5 April 2016 bilateral verbal agreement as a foundation “document” for guiding the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Summary Report of the MFA Activities of the Republic of Armenia, 2016).

- The cornerstone position of the Azerbaijani side in post-April political realities was to renege on the Vienna agreements and pursue its maneuvering diplomacy.




- The Vienna meeting dashed all the attempts of the Azerbaijani side to question the 1994 ceasefire after the April War and put at table instead the 2016 verbal agreement reached after the war.
- The motions of the Azerbaijani side addressed to the OSCE and UN throughout the years 2016-17 demonstrated the principle of the Azerbaijani side. Namely, Azerbaijan put forward withdrawal of the Armenian troops as a precondition to strengthen peace monitoring and finalize the OSCE investigative mechanisms, as well as for the expansion of the existing Office of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office.
- Azerbaijan disavowed the OSCE investigation mechanisms along the LoC, reasoning that the OSCE peace monitoring prior to and without the withdrawal of the Armenian troops could strengthen the *status quo* and protract the conflict. Arguably Azerbaijan, in fact, artificially consistently blames its failure to meet the preconditions rather disingenuously on the *modus operandi* of the Armenian side.
- The *modus operandi* of the Armenian side is consistent with the political-diplomatic strategy adopted by Armenia both at the previous stages and the renewed stage of the conflict, which is evidence that Armenia has adhered to the format adopted by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship.
- The Vienna meeting moved the precondition of the peaceful solution of the conflict to the political-technical center-stage, which despite the countermeasures taken by Azerbaijan, should be viewed as an opportunity to find a common ground for negotiations and ease polarization while shifting from discourse level to a more practical one.



- The aforementioned could be proved by the fact that monitoring is in practice pursued by using the military-technical potential of the two sides. Thus there are no guarantees for objectively publishing incidents of escalation along the LoC and there are no guarantees which could underlie objective investigation of those incidents.
- The main objective of the Azerbaijani side in the April War, as was mentioned above, becomes evident following the 5 April 2016 verbal ceasefire. However, these attempts were subdued by the Armenian side as a result of which the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries circulated in the UN and OSCE corresponding statements which underlined the timeless nature of the 1994-95 ceasefire agreements and urged the sides to strictly adhere to these agreements.
- Realizing the danger the Azerbaijani calls posed in the existing situation, the Armenian side undertook countermeasures. The statement by the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed, in particular:

“The Armenian side strictly condemns the Azerbaijani vein attempts to question the May 1994 timeless trilateral ceasefire agreement which is a dangerous step and is fraught with further destabilizing the situation in the region. The early April aggressive military operation launched by the Azerbaijani side fails to end the ceasefire agreement and makes the side having violated the agreement accountable.” (Statement Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, 2016).
- The military operations stirred up by Azerbaijan were strongly condemned by the Artsakh Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Statement NKR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). And on 11 April 2016,



over 520 (!) NGOs from the Artsakh Republic and the Republic of Armenia made a joint statement to the European Parliament (More than 520 NGOs of Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia present a joint appeal to the European Parliament, 2016).


In fact, despite the Azerbaijani counter-measures i.e. actual opposition to the mediation efforts, there is no alternative to the solution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict but through consistent mediation efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship, taking into account the conflict settlement principles as worded in the joint statements of the Russian, United States and French Co-Chairs.

In the political realities during the April War of 2016 and following it, the Co-Chair countries and OSCE Minsk Group participating states referred to the fundamental principles enshrined in international law, which developed at the settlement process as containment measures aimed at the parties to the conflict. These principles were refraining from threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, and that of territorial integrity of states.

It is noteworthy that in some cases these statements included strong wordings directed against the Azerbaijani side which had launched the attack and its steps undertaken beyond the arrangements. The technical instruments of conflict management thus remained unaccomplished due to the policy pursued by Azerbaijan.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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United States Condemns Ceasefire Violations Along Nagorno-Karabakh Line of Contact, 2 April 2016, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/04/255432.htm>.

NB: do you have any comments on Baghdasaryan's article? Please send these to info@ethnogeopolitic.org or by contact form at www.ethnogeopolitics.org.



What does article 'short Azerbaijani-Karabakh War' intend to prove


(First Critical Response to Nelli Baghdasaryan's "The short Azerbaijani-Karabakh War of 2-5 April 2016: Political Containment Instruments aimed at the Opposing Parties in the Conflict")

The article contains a lot of factual information and follows the timeline of the steps undertaken by the different political actors during the April War. However, does this timeline underpin the conclusion that the author makes? I would have to say no.

The author also tries to see these political developments against the backdrop of principles of international law. However, it is not very successful attempt. It remains unclear why or what is intended by the author. To demonstrate the contradiction between the principles of international law? Maybe to demonstrate that different countries due to their political interests favour one principle over another?

In this case the analysis should include some other factors of the domestic politics of the N-K conflict related countries. In general, I would rethink the material having in mind the main intention of the author. What is he or she meant to prove, explore or demonstrate by this article? The article seems also very biased with the selection of sources and the attempt to present the conflict as between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan, excluding Armenia.

- Anonymous




A Critique on ‘Azerbaijani-Karabakh War of April 2016’

(Second Critical Response to Nelli Baghdasaryan’s “The short Azerbaijani-Karabakh War of 2-5 April 2016: Political Containment Instruments aimed at the Opposing Parties in the Conflict”)

The article tries to address an important issue—the application of principles of international law in practice. The case-study concerns the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which can be seen (and named) differently. So the author does, non-consistently though. The conflict is named on many occasions Azerbaijani-Karabakh, emphasising that Armenia plays only a secondary role in it. Later the role of Armenia is partly admitted through the reference to the “trilateral cease-fire agreement”.

In any case, this demonstrates that the author is rather biased. The biases are seen on other occasions too. For instance referring to the Baku’s political decision to discuss the conflict within the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation the author describes it as “artificially creating a religious-political context”.

Having biases is not uncommon, but it is important to recognise them, which helps to avoid them later. In the case of this article, the author ends up being a captive of his or her own biases. These biases the author tries to balance by referring to the “neutral” journalistic sources. The article, actually, offers a journalistic chronology of the political process after the so-called April War of 2016. The latter is barely introduced in the article, which puts all the guilt on the Azerbaijani




side. The heavy reliance on journalistic sources can be regarded as fieldwork, but it is questionable if this reliance has been so necessary and relevant. The goal of the article (as it was stated) is different. The reference to journalistic sources is not justified by the conclusions either. Neither the conclusions of the sections, nor the article's overall conclusion seem justified enough.

In other words, the analysis (or rather reiteration of information) of the media sources does not allow a reader to see why and how one principle of the international law is preferred over the other.

The analysis itself is also considerably weak. For instance, the section that analyses French involvement in the process of resolution refers to half a dozen journalistic sources. On the basis of this, the author concludes that France follows the principle of refraining from threat or use of force and that of peaceful settlement of disputes. The same problem can be observed in other sections too.


All the mentioned criticism does not diminish the importance of the work done. The author has collected the media sources and analysed closely the moves of the countries that are involved in the process of mediation. This, to my mind, is the added value of this article. The reformulation of the main focus and goal of the article would make it of a larger significance for scholars and politicians though.

- Anonymous



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
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Dorsey's Column

Rise of Civilisationists forces rethink of sovereign Nation State


James M. Dorsey

A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audacibel, Patreon and Castbox.

Introduction

Shaping a new world order is proving to be about a lot more than power. The rise of the civilisational state and of civilisational rather than national leaders is calling into question the concept of sovereign nation states. That is evident in the consequences of the civilisationist assault on minorities ranging from the Kurds in Syria and Turkey to Muslims in China, India and Myanmar, to Islamophobia and mounting anti-Semitism in the United States, France and Hungary, as well as sectarianism in the Middle East.¹

Democracies legally enshrined yardsticks of non-discrimination and equality irrespective of creed, ethnicity, colour, gender and religion but never succeeded in truly enforcing those principles. As a result, civilisationism's assault spotlights the long-standing failure of the nation state, evident from the moment it was conceptualised by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, to give true meaning to guaranteeing the security, safety and rights of all its inhabitants irrespective of creed,



colour, race, ethnicity, faith or gender. ²


The rise of a critical mass of civilisational leaders, including China's Xi Jinping, Myanmar's Win Myint, India's Narendra Modi, Russia's Vladimir Putin, Hungary's Victor Orban and US president Donald J. Trump, makes a rethink inevitable not only of the functioning of democracy but also of the concepts of the nation state and sovereignty that have structured world orders for close to 500 years.

Many of these leaders conceive of their societies and/or states as defined by civilisation and its reach into akin Diaspora communities, rather than by legally recognised borders, population within those borders, and language.

Civilisationism has allowed China to extend its reach in the South China Sea beyond internationally recognised borders at the expense of other littoral states as well as to Diaspora communities across the globe. It also provided the basis on which China has so far successfully imposed its views on others whether it concerns its acceptance of its one-China policy or silence, if not acquiescence, of its repression in Xinjiang. Civilisationism has further enabled Russia to recognise breakaway states in Georgia, annex Crimea, and spark violent conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Quest for homogenous Nation States as contributor of civilisationism

In some ways, the nation state, designed to put an end to religious




wars in Europe, paved the way for a revival of civilisationism by godfathering exclusionary politics that were based on a determination of who belonged and who did not belong to a nation—a question which civilisationism answers by legitimising supremacism, racism and prejudice.

From the outset, newly conceived European nation states sought to build nations by not fully embracing those it believed were not truly part of their nation. The nation state's exclusivity, rather than as a result of the Westphalia treaty pulling the curtain on an era of European wars, sparked another round of armed conflict intended to fortify newly found national identities.

Today, reconceptualisation of the nation state and the notion of sovereignty has become an imperative, with civilisationism adopting exclusivity as its battle cry and the nation state's centuries-long inability and unwillingness to negotiate mutually workable arrangements that take account of aspirations and identities of societal groups that feel excluded.

Reconceptualisation would need to be geared towards guaranteeing individual and minority rights based on an international legal framework that is enforceable.

Failure to do so would likely usher in an era of disruptive societal tension, marginalisation and disenfranchisement of minorities, flows of mass migration, radicalisation and increased political violence.



The case of Chinese Civilisationism exported to other countries


A recent International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) report concluded that China was advising countries confronting political and economic instability, sometimes sparked in part by Chinese project-related corruption, to adopt its model of brutally cracking down on any expression of dissent like in Xinjiang.³

China, according to the report, is also advocating implementation of its system of social control, involving the use of invasive Chinese artificial intelligence-based surveillance technology, reducing media to parrots of government policy, and firewalling the Internet. China is further training governments in ways of disrupting opposition activity.

China's view of economic development as a way of countering what it sees as cultural drivers of extremism underlies its effort to Sinicize Turkic Muslim Islam in Xinjiang and is implicit in Chinese aid to countries in the Middle East.⁴

Mr. Xi announced in July 2019 US\$ 20 billion in loans to Middle Eastern nations as well as US\$ 106 million in financial aid for Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen on the back of Chinese assertions that finance would help resolve the region's political, religious and cultural tensions.⁵

"China is increasingly proactive in its response to instability in developing countries. It is now more forthright in its advice to partner countries and is proactive in promoting Chinese solutions to other countries' problems," said Nicholas Crawford, the IISS report's author.⁶




China's policy prescriptions, elements of which are being adopted across the globe, is likely to perpetuate problems inherent to exclusivism propagated by both civilisationists and nation states that are more concerned about perceived threats to their territorial integrity or constructed collective identities than aspirations of groups that are part of their societal fabric.

Rise of Civilisationism across the globe

The rise of civilisationists, autocrats, authoritarians and illiberals, including Mr. Xi, does not bode well for Eurasia, a region pockmarked by groups whose rights have been repeatedly violated by various civilisationist leaders as well as exclusionary nation states concerned about challenges to their territorial integrity or constructed collective identities.

“Geopolitics is no longer simply about the economy or security... The non-Western world, led by Beijing and Moscow, is pushing back against the Western claim to embody universal values... The rejection of Western universalism by the elites in Russia and China challenges the idea of the nation state as the international norm for political organisation... The new pivot of geopolitics is civilisation,” said political scientist Adrian Pabst.⁷

A tour of the world's flashpoints proves the point. The flashpoints include predominantly Kurdish south-eastern Turkey, what is left of the Kurdish enclave in northern Syria, Rohingya rotting away in Bangladeshi refugee camps after fleeing ethnic cleansing in Myanmar,



the plight of Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang and Catalan efforts to democratically decide whether they want to remain part of Spain.


These flashpoints illustrate the fact that the failure of the nation state to build truly inclusive and cohesive societies coupled with the rise of the civilisational state and civilisationalist (i.e. civilisationist) leaders portends a new world order that is likely to be characterised by individual and collective rights abuse that heightens societal tensions and aggravates disputes and conflicts.

“The global order provides more mechanisms for states to deal diplomatically with each other than with the people inside them,” noted scholar and author Malka Older.⁸

The civilisationist threat to individual and minority rights is enhanced by its insistence on collective adherence to an overriding ideology whether that is the Chinese communist party’s concept of absolute control of anything and everything cloaked in ultra-nationalism and concepts of unique Chinese characteristics; Russian Orthodoxy cemented in the alliance between church and state; or Victor Orban’s conceptualisation of a Hungarian nation that is homogenously white and Christian.

Conclusion: Civilisationists seek to control or undermine the private sphere

In a recent study of religion and tolerance in the Middle East, widely viewed as perhaps the religiously most intolerant part of the world,




political scientist Michael Hoffman concluded that it is not religion that in and of itself breeds intolerance and prejudice.⁹

Instead, Mr. Hoffman suggested that Muslim attitudes towards the other differ sharply between believers who pray collectively in a mosque and those who worship in private. Private prayer “does not contain the same sectarian content as communal prayer,” Mr. Hoffman noted¹⁰, implicitly pointing a finger at autocratic authorities who in the Middle East often exercise tight control of what is said in the mosque.

“The group identification mechanism is not present for private prayer; since private prayer is fundamentally an [a] personal phenomenon, it does not cause believers to distinguish more sharply between their own sect and others and therefore does not produce the intolerant outcomes associated with communal worship,” Mr. Hoffman went on to say.¹¹

Mr. Hoffman’s research, despite its focus on the Middle East, spotlighted in an era of rising civilisationism the risks to universal basic human dignity as well as individual and minorities rights in directly or indirectly imposing collectivist beliefs that drown out the political, ethnic or religious other.

The silver lining in what are bleak prospects may be Mr. Pabst’s conclusion that “neither the Western cult of private freedom without social solidarity nor the totalitarian tendencies among China’s and Russia’s elites can nurture resilient societies against the disruptive forces of technology and implacable economic globalisation... (Yet) across different civilisations there is an inchoate sense that the purpose of politics is the free association of people around common interests and




shared social virtues of generosity, loyalty, courage, sacrifice and gratitude. The practice of such virtues can bind us together as citizens, nations and cultures beyond colour, class or creed”.¹²

Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, an adjunct senior research fellow at National University of Singapore's Middle East Institute and co-director of University of Würzburg's Institute for Fan Culture. jmd@jmdonline.org

An earlier version of the article appeared on November 5, 2019, at <https://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2019/11/rise-of-civilisationalists-forces.html>


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2. Ibid.
3. Nicholas Crawford, 'China and instability in developing countries' *China and developing countries—IISS Research Report*, Quarterly Report, 28 October 2019 (see archive www.iiss.org/blogs).
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7. Adrian Pabst, 'China, Russia and the return of the civilisational state' *NewStatesman*, 8 May 2019, www.newstatesman.com/2019/05/china-russia-and-return-civilisational-state.
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11. Ibid.
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Event Column

Lecture on Dutch social-anarchist freethinker Domela Nieuwenhuis on 100th anniversary of his death





D. Nieuwenhuis around 1875

Caspar ten Dam

Introduction

On 7 December 2019, social historian Homme Wedman gave a lecture at the socio-cultural center 'Vrijplaats' ('Free place'; sanctuary) ¹ in the former cannery on the Middelstegracht in Leiden, the Netherlands, about the life and work of the social anarchist Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis, who died a hundred years ago on 18 November 1919. ²


Dennis Bos, lecturer in National History at Leiden University, gave the introduction. Both emphasised that Domela Nieuwenhuis was not only of great significance as an advocate for the poor and the oppressed, but that he can be a great example and inspiration to us nowadays—also in Leiden, with which Domela had a little known yet important connection.




Lecture about Domela Nieuwenhuis in Vrijplaats Leiden (Photo: Caspar ten Dam)

Connection with Leiden


Homme Wedman, social historian at the University of Groningen and board member of the Domela Nieuwenhuis Fund ³, has always been fascinated by Domela Nieuwenhuis (1846-1919), who became known under the Frisian Biblical nickname *Us Ferlosser* (Our Savior) given by Frisian peat workers.



During his inspired lecture, Homme also points out that Domela had connections with the university town of Leiden. For example, in preparation for his position as a pastor in the coastal town of Harlingen, the young Domela preached in the Lutheran church on Leiden's Hooglandse Kerkgracht (a former canal street).



Homme Wedman during his lecture (Photo: Caspar ten Dam)



Domela also had family ties with Leiden: for example, Domela's grandfather Jacobus Nieuwenhuis was professor of Philosophy and Arts at the town's university between 1822 and 1843. In addition, the Leiden branch of Domela's Social Democratic Association (*Sociaal-Democratische Bond*, SDB) was established in October 1882, making it one of the oldest SDB branches in the Netherlands, after Amsterdam, Haarlem, The Hague and Rotterdam.


These developments created a lot of resistance in Leiden, as elsewhere in the country, especially among the elite and well-to-do bourgeoisie. The Leiden Daily (*Leidsch Dagblad*) of July 30, 1883, for example, stated it was high time that "the fallacies that people like Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis hold out to the people are being challenged by prominent people with an eye for the true interests of the People".

Connection with Amsterdam

In his introductory lecture, Dennis Bos describes how Domela helped shape the socialist workers' movement after his death, particularly in Amsterdam. To this end he gives examples of the accomplishments of three individuals in Amsterdam:

Hubertus Zuurbier (1880-1962), street vendor of Domela's newspaper The Free Socialist (*De Vrije Socialist*);

Ratio Koster (1927-1984), activist and conscientious objector who was convicted of protests during his military service against the so-called 'police actions' in Indonesia after WWII (i.e. concerning Indonesia's




eventually successful anti-colonial struggle against the Dutch) under the motto of “let’s not turn our boys into SS men”;

and Pieter Hammelink (1907-1972), conscientious objector in 1927 and defender of Domela’s statue on Nassau Square in Amsterdam against possible destruction by opponents during and after the unveiling on August 29, 1931.



Dennis Bos during his lecture (Photo: Caspar ten Dam)



Incidentally, both Dennis and Homme consider the raised fist of Domela's statue in Amsterdam misleading because Domela never spoke and acted like this: his charisma was of a calm yet intense kind. Revealing detail: Hammelink and Koster each had a Frisian (grand) mother who had been maids at Domela's home in his Amsterdam years.

Concluding thoughts


Domela Nieuwenhuis became famous as the preacher who fell from his Christian faith and as a social anarchist and anti-militarist freethinker, activist and politician fought tooth and nail, through non-violent action, speeches and writings, for the rights, life-improvement and elevation of poor farmers and workers and other disadvantaged people.

Homme Wedman states that Domela as a cosmopolitan, ecological, solidarity and independent thinker can mean a lot for 'Vrijplaats' Leiden and other like-minded socio-cultural sanctuaries—and indeed for humanity as a whole.

Caspar ten Dam is a conflict analyst, terrorism expert and independent scholar with his own research company CT Dam Consultancy (www.ctdamconsultancy.com). info@ctdamconsultancy.com

Endnotes—References

1. For information on Vrijplaats Leiden, see <https://vrijplaatsleiden.nl>.



2. For more information on Domela Nieuwenhuis, see e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferdinand_Domela_Nieuwenhuis.
3. See for more information on the Domela Nieuwenhuis Fund and the Domela Nieuwenhuis Museum in Heerenveen, the Netherlands, which it helps to finance and run: <https://ferdinanddomelanieuwenhuis.nl>.

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
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
In early 2020 it opened an additional Book Outlet Leiden at Breestraat 70, which offers many books in Dutch and other non-English languages as well.


The Mayflower Bookshop in Leiden (www.themayflowerbookshop.nl) moved the nicest bookstore in Holland from Hogewoerd 107 to Breestraat 65 in 2015 in order to expand repository. In 2016 it moved to Breestraat 142.



Breestraat 142 (© Mayflower 2016)







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