JAPANESE INFILTRATION AMONG MUSLIMS IN CHINA

Description

One of a series of reports describing Japanese subversive activities among the Muslims of various areas. This report traces such activities in China from the beginnings to the summer of 1943.

15 May 1944

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JAPANESE INFILTRATION AMONG MUSLIMS IN CHINA

I. SUMMARY

A. The Background of Islam in China

Most of the Muslims of China and its dependencies are concentrated in Sinkiang (which is predominantly Muslim) and in the northwest and northern provinces of China proper (Kansu, Ningsia, Tsinghai, Shensi, Suiyuan, Hopei and Honan, where they constitute an important minority). Another large concentration exists in southwest China (Yunnan), while important groups are to be found in the major coastal ports, such as Canton and Shanghai. Every province of China, indeed, contains at least a few thousand Muslims. The total Muslim population of greater China is estimated by the Muslims themselves at around fifty million. This, however, is a gross exaggeration; eighteen million, or about 4 percent of the total population, is probably a closer approximation to the correct figure.

Not only in religion, but also in race and in social status, the Muslims of China stand apart from non-Muslim Chinese. Although considerable Chinese blood has entered their veins in the course of time, their original Arabic, Persian, Turkic, Mongol, or other non-Chinese stock is frequently still discernible in their physical appearance. Economically, too, they tend to be segregated into distinct occupations, and though in the cities some of the Muslims are very wealthy, the bulk of Muslims in China are poor, even when judged by Chinese standards. Coupled with poverty has been a low standard of education, and a consequent failure to play a part in the cultural life of the country commensurate to their actual numerical strength.

As a result, the Chinese Muslim press (most of it concentrated in Peiping, long the cultural center of Chinese Islam) has exerted comparatively little influence. Disturbances, or even large scale wars, have frequently broken out between Muslims and non-Muslims, particularly in Sinkiang, and in the northwest and southwest of China proper, where the Muslims are most strong. These conflicts have been aggravated by the martial spirit characteristic of many Muslims, and their strong sense of group solidarity.

Nevertheless, the above differences should not be overemphasized. Most Muslims, at least in China proper, speak Chinese as their native language, and often the cultural differences between them and non-Muslims are, superficially, scarcely apparent. During recent years, moreover, much has been done, both on the part of the Muslims themselves and on the part of the Chinese Government, to raise the social and educational status of Muslims in China, and to give them a greater participation in the life of the country as a whole. There is, therefore, no Muslim "problem" in China today, in the sense that such a problem exists in India, and no important Muslim group in China proper has publicly demanded anything like "Pakistan," despite frequent reports to this effect by Japan.

B. Japanese Activities Among Muslims in China Prior to 1937

The Muslims of China, as an important minority group, constitute a logical focal point for the Japanese technique of "divide and conquer." Japanese interest in the Muslims, however, developed only gradually, and came as a by-product of other activites. In the beginning, Japanese fear of Russian expansion led them first to pay their attention to the Muslims of Central Asia, and only later to extend this

attention to the Muslims of China proper. The year 1896 marks the conversion of the first Japanese of any note to Islam, and in 1906, following the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, a wave of propaganda was launched by Japan toward the Islamic world, in a bid to swing the Muslim countries to her side as the potential leader of Asia.

In China proper, Japanese interest in Islam first arose out of various activites conducted by members of the Black Dragon Society. Notable among these was the support of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary movement against the Manchu government, about 1904-12. In 1908, Chinese Muslim students in Japan published a short-lived Muslim periodical in Chinese, probably under Japanese auspices. In 1909, the Black Dragon Society's interest in Islam was made concrete through the drawing up of a formal Muslim pact, signed by Toyama and other men important in the world of Japanese secret societies. Following this event, at least five specially picked men were sent forth by the Black Dragon Society to travel extensively through China and Central Asia, making over a period of years, careful studies of Muslim conditions and personalities wherever they went. Most notable of these investigators was probably Tanaka Ippei, whose intellectual versatility is indicated by the fact that he was not only an expert on Shinto and Buddhism, but he also acquired while in China a considerable knowledge of Confucianism. In 1924 he became a convert to Islam and made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and a decade later he capped his career by a second pilgrimage to Mecca, performed when he was already a dying man.

The first ambitious Japanese attempt prior to 1937 to unify (and thus utilize) the Muslims in China proper was the creation of the Society of Light in Shanghai during

the years 1923-25. Sakuma Teijiro, founder of the society, hoped to awaken the Muslims of China from their age-long lethargy, and dreamed of ultimately establishing branches of his organization in all major cities of China, together with Muslim libraries, schools, printing presses, and hospitals. He hoped, furthermore, eventually to introduce Islam into Japan itself, and to bring about a pan-Islamic union between all Muslim countries, in which Japan was to form the keystone. The resulting economic and political benefits to Japan, he writes in a pamphlet published in 1923, would be inestimable. In 1925 or shortly thereafter, however, this grandiose scheme collapsed, probably through lack of funds.

Nevertheless, during the years 1927 to 1929, a Japanese group interested in the study of Islam maintained a Japanese-language periodical in Peiping, entitled Islam. Events took a sinister turn in 1931, when in November, shortly after the Japanese seizure of Manchuria, riots broke out in Tientsin, instigated by a Chinese Muslim acting under Japanese inspiration, in the course of which P'u-yi, scion of the old Manchu ruling house, was spirited from the city to Manchuria, where he later became "emperor" of "Manchukuo." In that land, between the years 1932 and 1937, the creation of various new Muslim organizations and periodicals testifies to the increased interest in Islam generated there under the influence of Japanese occupation. In 1935, a younger cousin of "Emperor" P'u-yi actually became a Muslim, and has, together with his wife, since played an active part in Muslim affairs within the Japanese Empire.

C. Japanese Activities Among Muslims in China Since 1937

Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, large numbers of Muslims in North China proper have fallen

under Japanese rule. As a result, although in Manchuria there have been developments in the field of Islam since 1937 (such as the creation of the Manchukuo Muslim People's League), the main center of gravity has shifted southward to Peiping. February 1938 saw the establishment in Peiping of the All-China Muslim League, an ambitious Japanese-sponsored organization designed eventually to bring all Muslims of China under Japanese control. To date, however, only the North China division is actively functioning; the other five divisions exist only on paper. The North China division maintains headquarters at Peiping, secondary headquarters at four other North China cities, and 394 lesser branches in smaller towns. It receives funds from the Japanese Army, publishes a magazine in Chinese, and operates (along military lines) a school for the Chinese Muslim Yough Corps in Peking.

The League is anti-Soviet, anti-Kuomintang, anti-Western imperialism, but pro-Axis and shows pan-Islamic leanings. It is used by the Japanese not only as a convenient organ of control, but also to arouse its constituents against Soviet Russia, and to gain influence, as well as to carry on espionage, among the Muslims of China's strategic northwest. A number of Japanese "advisers" direct the activities of the League, among them one who formerly worked as an agent in Afghanistan. In addition, there is a large Chinese Muslim personnel, recruited in part from Manchuria, in part from residents of Peiping and other North China cities. These men hold impressive titles but wield very little power. Many of them are old, and very few are in any way politically significant. In general, it may be said that the League has gained little following among any groups of the North China Muslim population.

In addition to the All-China Muslim League, other Japanese-organized leagues exist in the Northwest and at Canton, but these, especially in the latter region are of trifling importance. Since the occupation of North China, the Japanese have also either taken over c- created various Muslim schools and periodicals, which they use for propaganda purposes, but with comparatively little effect, owing in part to war conditions and in part to a realization by Chinese Muslims of the true nature of Japanese aims.

Politically, the Japanese in Peiping and elsewhere have outwardly tried to favor the Muslims living under their rule. Actually, however, they have succeeded in arousing bad feeling between Muslims and Chinese, and Muslims and Mongols, in various parts of North China. This is in line with the Japanese policy of creating disunity between the racial, social, and religious groups which they rule.

Economically, too, the Muslims have suffered equally with other sections of the population from Japanese monopolistic and expropriatory commercial activities. There is little cause, therefore, for Muslims living under Japanese rule to feel that they have benefited from this rule.

D. Plot and Counterplot in Central Asia

Sinkiang, as the Central Asiatic crossroads between Russia, Britain, and China, has for decades been a center of international intrigue, despite its remoteness from the outside world. Japanese interest in the area began early and may be attributed primarily to Japan's long-standing rivalry with Russia. As time went on, the fact that Sinkiang is a predominantly Muslim land impressed upon the Japanese the possibilities of organizing pan-Islamic movements in the area which could be used, not only to weaken China's control, but -- and this was more important to the Japanese -- as a powerful weapon against Russia.

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In 1888 the Rakuzen-do, an organization founded by young Japanese "patriots" in China for the study of conditions there, became alarmed by reports of the prospective building of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. One of its members was therefore sent into Central Asia to find out what might be done to stop the project. He disappeared, however, after departing westward (September 1889) from Lanchow, in Kansu, and was never heard of again. Other, and more successful, Japanese journeys of exploration followed in the next decades. One Japanese even succeeded in traveling overland all the way from Peiping to Istanbul (1924-25), having as his aim the mapping of a route for a trans-Asiatic railroad to counter the Trans-Siberian of the Russians. He and his Japanese confreres carefully studied the climate, topography, peoples, military defenses, etc., of Sinkiang, with special attention to the Muslims. Ili, owing to its position close to the Russian border, has been the goal of several of these Japanese travelers, and at least one of them became adviser to the Chinese military governor there. In the case of all these Japanese, there seems no question that it was political rather than scientific considerations that induced them to make their travels, often at the cost of great personal hardship.

A new phase in the history of Sinkiang came with the assassination of its governor, Yang Tseng-hsin, in 1928. Widespread disorders followed, giving Japan excellent opportunity to fish in troubled waters. Thus it is no surprise to find that during the years immediately following 1928 there was a flow of Japanese Muslim "prophets" into Sinkiang. The most important event of the period was the civil war waged by the young Kansu Muslim general, Ma Chung-ying, against the

provincial authorities during the years 1931-34. Probably it was only the aid received from Soviet Russia by the latter that enabled them finally to crush the revolt and force Ma into internment in Russia. Though Ma's bold plan of creating a Central Asiatic autonomous state, with himself as ruler, was probably original with him, there is no doubt that he enjoyed strong moral support from the Japanese, and very probably some material support as well. His chief adviser, a Turk named Kemal Kaya, may well have had Japanese dealings prior to coming to him.

At the same time that the Japanese helped Ma Chung-ying, they were using his revolt to further some independent schemes of their own. A young Turkish prince, Abdul Kerim, was brought to Tokyo in May 1933, where he was carefully groomed to become the future ruler of Sinkiang. A little later an English adventurer, "Dr." Khalid Sheldrake, who had long been a Muslim, tried to make himself king of an independent state of "Islamistan" in southern Sinkiang. The collapse of Ma Chung-ying's rebellion in 1934, however, brought both these efforts to an end. The Turkish prince subsequently committed suicide and the would-be "king of Islamistan" has disappeared from view.

Though peace has for the most part prevailed in Sinkiang since 1934, a short-lived rebellion in Kashgar in 1937 seems to have been linked to Japanese intrigue in the form of a Turki leader, General Mahmud. In other ways, too, the Japanese have continued active until the present day. Their work has consisted of: (a) infiltration (espionage, bribery, or direct military action); (b) "cultural activities" (such as establishing in Tokyo a primary school for Tartar children from Central Asia, or carrying

on Central Asiatic intrigue among Muslims in the Near East); and (c) propaganda (primarily consisting of assertions that the Muslims in Sinkiang and the northwest of China proper have broken relations with the Chinese Government and are on the point of creating an "independent" Muslim state).

E. Chinese Counter Moves to Japanese Islamic Activities

In recent years much has been done, both by Chinese Muslims and by the Chinese Government, to heal the old feeling of antagonism between Muslims and non-Muslims. Since 1912 numerous Muslim organizations have been created, of which the most important has been the Chinese Muslim Mutual Progress Association. All these, however, have now been supplanted almost entirely by the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation, established in Hankow in May 1938 as a direct answer to the Japanese-sponsored All-China Muslim League founded in Peiping three months earlier. The Federation is headed by General Pai Ch'ung-hsi, a right-hand man of Chiang Kai-shek, and has among its members many of China's most prominent Muslims. It maintains branches in seventeen provinces and 256 hsien (counties) in Free China, and fosters Muslim educational and industrial enterprises. The Chinese government, too, encourages the admission of Muslims to government universities. Thus though Muslims still feel that they do not hold adequate representation in the Chinese government, the relations between them and the Chinese as a whole have greatly improved, and the future looks encouraging. Certainly no Muslim problem exists in China today comparable in any way to that which has disturbed India in recent years.

Active steps have been taken, also, to strengthen relations between China and the outside Islamic world.

Many Chinese Muslims have gone for study to Islam's famous university, al-Azhar in Cairo. Some of them have translated Chinese books into Arabic; others have actively combatted Japanese propaganda in the Near East; and one returned student now broadcasts in Arabic from Chungking. The Chinese Government has also sent four goodwill missions to various Muslim lands since 1938, while in 1942 it instituted diplomatic relations with several of these countries. Through statements issued by the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation and by prominent non-Muslim Chinese leaders, China has attempted to present her side of the Sino-Japanese War to the Islamic world. There is no doubt that she is hoping to win the voluntary support of the Muslim countries for the time when she will take an important position in the post-war world.

INTRODUCTION

This study permits a very definite picture to emerge of the perseverence, consistency, and thoroughness of the techniques used by Japan as a prelude to direct militarist expansion. Many of Japan's apologists have attempted to excuse her actions of the past two decades on grounds of overpopulation, lack of natural resources, an expanding industrial economy, the world depression, the oriental exclusion act of the United States, imitation of Western forms of totalitarianism, and similar factors. This report indicates that such excuses do not bear inspection. Overpopulation and the other factors to which the apologists point may in recent years have aggravated Japan's thirst for world domination; but they obviously did not induce such overweening ambition, or even markedly influence it until it was already in full course, inasmuch as it goes back fifty years to a period when very few of the supposed causes were yet operative. The roots of Japanese imperialism must be looked for in ideological and sociological forces that lie deeply imbedded in Japanese history. They have been made manifest through the activities of those Japanese "patriots" who created the Black Dragon and similar organizations, and who for years, with extreme fanaticism and self-abnegation, labored to promote what they considered to be the greatness of their country. In the early stages these men often suffered from lack of appreciation at home as well as difficulties abroad, but little by little they gained support from sections of the Japanese Army, and through the Army, of the Japanese Government. Japan's present "Co-Prosperity Sphere" may justly be described as the realization of the dreams of these men.

It should be remembered in this connection that Japan's Muslim program in China is only a portion of a much vaster

interlocking Islamic program, covering virtually all countries of the world in which Muslim groups exist, including even the United States. A reading of the reports parallel to this should make this evident. Furthermore, this program has itself been only one of several similar programs, assiduously and persistently conducted during many years, among many peoples and in many lands. The Toa Senkaku gives extraordinarily frank accounts of these varied operations under such headings as "Activities of our Religious Figures in China" (vol. 1, ch. 36), or "Activities of our 'Men of High Purpose' in Siam" (vol. 2, ch. 47).

This report also demonstrates the extreme mental "flexibility" displayed by Japanese of the "patriot" type described above -- a flexibility that permits such Japanese to accept, seemingly wholeheartedly, Islam or Catholicism or any other alien faith, and yet remain completely loyal to their native Shinto and the mystic nationalistic beliefs it entails. A man like Tanaka, for example, will be famed as a specialist on Confucianism, become a deep scholar of Buddhism, and then turn into an apparently sincere and ardent convert to Islam; yet at the same time he will be hailed by his fellow countrymen as "a noble soldier of our glorious empire" who labored his entire life for "the administration of East Asia." A man like Sakuma will work zealously with his Society of Light for the advancement of Chinese Muslims; yet he will quite unashamedly recommend this organization to his own people as an ideal instrument for establishing Japanese hegemony on the Asiatic continent. In cases like this the individual concerned displays seemingly wholehearted (and, in his own mind, perhaps quite sincere) admiration for the alien concepts he adopts; yet if any conflict arises between these and his inner core of native belief, he so subordinates them to the latter as to strip them of

meaning, save for certain superficial externals. In so doing he gives no apparent evidence of mental confusion or moral guilt.

The origin of this strange monocentric type of mentality is probably the mystical belief, implanted in the individual Japanese at an early age, that he belongs to a chosen people descended from the gods; that his country is some day destined to rule all other countries; and that such rule will bring true peace and happiness, not only to Japan herself, but to all countries under her hegemony. This would explain why, with no conscious sense of hypocrisy, a Japanese can, and frequently does, charge "insincerity" against China or any other nation that "fails to understand" Japan. It is this type of mentality that makes a Japanese so difficult to reason with on certain subjects, and therefore such a dangerous foe.

Turning more specifically to China, the Japanese attempts to utilize the Muslims in that country are typical of the general pattern of Japanese imperialist technique: currying favor among as many social, racial, religious, or linguistic groups as possible; attempting to strengthen the centrifugal forces at work within the country, by intensifying if possible, differences between these various groups; and consistently furnishing support to those minority groups that happen to be antagonistic to the group in power. In the case of the Chinese Muslims, their martial traditions, and the strategic concentration of their population in regions adjacent to the Russian frontier, have provided added inducement for Japanese activity.

However, perhaps owing to the monocentric type of mentality just described, the Japanese, in dealing with the Chinese Muslims, as with Muslims generally, have revealed only a most superficial understanding of Islamic doctrine. This becomes

evident after reading the writings of even such a Muslim enthusiast as Wakabayashi, author of The Muslim World and Japan. The themes of Japanese propaganda among Chinese Muslims, therefore, have been confined with montonous regularity to anti-Communism, pan-Islamism, anti-Chungkingism (to coin a new phrase), anti-white (but non-Axis) imperialism, and the concept that Japan is the benevolent and invincible protector of all Asiatic peoples.

On the whole it may be said with some confidence that the results of this propaganda have been meager as far as the Muslims of China are concerned; certainly more so than in the case of their co-religionists elsewhere. Such failure may in part be attributed to its rather crude, mechanical, and obviously self-interested nature. Even more important, however, is the fact that the Chinese Muslims, among world Muslims, have been the only ones (until recently) to learn through direct personal experience what the Japanese are like. They have been able to see for themselves the way in which Japanese performance fails to live up to Japanese promise. In general, it may perhaps be accepted as an axiom that the effectiveness of Japanese propaganda varies in inverse ratio with the degree of direct Japanese contact experienced by the people being propagandized.

Another reason for Japanese lack of success has been their apparent failure to recognize the strength of Chinese culture as a unifying force, and consequent overemphasis upon the differences (cultural, social, and racial, as well as religious) separating Muslims from the Chinese people as a whole. It is precisely those Muslims of greatest prominence in China (and therefore most to be desired by the Japanese as adjuncts to their cause) who have gone farthest through this process of sinification.

A final, but important, factor, has been the growing rapprochement between Muslims and non-Muslims during recent years, and the Chinese efforts (described in Part VI) to counter Japanese Muslim activities. Though much along these lines still remains to be done, virtually all Muslim leaders who are really prominent profess at least outward loyalty to China and exceedingly few have been won over to the Japanese side.

The report is incomplete. Not only does the fact that it deals with a "live" subject mean that new developments are constantly crowding into view, but the very nature of the subject -- its atmosphere of intrigue and secrecy -- makes it inevitable that there should be gaps in knowledge. Most of the report has been based on literary sources available in Washington; it consequently suffers, in certain places, from a lack of such knowledge as could be supplied only by first-hand observers. Nevertheless, some of the literary sources used, particularly the Toa Senkaku and similar Japanese publications, are to the highest degree informative and significant. So far as is known, they have never hitherto been systematically utilized for any similar study of Japanese infiltration techniques. Because of the lack of source material available, the report has also been obliged somewhat to slight the Muslim community of the Northwest, and has not given it a part in the picture proportionate to its importance as the core of Islam in China. Thus the picture of Islam in China is unavoidably somewhat out of focus.

The major parts of the research for and writing of this report were completed by August 1943.

All names of Chinese and Japanese persons appearing in this report (save, on occasion, those mentioned in direct quotations from other sources) are given with the surname first, followed by the personal name. Thus in the case of the Chinese name, Ma Chung-ying, Ma is the surname and Chung-ying is the personal name. Similarly, in the case of the Japanese name, Toyama Mitsuru, Toyama is the surname and Mitsuru the personal name.

III. THE BACKGROUND OF ISLAM IN CHINA

A. Origin and Numerical Strength of Muslims in China

The first references in Chinese history to contacts with the Islamic world date from the seventh century A.D. In this and following centuries large numbers of Muslims, most of them traders, came to China. There, many took Chinese wives and became permanent residents, thus founding the Islamic communities that have survived to the present time. As a consequence, there is no single province in China today which does not contain at least a few thousand Muslims.

The greatest Islamic influx has been that via the overland caravan route across Central Asia (Sinkiang) into Northwest China. Even today, Sinkiang is predominantly Muslim, while in China proper the bulk of the Islamic population is concentrated in her northern and northwestern provinces: Kansu, Ningsia, Tsinghai, Shensi, Suiyuan, Hopei, and Honan.

Another large influx has been that of Muslim traders who came by boat around Malaya to the seaports of South and Central China. Here, however, most Muslims live in the cities, whereas in North and Northwest China many are rural. Important Islamic communities are to be found in many South China coastal cities such as Canton, but the largest concentration in the coastal provinces is in Kiangsu, in which Nanking and Shanghai are situated.

Still another important group is that in the southwestern province of Yunnan; a lesser number is found in the neighboring province of Szechwan. Most Muslims now living in these provinces are descendants of Muslim troops which were stationed there by the Mongols during their rule over China in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

No figures for the total Islamic population of China can be more than the most uncertain kind of guesswork. Chinese Muslims themselves usually speak of their number as fifty million, including in this figure those in Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria, as well as in China Proper.1/ This, however, is almost certainly several times the correct figure. Broomhall, writing in 1910, gives for the same area a possible minimum of 4,727,000, and a possible maximum of 9,821,000.2/

The latter figure is supported by two Japanese estimates independently made in 1921 and 1925. In the former year Omura Hajime, who was attached to the Intelligence Department of the Japanese War Ministry, placed the Muslim population for greater China at 9,207,000. In 1925 Dazai Matsusaburo, an Islamic expert attached to the Research Department of the South Manchurian Railway, gave a slightly larger estimate of 10,262,000.3/ Still more recently an American, Lyman Hoover, long a student of Chinese Islam, has estimated that "about one Chinese out of every twenty-five" is a Muslim.4/ Thus, acceptance of the traditional figure of 400 million for the population of China as a whole would give the Muslims a total of about sixteen million; if the total population is raised to the often suggested figure of 450 million, the Muslim figure would be correspondingly increased to eighteen million. The total Islamic population

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1/ Cf. Ha Kuo-tung, "Mohammedanism," in The Chinese Year Book (Premier Issue of 1935-36), p. 1561.

2/ Marshall Broomhall, Islam in China (London, 1910), pp. 194-5, 215.

3/ Yang Ching-chih, "A Complete Exposure of Japan's Islamic Political Plot," Ta Kung Pao 9 March 1942. For an evaluation of the reliability of this important article in Chinese, see the Bibliography.

4/ Lyman Hoover, "China's Muslims Must Choose," Asia, November 1938, p. 657.

for greater China, including Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria, can hardly be greater than eighteen million. Probably it lies somewhere between this figure and the various lower estimates of around ten million.

For purposes of comparison, and in order to suggest the possible relative population density of Muslims in different parts of China, the estimates of Omura (1921), Dazai (1925), and Ha Kuo-tung (1935) are presented in the table on the following page.

B. Religious, Ethnic, Economic, and Social Status of Muslims in China

The attempts of the Japanese to manipulate the Muslims of China for their own ends cannot be properly evaluated without some understanding of religious, ethnic, economic, and social status of the Muslims prior to Japanese contacts.

1. Religion. In China, as elsewhere, religion has given to the Muslims a strong feeling of group solidarity, a feeling further fortified by ethnic and occupational factors. Religion plays a greater part in the life of Chinese Muslims than it does in that of most other Chinese, and it has given to the Muslims something of a reputation for aggressiveness and fanaticism. These qualities, nevertheless, are probably considerably less pronounced than they are among many Muslims of the Near East. Perhaps, as some writers have suggested, Confucian ethics and Chinese civilization generally have exerted a mellowing influence.

All Muslims in China are said to be Sunnites, with a strong Sufi influence. Sectarian distinctions arising from the existence of sects peculiar to China have, however, often caused sharp internal discord. The three main sects of China are known as the "Old Sect," the "New Sect," and the "Modern

Sect." The Old Sect is considered to be the most conservative, and at the same time the most lax in its attention to dietary and moral habits. The New Sect, which may already be several hundred years old, tends to be more mystical and ritualistic; it also opposes such irregularities as opium smoking and wine drinking, which the Old Sect tends to overlook. The Modern Sect was founded some seventy years ago by a reformer who believed himself to be Christ sent back on earth to pave the way for the return of Mohammed. Sharp ideological differences between these three groups have thus far prevented attempts at fusion.1/

2. Race. Ethnically, the Muslims, both of China proper and of greater China, are exceedingly mixed. Intermarriage has to a considerable extent obliterated the distinctions between the Arabic, Persian, Turkic, Mongol, and other racial groups from which most of them are descended. Moreover, considerable Chinese blood has been added in the course of time, both through intermarriage, and through the practice, often followed by well-to-do Muslim families, of adopting Chinese children. In view of the mixed origin of the present-day Muslims, therefore, it is incorrect to refer to them, as is often done, as constituting a single "race" separate from that of the Chinese. Even in Sinkiang where the Chinese form a minority and are racially distinct from the Muslim majority, it does not follow that the latter are therefore a racially homogeneous unit. Among them are to be found various groups of Turkic stock, such as the Turki (known to the Chinese as the "turban-heads"), Uzbeks, Taranchi, Kazaks, etc.; of Mongol stock, such as the Tatars; and of mixed Chinese-Turkic

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1/ Rudolf Lowenthal, The Religious Periodical Press in China (Peking, 1940), pp. 214-5; Lyman Hoover, "Chinese Muslims are Tough," Asia, December 1938, pp. 720-1.

Estimates of Muslim Population for Greater China

Area	Omura (1921)	Dazai (1925)	Ha Kuo-tung (1935)
Sinkiang	2,488,000	1,157,000	2,350,950
Mongolia	0	24,000	195,050
Manchuria	168,000	83,000	7,533,680
Kansu, Ningsia, Tsinghai	3,060,000	2,965,000	5,458,910
Shensi, Suiyuan	568,000	2,135,000	4,513,710
Hopei, Jehol	653,000	628,000	3,658,360
Shantung	158,000	254,000	2,890,430
Honan	210,000	818,000	3,094,800
Shansi	159,000	65,000	1,589,570
Kiangsu	206,000	323,000	1,963,170
Anhwei	311,000	255,000	2,288,580
Hupeh	11,000	16,000	1,587,080
Chekiang	7,000	82,000	357,300
Fukien	1,000	20,000	471,750
Kiangsi	2,000	50,000	286,590
Hunan	28,000	22,000	1,302,900
Kweichow	23,000	15,000	519,160
Szechwan	265,000	402,000	2,615,330
Yunnan	836,000	827,000	4,568,290
Kwangtung	27,000	53,000	558,450
Kwangsi	26,000	58,000	280,180
TOTAL	9,207,000	10,262,000	48,104,240

stock, such as the Chinese-speaking Tungans. In China proper the racial distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims is far less pronounced than in Sinkiang. This is true even in the northwest provinces of Kansu, Tsinghai and Ningsia, where Muslims constitute perhaps one-third of the total population. Nevertheless, even in China proper, Muslims may frequently be distinguished, by their physical appearance, from ordinary Chinese upon casual observation.1/

3. Economic Status. There are several occupations in which Muslims play a prominent or even major part. Certain trades and crafts, particularly those (such as jade work or fur trading) connected with Mongolia and Central Asia, have been monopolized by Muslims. Furthermore, Muslims are renowned for their abilities as soldiers. Though not considered equal to the Chinese in agriculture, the Muslims are admittedly superior in sheep and cattle raising. The butchering of beef and mutton, even in the larger cities, remains largely in Muslim hands. In North China, most carters and cameleers, as well as many restaurant- and inn-keepers, are Muslim -- these being occupations all closely connected with peripatetic trade. The Muslim stress on cleanliness, which has helped to make their restaurants famous, has likewise served them well in giving them control over most public bath houses.2/

Yet, although many urban Muslims (traders, restaurant-keepers, and others) are well off or even wealthy, the great bulk, even judged by Chinese standards, are extremely poor. This is probably due in part to the fact that the areas chiefly inhabited by Muslims in China happen to be those which tend to be arid and therefore less productive than other areas of China.

1/ Löwenthal, op. cit. p. 215; Hoover, "China's Muslim Must Choose," p. 659; Y.P. Mei, "Stronghold of Muslim China," Asia, December 1940, pp. 659-60.

2/ Hoover, op. cit. pp. 659-60.

4. Social Status and Literacy. Coupled with Muslim poverty has gone widespread illiteracy and lack of education. This in itself would not be remarkable in a land in which illiteracy is common. It is often accompanied, however, by an actual indifference and lack of respect for the refinements and attainments of Chinese culture. The consequent failure of the Muslims to play their due part in the literary and scholarly life of China has been enough to give them an inferior status in the eyes of most Chinese.

The Muslims, for their part, quite aside from their low economic standing, have been sharply cut off from the main stream of Chinese culture by yet another factor: the injunction laid upon all Muslims that only Arabic is to be used as their liturgical language. As a consequence, the earliest known Islamic book to be printed in the Chinese language dates only from 1642; the first published Chinese translations of the Koran appeared as recently as the 1920's; and, despite a sojourn of more than one thousand years in China, China's Muslim millions have produced hardly a dozen men sufficiently versed in Chinese scholarship to be remembered for that reason alone.1/ This injunction still remains strong among the mullahs of today, and this despite the fact that among Muslims as a whole in China proper, almost all speak Chinese as their native tongue, while very few can either read or understand Arabic.

In spite of widespread illiteracy, a Muslim periodical press exists in China. Following the Chinese Revolution of 1911, which marks the beginnings of this press, one hundred Chinese-language Islamic periodicals are known to have been published at one time or another. Of this number, thirty-four were in existence just prior to the outbreak of the

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1/ Löwenthal, op. cit., pp. 217-9; Hoover, "Chinese Muslims are Tough," p. 721.

Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Since then, however, many have ceased publication. Peiping, with a total of thirty periodicals between 1911 and 1937, has been the cultural center of Islam in China, despite the fact that most Muslims live many hundreds of miles farther west. Shanghai, with eleven periodicals, and Nanking with nine, were Peiping's closest rivals.1/

However, of the thirty-four Sino-Islamic periodicals which existed in 1937, only nine were of any importance, and of these the largest had a circulation of only 3,000 to 4,000 copies per issue. None of the remaining had a circulation exceeding 1,000 to 2,000 copies.2/ Thus it is obvious that the combined circulation of all Sino-Islamic periodicals immediately prior to 1937 could at the maximum hardly have exceeded 35,000 copies. Therefore, such periodicals could have reached only an infinitesimal fraction of China's ten or more million Muslims.

C. The Relations of Muslims with Non-Muslims in China

It is evident that many factors -- religious, racial, economic, social, and cultural -- tend to make the Muslims in China regard themselves and be regarded by others as a separate group. It is thus not surprising that from time to time minor disturbances and quarrels break out between Muslims and non-Muslim Chinese. Often these disturbances develop out of seemingly trivial causes, for example, the Muslim avoidance of pork which is a habit inexplicable to the pork-loving Chinese.

It is notable that when such quarrels arise, the Muslims, by acting aggressively and unitedly, commonly emerge victorious. In 1936, for example, a Chinese-language Islamic

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1/ Löwenthal, op. cit., pp. 219-21.

2/ Ibid., p. 222.

periodical listed twenty-four instances of slander against Islam which had appeared during the decade 1926-36 in various Chinese newspapers and other publications. In no less than eighteen of these twenty-four instances, concerted and vigorous action by the Muslims forced the publications in question to withdraw their remarks, make public apology, or otherwise atone for their offensive conduct.1/ When it is remembered that the Commercial Press, one of the concerns which rendered satisfaction, is the largest publishing house in China, and one of the largest in the world, it is evident that Muslim public opinion is a force to be reckoned with in China, despite the low status held by Muslims in the eyes of many Chinese.

Of greater significance is the fact that disturbances, some of them originating in trivial disputes apparently, occasionally have been permitted to develop into full-fledged Muslim rebellions. Such rebellions -- all confined to areas in northwest and southwest China having large Muslim populations -- have occurred in 1648 (Kansu), 1785 (Kansu), 1818-19 (Yunnan), 1826-28 (Yunnan), 1834-40 (Yunnan), 1853-73 (Yunnan), 1862-76 (Northwest), 1895-96 (Kansu), and 1928-29 (Kansu). The last three in the nineteenth century, coming at a time when the Manchu dynasty was rapidly declining, resulted in millions of deaths and shook the Chinese Empire to its foundations.

Nevertheless, it should not be concluded that revolt is imminent among any large Muslim group in China today. Prior to the first rebellion of 1648, Muslims and non-Muslims lived together for almost a thousand years without serious strife between the two. The suppression of the great rebellion of 1862-76 left the Muslims so weakened as to discourage

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1/ See Löwenthal, op. cit., pp. 242-6.

for some time, at least, any hopes of autonomy such as may once have been entertained. Although Muslims, when dealing with non-Muslims, always begin by displaying a strong united front, this front usually breaks down under pressure of internal sectarian dissension. The Chinese have always shown a genius for taking advantage of such dissension to maintain their control over the Muslims, even when the latter form a large majority, as in Sinkiang.

Another factor of importance in reducing the likelihood of rebellion has been the effort of the Chinese government since 1912, and especially during the last decade, to remove the old feeling of hostility that often existed between Muslims and non-Muslims, and to give to the former a greater sense of participation in the left of the country as a whole. Finally, and perhaps most important, is the fact that in China proper, at least, the cultural differences between Muslims and non-Muslims are less striking than the similarities. A traveler from the Near East would probably be impressed by the striking similarities that exist between Muslims in China and the remaining Chinese population. The Chinese Muslims have long been isolated from their co-religionists in other parts of the world. Hence pan-Islam has little meaning for most of them, despite the movements of recent years (some fostered by the Chinese Government itself) to destroy this isolation. Many Chinese Muslims, too, when compared with Muslims elsewhere, are surprisingly lax in their religious observances. Often their avoidance of pork is the only striking distinction between them and other Chinese, and sometimes even this taboo is secretly broken.

It should be emphasized, therefore, that no Muslim "problem" exists in China today, in the sense that such a problem exists in India. This statement remains true quite

aside from the fact that the Muslim population of India is far larger than that of China. Certainly, no important Muslim group in China proper has publicly demanded anything like "Pakistan," despite frequent reports to this effect advanced by outside interested parties, notably Japan.

On the other hand, the Muslim Community of the Northwest -- Tsinghai, Kansu, and Ningsia -- remains a factor with which to reckon. Because of a certain lack of balance in available sources of information, the true relationship of this community to the greater Muslim community of the whole of China is not altogether clear. These Muslims make up a community that is cohesive, stubbornly resistant, and much more fanatical in its allegiance to Islamic ideals than the more tolerant part of diffused Islam found throughout the other sections of China. It is also largely inarticulate, and much less responsive to, or active in, the various movements for cooperation between the Chinese Government and the Muslims of China. This is well illustrated in the case of Pai Ch'ung-hsi. He is a great general and a recognized national leader of the Muslims, but because of his known laxity in the matter of ritualistic observance, and his modernistic advocacy of such laxity, he is by no means acceptable to the Muslim community of the Northwest. The cultural center of Islam in China may be elsewhere, but the religious center is in the Muslim community of the Northwest that has produced the phenomena of all-Muslim armies and two all-Muslim provincial governments that constitute a difficult problem for the Chungking Government in wartime.

IV. JAPANESE ISLAMIC ACTIVITIES IN OCCUPIED CHINA SINCE 1937

A. Development of Japanese Interest in Chinese Islam

The unvarying technique followed for decades by the Japanese in their efforts to swallow the Chinese colossus, has been to divide the country and its people into as many separate segments as possible, in order thereby to absorb these segments one by one. This process of segmentation has been carried out along racial or psuedo-racial lines: the former in the case of the Japanese-sponsored puppet regime in Inner Mongolia; the latter in the case of Manchukuo, where thirty million Chinese inhabitants are officially referred to by the Japanese as "Manchukucans" who speak the "Manchu" language. It has been carried out along religious lines, as in the organization in North China since 1937 of Buddhists, Taoists, and Christians into distinct but highly centralized groups, each subservient to Japanese "advisers"; along political lines, as in the continued refusal of the Japanese to make more than a paper merging of their North China Political Affairs Commission in Peiping with the Wang Ching-wei "Central Government" in Nanking; and along social lines, as in the Japanese support for many years prior to 1927 of the conservative warlord groups in North China, against the revolutionary party in the south.

The Japanese early turned their attention to the Muslims of China as a promising instrument for Japanese expansion. Religiously, racially, and to some extent socially, the Chinese Muslims have felt themselves to be a group apart from the great bulk of non-Muslim Chinese. Although constituting only 4 percent of the total population, they form an important minority and, in certain parts of the country, even a majority. These latter regions happen to hold particular strategic significance for the Japanese, both as a buffer belt protecting Japan from possible Russian attack, and as an insulator against Sino-Russian

cooperation. Moreover, the cohesiveness of the Muslims and their aggressive fighting spirit would make them, conceivably, far more formidable tools for Japanese expansion than, for example, would the numerically far greater number of Chinese Buddhists.

The first expression of Japanese interest in Islam seems to have been motivated primarily by fear of Russian expansion. Therefore, it did not manifest itself in China proper but in the far-off reaches of Central Asia. Only gradually did the Japanese come to realize that the existence of a predominantly Muslim population in Sinkiang and Russian Turkestan made possible the formulation of an ambitious pan-Islamic program -- a program such as might be advantageously directed against Russia.1/

In China proper Japanese interest in Islam did not become manifest until about 1900.2/ As in Sinkiang, moreover, this interest was at first subsidiary to other activities, commonly subversive or propagandistic. These were usually engineered by members of the notorious Black Dragon Society, that group of fanatical and self-sacrificing "patriots" who, ever since the formation of the Society in 1901, have worked unceasingly in many countries (with the growing assistance of the Japanese War Ministry) toward the realization of Japan's present "Co-Prosperity Sphere."

In China proper, as in Sinkiang, these men seem only gradually to have realized the importance of the Muslims per se, or to have evinced particular interest in them. This is scarcely surprising in view of the cultural isolation of Chinese Muslims from the rest of the Islamic world; their low economic and educational level; their status as merely one among several

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1/ The early activities of Japan in Sinkiang, which began around 1888, are described in Appendix B.

2/ For an account of Japanese activities among the Muslims in China prior to 1937, see Appendix A.

minority groups in China; and the fact that there have been so many other promising lines of activity to which the cohorts of Japanese expansion could turn their attention.

After 1931 Manchuria became the base from which Japanese activities among Muslims in other parts of China were directed, and also the training ground on which the Japanese tried out the techniques later applied on a much larger scale in China proper. After 1937, however, the center of Islamic gravity shifted southward to Peiping (long the cultural center of Chinese Islam), while the function of Manchuria itself became primarily that of supplier of trained Muslim personnel for organizational work south of the Great Wall.[1/]

In post-1937 Manchuria, nevertheless, certain positive developments have taken place. During the 1930's Japanese converts to Islam were combining religious fervor with shrewd political acumen by making a series of almost yearly pilgrimages to Mecca. In December, 1937, when Suzuki Tsuyomi, one of the most ardent Japanese converts, started forth on the sixth of these pilgrimages, he was accompanied by a Chinese Muslim from Manchuria, a certain Chang Shih-an who was at the same time an office-holder in the all-important Manchukuo Concordia Society. The two carried with them presents for various prominent Muslim dignitaries, and of course did not fail to use the pilgrimage as an occasion for acquainting their Near Eastern co-religionists with the flourishing condition of Islam (as well as of affairs generally) in Manchukuo.[2/]

Before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War on 7 July 1937, the Japanese had nowhere (save in Manchuria since 1931) held actual sovereignty over any considerable number of Chinese Muslims. Their interest in Chinese Islam had therefore been largely confined to "investigations," diffusion of propaganda, and political intrigue aiming at promoting the "true interests" of Muslims in China. The conquest of North China in 1937 brought a far greater number of Muslims than ever before under Japanese rule. Since that date, therefore, the story of Japanese Islamic activities loses much of its earlier melodramatic quality and becomes the straightforward account of efforts to organize and utilize the Muslims of Occupied China.

1/ These remarks apply only to Japanese activities in China itself. For Japanese-Muslim intrigues directed against the USSR, Manchuria has continued since 1937 to be important.

2/ See Yang Ching-chih, in Ta Kung Pao of 9 March 1942, and Wakabayashi Nakabe, Fui-kyo Sekai to Nippon (The Muslim World and Japan) 5th printing, 1938 (Tokyo, 1st printing, 1937) p.8. (This book will hereafter be referred to under the English translation of its title.) A photograph of Chang Shih-an appears near the beginning of the book.

B. Muslim Leagues

1. The All China Muslim League.

a. Organization. On 7 February 1938, exactly seven months after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Peiping was the scene of the inauguration, under Japanese auspices, of the All China Muslim League (Chungkuo Hui-chiao Tsung-lien Ho-hui). The ceremony is said to have been attended by over 500 Chinese Muslims representing all provinces of China, as well as by many prominent Japanese, among them Major-General Kita Seiichi, who since 1937 has played an important part in the North China regime.1/

As originally planned, the All China Muslim League was to comprise the following six divisions: (1) North China, (2) Northwest China, (3) Outer Mongolia, (4) Central China, (5) South China, (6) Southwest China. Of these six divisions, however, only that of North China has at any time been actively functioning; the remainder are still "in process of formation." The chief reason for this, of course, is that those remaining portions of China proper which contain large numbers of Muslims have not yet been sufficiently "pacified" to permit their inclusion.2/

Discussion in the following pages is confined to the North China Division of the All China Muslim League, referred to,

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1/ Information for this and the following paragraphs of this section is derived chiefly from Yang Ching-chih, in Ta Kung Pao of 10 and 13 March 1942. Corroborative and additional material has been taken from the Shin Shina Gensei Yoran (Survey of Present Conditions in New China) (Tokyo, 1st issue, 1938), pp. 524-5; an anonymous article, "Fui-kyoken no Unyo to Shina Fui-kyo no Doko" (Disturbances in the Islamic World and Trends among Chinese Muslims), in Toa (East Asia), Tokyo, 14.6 (June 1941), esp. pp. 34-6; and Hui-chiao (Islam), Peking, 1.3 (July 1938), passim.

2/ Two other Muslim leagues have nevertheless been created by the Japanese in China proper, one in the Northwest, the other at Canton. These, however, like the Manchukuo League, have administrations entirely separate from that of the All China League For details, including reasons for their separatism, see subsection 2 below.

for convenience, as the North China Muslim League, or simply as the League. This League is in its turn divided into main sections or divisions each controlling numerous lesser branches, as follows:

(1) Peiping: established 7 February 1938, 84 branches, covering two municipalities and 86 hsien (counties) in western Hopei Province. This is the general headquarters of the League as a whole. One of the municipalities is undoubtedly Peiping itself; the other is probably Pao-ting-fu, provincial capital of Hopei.

(2) Tientsin: probably established early in 1938 soon after that of Peiping; 62 branches, covering one municipality (Tientsin itself) and 44 hsien in eastern Hopei.1/

(3) Tsinan: established 30 April 1938; 144 branches covering all of Shantung.

(4) Taiyuan: probably established also in the first half of 1938; 43 branches covering all of Shansi.

(5) Honan: established 11 May 1938 at Hsin-hsiang, north of the Yellow River on the Peiping-Hankow Railroad; 61 branches.

(6) Kalgan: covers Chahar.

(7) Paotow: covers Suiyuan.

Numbers (6) and (7) have never existed except on paper, inasmuch as their areas fall under the jurisdiction of the independently operated Northwest Muslim League. The five actually functioning divisions of the League operate a total of 394 branches. All Muslims resident in the provinces covered by the League are claimed by the Japanese as de facto members.

1/ Yang, op. cit., speaks of two municipalities, but this is probably incorrect. One is the number given in the Toa article cited above.

To anyone familiar with present political conditions in occupied North China, however, it is obvious that many of the 394 branches must lie in territory only loosely or imperfectly controlled by the Japanese, and therefore must be in a moribund or quiescent state. Almost all discernible activity seems to emanate from three or four large centers, such as Tsinan, Tientsin, and above all, Peiping.

The Peiping headquarters of the League occupy the expropriated buildings of Northeastern University, in the northwest part of the city, 100 Kuang-an Men Ta-chieh (Kuang-an Gate Avenue). The expenses of the League, said by Yang Ching-chih to be in excess of North China $500,000 annually, are paid from appropriations made by the Department of Special Affairs of the Japanese Army. The latter thus maintains complete financial control over the League, which is liberally staffed with Japanese "advisers," under whom are Muslim officials from Manchuria as well as Muslims native to North China proper.

In Peiping, the central administration of the League is divided into three boards: (1) a Board of General Affairs, comprising a secretariat bureau, a treasury bureau, a bureau for education, and a bureau for philanthropy; (2) a Board of Investigation, comprising a bureau for publications, a library bureau, a research bureau, a bureau for statistics (i.e., for studying Muslim population figures in China, etc.), and a bureau for "unification" (i.e., apparently for enlarging the scope and membership of the League); (3) a Board of Production, which does not seem to contain any separate bureaus, but apparently aims at raising the standard of living of Muslims in China by furthering means for increasing their economic output.

The League boasts of a special flag, consisting of a white crescent mounted on the right side of a green disk. Two white stars, mounted one above the other along the central

vertical axis of the disk, lie within the two horns of the crescent. A horizontal red oblong is mounted along the horizontal axis of the disk, between the two stars. The exact symbolism of this insignia is not clear.

b. Aims and Diffusion of Propaganda. Under the auspices of its Board of Investigation, the League issues from Peiping a monthly journal called Hui-chiao (Islam), the first number of which appeared in April 1938.1/ Only one issue of this publication, that of vol. 1, No. 3 (June 1938), has been available for analysis in this report.2/

The examined copy consists of seventy-six rather well printed pages, plus six pages of photographs printed on glossy paper near the front, with a number of other photographs scattered throughout the magazine. The text is wholly in Chinese, save for a few Arabic quotations. The subscription price is listed as North China $2.00 per year, or $0.20 per issue. The journal is said by Yang to have a circulation of 2,000 and by early 1942 to have reached vol. 6, No. 7. According to Löwenthal, "The enterprise must be well founded financially, because accepted articles are remunerated with an amount ranging from $1 to $5 for a thousand characters. This rate is comparatively high for Chinese magazines. It is, however, expressly stated that articles are accepted only when the authors agree with the purpose of the periodical."

A manifesto, printed in the journal gives the aims of the League as follows (trans):

1/ A journal in Japanese published in Peiping from 1927 to 1929 used the identical Chinese characters in its title, the pronounciation of which in Japanese, however, is Fui-kyo. For description see Appendix A, section G.

2/ Yang Ching-chih (Ta Kung Pao, 13 March 1942) and Löwenthal (Religious Periodical Press in China, p. 230) give further information concerning this publication.

"Externally, to promote close bonds between the three countries of China, Japan, and Manchukuo, firmly to oppose Communism; resolutely to uphold and protect the New Order; to extend Asiatic culture; and to preserve the eternal religion [i.e., Islam].

"Internally, to unite all fellow Muslims; to encourage education; and to establish means for relieving sickness and suffering among fellow Muslims."

The objectives of the magazine itself are then listed as: the diffusion of official League statements concerning the League's activities; encouraging the spread of education; giving direction to philanthropic activities; conducting population studies among Muslims; uniting all classes of Muslims; investigating living conditions among Muslims; establishing productive industries; collecting and preserving ancient literary relics of Islam; uniting the various branches of the League; and acting as a clearing house for news from various regions.

Innocent and even praiseworthy as some of these avowed activities appear, there seems to be no reason for doubt, judging from the contents of the magazine itself and statements by Yang and Löwenthal, that the real Japanese aims in creating the League are: (1) effectively to control the Muslims living in Occupied China under puppet rule; (2) to train Muslims for espionage and similar activities; (3) to gain Muslim support against the Chinese Central Government and on behalf of the Japanese New Order; (4) to arouse Muslims against Western imperialism, particularly that of the non-Axis countries; (5) to arouse among Muslims a realization of the danger of Communism to their religion; (6) to create rifts between Muslims and non-Muslims in China and to arouse pan-Islamic feelings, with the hope of eventually creating a buffer "Muslim autonomous state" in Northwest China or in Central Asia.

Point (1) is inherent in the very existence of the League, and point (2) will be discussed below under the Chinese Muslim Youth Corps. Point (3) is illustrated in an article in the

League's journal1/ entitled "Why We Must Destroy Communism and Obliterate the Kuomintang," which attacks the Kuomintang as being in the same class with Communism, using as its reasoning the argument that the Kuomintang had at one period (prior to 1937) "embraced" Communist principles, and that although it has since outwardly rejected them, the poison still lingers.2/ Point (4) is attested to in Löwenthal's description of the journal: "In character, the periodical is not only opposed to Russian Communism, but also to the policy of Great Britain and France in their colonies which have Mohammedan population. On the other hand, a much friendlier attitude is taken towards Italy and her treatment of Mohammedan subjects, presumably because Japan and Italy are allies and both claim to be protectors of the Mchammedan world." Points (5) and (6), which are closely allied, are not only generally exemplificd in the foregoing observations, but appear particularly in an article written by the notorious promoter of Islam in Japan, the Siberian exile, Ibrahim.3/

Much of the particular issue examined is devoted to notes and news on the League itself, including a lengthy day-by-day account of the trip of the League's delegation to Tokyo to attend the inaugural of the mosque there on 12 May 1938.

1/ Hui-chiao (Islam), 1.3 (June 1938). p. 26.

2/ This refers to the Kuomirtang of Chiang Kai-shek; the article was written before the "orthodox Kuomintang," headed by Wang Ching-wei, had yet come into being under Japanese auspices at Nanking.

3/ His name, as translitered into Chinese characters, is pronounced "I-pu-la-hsing." Under the title, "The Problems of Resisting Communism and of the Northwest," Ibrahim (op. cit., pp. 23-5) attacks what he terms the poison of Communism and urges that all Muslims take strong steps to rescue their co-religionists in Sinking from the supposed horrors of Communist imperialism there. In general, anti-Communism appears as the most prominent theme throughout the magazine.

Comparatively little space is devoted to purely cultural matters, though an unfinished article, entitled "Translation and Exegesis of the Koran," occupies the place of honor. Of thirteen publications listed as having been received by the League's library during May 1938, several are plainly political, such as "The New China," "Sun Yat-sen and the History of the Kuomintang," and "The Anti-Communist Front," whereas only one, "An Outline of Islam," deals specifically with that religion. Several are written by Japanese authors.

c. Personnel:

i. Takagaki Shinzo: The leading spirit of the League is Takagaki Shinzo, whose photograph appears inside the front cover of the June 1938 issue of Hui-chiao. Considerable information concerning the past history of this appears in various Japanese publications.1/ According to these Takagaki is a graduate of the Commerce Department of the University of Japan, Tokyo; after graduation he studied economics for a while at Columbia University, returning to Japan some time before 1929;2/ and he is not only a student of economics, but enjoys considerable reputation as an exponent of Judo (Japanese wrestling)

1/ Toa Senkaku, vol. 2, pp. 896-7; Saishin Ajiya Taikan (Comprehensive View of the New Asia), Black Dragon Society, Tokyo, 1931, pp. 495-7; Wakabayashi, Muslim World and Japan, p. 10. What Yang Ching-chin says about Takagaki is derived at second hand from these publications.

2/ The only Takagaki ever listed as having attended Columbia is a Takagaki Torajiro who registered there as a "guest" (i.e., non-paying auditor) on 11 October 1918. Information supplied by the Columbia Registrar's Office states that this Takagaki was born 26 February 1890, at Onomichi, Japan, and was a graduate of the College of Commerce, Tokyo. It is not known when he left Columbia. The fact that both he and Takagaki Shinzo had studied commerce before coming to Columbia is suggestive, and even the difference in personal name is not an insuperable bar to identification between the two, inasmuch as it sometimes happens that a Japanese adopts different personal names at different times of life. The Commerce Department of the University of Japan, however, is an institution entirely different from the Tokyo College of Commerce. Hence no absolute identification of Columbia's Takagaki Torajiro with Takagaki Shinzo is possible.

It is no doubt on the strength of this latter accomplishment that Takagaki was brought to the attention of the Indian poet, Tagore, when Tagore was making his third tour of Japan in 1929. Takagaki, as a consequence, was engaged by Tagore to teach Judo at Tagore's famcus International University (Visva-bharati) in Bengal, India.

After teaching in the International University for two years, Takagaki, utilizing an introduction given him by Tagore, succeeded in obtaining an audience with the King of Afghanistan, before whom he demonstrated his skill in Judo. He was consequently, in 1931, appointed instructor in Judo in the Officers' Training Academy in Kabul. This is significant, for it is known that other Japanese were active in Afghanistan during this and the following years. While in Kabul, he became "converted" to Islam, and was given the Muslim name of Abdullah by the Afghan Minister of War. The Afghan government, according to Wakabayashi, also honored him by conferring on him its highest decoration.

In 1938 Takagaki returned to Japan on "vacation," and almost at once was sent to Peiping to attend the inauguration of the All China Muslim League.1/ There he has remained as the real controller of the League. According to Yang Ching-chih, he also has particular supervision over the Muslim Youth Corps. To quote Wakabayashi, "His future activities will be greatly worth watching."

ii.. Other Japanese "Advisers". Concerning the remaining Japanese "advisers" to the League comparatively little is known. The following names of bits of information (all referring to Japanese connected with Peiping headquarters) have been derived from Hui-chiao of June 1938, supplemented in some cases by Yang Ching-chih:

1/ This follows the account given in Wakabayashi. Toa Senkaku states that he had left Afghanistan in 1933.

Hashiguchi Komura: director of (largely military) instruction in the Muslim Youth Corps.

Koike Sadao: "adviser" to the Muslim Youth Corps, and said by Yang to be directly under Takagaki Shinzo in that capacity. He was leader of the delegation from North China to the inauguration of the Tokyo mosque, 12 May 1938.

Mitani Toru: an "adviser" to the North China League.

Tsumura (no personal name given): teacher of Japanese.

Yamaguchi Kiyoshi: "adviser" to the Bureau of Production, North China League. Said to be a specialist in production who "during the last ten odd years, wherever he has gone, has never refused his help toward Islamic affairs in any region." He was responsible for the establishment of the Honan Branch of the League, and seems in general to be one of the most important Japanese next to Takagaki himself. His photo appears in Hui-chiao, June 1938, inside front cover.

Shimura Masamitsu: a specialist in military education, appointed "honorary adviser" to the League because "he, too, has exerted great efforts on behalf of Islam."

iii. Chinese Personnel in the League. This information, like the preceding, is obtained from Hui-chiao and Yang Ching-chih, and is unavoidably incomplete. The large number of "chairmen" and "honorary chairmen" for the different branches of the League, is notable. It exemplifies the Japanese technique of trying to gain support through the distribution of as many grandiloquent but meaningless titles as possible.

(1). Peiping Headquarters: nine chairmen and twelve honorary chairmen, including the following:

Wang Kuei-chao (tzu: Yueh-ch'uan), the Chairman-in-chief from founding of the League until his death in May 1938, at age of fifty. He had been a Muslim of some consequence, having formerly acted as magistrate of Ch'ung-jen-hsien in Kiangsi and Ch'ing-feng-hsien in Hopei, after which he was principal of the well known Niu Chieh Muslim School in Peiping.

Wang Jui-lan, became provisional chairman-in-chief, following death of above. Over seventy years of age, he has since been apparently replaced by:

Chang Kuo-cheng, present Chairman-in-chief. Nothing further is known of him save that he is mentioned as "president of the Chinese Islam Federation" (i.e., the League) in a Domei broadcast from Tokyo of 19 March 1943 (on which see below).

Liu Chin-piao (tzu: Kuan-hao), Chairman of the Muslim Youth Corps. Of all Chinese Muslim officials, he is by far the most important and the one who works in closest contact with Takagaki and the other Japanese "advisers." He has been chief Chinese assistant to Takagaki in creating the League.

T'ang I-lu, Chairman of the Board of General Affairs, and also editor of the Chen-tsung Pao, a Muslim organ which, since Japanese occupation has been supported by the Japanese (see below). He was one of the five Muslims sent to Mecca from Peiping in 1938-39 by the Japanese for propaganda purposes. (See also below.) Photo in Hui-Chiao, June 1938, inside front cover.

Chao Yün-sheng, Chairman of the Board of Investigation. Photo in ibid.

Wang Jo-yü, head of the teaching staff, Muslim Youth Corps..

Others (exact titles of whom are uncertain, save that some are known to be chairmen; others are casually mentioned in Hui-chiao, but may not be actual officials in the League): Ch'ang Tzu-hsüan, Ch'en Hsiung-chou, Mullah Hsia Ssu, Hsia Wen-yüan, Hsü Fu-sheng, Lai Wen-ch'i, Li Shao-t'ing, Li Tsung-ch'ing, Li Wen, Liu Ching-ch'üan, Liu Wei-chung, Mu P'ei-yao, T'ang Chen-yü, T'ang Tsung-cheng, T'ang Tzu-hsüan, Wang Jui-fang, Wang Lien-ch'eng, Wang Lien-hsü, Wang Lien-shan, Wang Lien-yü, Mullah Wang San, Mullah W ei Hai-hsüeh, Yang Chia-nien, Yang [illegible] Pao-wen.

(2) Tientsin Division: Liu Meng-yang, Chairman-in-chief; Chairmen: Ch'ang Chu-chiu, Li Hsi-chen, Liu Jan-kung, Liu K'o-chien, Ma Jen-p'u, Mu Chin-ch'eng, Mu Tzu-ming, Mu Tzu-p'u, Shih Chu-lin.

(3) Tsinan Division: former Chairman-in-chief, Ma Chih-hsin; present Chairman-in-chief, Ma Liang-p'o, said by Yang to be a native of Manchuria and long under Japanese influence; he was one of the five sent by the Japanese from Peiping to Mecca in 1938-39 for political purposes (see below) No other officials directly mentioned, but Chin Hsü-wu is referred to Hui-chiao as a Tsinan delegate to the Tokyo mosque inaugural of 12 May 1938.

(4) Honan Division: Ma T'ien-chüeh, Chairman-in-chief; Chairmen: Ch'en Liu-ch'ing, Li Hsing-fu, Tan Tzu-wan, Ting Ching-hsiao, Ts-ao Hsiang-t'ing, Wang Shao-wu, Yü Yao-chou; honorary chairmen: Chao Yung-ch'ing, Kuo Hsüeh-ch'in, Li Yün-lung, Liang Wen-tou, Pa Yü-ch'ing, Pai Chung-an, T'ang Yao-t'ing, Ting Chen-nan, Ting Tzu-chieh, Tu Hsiu-sheng.

d. Miscellaneous activities. A study of official Japanese radio broadcasts reveals two ways, additional to the "official objectives" listed above under b., in which the Japanese attempt to utilize the League. The first is as a mouthpiece for Japanese propaganda to the rest of the Islamic world. This is exemplified in a Domei broadcast of 19 March 1943, issued as part of the wide spread Japanese sponsored celebration of Mohammed's birthday carried out at that time in various Japanese occupied countries:1/

> "The 3,000,000 Mohammedans in North China are firmly resolved to cooperate with Japan for the complete overthrow of Britain and the United States in the Greater East Asia War, declared Chang Kuo-cheng, president of the Chinese Islam Federation, in a statement today on the occasion of the birthday of Mohammed.... Since the outbreak of the War of Greater East Asia, and with China's participation in the war against the United States and Britain, the main mission of the Mohammedans has been to lead all East Asiatic races. Thus the 3,000,000 Mohammedans in North China rise for the enhancement of the Mohammedan spirit and the successful consummation of the War of Greater East Asia."

Another form of Japanese utilization of the League is exemplified in the following Tokyo broadcast of 24 February 1943:2/

> "Further bolstering the labor supply to Manchukuo, the All-China Muslim Federation has decided to undertake a collective emigration of Muslims... to work in the coal producing districts of Manchukuo. The plan was mapped out in view of the successful results gained last summer, when a similar labor service party was sent to the Fushun coal mine in Manchukuo."

1/ Recorded by the Federal Communications Commission and purporting to emanate from Peiping as of March 18.

2/ Recorded by the Federal Communications Commission and purporting to emanate from Peiping.

2. The Northwest and Canton Muslim Leagues. 1/ As indicated above, the All China Muslim League has never actually established divisions in the provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan, although originally it had intended to do so. The reason for this is that these two provinces (those portions of them which have been conquered) fall under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Kwantung Army, and a certain degree of jealousy exists between this organization and the North China Army, from which the All China Muslim League receives its backing. One of the first acts of the Kwantung Army, therefore, after its creation of the "Federation of Autonomous Governments of Mongolian Provinces" (22 November 1937), was to establish an All Northwest Muslim League (Hsi-pei Hui-chiao Tsung-lien Ho-hui) to counter the influence of its Peiping rival. This Northwest League is divided into four divisions and 146 branches as follows: Suiyuan (renamed by the Japanese Hou-ho; 28 branches; Paotow; 24 branches; Kalgan; 63 branches; and Tatung; 31 branches.

Headquarters of the League are at Tung-ssu Hsiang-k'ou (Entry Lane to the East Temple), in Suiyuan city, capital of the province of the same name. Each of the four divisions is administratively subdivided into a Secretariat Bureau, a Treasury Bureau, and a Bureau of Investigation. As in the case of the All China League, expenses are covered by grants from the Department of Special Affairs of the Japanese (Kwantung) Army. According to Yang, no suitable Chinese Muslim has as yet been found to be President 2/ of the League, but the vice-presidency is held "by a certain man, Ts'ao."

1/ The information in this section is derived from Yang Ching-chih, in Ta Kung Pao of 13 March 1942.

2/ This is the title used in the case of the Northwest League, whereas the All China League uses the term, Chairman-in-chief.

anti-Communist organization; and how this movement has been greatly encouraged by news of the recent decision of 5,000 Muslims in Peiping to support an anti-Communist movement there.1/

Another objective of the Manchukuo League has been the creating of a body of trained Chinese Muslim personnel for the execution of Japanese sponsored activities among their co-religionists, either in Manchuria or elsewhere. "Trustworthy" members of the League who are above the age of twenty-five have the opportunity of gaining employment under the Japanese. Those under twenty-five, if they show signs of promise, are either sent for special training to Tokyo, or in some instances even to the Near East. Thus at least one group of five Muslims from Manchuria, headed by a certain Sha Tien-ming, has gone at Japanese expense to Turkey for study in the University of Istanbul.

During the past year it has been rumored that the Manchukuo League is in future to be reorganized, and is to become subordinate to the Japan Muslim League (founded 19 September 1939 in Japan).2/

C. Muslim Youth Corps

1. Chinese Muslim Youth Corps. Presumably sponsored by the "bureau for education" of the All China Muslim League is the Chinese Muslim Youth Corps (Chungkuo Hui-chiao Ch'ing-nien T'uan). This Corps, which is wholly a Peiping organization, occupies a dormitory, a dining hall, and class rooms in the former Northeastern University, where the League itself also has its headquarters. Classes are not large. The first one was opened 1 May 1938, and by 1942, ten classes, lasting two months each, had been completed, graduating a total of about 500 Muslim

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1/ See Japan Advertiser of 17 February 1938.

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Still another organization is the Canton Muslim League (Kwang-chou Hui-chiao Hsieh-hui), established early in 1939 in Canton by the Department of Special Affairs of the Japanese South China Army, soon after its occupation of that city. This League maintains headquarters at the Huai Sheng Ssu (Mosque of Holy Remembrance), most famous of the five mosques of Canton, which owes its reputation to the erroneous tradition that it was built by a maternal uncle of Mohammed. Aside from this, nothing is known about the personnel or activities of the Canton League, which, being restricted in its activities to Canton and its immediate environs, cannot compare in importance with the Northwest League. The latter, in its turn, is of much smaller dimensions and significance than is the All China Muslim League.

3. The Manchukuo Muslim Peoples' League. The most important event in Manchuria since 1937 has undoubtedly been the creation of a Manchukuo Muslim Peoples' League (Manchukuo Hui-chiao Min-tsu Hsieh-hui) to take the place of the former Islamic League (organized at Hsinking in 1932). The new League is more active and broader in scope than its predecessor, and unlike the latter, does not come under the jurisdiction of its own. Its personnel, unfortunately, is unknown.

A primary object of the Manchukuo Muslim League is to activate anti-Communist sentiment among its members. Several meetings and demonstrations of an anti-Communist nature have accordingly been held under its auspices at Harbin, Ying-k'ou and other large centers. Illustrative of such movements is a Domei dispatch from Harbin of 16 February 1938, even though it probably antedates the actual founding of the present Manchukuo League itself. This dispatch narrates with enthusiasm how the "20,000 local Muslims" of Harbin are "increasingly eager" to cooperate with the Japanese against Communism; how the Concordia Society has been asked to help them in forming an

youths.[1] Admission to these courses was at first restricted to Muslim graduates of junior middle schools (corresponding roughly to graduates from the second year of high school in the United States). Later, however, apparently because this requirement was too high to secure an adequate enrollment, any Muslims between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five who had some elementary education might qualify for admission. As a consequence, Yang estimates that of the total 500 graduates, only about twenty percent has had prior middle school experience, while approximately half has been recruited from the "professional" class (i.e., presumably sons of Muslim innkeepers, shopkeepers, restauranteurs and others in Peiping).

The Youth Corps is primarily a military organization. Students wear uniforms and spend much of their time learning to drill in Japanese fashion. On the ideological side they are exercised in the usual themes of anti-Communism and pan-Islamism. The extent of "education" imparted by the end of the first half of the total two-month training period is indicated by the following list of examination questions, as published in Hui-chiao (op. cit., p. 69):

1. Anti-Comintern: (a) "What effect does the denial of private property have upon the people's livelihood and national strength?" (b) "Describe present conditions in Russia."

2. Military regulations: four questions, including: "If, while at drill or in the lecture hall, an emergency phone call comes for someone, what is to be done?"

3. Military etiquette: four questions, including: "If, at a moment when one is supposed to salute, one happens to be holding an inconvenient object, how should one behave?"

4. Infantry drill: three questions, including: "What is the purpose of drill?"

5. Calisthenics: performance of calisthenics of various kinds,

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Yang Ching-chih claims that graduates of the Youth Corps are commonly assigned posts either in the gendarmerie or in the Special Service Department of the Japanese Army in North China. It is difficult to see how such questions as those just listed could possibly give adequate preparation for service in the latter organization, for which some degree of prior education would seem prerequisite. The explanation may either be: (1) that the more sinister aspects of the training program have been deliberately suppressed from the list of examination questions as published in Hui-chiao; or (2) that the Japanese do not regard the Muslim Youth Corps as in any way significant, but operate it merely as a "front" organization designed to prove to Chinese Muslims the extent of Japanese "sincereity" and interest in promoting the Muslim cause. In any case, 500 graduates in the space of almost four years is scarcely an imposing total for an institution operated by an organization supposedly representing the will and interests of several million Muslims in North China. As an instrument for impressing Chinese Muslims, the Youth Corps, like its parent organization, the League itself, can hardly be regarded otherwise than as a failure.

2. Suiyuan Muslim Youth Corps (Suiyuan Hui-chiao Ch'ing-nien T'uan). This enjoys a status independent from that of the Northwest Muslim League, though it falls, like the latter, under the supervision of the Kwantung Army. It is located in Suiyuan City on Tung-men-wai Ta-chieh (Outside-East-Gate Avenue). Aside from military training, its curricular emphasis is upon Japanese, and upon the geography, military conditions, and politics of Northwest China (Shensi, Kansu, Ningsia and Tsinghai). Graduates are sent to these provinces in Free China for espionage and subversive activities. Yang Ching-chih states that as of date of his writing (early 1942), six training periods had been held, graduating a total of about 240 Muslims.

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D. Japanese Sponsored Organs for "Education" and Propaganda[1]

Muslim schools and other organizations of an "educational" nature perpetuated or created by the Japanese since the occupation of North China in 1937 include the following:

1. Schools.

a. Northwestern Academy (Hsi-pei Hsüeh-yüan). This academy consists of a middle school (corresponding to the American high school), with an enrollment of over 300, and a primary school, with an enrollment of over 1,000. Of this total, some sixty percent is said by Yang to consist of Muslims. The academy was founded in Peiping in 1921, and is located on Niu Chieh (Ox Street), center of Peiping's Muslim community. Following Japanese occupation, it, like all other institutions which did not elect to move to Free China, fell under Japanese control. Its Japanese reorganizer is said to have been Kawamura Kyodo, that same Japanese "Muslim" who for years following the signing of the Muslim Pact traveled through China proper and greater China studying Muslim conditions, and who in July 1932 founded the Islamic League in Manchuria.[2] At present the academy receives a subsidy of local currency $1,000 per month from the Department of Special Affairs of the Japanese Army. Liu Te-jun, former Peiping Muslim jade and curio dealer, is its principal, a position which he accepted under compulsion, according to Yang. He was among those five who made a propagandistic trip from Peiping to Mecca in 1938-39 (to be described in Part VI, Sec. B).

1/ Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is derived from Yang Ching-chih, Ta Kung Pao of 15 March 1942.

2/ Cf. below, Appendix A, Section I. For his recent connection with the Northwestern Academy, cf. Mullah T'ien, "Remnants of Schools and Learning in Peiping after its Fall," article in Chinese in T'u-chüeh (The Turk), 1 October 1940.

b. Shih Chien Girls' Middle School. This school was founded in Peiping in 1936. In the following year it was closed, owing to the outbreak of hostilities, but in the autumn of 1938 the Japanese compelled it to reopen. It has an enrollment of 300 girls, of whom seventy percent are Muslim. At present, according to Yang, it turns out very few actual graduates.

2. Periodicals. Propaganda among Muslims is carried on through the following Muslim periodicals, operated or controlled by the Japanese:

(1). Hui-chiao, organ of the North China Muslim League. This has been described in detail above.

(2) Tsung-chiao Chou-k'an (Religious Weekly). This weekly made its first appearance 3 October 1939 as a supplement, published every Tuesday, for the daily Hsin Min Pao Wan-k'an (New People's Evening News), a non-Muslim newspaper under Japanese auspices with a claimed circulation of 180,000 copies. The Tsung-chiao Chou-k'an itself is a supplement designed specifically for Muslim readers of the Hsin Min Pao Wan-k'an, and is described by Löwenthal[1/] as being a single illustrated sheet, selling for 3 cents local currency, divided into the following three columns: history of Mohammed; history of Islam; Muslim teachings and rites. It would thus appear to be primarily cultural rather than political.

(3) Chen-Tsung Pao Yueh-k'an (Awe-inspiring Faith Monthly). This magazine was founded in Peiping in 1927 as an illustrated monthly, selling for ten cents an issue and dealing with Muslim political and religious subjects. It suspended

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1/ Religious Periodical Press in China, pp. 230, 231.

publication during September and October 1937, but has since resumed under Japanese inspiration. "At present it has a very strong anti-Russian and anti-Communist tendency," thus being similar in character to the magazine, Hui-chiao.1/ Its editor is T'ang I-lu, who, as noted above, is at the same time chairman of the Board of General Affairs of the North China Muslim League.

(4) Hai-pei Hui-chiao Tsung-lien Ho-hui Hui-pao

(Journal of the All Northwest Muslim League). On 20 February 1939, a Tokyo magazine announced that an organ by the above title was to be published by the Northwest Muslim League. It was to appear three times a month, and its policy was to include the four following aims: (1) Islamic doctrine; (2) Islamic culture; (3) Muslim social and economic welfare; (4) defense of Islam against Communism. Löwenthal, adds that as of 1940, "no copies of the journal had as yet been received."2/ Yang Ching-chih, too, fails to mention its existence, so that it is quite possible that it has never materialized.

Japanese-sponsored periodicals seem to have exercised comparatively little influence upon Muslims in China, probably because of the following factors: (1) The high degree of illiteracy among Chinese Muslims, which even in the pre-1937 days of peace prevented the largest Muslim periodical from having a circulation of more than 3,000 to 4,000 copies.3/ (2) The fact that this illiteracy is highest among Muslims of the strategic Northwest, who are the very ones whom the Japanese are most anxious to win over. (3) The fact that war conditions have done much to hamper the spread of Japanese inspired Muslim

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1/ Löwenthal, op. cit., p. 229.

2/ Op. cit., pp. 240, 241.

3/ Cf. above, Part III, Section B.

publications, save among those Muslims already under Japanese control. The latter are able to judge through personal experience as to the true nature of Japanese intentions, without having to read the effusions presented to them in the Japanese controlled press.

3. Radio.

As for the radio, although it has been extensively used by the Japanese for broadcasting propaganda to the outside Islamic world, it does not seem to have played any significant part in spreading Japanese propaganda of a specifically Islamic nature among Muslims in China itself. The low standard of living of most Chinese Muslims, which prevents all but a small urban percentage from buying radios, is probably a prime reason for this neglect. Another is the fact that such propaganda would conflict with the bulk of Japanese propaganda intended for non-Muslim Chinese, and broadcasted to the same areas of China.

E. Japanese Political and Economic Policy among Muslims in China.

Japanese political policy has been a separatist one: to emphasize the difference between Muslims and the great bulk of non-Muslim Chinese, and to inflame the relations between the two. Often this is done by the application of (seemingly) preferential treatment for the former. Thus Taylor writes concerning the activities of the North China Muslim League: "Legal help is given to Mohammedans who are involved in law suits against Chinese. It is said that in certain places Mohammedans are allowed to avoid taxation."1/

1/ Taylor, George E., The Struggle for North China (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1940), p. 84.

Although he adds that his latter statement "has not been checked," Yang Ching-chih[1] asserts categorically that in lawsuits between Muslims and non-Muslims, the Japanese generally give preference to the former; that special passes are given to Muslims in Peiping, freeing them from vexatious regulations imposed upon the rest of the population; and that in other ways the Japanese seek Muslim goodwill, as through donation of funds for the repair of the famous old mosque on Niu Chieh (Ox Street) in Peiping. Hoover, too, records some interesting remarks that were made to him in June 1938 by a Chinese Muslim: "The Japanese tempt us by giving us much face. They offer to put us over non-Muslims. In Kalgan, their advance scouts posted signs on the doors of the homes and shops of Muslims forbidding Japanese troops to enter. We are told that these posters were obeyed.... But," adds this informant significantly, "most of us try to avoid the Japanese, only wishing to be left alone."[2]

In Shantung the situation between Muslims and non-Muslims has been made especially acute by the installation of a puppet governor, Ma Liang, who is a Muslim. This man (born 1875) a native of Hopei, was formerly an officer in the Peiyang Army, and also is a former member of the highly reactionary Anfu political clique, long an instrument for Japanese infiltration in North China.[3] Under Ma's regime the Muslims have been given many privileges, and the Japanese, according to Yang, have not hesitated even to spread rumors among the Chinese guerrillas

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1/ Op. cit., 13 March 1942.

2/ Lyman Hoover, "Chinese Muslims are Tough," Asia, December 1938, p. 722.

3/ Cf. Who's Who in China, Supplement to 5th edition, (Shanghai, 1940), p. 75; also Yang Ching-chih, op. cit., 14 March 1942. Ma Liang should be differentiated from Ma Liang-p'o, who has been mentioned above as head of the Tsinan (Shantung) Division of the North China Muslim League. He was once associated with Sakuma's Society of Light in Shanghai. Appendix A, Section F.

of Shantung to the effect that Muslims there are wholeheartedly in favor of the Japanese New Order, thus exacerbating relations between them and the Chinese.

In general, according to Yang, the Japanese have made extensive use of Mongols, Muslims, and other non-Chinese for service in the gendarmerie and secret police of the occupied areas. This situation would inevitably lead to resentment by the Chinese masses against non-Chinese groups. According to Yang, however, conditions are still further inflamed by a deliberate Japanese policy of setting off one group against another. Such separatist tactics have been particularly noticeable in Suiyuan, where the Japanese have fanned antagonism between Mongol troops and Muslims, leading to vendettas which have cost more than 2,000 lives over a period of three years. In these vendettas the Suiyuan Muslim Youth Corps has played a prominent part.

In a somewhat different category is the Japanese "observation" work carried out among Muslims in China. Since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, according to Yang, the Department of Special Affairs of the Japanese Army has maintained observation posts at such key centers as Tientsin, Peiping, Kalgan, Taiyuan, Suiyuan, Paotow, Tsinan, Tsingtao, Nanking, Anking, Hankow, Nanchang, and Canton. These posts collect information on Chinese Muslim activities, among other things, and this information is printed monthly and circulated among high functionaries, both in Japan and China.

Japanese economic policy nullifies what political "privileges" may seem to accrue to Muslims, because they are subject to the wide variety of economic controls placed upon the Chinese in general. 1/ A case in point is that of Peiping's most famous

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1/ Information on this subject is derived from Yang Ching-chih, op. cit., 19 March 1942. Confirmatory details may be found in John Kin, "Allah Flays Japan," Asia, March 1942, p. 172, and in various articles published in Chinese Muslim periodicals in Free China.

Muslim restaurant, Tung Lai Hsün. This restaurant, which formerly enjoyed a daily gross of $3,000 to $4,000, was compelled following the occupation of Peiping, to issue shares of stock to a group of Japanese, in return for a sum of "unpaid capital." From these shares, the latter now receive an income of about $5,000 per month. When the owner tried to protest against this exaction, he was told that it was a part of "Japanese-Muslim cooperation."

Another action which ended less successfully for the Japanese was the attempted organization of some 700 beef and mutton butchers of Peiping (virtually all Muslims) into a "Beef and Mutton Cooperative." A Muslim selected by the Japanese was placed at the head of this cooperative, and was promised 3 percent of the profits, the remainder to go into the hands of the Japanese organizers. This resulted, however, in a mass protest from the butchers concerned, culminating in a physical attack upon the head of the "cooperative," in the course of which the latter lost an ear and an eye. As a consequence, the whole matter has been dropped.

The above are instances of rackets organized (with the connivance of the Japanese military) by private Japanese of the carpet-bagger type, such as have poured into North China by the thousand since 1937. Exploitation of a semi-official and much larger type is exemplified in the creation by the Japanese of a "Great Mongolia Trading Corporation" (Ta Meng Kung-ssu). In former times, small Muslim merchants were the chief participants in the trade of skins and furs, brought from Suiyuan and Mongolia to Tientsin, to be exchanged there for Hupeh brick tea. The usual rate of exchange would be about one brick of tea for a single sheep skin. Following Japanese occupation, however, all such trade has fallen under the control of the Great Mongolia Trading Corporation, with headquarters at Tientsin, and branches at Kalgan, Tatung, Suiyuan and Paotow. Exchange of goods is

arbitrarily fixed by this Corporation at the rate of five sheep skins for one brick of tea, and payment is sometimes not made to the private trader until three to five months after the transaction has been concluded.

Another blow at Muslim economy is a Japanese-created "Transport Cooperative" (Yun-shu Tsu-ho). This organization operates a fleet of trucks throughout the area extending from Peiping westward to the edges of occupied China, which has virtually put out of business the several thousand Muslim camel drivers who formerly conducted most of the transport in this region.

These accounts are well in line with observations by Westerners, of Japanese techniques for dealing with Chinese in general in occupied North China. The Great Mongolia and the Transport organization, for their part, are thoroughly typical instances of the techniques generally employed by the Japanese authorities in every occupied country: that of squeezing the country dry economically by means of huge government-controlled monopolies.

V. JAPANESE ACTIVITIES AMONG THE MUSLIMS IN CHINA'S NORTHWEST

A. Japanese Intrigues

While the Muslims in occupied areas of China have been subjected to increasing organization and propaganda by the Japanese since the start of the Sino-Japanese War, it should be remembered that most Muslims of China continue to live beyond the range of Japanese guns. The tale of the Japanese intrigues among these Muslims of Free China, therefore, particularly those of the Northwest, has retained something of the old melodramatic flavor.

At the same time, Japanese activities in unoccupied areas of China have necessarily been of such a nature that they are less easily detected or described than those in areas under Japanese control. It is nevertheless possible to trace a continuing Japanese interest in the Muslims of Northwest China.

Prior to 1937, Japanese activities among the Muslims of Northwest China were concentrated largely in Sinkiang and were directed against Russian influence there.1/ Since 1937, however, one pattern of Japanese activity is common to the Northwest in general. In outlining these activities in the following pages, therefore, no distinction will be drawn between those directed at Sinkiang and those directed toward the adjoining provinces of Kansu, Ningsia, and Tsinghai in which sizeable Muslim populations exist. The Chinese commonly refer to all these regions as the "Northwest," and the Japanese, in their intrigues of recent years, make no apparent distinction between them.

These Japanese intrigues have in general followed three lines: (1) physical infiltration, in the form of espionage,

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1/ See Appendix B.

subversive activity, or direct military action; (2) "cultural activities" designed to swing Muslims of the area over to the Japanese cause; (3) propaganda dealing with the area, but intended primarily for outside consumption.

1. Infiltration. In the spring of 1937, a caravan of 280 camels, carrying 1,000 rifles and large quantities of ammunition and food, was organized by seven Japanese to go on a journey to "Tibet."1/ This caravan arrived as far as Edsingol (in western Ningsia), but there, according to Hoover, was seized by Muslims, and the Japanese have never been heard from again. During the following year two other caravans were dispatched, and likewise disappeared from view.

This story may be connected with the 1937 Kashgar disorders (See Appendix B, Sections A and G).. It is also reminiscent of a similar incident described by Yang Ching-chih.2/ According to Yang, the Sinkiang disorders preceding 1934 caused some 20,000 Kazaks (nomads of Turkic blood and Muslim religion) to leave their homeland in Dzungaria (extreme northern part of Sinkiang) and migrate to Kansu. There they settled on a belt of land extending in a roughly north-to-south axis a little east of the famous "Jade Gate" (Yu-men). Soon they fell into difficulties with the local population, and the Japanese, eager, as ever, to stir up dissension, sent them two caravan loads of munitions from Suiyuan. The first of these caravans apparently arrived successfully, but a second was halted at the Suiyuan-Ningsia border by General Ma Hung-k'uei, governor of the latter province. Though Yang gives no date for this occurrence, the fact that it resulted merely in stoppage but not seizure of the caravan, might well place it in

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1/ Lyman Hoover, "China's Muslims Must Choose," Asia, November 1938, p. 660.

2/ Ta Kung Pao, 15 March 1942.

the spring of 1937, when China and Japan were not yet officially at war.

Following the outbreak of hostilities in 1937, the Japanese attempted to create a puppet "Muslim Army," with headquarters at Paotow, over which they appointed a renegade Muslim named Chiang Hui-jo as commander-in-chief. The latter was a veteran of many military posts in North China since before 1912, but was forced into retirement by the political changes consequent to Chiang Kai-shek's unification of the country in 1927, and had fallen into penurious circumstances. In the winter of 1939 he led the new "Muslim army" in an attack on Wu-yuan (a little west of Paotow), but was badly defeated by Chinese forces under General Fu Tso-i. Since then little has been heard of him.1/

In the same year (1939) the Japanese attempted a bold, but unsuccessful, cout d'état within Sinkiang itself. A special dispatch from Shanghai, printed in the Christian Science Monitor of 9 November 1939, gives the story as follows:

> "A high Chinese official who had recently visited Urumchi (Tihua), Soviet-controlled part of Sinkiang, claimed that the Tientsin remittances /sent by the Japanese/ for subversive work in Sinkiang reached $3,000,000, while additional $10,000,000 were said to have been appropriated for the purpose. Scores of Japanese agents -- mostly masquerading as traders -- were reported to have been arrested with vast sums of money in their possession. That some of this money reached the right hands was indicated by the arrest and execution of a number of Sinkiang officials, including the Deputy Governor, on charges of conspiring with the Japanese..... In Tokyo, hundreds of college students are receiving special training in Sinkiang's main dialects, geography and problems. Japanese Mohammedans are being sent to Inner Mongolia to await a propitious moment for a 'visit' to Sinkiang." 2/

1/ Yang, op. cit., 19 March 1942.

2/ This account is confirmed by an article "Japan Covets the Rich Hinterland Province" by Anna L. Wang and Doris Rubens, in the China Weekly Review of 22 July 1939, pp. 229-30. According to this article, Japanese agents bribed some Tientsin merchants to transport 3 million dollars in cash to Sinkiang to be used there for bribery and terrorism. Certain merchants at Tihua, and even the vice-chairman of the province, accepted the bribes, in return for which they were to attempt to overthrow the government. The plot was detected, however, and the plotters jailed.

The collapse of this attempt was apparently followed by severe reprisals. Early in 1940, at any rate, an American missionary who for four years had resided in Tihua, reported that anti-Japanese governmental propaganda in Sinkiang was intense, and gave it as his opinion "that no Japanese would be safe in Sinkiang and that there are none there."1/ There seems no reason to suppose that since 1940 conditions have led to any lessening of vigilance on the part of the Sinkiang Chinese authorities.

2. "Cultural Activities." On the "cultural" side, Yang states that in 1936 a primary school, accomodating fifty pupils, was established in Tokyo expressly for Tatar children. Children of this school, according to Yang, are periodically permitted to inspect units of the Japanese Army, and are filled with the usual propaganda to the effect that the Japanese Army is fighting for the overthrow of Communism in China and for the restoration of "independent" Muslim rule in Sinkiang. These children participated in lantern processions held in Japan to celebrate the fall of Nanking, Hankow, and other large Chinese cities. Yang further states that when he visited Tientsin in 1941, he came in contact with several tens of Turki from Sinkiang, who had become imbued with Japanese propaganda, and had at one time or another paid visits to Tokyo at the invitation of the Japanese government.2/

In the Near East, too, the Japanese have been active in advancing their Central Asiatic intrigues. In February of 1937, a group of Japanese "muslims," consisting of Suzuki

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1/ Communication from Calcutta, 8 January 1940, reporting on an interview with Dr. H.D. Hayward recently arrived from Sinkiang to Calcutta.

2/ For the above information, see Yang, op. cit., 15 March 1942.

Tsuyomi, Hosokawa Susumu, Enomoto Momotaro, and three other young men, reached Mecca on the fifth of six Japanese pilgrimages to that city conducted during the years between 1924 and 1938.[1] While there, they not only were honored by an audience with King Ibn Saud himself, but a few days later had an interview with the noted Chinese Muslim, Ma Lin, who happened to be visiting Mecca that same year. The latter, one of the famous "Ma's" of China's Northwest, has had a distinguished military career extending to pre-1912 days, and for a while was governor of Tsinghai province. The fact that the activities of his equally famous nephew, Ma Pu-ch'ing, forced him to relinquish this post in the autumn of 1936 and come to Mecca, may have made the Japanese "pilgrims" especially anxious to hold this interview with him. In the ensuing conversation it is known only that conditions in Tsinghai and in China's Northwest were discussed, and that Sha Kuo-chen, prominent Chinese Muslim educator staying at Cairo's famous al-Azhar university, (on whom see below, Part VI, Section B) who was among Ma Lin's entourage, acted as interpreter. No positive results seem to have been achieved, for Ma Lin today holds an honored position as Vice Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese 17th Army, and is a State Councillor of China.[2]

It was probably during this same 1937 pilgrimage that Suzuki and his confreres circulated rumors to the effect that General Ma Hung-k'uei, Muslim governor of Ningsia, had broken

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1/ [redacted]

2/ For this Japanese pilgrimage to Mecca, and the meeting with Ma Lin, see Wakabayashi, Muslim World and Japan, pp. 8, 168. For biographical details on Ma Lin, see Y.P. Mei, "Stronghold of Muslim China," Asia, December 1940, p. 660; Who's Who in China, fifth (1936) edition, p. 185; China at War 7 (December 1941), pp. 80-81.

away from the Chinese Central Government and organized an autonomous Muslim state. Such, at least, was the story heard by the Chinese Muslim goodwill mission to the Near East, when it reached Mecca in February 1938. There it found a colony of some 7,000 former inhabitants of Sinkiang who had settled down in Mecca, and who told the mission that the rumors had originated with two recent Japanese pilgrims to Mecca, one named Suzuki, the other Abdullah.[1/]

Further evidence of Japanese attemps in the Near East to promote a Central Asiatic Muslim state -- attempts reminiscent of the unfortunate Abdul Kerim -- is a report published in a Cairo newspaper early in 1938, which stated that "Japan contemplates the creation of a Muslim Kingdom in a predominantly Muslim part of China and importing a member of the ruling dynasty of Egypt to become the King."[2/] Secret negotiations toward this end, according to one version of the rumor, were being conducted by Japanese Embassy officials in Cairo in talks with members of the Egyptian royal family.[3/]

3. Propaganda. It was seemingly not until the spring of 1938 that the Japanese began to propagate persistent rumors, intended primarily for the outside world, stressing the existence of strong Chinese-Muslim friction in China's Northwest, and the imminent intention of Muslims there to form an independent state. In April 1938, for example, the Tokyo

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1/ Cf. "Mohammedanism Sides with China," China at War 2 (March 1939), pp. 24-5. This Chinese goodwill mission to the Near East will be described in detail below, under Part VI, Section B. The name Abdullah gives difficulty, as it does not correspond with any of the known Muslim names of the Japanese who went to Mecca on the fifth or earlier pilgrimages. Wakabayashi (op. cit., p. 7) states that Suzuki's Muslim name was Muhammad Sharifi, and Hosokawa's was Muhammad abd el-Mun'im. He does not, however, give the Muslim name of Enomoto, third of the trio, or even the Japanese names of the "three other young men" who accompanied the group.

2/ The Light, 8 March 1938, p. 11.

3/ Hoover, "Chinese Muslims are Tough," Asia, December 1938, p. 725

radio relayed "a message from Suiyuan" to the effect that sentiment for such a state was growing among the ten million Muslims of Ningsia, Kansu, Tsinghai and Sinkiang, and that General Ma Hung-k'uei, governor of Ningsia, "is now strongly dissatisfied with General Chiang Kai-shek, with the result that antagonism between the 70,000 Mohammedan troops and about one division of Chinese troops stationed in Ningsia has come to the fore..... General Ma is reported to be acting in concert with other Muslim leaders."1/ The fact that this and similar dire predictions have in every case failed on realization, has in no way deterred the Japanese from periodically repeating such propaganda. Thus in August 1942, a Tokyo broadcast to Australia reported that disputes between Muslims and Chinese in the Northwest had reached the stage of armed conflict between the "48th Chungking Division" and the "82nd Army of the Muslims."2/ Only a few days later the Tokyo radio, this time broadcasting to Europe, enlarged on the same theme by quoting an Asahi dispatch from Shanghai, to the effect that Muslims in Kansu, Ningsia, Tsinghai, etc., were fired with a desire for racial equality with the Chinese; that they, therefore, opposed the entrance of Chungking and Chinese Communist armies into the area; and that they had created a "Gobi Federation" which operated an autonomous Muslim army.3/

1/ Hoover, "China's Muslims Must Choose," Asia, November 1938, pp. 657-8. As a matter of fact, there have been rumors in the past that Ma was not averse to working with the Japanese. Edgar Snow, writing as of 1936, after accusing Ma of gross misgovernment in Ningsia, asserts: "A Japanese military mission had been established in Ninghsia City, and General Ma had given them permission to build an aerodrome north of the city, in the Alashan Mongol territory. Some of the Moslems and Mongols feared an actual armed Japanese invasion." Cf. Red Star over China (New York, 1938), p. 318. But whether or not this allegation may once have been true, Ma has since then been apparently regarded by the Chinese Central Government as a loyal follower.

One Tokyo attempt to create dissension was a broadcast of 13 March 1943, according to which an American engineer, sent to Tsinghai by Chungking to develop new communication routes, was attacked there by Muslims. "The reaction of these people against Chungking gets worse every day. It seems there is hardly any solution to this problem at present.... An American engineer... was sent to supervise the developments in the Northwest. He did not learn a single thing about the customs or habits of the people there:... When some of the Muslim establishments were being torn down, the Muslim people became angry and set fire to the new installations. The U.S. government immediately protested to the Chungking government but the Chungking government was unable to do anything to ease the situation."1/

Local unrest south of Lanchow in Kansu province in the first half of 1943 caused a flood of Tokyo (and Tokyo-controlled or inspired) broadcasts which tried to persuade the world that a serious uprising was taking place in Kansu province.

The rebels were said by Tokyo to be farmers, Communists, members of the Chinese secret society known as the Ko-lao Hui (Elder Brother Society), students of the Army Cadet School and of the Normal School in Lin-hsia (slightly west of the places mentioned above), Chungking central troops, and last, but apparently most important, Muslims. Their numbers as mentioned in different broadcasts range from "several hundred" to 100,000 (a figure further enlarged by Berlin to 300,000 in a broadcast of 1 July 1943). The most precise account (Tokyo broadcast of 19 June 1943) spoke of "100,000 revolting troops gathered under the command of Ma Fu-shan, erstwhile

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[redacted]

right-hand-man of General Ma Pu'ch'ing, daring cavalry commander of the Mohammedan army.... The eight divisions were armed with obsolete rifles, spears, swords, and even farming implements." Another broadcast two days later reports that in late May a certain Muslim representative, Ma Ching-yu (or possibly, according to a still later broadcast, Ma Chung-yu) had gone to Min-hsien to discuss the situation with the leaders of the secret society, Ko-lao Hui.

The 100,000 troops under the Muslim leader, Ma Fu-shan, are said to have rallied with the slogan, "Down with Ku Cheng-lun," governor of Kansu province. Mediation efforts are claimed to have been undertaken by General Pai Ch'ung-hsi and other Chungking Muslim leaders, but to have failed. Thereupon, according to Tokyo, Chungking dispatched "more than ten divisions of troops" from Lanchow, a number later said to have been considerably increased. Despite this action, the continuing resistance of the insurrectionists is alleged to have been so "discouraging" to "certain quarters among the Chungking leaders," as to cause them to urge abandonment of the attempt to bring the Northwest under Chungking control. Tokyo also (in English to North America, 10 July 1943 quoting Domei from Nanking) accused the Chinese Communists of secretly fostering the Muslim uprising, and stated that on 7 July Pai Ch'ung-hsi arrived in Lanchow to attempt a settlement in cooperation with Ma Hung-k'uei and other northwestern leaders.1/

1/ With the exception of the 10 July broadcast, all the information in the above three paragraphs is taken [redacted] from the following monitored broadcasts: Tokyo in English to the Americas and in Mandarin to China, 19 June; Tokyo Japanese Home Service, 30 June; Tokyo English Domei, 30 June and 1 July; Berlin Transocean to North America, 1 July; Shanghai in English to Australia, and Saigon in English to Australia and New Zealand, 2 July.

The above reports, show certain evident exaggerations and inconsistencies -- for example, the emphasis on Muslim participation; the variant numbers of rebels cited in different broadcasts; and its attempt to fan the flames of Chungking-Communist dissension, by linking the latter with the Muslims. Incidentally, neither the Muslim general, Ma Fu-shan, nor the Muslim representative, Ma Ching-yu (or Chung-yu), are identifiable. On the other hand, the very specific and detailed nature of these broadcasts suggests that Tokyo may actually have found some factual basis for its long continued allegations of Muslim-Chungking dissension, even though it probably inflated this out of all proportion to its true importance.

While Tokyo was painting its gloomy picture of conditions in Free China, it pointed to the solicitude shown for Muslims in Inner Mongolia, one of the areas under Japan's "benevolent" jurisdiction. In a broadcast of 19 June 1943 (monitored by the Federal Communications Commission), Tokyo stated: "To enable the 100,000 Moslems in Mengchiang (Inner Mongolia) to participate in the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Federated Autonomous Government of Mengchiang today announced the policy for educating and guiding them."

Another Tokyo broadcast (7 July 1943) which, though concerning a portion of North China lying outside the immediate area considered here, may be conveniently mentioned at this point. According to this broadcast, which purported to carry news from Taiyuan, capital of Shansi province, "it was disclosed that Chungking's Lieutenant General Ma Chung, who was attached to the Headquarters of the First War Zone," had on 1 July 1943 arrived at Hsing-hsien (near Taiyuan) to surrender to the Japanese, and had "pledged that he would offer

Kansu in northern Tsinghai, extending almost as far east as Lanchow. From there a tongue of land would project northward along both sides of the Yellow River, to include eastern Ningsia and the Ordos region of Suiyuan, terminating in the vicinity of Wu-yüan, above the northern elbow of the Yellow River. This northward projection, however, would not include the Alashan region in central Ningsia, which would be allotted to a Mongol "independent" state.

It is immediately evident that such a plan could be realized only at the expense of conflict with the Soviet Union. A second and more modest plan, advocated by what Yang calls the "main section" of the Kwantung Army, would for the moment include merely eastern Ningsia (east of the Alashan region) and western Suiyuan. With these areas as a nucleus, it would gradually be extended indefinitely, as far as circumstances might permit.

Though neither of these plans need be accepted too literally, they undoubtedly represent the general outlines of Japanese aspirations, and would leap into immediate prominence should Japan succeed in gaining a military foothold in these portions of China.

his services for the construction of New China, thus advancing the peace movement throughout China.... He revealed that Japan's sincere attitude toward New China has awakened him from his lethargy. New China, he said, is filled with bright hope under the able policy of Wang Ching-wei." General Ma Chung is further described as a man sixty-two years of age who received his education in England, was a former office-holder in the Shansi provincial government, a director-general of the anti-Communist movement in Shansi, and (of interest for our present report) former chairman of the Shansi branch of the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation. If all this be true, he would seem to be perhaps the most prominent Chinese Muslim yet won by the Japanese to their side. Unfortunately, however, nothing more is known concerning him than what is stated in this broadcast.

B. Japanese Aspirations

The above broadcasts indicate that Japan, despite a record of only meager success in her intrigues in Sinkiang and Northwest China proper, has by no means abandoned her aspirations in these regions. According to Yang,[1] two plans for an "autonomous Muslim state" have been cherished by different groups within the Kwantung Army, which has been the chief proponent of the whole idea. The more ambitious of the two is that advanced by Lieutenant General Sakai Takashi.[2] This would roughly include all of Sinkiang extending as far south as the Tarim Basin, and the greater part of Kansu, together with the strip of land immediately adjoining

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1/ Ta Kung Pao of 19 March 1942.

2/ From 1938 onward Director on the Inner Mongolia Liaison Agency of the China Affairs Board, but reported by the New York Times of 2 October 1942 as having been killed in action on the China front.

VI. CHINESE COUNTERMOVES TO JAPANESE ISLAMIC ACTIVITIES

A. Improvement in Status of Muslims within China

While the Japanese have been conducting their "investigations" and other activities among the Muslims in China, certain changes have been taking place among the Chinese Muslims themselves leading to a definite improvement in their status. Such movements have aimed at strengthening the self-consciousness and pride of the Muslims in their own achievements, and at the same time giving them an increased sense of responsibility and participation in the life of the country as a whole.

During the past decade and especially since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, there is no doubt that the Chinese Government has become keenly aware of the strategic importance of the Muslim minority within its borders, and of the Japanese efforts to utilize this minority. This awareness has resulted in increased efforts to win the friendship of Muslims, not only in China itself, but in the entire Islamic world.

With the establishment of the Chinese Republic, the Muslims were given official recognition as one of the five races of China (the others being the Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, and Tibetans), and were ascribed the white stripe in the former five-barred republican flag.[1/] In recent years, however, the danger of stressing the difference in race between Chinese Muslims and non-Muslim has been recognized. Therefore the present policy is to regard the Muslims of China as a separate religious group rather than a separate race; no longer are they referred to by the Chinese as hui min (a Muslim people or race) but as hui-chiao jen (believers in Islam). This is

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1/ Hoover, "China's Muslims Must Choose," Asia, November 1938, p. 659.

a point of view that has been repeatedly emphasized by Chiang Kai-shek himself in public speeches.[1]

From the first year of the Republic until 1937, many Chinese Muslim Associations were formed. Information on these organizations is to be found in Appendix C, but probably only the Chinese Muslim Mutual Progress Association has had any lasting effect. However, the mere fact that these associations were founded, along with many Muslim Schools and periodicals, attests to the attempt at revival of Islam in China.

In May 1938, however, the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation[2] (Chung-kuo Hui-chiao Chiu-kuo Hsieh-hui) was founded at a mass meeting in a big mosque in Hankow, with Muslim representatives from all parts of China. Since its inception it has received direct and powerful support from the Chinese National Government, and it is today the most influential and widespread Muslim organization in China, having largely supplanted all prior organizations. Created in order to counterbalance the Japanese-sponsored All China Muslim League (which was founded 7 February 1938), it has succeeded in rallying around it many of the leading Muslims of China, in marked contrast to the latter organization.

Chairman of the Salvation Federation is the Muslim General (Omar) Pai Ch'ung-hsi, who is probably China's most famous single Muslim today. Born at Kweilin, Kwangsi, in 1893, Pai participated

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1/ John Kin, "Allah Flays Japan," Asia, March 1942, p. 174; Y. P. Mei, "Stronghold of Muslim China," ibid., December 1940, pp. 659-60.

2/ Information on this organization, unless otherwise stated, is derived from John Kin, "Allah Flays Japan," Asia, March 1942, pp. 172-4; John Kin, "Chinese Muslims View Pakistan," Asia, March 1943, pp. 155-7; Lyman Hoover, "Random Notes of Conversation held with Sha Heng-chün, third year student at Northwest Agricultural College, Wukung, 18 November 1941," [redacted]
For date of founding, see T'ang K'o-san, "Problems Regarding the Organizing of Muslims into the Movement for Resistance and National Reconstruction" (article in Chinese), Chung-kuo Hui-chiao Chiu-kuo Hsieh-hui Hui-k'an (Bulletin of the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation), 2.4 (1 June 1940), p. 3.

in the overthrow of the Manchus in 1911 and has long been closely associated with the Kuomintang party. At present (1943) he is Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the Chinese Army, and one of Chiang Kai-shek's most trusted men. He, more than any other man, is responsible for the favorable interest in Islam which the Chinese government has shown during the past few years. Vice chairman of the Federation is T'ang K'o-san, native of Shantung, who is at the same time a member of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission of the Chinese Government.

Following the fall of Hankow to the Japanese in October 1938, headquarters of the Salvation Federation was removed to Chungking. It now maintains branches in seventeen provinces in Free China, with sub-branches in 256 hsien (counties). These are in part supported by funds from the central headquarters; at the same time they are expected to raise some money themselves. In Chungking the Federation publishes a Bulletin (Hui-k'an), the first issue of which appeared on 15 October 1939.

The Federation has done much to raise the educational and economic status of Muslims in China. In a number of places it maintains primary schools and literacy classes, and offers lectures on Islamic doctrine. Among its economic enterprises may be cited a leather factory for refugee Muslims at Shao-yang, Hunan; still a larger factory (type unspecified) at Kweilin, Kwangsi; and an agricultural and experimental station near Kweilin.

Its chief purpose, however, is to promote improved relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in China; create goodwill between China and the outer Islamic world; and combat Japanese propaganda, both in China and abroad. Its activities outside China will be narrated in the following section. Internally, one of its first acts after inauguration in 1938 was to send a Muslim Propaganda Corps of twelve persons to the northwest provinces of Kansu, Ningsia and Tsinghai, in order to forestall Japanese intrigue there.

Under the leadership of General Wang Yüeh-p'o, a Muslim member of the National Military Council, this corps traveled several months through the Northwest at the expense of the government.

The Chinese Central Government, for its part, has done much on behalf of Muslims since 1937. Following the destruction of Chungking's third and largest mosque by bombing in 1941, it was announced in September 1942 that construction on a new mosque, to accommodate 4,000 persons, had been begun at a cost of $700,000 in Chinese National Currency (CN$). Half of this sum was to come from the government; the other half from the Salvation Federation.1/

It is in educational matters, however, that the government has been most active. Some 1,500 young Muslims from China's Northwest have been placed by Pai Ch'ung-hsi in the Kweilin branch of the Central Military Academy, and another group has been brought from Sinkiang for the same purpose. Ch'eng Ta Islamic Normal School, which moved from Peiping to Kweilin following 1937, was "nationalized" on 1 July 1941, thus allowing it to receive a government subsidy; other Muslim secondary schools will probably be similarly nationalized in future.2/

In February 1939 the Supreme National Defense Council decided to institute professorships in Islamic studies at three government universities: Central, Yunnan, and Northwest Union. At the same time it was announced that increased numbers of Muslim students were to be encouraged to attend these institutions, by freeing them from entrance examinations and granting them admission either upon the recommendation of the Ministry of Education or of the Salvation Federation. Students from poor families were to be given scholarships.3/

1/ China at War 9 (November 1942), pp. 67-8.

2/ Kin, "Allah Flays Japan," op. cit., p. 174.

3/ China at War 2 (April 1939), pp. 62-3. This source incorrectly gives the name of the third university as "Southwest Union" instead of "Northwest Union," but correctly identifies its location then as Han-chung, Shensi.

Lack of student interest in the proposed Islamic courses unfortunately led to postponement of the plan for creating the new professorships. However, the third session of the People's Political Council, which adjourned 31 October 1942, passed a resolution urging the "institution of professorships of Islamic culture and Arabic language in government universities."[1] Thus it is possible that this plan may after all be revived.

Finally, along lines of popular education, may be cited a news item in the Ta Kung Pao of 15 November 1942, stating that the Salvation Federation had decided to appeal to the Government for a grant of CN$1,000,000 in order to expand and improve primary education among Muslims in the Northwest.

All these activities have led to a relationship between the Muslims and the Chinese Government more cordial than has existed for decades, perhaps for centuries. Lyman Hoover, long an interested observer of Chinese Islam, sums up the present situation as follows: "Personal contacts with Moslems in Occupied China lead one to believe that only a small proportion of their co-religionists have been influenced by Japanese efforts and propaganda. In Free China, all Moslems I have talked with profess complete loyalty to the National Government and the anti-Axis cause. In the Northwest I visited several centers during the summer of 1942, and found complete loyalty there to the cause of resistance to Japan."[2]

1/ [redacted] Concerning the three professorships in Islam to be established by the Chinese Government, Hoover (personal communication of July 16) writes: "The three professorships have been in operation for at least part of the time. I know that Professor Sadi Yang is still at National Northwest University at Chengku (near Hanchung) Shensi, because I had a letter from him just before I left China."

2/ "Japan -- Protector of Islam," Pacific Affairs, 15 December 1942, pp. 479-481. That portion of the article here cited was prepared by the British Ministry of Information at New Delhi, on the basis of information supplied by Hoover in Chungking. The last sentence in this quotation differs from that in the original Pacific Affairs article, and was given in writing to the author of this report, in June 1943, shortly after Hoover's return to the United States from Chungking. The sentence it replaces in the Pacific Affairs article, which, of course, was made at an earlier time, reads as follows: "Though I have not had a recent opportunity to visit the Northwest, Moslem friends I have met from that area profess the same loyalty."

Nevertheless, as Hoover points out immediately afterward, this does not mean that Chinese Muslims are wholly satisfied with the present situation. In private conversations with him they have made the following criticisms:

(1) More should be done than hitherto to promote education among Muslims. There should be more Muslim primary schools, and greater assistance for Muslims going to middle schools and universities. The ignorance still prevalent among large sections of the Muslim community, especially in the Northwest, is a serious problem.

(2) The above problem is closely related to the low average economic standing of Muslims. The "poverty" of the "Muslim masses" should receive special attention from the National Government.

(3) Muslims feel that their political opportunities have been far too circumscribed in the past. While they appreciate what has been done by the National Government in recent years, they feel this is not enough.

(4) Muslims take pride in what their members have done in fighting Japan, and in the prominence of certain Muslim commanders, such as Pai Ch'ung-hsi. Nevertheless, they feel that more opportunity for specialized military training should be given them in order to equip them for higher commands in the Chinese armed forces.

Concerning the Muslim Salvation Federation, the Muslims with whom Hoover talked expressed the following criticisms:

(1) Although they recognize the good work of the Federation in unifying Chinese Muslims, those outside the circle of active membership charge that it has been organized from the top down, and that it is not sufficiently representative of the Muslim communities as a whole, save in a few provinces where it has absorbed the older Chinese Muslim Mutual Progress Association.

(2) Younger Muslims agree with the pronouncements of the Federation, but argue that it has lacked efficiency in carrying

these pronouncements into effect, especially in inducing the government to improve the conditions of Muslims. As an example, they cite the fact that, in spite of all that has been said on the subject, there are today only slightly over 100 Muslims studying in government universities. Most of these arrived there through their own efforts, and those who are aided by scholarships sometimes receive as little as CN $80. which is scarcely sufficient to support them for a single month.[1/]

(3) A small but earnest minority of young educated Muslims complain that the government still follows the old policy of lining up the "big names" in the Muslim world. There should be greater utilization of young Muslims educated along modern lines, they say, and local communities should have the chance to choose their own representatives to the Federation. Some Muslims favor the creation of a "Minorities Congress" in the government, in which Muslims could have their own representatives; others would favor a "Muslim Political Party," if the government would permit it.

(4) Older Muslims of the Northwest urge the importance of improved training for the ahungs or Muslim teachers, saying that these ahungs have great influence among the masses, and that the political consciousness of the Muslim people depends more upon them than upon any other factor.

In connection with the Muslim complaint of inadequate political representation, the following table, showing the numbers of Muslims who hold positions in important organs of the Central Government, is instructive:[2/]

1/ This, of course, refers to conditions as they were in the earlier stages of the Sino-Japanese War. Today the extent of Chinese currency inflation would make such a sum as $80 completely insignificant.

2/ Derived from John Kin, "Chinese Muslims View Pakistan," Asia, March 1943, pp. 156-7. The Muslim percentages have been added for this study. It should be noted that Kin's article does not give a complete list of all Muslims holding government positions, but only those in a few of the more important organs of the Central Government. For a more detailed picture, see China at War 7 (December 1941), pp. 80-1.

Muslim Representation in the National Government

Government Organization	Total Number of Members	Muslim Representation	Muslim Percentage of Total
State Councillors	36	2	5.55
Central Executive and Advisory Committees of Kuomintang	260	5	1.92
Legislative Yuan	45-99	2	4.44-2.02
People's Political Council	240	1	0.42

The inadequate representation revealed by the above figures is striking if acceptance is given the Muslim claim that they constitute ten percent of the total population of China.[1/] It is less conspicuous if the thesis is accepted that Muslims constitute four percent of China's total population, which, as shown at the very beginning of this study, is probably closer to the actual Muslim proportion. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Muslim representation in the Central Government remains in any case less than adequate, and that it is not truly democratic. Thus the largest and most democratic organ of the Chinese Government, the People's Political Council, shows the lowest Muslim representation, whereas in the much smaller and "big name" group of State Councillors the Muslims actually have more than the share that would be allotted to them on a strictly proportionate basis.

It is difficult to see, on the other hand, how this condition can well be otherwise than it is, as long as the degree of education among the Muslims of China remains at its hitherto prevailing low level. Nevertheless, there is no reason to feel unduly pessimistic about the situation. A steady, even if slow, improvement has been taking place, and the desire for goodwill that seems to exist on both sides gives cause for hope that this improvement will continue. Complete participation of the Muslims in the

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1/ This is the proportion given by Kin, op. cit., on the basis of Muslim assertions that they number 45,000,000 out of a total population of 450,000,000.

political life of the country can probably come only with the further democratization of China as a whole. But meanwhile, it is encouraging that many of China's most famous Muslims are working wholeheartedly for the Chinese cause, and that as yet extremely few of any real note have been won over by the Japanese.

B. Chinese Activities in the Islamic World

Not only have there been important internal developments in Chinese Islam during the past few years; the relationship of China toward the outside Islamic world has also undergone profound changes. Indifference and ignorance have been replaced by awakened interest and by efforts aiming at the promotion of Sino-Islamic cultural relations. In these efforts both the Muslims of China and the Chinese Government have taken a hand.

Efforts have been made within the past few years to break down the barrier of isolation long dividing the Muslims of China from their co-religionists in other lands, and to give them a keener awareness of what is going on in the outside Islamic world. This pan-Islamic movement, if such it can be called, is cultural rather than political in nature; it does not follow the lines of Japanese-inspired Islamic propaganda, aimed at inducing Muslims in China to break away from non-Muslims and to create an independent Muslim state. Therefore, it has received direct encouragement and aid from the Chinese Government, which has seen in it an excellent means for forging bonds of friendship between China and the Islamic world, and thus countering Japanese activities in Islamic countries.

One result has been that a small but increasing number of Chinese Muslim students has gone to the Al-Azhar University at Cairo. For a time they are said to have received special scholarships from the King of Egypt, but early in 1939 this arrangement was terminated and the Chinese Ministry of Education granted fellowships of £20.[1/] In that year the first batch of students, who

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1/ China at War 2 (April 1939), p. 63.

had gone to al-Azhar in 1931, returned to China. It is said that twenty-eight Chinese students remained at al-Azhar.[1]

In 1941 it was announced that the remaining Chinese at Cairo were to return to China during the summer, with financial help from the Chinese Ministry of Education.[2] As of March 1943, however, there were still five Chinese students in residence at al-Azhar.[3] As recently as April 1943, moreover, the Chungking radio proclaimed plans for a new educational mission. At the invitation of the Indian, Turkish, and Iranian governments, it stated, the Ministry of Education was to select fifteen Chinese Muslims who were to be sent to those countries for advanced study, thus strengthening Sino-Islamic cultural relations. Subjects of study would include political science, economics, philosophy, language and arts.[4] Thus it is evident that Chinese educational contacts with the Islamic world are being continued.

During their stay in Egypt, the Chinese Muslims served their country well, both through promotion of general cultural ties, and through activities directly aimed against Japanese propaganda. On the cultural side, outstanding achievements have been made by Ma Chien and Na Chung (who both entered al-Azhar in 1931), and Hai Wei-liang (who after long study in India entered al-Azhar in 1934). While in Egypt, these three collaborated on an Arabic translation of Lin Yu-t'ang's best seller, My Country and My People. Ma Chien has also translated the Confucian Analects into Arabic, while Hai Wei-liang, in addition to several original works written in Urdu, has published a translation of T'ang dynasty poems in that language. Furthermore, both Ma and Na have written books in Chinese treating

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1/ Ibid. 7 (September 1941), pp. 52-54.

2/ Ibid. 6 (March 1941), p. 20.

3/ Personal telegram of 15 June 1943 from Lyman Hoover, who visited Cairo in March of the same year.

4/ Chungking radio of 29 April 1943, as monitored by the Federal Communications Commission.

Islam from philosophical and historical points of view.[1] These three men are recognized as probably the outstanding Islamic scholars of China today, and were slated to hold the chairs in Islamic studies proposed for three Chinese universities in 1939.

Still another returned student from al-Azhar, Lin Chung-ming, gives broadcasts in Arabic on the Chungking radio, directed to the Near Eastern and South Asian Muslim countries.[2]

The last named activity merges imperceptibly into direct anti-Japanese propaganda work. In this field the Chinese at al-Azhar have also played an important part. Thus within a few months after the outbreak of war in China in the summer of 1937, it was announced in the Arabic press that the Chinese students at al-Azhar, led by Sha Kuo-chen, had formed a committee to appeal for Muslim aid to China against Japanese aggression.[3] Most outstanding, however, has been the way in which the al-Azhar students dealt with a Japanese-sponsored Chinese delegation sent to Mecca in 1938-39. This delegation consisted of the five following persons, all connected with the North China Muslim League or other Japanese-controlled North China Muslim organizations: T'ang I-lu, Liu Te-jun, Ma Liang-p'o, and "a certain Chang" and "certain Su."[4] Well equipped with Japanese presents destined for notables in Egypt, Arabia, and Turkey, the five left Peiping for the Near East on 19 December 1938. The Chinese National Government, however, getting wind of the scheme, promptly telegraphed to the Chinese at al-Azhar, with the result that a group of the latter was on hand to meet the delegation when it arrived in the Near East early in 1939. Through their own statements and admissions gained by them from the Peiping delegation, the

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1/ China at War 6 (March 1941), p. 21; Chao Chen-wu, op. cit., p. 20; Oriente Moderno 15 (1935), p. 353.

2/ China at War, op. cit.

3/ Oriente Moderno 17 (November 1937), pp. 540-41.

4/ Concerning the first three of these men, see above, Part IV, Section B.

al-Azhar Chinese effectively succeeded in dissipating among Near Easterners any idea that the Peiping group was at all representative of Chinese Muslims as a whole, or was, in fact, anything more than a puppet organization operating under Japanese pressure.1/

The Chinese government, working in close cooperation with the Chinese Muslim National Salvation Federation, has also acted vigorously to bring its side of the Sino-Japanese War to the attention of Muslim countries. Since 1938 it has sent no less than four official missions to various parts of the Islamic world, as follows:

(1) Near East Mission. In January 1938 a group of five Chinese Muslims sailed from Hongkong for the Near East. Their leader was Wang Tseng-shan, graduate of Istanbul University, and member of the Legislative Yuan in the Chinese government. Their itinerary runs as follows: February 1938: Arrived in Mecca for annual Hajj conference. Were received by King Ibn Saud and had excellent chance to present China's cause to their co-religionists.2/ 12 March: Arrived Cairo, after one month's stay in Arabia. There made contacts with such groups as the Muslim Young Men's Association, Egyptian Women's Association, and Muslim Brethren Association. Held mass meetings at which urged boycott of Japanese goods. Organized, in conjunction with members of al-Azhar University, a Sino-Egyptian Cultural Association in Cairo, (A parallel association in China is planned after the war.) 15 May: Left Egypt for Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and India. 2 July: Arrived Bombay, where they interviewed both M.A. Jinnah, president of the Indian

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1/ Yang Ching-chih, in the Ta Kung Pao of 14 March 1942.

2/ It was on this occasion that they heard from Sinkiang Muslims settled at Mecca the tales inspired by Japanese "pilgrims" to the effect that an independent state was being organized by Muslims in Northwest China. See above, Part V, Section A.

Muslim League, and members of the Indian National Congress. As a result, an Indian China aid committee was formed; at a special China Day held 7 July 1938, 20,000 rupees were raised; and a decision was reached (later carried into effect) to send five Indian doctors to China under auspices of the Indian National Congress and the Red Cross to do war relief work. On the same day, a separate mass meeting, attended by over 7,000, was held by the Muslim League. From Bombay, the Chinese delegation then toured Lahore, Lucknow, Patna, and Calcutta. 11 October: Sailed from Bombay for Turkey, arriving Ankara 26 October. There they were received by the Turkish foreign minister. 10 November: Left Turkey for China, arriving Chungking late in January 1939.1/

(2) Burma Mission: Sha Kuo-chen, after his return to China from Egypt in 1939, was sent to tour Burma with four other Muslims. He traveled more than 6,000 miles, attending 196 meetings at seventy-five major Borman centers. At Rangoon a big reception was held, presided over by the mayor of Rangoon, and attended by both Muslim and Brahan organizations. During his tour, Sha stressed that he represented not only Chinese Muslims, but all other classes of Chinese as well. Hence he not only visited Burmese mosques, but also Buddhist temples. His tour led to a great increase in war relief funds sent to China from Burma.2/

(3) Malaya Mission: A South Asia Goodwill Delegation, made up of Ma T'ien-ying and two other Muslims, was sent under the auspices of the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation to Malaya, where it arrived at Singapore 10 December 1939. There the group was entertained by the All Malaya Muslim Missionary Society at a reception attended by 2,000 persons. The visit resulted in the formation of a committee on medical aid to China

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1/ For this whole mission, see China at War 2 (March 1939), pp. 21-25.

2/ China at War 7 (September 1941), pp. 52-54.

composed of fifteen Singapore Muslims, and in the raising of considerable amounts of money for China. The Chinese delegation also traveled to Penang and other places in Malaya. The exact date of its return to China is not given in the sources available.[1/]

(4) Mission of Wu Chien-hsün: At its annual general conference of 29-31 March 1942, the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation decided to send Wu Chien-hsün (also commonly known as Osman K. H. Woo) on a tour to India and other countries.[2/] Wu, who is a close friend of General Pai Ch'ung-hsi and who had been one of the three members of the Malaya goodwill mission, flew from Chungking to Calcutta in April 1942. Thereafter he visited twenty-five Indian cities, including such centers as Bombay, Delhi, Lahore, Allahabad, and Rawalpindi. Leaving India about the middle of October, he traveled through Afghanistan and Iran, where he was received by the kings of those two countries, to whom he presented personal letters and presents from Pai Ch'ung-hsi. On 26 December he left Teheran for Baghdad, where he stayed for some weeks as a guest of the Iraqi government.[3/] The Budapest Axis newspaper, Pester Lloyd, in its issue of 1 April 1943, accuses Wu of having propagandized the Muslim youth of Iraq so successfully as to have contributed to that country's declaration of war on the Axis on 16 January 1943. (Iraq has been the first Muslim country to do this.) The newspaper further asserted that in Cairo, Wu would strive to accomplish similar results. His efforts toward this end, it claimed, are supported both by British diplomacy and American money. After leaving Egypt, Wu's itinerary was to include Turkey, Syria and Palestine.

1/ China at War 4 (1940), pp. 48-49, 52-53, 27.

2/ John Kin, "Chinese Muslims View Pakistan," Asia, March 1943, p. 156.

3/ See the Baghdad Iraq Times of 6 January 1943; the Chungking National Herald of 25 February 1943; [redacted]

4/ National Herald, op. cit.

By means of these four missions, as well as through pronouncements made in China itself, the Chinese Muslims have done much to gain favorable hearings for China in the Islamic world. Thus appeals by Chinese Muslims for Islamic support against Japan, as well as general articles favorable to China, have appeared in a number of newspapers both in the Near East and in India.1/ The Chinese Muslim stand on the Muslim question in India is especially interesting. Consequent upon the appeal made 27 September 1942 by fifty-five prominent Americans, urging President Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek to intervene in the deadlock between the Indians and the British government, the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation held a meeting to discuss the situation. As a result of this meeting, a letter, signed by Pai Ch'ung-hsi, president of the Federation, was sent to M.A. Jinnah, head of the Indian Muslim League, appealing for cooperation between the League and the Indian National Congress. Although the letter did not explicitly criticize Jinnah's demand for Pakistan, Chinese disapproval of that idea could easily be read between the lines.2/

1/ Herewith are a few examples: On 7 August 1937 the Anatolia News Agency carried a report of an appeal for help to China against Japan, issued in Turkish, Arabic and Persian by a group of Chinese Muslims in Nanking. Cf. Oriente Moderno 17 (1937), p.440. In 1938 the Chinese mission to the Near East issued a seventeen page pamphlet in Arabic in Egypt, stressing the unity of all Muslims in China against Japanese aggression. It also issued a message apropos of the dedication of the mosque in Tokyo on 12 May 1938, in which it warned all Muslims to beware of Japanese intentions, pointing out that the Japanese are Buddhists and know nothing of the true principles of Islam. Cf. op.cit., pp.277-80. On 18 April 1939 the Cairo Arabic newspaper, La Tribuné d'Orient, published a manifesto by Chiang Kai-shek against Japan, together with Chiang's portrait. Likewise the Cairo Minbar ash-Sharq of 25 April, 2 May, and 9 May, 1939, issued three Chinese appeals for aid against Japan, one signed by Pai Ch'ung-hsi, the others by prominent non-Muslim Chinese government officials. Cf. op.cit., 19 (1939), pp. 272, 310. In India the Lucknow Muslim Review of July-September 1941 (vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 17-23) published a "Call to World Muslims from China," urging an Indian boycott of Japanese goods.

2/ John Kin, "Chinese Muslims View Pakistan," Asia, March 1943, pp. 155-6.

The Chinese government, for its part, took active steps during 1942 to forge diplomatic ties with various Near Eastern countries. Prior to that year Turkey was the only Muslim country of the Near East with which China enjoyed diplomatic relations of ministerial status, though a Chinese consulate was maintained at Cairo and also at Jidda in Arabia. Early in March 1942, however, China concluded a treaty of amity with Iraq, which provided for the exchange of ministers and consuls between the two countries, and the development of improved commercial relations.[1] This treaty was described in the press of the time as "part of a Chinese attempt to unite nations extending from China into the Middle East -- containing half the population of the world -- in the support of the United Nations war effort."[2] A similar treaty with Iran was concluded in the same year[3] and on 5 May 1942 Li Tieh-tseng, senior secretary in the Chungking Foreign Office, was appointed China's first Minister to Iran.[4]

In February 1944 China announced the opening of the first consulate in Iran, "at Meched, a Mohammedan holy city as well as a trading center in Central Asia."[5]

Meanwhile on 25 April 1942 it was reported that China had reached an agreement with Egypt for the exchange of ministers.[6]

When in March 1944 the treaty of amity between China and Afghanistan was signed, the press commented: "Competent

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1/ United Press dispatch from Chungking in the New York Times of 8 March 1942. For text of the treaty, see China at War, 8 (June 1942), p. 23.

2/ United Press dispatch from Ankara in the New York Times of 24 February 1942.

3/ The Chinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook, 1937-43 (New York 1943), p. 172.

4/ China at War, 9 (July 1942), p. 64.

5/ China at War, vol. 12, (March 1944), pp. 75-76.

6/ Reuter dispatch from Chungking in the New York Times of 26 April 1942.

observers said the treaty would result in closer relations between Afghanistan, strategically situated between India, Iran, and Russian Turkestan, and the Allies. It was pointed out that Japan maintains large diplomatic and consular staffs in Afghanistan to gather intelligence."1/

It is evident that the Chinese are fully aware of Japan's activities and intentions in the Islamic countries, and are taking active measures to win these countries over to their own side. The Chinese Muslim writer Yang Ching-chih, in 1940 urged the adoption by China of the following six-point program, as a means of countering Japan's Islamic activities: (1) Strengthening of ties with Islamic countries through the creation of Sino-Islamic cultural societies and the sending of good will visitors to the Near East. (2) Increased Chinese diplomatic representation in the Near East. (3) Encouragement to Muslim countries to send official missions to China. (4) Encouragement to youths of Islamic countries to come to China to study, in order to acquire there anti-imperialist techniques. (5) The exchange of professors and students between China and the Islamic countries, and publication of Chinese periodicals devoted to Sino-Islamic affairs. (6) Stimulation of Chinese interest in the Islamic world through promotion in China of exhibitions devoted to products from the Muslim countries.2/

These proposals represent what many Chinese Muslims would like the Chinese government to do, rather than what the government itself is necessarily immediately contemplating. It is well to remember in this connection that what the government can at present carry out in Islamic affairs is severely circumscribed by financial stringency and the need to pay

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1/ United Press dispatch from Chungking in the New York Times of 5 March 1944.

2/ Yang Ching-chih, "Japan's International Islamic Conspiracy," in the Ta Kung Pao of 11 November 1940.

attention to other more pressing considerations first -- so much so that, as described above some Chinese Muslims have even expressed a certain degree of dissatisfaction, despite the extent of what has already been accomplished. Nevertheless, it is evident that a beginning has been made toward the achievement of at least some of Yang's proposals, and that others may conceivably be carried into effect when more favorable opportunity permits.

Taken in themselves, these proposals may appear to bear a somewhat disturbing resemblance to Japan's own Islamic program. Yet it would be unwise on this account to conclude that China has any thought of dominating the Muslim countries, either politically or economically, a la japonaise. China's own internal political and economic problems, and her lack of industrialization, will make such a plan unthinkable for many years to come -- this, quite aside from the oft repeated pronouncements by Chinese leaders on the subject of imperialism, and such intangibles as Chinese common sense and the ability to learn from personal experience about the nature of alien domination. What China would at the moment undoubtedly like, however, is to swing the Muslim countries to the Allied side; but more than this, she very probably is looking forward to a post-war era, when the moral and voluntary support of these countries will give her powerful reinforcement in her demands for equality when dealing with the Western powers.

APPENDIX A.

JAPANESE ISLAMIC ACTIVITIES IN CHINA PRIOR TO 1937

A. Japanese Support of Revolution and Islam in China

In 1906 the Japanese first initiated a great wave of Muslim propaganda, consciously directed toward the entire Islamic world. This propaganda wave, though short-lived, has been followed by several similar waves, and assumes great significance when it is remembered that it came immediately after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Through that war Japan for the first time was raised to the status of a world power, and became a potential leader of the peoples of Asia in their struggle for equality against the whites.

Since 1905, Japan's continuing continental expansion has been marked both by a steadily increasing interest in the Islamic world in general, and a sharpening awareness of the importance of the Muslims of China in particular. The years 1904 and 1905 were important ones for Sun Yat-sen and the other Chinese revolutionaries plotting against the Manchu dynasty. In October of 1904, Huang Hsing, Sun Yat-sen's trusted military leader, plotted a coup d'état in Hunan. The conspiracy, however, was revealed, and Huang saved his life only by fleeing to Japan. There, in July 1905, he, Sun Yat-sen, and over one hundred other Chinese revolutionary leaders, met to create the famous T'ung Meng Hui, a union group under Sun Yat-sen's leadership organized through the merging of all former secret anti-dynastic societies.

Japan, in line with its policy of supporting subversive groups in China, considerably aided the Chinese revolutionaries during these years, although it later turned against them when they had come into power. The aid it offered was of a clandestine nature, and was engineered chiefly by such "patriotic" groups as the Black Dragon Society. It is notable, for example, that the meetings which led to the creation of the T'ung Meng Hui actually took place in the headquarters of the Black Dragon Society in Tokyo.

Japanese interest in Chinese revolution, and Japanese interest in Chinese Islam, are found merged in the figure of Fukuda Kikuo. This man, of uncertain but probably mixed Chinese-Japanese parentage, was born at Sasebo, in Nagasaki prefecture. In 1904, he went to China for the first time, where for a while he visited a Colonel Aoki in Peiping. In the summer of 1904 he went to Shanghai, there joining the Eastern Light Society (Japanese: To Ko Kai; Chinese: Tung Kuang Hui). This society, headed by two Japanese named Shinoda Munehira and Kikuchi Enzo, had originated in Kiangsu and Chekiang, but speedily expanded until it possessed branches in Anhwei, Kiangsi, Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, Shensi, and Chihli (Hopei). Its ostensible business was to sell Japanese medical supplies; its actual purpose was to "investigate conditions in China." It seems not unlikely, furthermore, that it may have had connections with the Chinese revolutionary groups.

Its very name, in fact, suggests that of the Society of Returning Light (Kuang Fu Hui), a Chinese anti-Manchu group which was active at this time in Chekiang and Kiangsu.1/

Following a brief stay in Shanghai, Fukuda decided to join the cause of "the promotion of Islam" in China, and departed for the interior on a trip that took him to Changsha (in Hunan), and then to Yunnan, where he studied Muslim communities. During this trip he also "held conversations" with Huang Hsing. Although the nature of these conversations is not known, it would seem that they must have been connected with Huang's abortive attempt at revolution in October 1904. At any rate, they were such that the Japanese consul at Changsha was compelled to have Fukuda arrested. After two months of incarceration, Fukuda was released owing to the good offices of his friend, Colonel Aoki.

Following this incident, Fukuda continued to travel extensively through North China and Manchuria. During these travels he lived and dressed like a Chinese, assumed a Chinese pseudonym, Cheng Ch'ao-tsung, and lived constantly with Chinese, always placing special emphasis in his studies upon Muslim problems. The fact that he was himself perhaps of mixed Chinese-Japanese parentage no doubt made it easy for him to undergo this transformation.

In 1909 Fukuda settled in Chou-chia-k'ou, a town of eastern Honan, where he established a school for Muslims called the Tung-fang Hsüeh-t'ang (Hall of Eastern Learning). He himself became a Muslim at this time, and on behalf of "the twenty-five million Muslims of China" became a pioneer in the "Li Ming Movement". About this movement nothing is known, save that the words li and ming respectively mean "black" and "to brighten," thus forming a classical Chinese phrase meaning "daybreak." The Li Ming or "Break of Day" movement would therefore seem to have had something to do with the "dawning of a new day" for the Chinese Muslims. At the same time Fukuda wrote a book in Chinese which he called Wo Wei Wo (I Am I), and which gave "clear expression to the sense of spiritual awakening of the Muslims." This book, because it was written during the troubled years at the end of the Manchu dynasty, could not be freely circulated and therefore did not exert a wide influence upon Chinese Muslims. Later it passed into the hands of Tuan Ch'i-jui (Chinese premier in 1916 under Yuan Shih-k'ai), via Tuan's Japanese adviser, Otani Isamu; but with Tuan's downfall after a few months in office, the book fell into oblivion.

1/ For this and the following information about Fukuda, see his biography in the Toa Senkaku Shishi Kiden (Biographies of Pioneer Patriots in East Asia) (Tokyo, 1936), vol. 3, pp. 533-35. This work (hereafter referred to as Toa Senkaku) was published by the Black Dragon Society, and gives remarkably frank accounts of Japanese who have been active in various "patriotic" Japanese activities. Unfortunately, it is restricted in its subject matter only to those Japanese "patriots" who were dead at the time of its publication in 1936.

While Fukuda was thus engaged in "educational" activities among the Muslims, he maintained his contacts with Sun Yat-sen, Huang Hsing, and the Chinese revolutionary societies which existed along the Yangtze River. As time passed, however, he seems to have become increasingly disillusioned with the possibilities of Japanese utilization of the Chinese revolutionary movement. More and more he concentrated his energies upon the Muslims. In the spring of 1912, soon after the establishment of the Chinese Republic, he broke with the revolutionists entirely and left China for the South Seas, intending there to raise funds for the Muslim movement. After that, his fate becomes unclear, and he has no doubt long since died.

B. The "Five Men of the Yangtze"

This was a group of Japanese who were active in Central China during the years immediately preceding the Chinese Revolution. Their work consisted in the "promoting of concord between China and Japan." Actually, it seems at least in part to have been connected with the fostering of the Chinese revolutionary movement. The "five men of the Yangtze" were Sato Tomoyasu, Mizuno Sobai, Oka Koshichiro, Nakakuki Shinshu, and Miyata Shinichi. Only the last two named seem to have been interested in matters concerning the Chinese Muslims:

Nakakuki Shinshu:[1] Born 1876; went to China at sixteen where he became a newspaperman. He went to Hankow in 1906 as a correspondent, and in 1910 established the Yangtze River News Agency. "At this time he was commissioned by the Foreign Office to study the conditions of the Muslims in Honan." At the time of the Chinese Revolution he gave aid to Li Yuan-hung, later president of China, but the formulation of the notorious Twenty-one Demands by Japan in 1915 led to an anti-Japanese movement in China which forced him to return to Japan. He died on 29 December 1915. Toyama Mitsuru (patron of the Black Dragon Society, on whom see below, Section D) was among his mourners.

Miyata Shinichi:[2] Born 1875; graduated from the Tokyo Merchant Marine College in 1898. In 1906 he entered the service of the Nisshin Kisen Kaisha (Japanese-Chinese Steamship Co.) as captain of a river boat on the Yangtze. He was active during the Chinese Revolution. During this time, when Toyama Mitsuru and Inukai Tsuyoki (Japanese premier in 1931 to 1932) once traveled on his boat from Shanghai to Hankow, he greatly profited from his many conversations with these men. In 1913 he established a private business, the Kaiyo Sha (Marine Company) in Shanghai, where he remained until his death in 1929. There, about 1923-25, he became connected with the Chinese Muslims through the agency of the Society of Light, as will be described below under Section F.

C. Establishment of a Chinese Muslim Periodical in Tokyo

In 1908, a group of about thirty Chinese Muslim students in Tokyo, who called themselves the "Society of Muslim Students in Japan" (Liu-tung Ch'ing-chen Chiao-yü Hui), began a quarterly Chinese publication known as the Hsing Hui Pien or Muslims Awake.

1/ Toa Senkaku, pp. 355-57.

2/ Ibid., pp. 679-81.

This magazine was not for sale, but was intended to be freely distributed among the Muslims of China.1/

The magazine apparently had but an ephemeral existence, and as there were no copies available for consultation in the preparation of this report, it is difficult to know whether it had any political purpose or Japanese backing. The Chinese table of contents of the first number, as reproduced by Broomhall, seems to show that the magazine was concerned primarily with the cultural aspects of Islam. It contains one article, however, entitled "Islam and Bushido," which might provide an ideological clue were the magazine now available. In any case, the fact that this periodical was appearing in Japan in 1908, five years before the appearance in 1913 of the first Chinese Muslim periodical in China itself, certainly gives support to the belief that there must have been Japanese support and inspiration behind it. So, too, does the fact that it was to be distributed free of charge among Muslims in China. A group of thirty Chinese Muslim students in Tokyo would hardly have had the means or inclination for raising money for such a venture.

D. The Japanese Muslim Pact of 1909.

At a date which cannot be precisely determined, but which was probably 1909, the growing interest of the Black Dragon Society in Islam was given concrete expression when prominent members of the society drew up and signed a solemn Japanese-Muslim pact. This pact, written partially in Japanese, partially in Arabic, reads as follows:2/

Arabic text: "In the name of Allah, the Best of ... [one word illegible]. I take refuge in Allah from the accursed Satan. Be ye, servants of Allah, brothers."

Japanese text: "If we have the slightest difference of mind (one from another), may we receive the august punishment of the Spirit [or Spirits] of Heaven and Earth."

Arabic text: "Keep the covenant, for the covenant is with Allah, may he be exalted."

The man who wrote the Arabic portion of this covenant, and who was probably responsible for its creation, was a Siberian Muslim of Turkic blood whose full name is Abdur Rashid (Abder-Rashid) Ibrahim, but who is generally known simply as Ibrahim. Long before 1909 Ibrahim had been famed as a leader of the Muslims in Russia, where he held a post as adviser for Muslim affairs to the Ministry of Religion. As early as 1901 he seems to have made secret contacts with

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1/ Marshall Broomhall, Islam in China, pp. 283, 295.

2/ A photograph of the pact is to be found among the illustrations at the front of Wakabayashi, The Muslim World and Japan.

3/

with Japanese "patriots," leading to subversive movements among Muslims in Russia of such a nature that he was eventually forced to flee the country for Japan. There he was welcomed, apparently in December 1908, by members of the Black Dragon Society. In the summer of 1909 he seems to have left Japan, and he later succeeded in returning to Russia, where he remained until the Russian Revolution. He then fled again, this time to Turkey, which he in turn left upon the outbreak of the Turkish revolution. In 1933 he reappeared in Japan, and has since remained there, though in 1938 he was described as being in his nineties.1/

In addition to the signature of Ibrahim himself, those of eight Japanese, some of them very prominent "patriots," are attached to the pact as follows:

(1) Toyama Mitsuru (born 1855; still living); Chief patron of the Black Dragon Society since its very inception (though never its formal head), and undoubtedly still the most powerful single secret society figure in Japan. For decades his name has been associated with the concept of "Greater Asianism" and he was given support to Japanese "patriotic" activities affecting many Asiatic countries. In Japan itself he has undoubtedly been responsible for many political assassinations.

(2) Inukai Tsuyoki (1855-1932): One of the closest associates of Toyama, and like him, an ardent proponent of "Greater Asianism." He has long taken a special interest in Muslim affairs.2/ His term as Premier of Japan, which began December 1931, was ended by assassination in May of the following year.

(3) Nakano Tsunetaro (1866-1928): The man who actually wrote the Japanese text of the pact. He was long a worker in Manchuria; was formerly associated with the Asiatic Justice Society (Ajiya Gi-kai), a group formed about 1909 for the promotion of relations with Muslims and Hindus; and has cherished hopes for an eventual unification of all Asia.3/

(4) Aoyagi Katsutoshi (1879-1934): Army captain, and like the preceding he is described by Toa Senkaku, as being filled with a desire to bring about an awakening of all Asiatic peoples, having worked for the Manchurian and Mongolian independence movements.4/

1/ Concerning Ibrahim, see Wakabayashi, op. cit., pp. 8-10. His chronology is variously reported in different sources, and it is possible that he may already have visited Japan before 1908. The dates here given are taken from Washio Yoshinao, Inukai Bokudo Den (Biography of Inukai Tsuyoki) (Tokyo, 1939), vol. 2, pp. 802-3. More information on Ibrahim will be found in the report parallel to this one dealing with Japanese Muslim activities in the USSR.

2/ A whole section devoted to this subject is to be found in his biography by Washio Yoshinao (see Bibliography), vol. 2, pp. 802-11.

3/ Toa Senkaku, vol. 3, pp. 351-52.

4/ Ibid., pp. 796-97.

(5) Ohara Bukei (1865-1933): Lieutenant Colonel in the army; active in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95; then served in Formosa, in the Chinese Revolution, and in Manchuria. He died in Tsingtao in 1933, where he had gone one or two years earlier to organize a Chinese rebellion.1/

(6) Kawano Hironaka (1849-1923): Long a member, and then president, of the Diet. As a fiery patriot he was more than once imprisoned for his activities.2/

(7) Yamada Kinosuke (1859-1913): A well known jurist and member of the Diet. He was among those arrested in September 1905, when a mass meeting was held at Hibaya Park, Tokyo, to protest the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty with Russia -- a treaty which to many Japanese seemed too lenient.3/

(8) Nakayama Yasuzo: Not otherwise identified.

Although the above list of Japanese "patriots" who signed the Muslim pact is a distinguished one, the pact should be considered more as a friendly gesture offered to Muslims by the Black Dragon Society in token of its growing interest in Islam, than as the inauguration of a radically new policy.

E. The Black Dragon Society Sends Forth Its Minions

The signing of the Muslim pact was speedily succeeded by renewed evidences of Black Dragon Society interest in Islam. In the three years following 1909 at least five picked men were sent by the society on extensive tours of "investigation," which led not only to China, but in one case across much of Asia as far as the Near East:

(1) Kawamura Kyodo: The first traveler4/ is Kawamura Kyodo, who departed from Japan for Dairen to study conditions of Islam in China. From that port, his "studies" took him over the following itinerary: via Manchuria to Peiping, where he became a Muslim; then through Mongolia and the Ordos region to Sinkiang, as far as the Tarim Basin; from Sinkiang back to Tsinghai, where he spent three months in the Muslim sacred center of Lin-hsia (Ho-chou); then via Lanchow to Sian, and from Sian southward to Changtu; from Chengtu to Yunnan and then back again to Chungking; from Chungking down the Yangtze to Kiangsu; then to Chekiang, Fukien, and Kwangtung, where he finally ended his tour at Canton.

1/ Toa Senkaku, vol. 3, pp. 140-41.

2/ Ibid., pp. 220-21.

3/ Ibid., pp. 459-60,

4/ Yang, op. cit.

During Kawamura's sojourn in North China, his underground political activities were such as to result in his expulsion from that area by Ma Fu-hsiang, well known Chinese Muslim military leader who was then Lieutenant-General of the Chinese army in Suiyuan.1/ This event can probably be dated during the years 1921 or 1922. Even since 1937 there is evidence (See below Section I) to show that Kawamura was then still active in Chinese Muslim affairs, and it is probable that he continues to play an important part today.

(2) Sakuma Teijiro: Sakuma, who apparently left Japan shortly after Kawamura, traveled through Manchuria to Outer Mongolia, and then via the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Sinkiang. There he spent some time studying the Kazaks, Tatars, Tungans and other Muslim groups, finally moving again westward as far as Turkey.2/ From Turkey he went to India, where he stayed for three years. He finally returned to Tokyo in 1930.3/ Before his latter event, however, he spent at least three very important years in Shanghai, from 1923 to 1925 (See Section F below).

(3) Nami Hidenari: Nami's areas of investigation included the northwestern and northeastern provinces of China, where he operated under the Chinese pseudonym of Ma Ch'eng-lung. His special aim is said to have been the creation of an autonomous Muslim state (an aim which has reappeared frequently in Japanese statements during the past five years). In Mukden he formed a branch of the Black Dragon Society, but his mission, for some unexplained reason, seems to have come to nothing.4/

(4) Wakabayashi Kyuman: Wakabayashi Kyuman (born 1891) was a graduate of the Military Staff College in Tokyo, and a younger brother of the more famous Wakabayashi Nakabe, author of The Muslim World and Japan. The latter, who in his book acknowledges both Toyama Mitsuru and Uchida Ryohei (formal head of the Black Dragon Society until his death in 1938) as his "superiors," seems himself to have played a considerable part in the formulation of Japanese policy toward the Muslim world as a whole. In 1914, he sent his brother, Kyuman, to China. There Kyuman worked for a certain Yamamoto Yukichi, who operated a variety shop in Changsha. Kyuman's duties were to peddle Yamamoto's goods throughout Hunan, Hupeh, Szechwan, and Yunnan. He thus had excellent opportunity to perform the task for which he had been sent to China: namely, to study the Muslims and forge bonds of friendship with them. In 1921 he took over management of a branch of Yamamoto's firm in Ch'ang-te, an important town west of Tung-t'ing Lake in

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1/ See Yang Ching-chih's earlier article, "Japan's International Islamic Conspiracy," in the Ta Kung Pao of 9-11 November 1940. Ma Fu-hsing, born 1876 in Kansu, was the father of Ma Hung-k'uei, present governor of Ningsia.

2/ Yang Ching-chih, in Ta Kung Pao of 9 March 1942.

3/ Ibid., 9-11 November 1940.

4/ Ibid., 9 March 1942.

Honan. This was a period of strong anti-Japanese feeling in this part of China. Nevertheless, Kyuman had by now succeeded in gaining considerable trust among Chinese Muslims. On 14 April 1923, however, he died of dysentery in Changsha.1/

(5) Tanaka Ippei:2/ Wakabayashi Nakabe's closest associate in stimulating Japan's Islamic program seems to have been Tanaka Ippei. Born in Tokyo in 1882, he specialized in Chinese during his school years, and went to North China immediately after his graduation in 1902. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) he served as combined translator and spy in North China and Manchuria. During his stay in China he became a specialist on Confucianism, and is said to have climbed the sacred mountain of T'ai Shan, near the birthplace of Confucius in Shantung, no less than ten times. He is also admiringly described by Wakabayashi as "a deep scholar of both Shinto and Buddhism" who labored his entire life for "the administration of East Asia" and who was "a noble soldier of our glorious empire."

Tanaka's life is typical of the intellectual versatility of Japanese of his stamp. In 1917 Wakabayashi Nakabe, having sent his brother to Changsha three years before, went himself to Tsingtao on the behest of his superiors, Toyama Mitsuru and Uchida Ryohei. There he had long talks with Tanaka on the importance of Islam in any program for pan-Asiatic expansion, and was delighted to find an eager listener. In the same year, according to Wakabayashi, Tanaka himself became a Muslim. If so, however, this was merely a provisional confirmation, for it was only in 1923 that Tanaka entered a mosque in Tsinan, Shantung, for study, and not until the next year that he was formally admitted to the faith by the Mullah Ts'ao Feng-lin.

Following this event, Tanaka visited his co-religionists in Peiping, Tientsin, and Kalgan. In May 1924, he joined a group of Chinese Muslim pilgrims who were bound for Mecca, and thus became the second Japanese ever to have reached that sacred city. On his return in 1925, he visited the Muslims of Manchuria, and then began to teach in the Dai to Bunka Gakuin (Academy of Great Eastern Learning).

After this year, Tanaka fades from the China picture. He wrote several tracts concerning Islam, however, including a book, Fui-kyo to Dai Ajiya Shui (Islam and Great Asianism) and an article, "Islam in China and the movement for Amalgamation of the Five Religions,"3/ In 1933, having fallen a victim to cancer of the stomach, he determined to see Mecca once more before he died. With the support of his old friend, Wakabayashi Nakabe, he left in November of that year for the Near East, this time accompanied by several other Japanese. At Mecca on 27 March 1934, he received the signal honor of a personal interview with King Ibn Saud (ibn-Sa'ud) himself. Then he returned to Japan, where he

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1/ Most of the above facts are taken from Wakabayashi Kyuman's biography in Toa Senkaku, vol. 3, p. 777.

2/ The information here given is derived from Tanaka's biography in Toa Senkaku, vol. 3, pp. 261-4, supplemented by Wakabayashi, Muslim World and Japan, pp. 2-7.

3/ Published in Nikka Gahuho, 19 (1931), pp. 19-32.

died on 15 September of the same year. His funeral was held according to Islamic rites, and its chief officiator was that same Ibrahim who in 1909 had instigated the signing of the Muslim pact by Toyama Mitsuru and other notables in Japanese secret societies.

F. The Society of Light in Shanghai, 1923-25

Heretofore Japanese activities among Muslims in China seem to have been largely confined to making "investigations" and "contacts". About the year 1923, however, the first important Japanese-sponsored Islamic organization was created in Shanghai. It was specifically designed to arouse Chinese Muslims from their age-old lethargy and to unite them in a great pan-Islamic movement. It was known as the Society of Light (in Japanese: Kisha; in Chinese, Kuang She).1/

The founder of this organization was that same Sakuma Teijiro who at some period after 1909 had been sent out by the Black Dragon Society to study Islam in China, Sinkiang, and the Near East. Sakuma had been deeply impressed on his travels by the possibilities of the pan-Islamic movement. He had arrived in Shanghai strongly convinced that the political and economic status of Muslims in China could be improved only if they were given educational and cultural opportunities. The Light Society was founded for this purpose and was ultimately to be enlarged until it had branches in all major cities of China. It was to be operated very much along the lines of the YMCA, and in conjunction with it were planned libraries, schools, printing presses, and hospitals, all serving as means for social intercourse and education for Chinese Muslims.

To establish the Light Society, Sakuma succeeded in obtaining support from the following persons: (1) Matsuoka Yosuke (born 1880), a diplomat and ardent chauvinist, most of whose life has been spent in Manchuria. He was president of the South Manchuria Railway from 1935 until his retirement in 1939, and became Japanese foreign minister in 1941. He is best known in the West, however, for his farewell speech delivered at Geneva when Japan resigned from the League of Nations in 1932. Besides his support of the Light Society he has since been known in other ways in the Muslim world as a friend of Islam, who on at least one occasion has given money for the building of mosques in Mukden and Dairen.2/ (2) Miyata Shinichi, one of those "five men of the Yangtze". who are described above under Section B, and in 1923 was operating his Marine Company in Shanghai, (3) Qurban Ali (also known as Kurbangali, or, in Russian writings, as Kurbangaliev), a Russian Turk who fled after the Russian Revolution to Japan, where he did much to organize the Muslim

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1/ Most of our information on this society is derived from a fifty-four page pamphlet written in Japanese by Sakuma himself, and entitled Shina Fui-kyoto no Kakyo oyobi Genzai to Kosha no Zenshin Undo (Chinese Muslims, Past and Present, and the Forward Movement of the Light Society). Sections 13, 17-18, 22, and 26-27, together with the preface, describe the aims of the Light Society, which apparently had been founded only shortly before the appearance of the pamphlet, the preface to which is dated 25 August 1923.

2/ On this point, see the Oriente Moderno, March 1936, p. 117.

movement. He plays an important part in the history of Japanese-Islamic relations in the USSR and is described at length in the report dealing with that subject. (4) Yamaoka Kotaro, referred to by Sakuma as "my Muslim colleague," and the first Japanese ever to have visited Mecca, in 1909. (5) Matsuoka Shinichiro of the Foreign Office; a medical doctor, (6) Hayami, of Shanghai; (7) a certain "head of investigation," Sada; and (8) a Chinese, Chang Tzu-wen.

Sakuma's Light Society was more than an organ for true believers of the faith alone. In conjunction with it he states that a club was being formed at Shanghai to which all persons, unbelievers as well as believers, were welcome as long as they showed sympathy for Islam. This club was to be centered around Ma Liang, future puppet governor of Shantung under Japanese occupation after 1937 (see above, Part IV, Section E); Ma T'ung, who was Commercial Attache in the Bureau for Foreign Affairs for Kiangsu; and Ha Shao-fu, otherwise unknown.

Most remarkable in Sakuma's program, however, was the part to be played in it by Japan. He argued that since Japan had failed in her attempt to "Japanize" Korea and Formosa, it was useless to expect that the religions indigenous to Japan could be readily propagated in China. Therefore, China should bring Islam to Japan! This was to be one of the most important functions of the Light Society. "The Light Society wishes to evangelize Japan, and is putting all its weight behind the movement to construct an actual mosque in Japan." Chinese Muslim students, too, should be sent by the Society to Japan to hasten the spread of the faith.

Sakuma envisaged many benefits resulting from such a program. It would strengthen the bonds of friendship and trade between the two countries. The integration of Japan into a great pan-Islamic movement, moreover, would enable her to check German and Russian penetration into the Islamic world; would prevent the entry of Communism into Japan proper and would permit Japan herself to extend her economic contacts far beyond China to Central Asia, Russia, and even as far as the countries of the Near East.

It may thus be seen that Sakuma's program was one which looked toward the organization of Muslims in China as only the first step in the creation of a great pan-Islamic union in which Japan would form the keystone. As an organ for this program, he founded a bilingual English-Chinese periodical known as the Asiatic Weekly (Ta-ya Chou-pao). In 1925 this periodical seems to have been followed by or changed into the Light of Islam (Mu-kuang Pan-yüeh-k'an). This magazine, which was illustrated, contained articles in Chinese, Japanese, and English. It is described as "a progressive journal of which at least three numbers were issued."1/ The name of its editor is given as "I.T. Sakuma," which is the way Sakuma Teijiro seems to have been known in English speaking circles. Sakuma wrote articles in his magazine under the Chinese pen name of Tso Tung-shan, in which he attacked the Chinese government and tried to incite the Muslims of China to seize political power. These writings aroused strong opposition from Shanghai Muslims.2/

1/ Löwenthal, Religious Periodical Press in China, p. 240.

2/ Yang, in the Ta Kung Pao of 9 March 1942.

Whether this opposition had a damaging effect upon the Society of Light is not known, but its peridocal seems to have stopped publication after 1925, and the society itself apparently disintegrated. By 1930 Sakuma had returned to Tokyo. In 1935 the following small notice appeared in an Indian Islamic periodical: "Mr. I. T. Sakuma of Tokyo has published in the Japanese language a book on 'The History of Islam in Japan' and has formed the 'Culture Association of Japan.' Mr. Sakuma for many years past has done good service to Islam in China and Japan."1/

G. A Japanese Islamic Publication in Peiping, 1927-29.

On 15 May 1927, the Society for the Investigation of Islam (Hui-chiao Yen-chiu Hui) began publication in Peiping of a Japanese-language monthly, called Islam (Fui-kyo). The last known issue of this journal is dated December 1929 (vol. 2, no. 8). "This journal of some 40 pages was well printed and used comparatively high-grade paper. The contents covered the various sociological phases of Islam in China. Each issue contained also a news column and a biographical section. In the latter, the life of historical and living Moslem leaders was recounted."2/

Unfortunately, as no copies of this journal are available in the United States, nothing is known as to the personnel of its supporting organization, which is described as follows:

> "The purpose of the Hui Chiao Yen Chiu Hui was to study Mohammedah problems in China, as Moslem influence is considered to be very high. This society had its seat in Peiping, but also accepted members from other cities. Everybody interested in the aims of the society was asked to join. The monthly fee amounted to 50 cents which included the subscription rate for the periodical and for occasional pamphlets. It also entitled the members to attend lectures which were held in the scope of the society. Naturally the use of the Japanese language to a great extent limited the circle of readers, because only few people are able to read and speak the language."3/

H. Riots in Tientsin and an Imperial Kidnapping, 1931.

Japanese interest in Chinese Islam took a much more sinister turn after 1931. The "Mukden Incident" of 18 September 1931, and the subsequent creation of the puppet state of "Manchukuo," for the first time placed considerable numbers of Chinese Muslims under direct Japanese rule. At the same time it exposed even larger numbers of Muslims living in North China proper to increasing Japanese political and military pressure.

1/ Islam (English fortnightly of Lahore), 22 December 1935, p. 5. In the preparation of this report it has not been possible to consult either this book or a number of articles written by Sakuma during the 1930's, one of which -- dealing with Islam in China and Sinkiang -- appeared as late as 1938.

2/ Löwenthal, op. cit., p. 239.

3/ Ibid.

On the night of 8 November 1931, less than two months after the Mukden Incident, a mob of some 1,800 plain-clothes men suddenly surged from the Japanese Concession in Tientsin and started a march upon the Chinese Bureau of Public Safety in the Chinese City. This surprise attack was dispersed by the Chinese authorities, but for several nights thereafter there was rioting in Tientsin and in the suburbs, and on the night of 26 November a new outburst flared up which was finally suppressed only several days later.1/

This attempted coup d'état is generally known to have been of Japanese origin. It was said at the time that its object was to take P'u-yi, last scion of the defunct Ch'ing dynasty, out of his retirement in Tientsin and place him once more upon the dragon throne of his ancestors, in Peiping.2/ Although the plot failed, it is nevertheless a fact that during the disturbances of 8 November, P'u-yi was smuggled cut of Tientsin and reappeared several days later in Mukden, where he had been escorted to "safety." As all the world knows, he was subsequently placed upon a throne of special Japanese manufacture to become ostensible ruler of "Manchukuo."

Prime agent in the Tientsin riots was Li Chi-ch'un, a man described in an article of 1936 as a Muslim general of fifty, a native of Honan, and a man who for years had followed a military career in Sinkiang, but had then served under Marshal Wu P'ei-fu until the latter's downfall, since which time he had lived in "retirement" in Dairen.3/ The North China Star of 11 November 1931, describing the Tientsin affair, states that the Chairman of Hopei province had "offered a reward of $3,000 for the arrest of Li Chi-ch'un, the gang leader of the plain-clothes men, and $1,500 for the dead body." This inducement failed to lead to his apprehension, and on 15 November it was announced that he had gone into hiding. One explanation as to why the Tientsin riots failed of their complete purpose is that the Japanese had purposely made use of Li Chi'ch'un, hoping thereby to gain local Muslim support for the uprising, but that the Muslims had revealed the whole plot beforehand to the Chinese authorities.4/

I. Revival of Islam under Japanese Auspices in Manchuria, 1932-37

After the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, a great "revival" of Islamic interest occurred in that area. It will be remembered that in 1923 Matsuoka Yosuke, who later became president of the South Manchuria Railway, had given support to the Light Society in Shanghai. The South Manchurian Railway, as well as the Kwantung Army, had long

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1/ See the Peiping Leader and Tientsin North China Star of this period for accounts of the trouble.

2/ See the Peiping Leader of 16 November 1931.

3/ Oriente Moderno 16 (1936), p. 56.

4/ Yang Ching-chih in Ta Kung Pao, 10 March 1942.

conducted Islamic research, resulting in the estimates of Chinese Muslim population made by Omura Hajime in 1921 and Dazai Matsusaburo in 1925, which are cited at the beginning of this report. Research by these bodies is said to have laid special emphasis upon the collecting of information regarding the Muslim leaders who had formerly worked for northern Chinese warlords.1/

It was not until July 1932, however, that the Japanese created an Islamic League (I-ssu-lan Hsieh-hui) in Hsinking. This League has operated under the aegis of the Concordia Society, a Manchukuo organ formed soon after the establishment of the state itself to deal with all kinds of "cultural" activities.2/ The League has maintained 166 branches in Manchuria, with a total membership of 15,000 Muslims, and every ten days has issued a periodical called Islam (I-ssu-lan). Its founder is said to be Kawamura Kyodo -- that same Kawamura who some decades earlier had been sent out by the Black Dragon Society to study the Chinese Muslims.3/ The League presumably was established by the Japanese as a means for uniting and thus better controlling Chinese Muslims in Manchuria.

Soon after the founding of the Islamic League, and probably in the same year an educational organization known as the Institute for Islamic Culture (Hui-chiao Wen-hua Hsueh-yuan) was created in Dairen.4/ The head of the Institute is Chang Te-ch'un, who is described by Sakuma in his pamphlet of 1923 as having then been Mullah of the North Mosque in Mukden,5/ and who during the past few years has been a leader of the (Japanese-sponsored) Muslim mosque and school movement in Manchukuo. In 1938 he was an official delegate from Manchukuo to the dedication of the new mosque in Tokyo which took place on 12 May of that year.6/ The institute which he heads began its existence by accepting some eighty odd Muslims for the study of Islamic culture, and by 1942 is said to have graduated two classes, together totaling over one hundred persons.7/

1/ Yang Ching-chih, op. cit.

2/ Ibid.

3/ Kasama Akio, Followers of Islam, p. 120. Kasama's statement is confirmed by an item from an unidentified North China Chinese newspaper, which is reproduced in J.J. Brandt, Modern Newspaper Chinese (Peiping, 2nd ed. 1935), p. 57.

4/ Yang Ching-chih, Ta Kung Pao of 15 March 1942.

5/ Sakuma, Chinese Muslims, Past and Present, etc., sec. 18.

6/ Kasama, op. cit., p. 120.

7/ Yang Ching-chih, Ta Kung Pao of 15 March 1942.

At least two Islamic periodicals have been established in Manchuria since Japanese occupation: the Hui-kuang Yueh-k'an (Muslim Light Monthly), about which nothing is known except that it began publication in Hsinking in 1934 under the editorship of Han Ku-chou,1/ and the Hsing-shih Pao Yueh-k'an (The Awakening), a monthly which appeared in Mukden for the first time on 1 June 1937.2/ Concerning The Awakening we are told by Löwenthal: "Apparently it is the continuation of a journal which was established .... under the same title in 1925. This illustrated periodical consists of a sheet the size of a newspaper. It is devoted to the propagation of religion, and is non-political in character. It reports largely on Mohammedan activities in Japan and is distributed free of charge among Mohammedans." The fact that this journal supplanted (perhaps forcibly) an earlier one of the same title, that it is distributed free of charge, and that it gives news on Islamic activities in Japan, indicates it to be an organ for Japanese propaganda among Muslims of Manchuria. Therefore, the assertion that it "is non-political in character" is open to question.

The various above-mentioned activities provide convincing evidence of the extent of Japanese interest in Islam in Manchuria since 1932. In 1935 they were climaxed by the conversion to Islam of a member of the imperial "ruling" family of Manchukuo. This was His Highness P'u-kuang, a younger cousin of P'u-yi, the "Emperor" of Manchukuo. The report of P'u-kuang's conversion, which appeared in 1935 in the Cairo weekly al-Fath, gives him the Muslim name of Ali, and states that his conversion resulted from a long interest in Islam dating back to the days when he still lived in Peiping.3/

In 1934, P'u kuang's wife, neé Huang Yung-ni had been referred to in connection with Islam. Thus the Afghan periodical Kabul, under date of 22 March 1935, has a photograph of A'ishah Begum (whom it describes as being the wife of P'u-kuang), which shows her holding in her hand a copy of the Koran. The accompanying text states that on 30 August 1934 the Institute for Studies in the Sphere of Islam (a Japanese organization founded in Tokyo on 27 January 1925) held a meeting in Tokyo at which it inaugurated a program for the wide-spread distribution of the Koran in Japan and surrounding areas. P'u-kuang's wife, it adds, was among the first to receive a copy of that holy book. It also mentions a certain Jan Ju-en of Mukden (Muslim name: Abu Bekr Akhond) as having attended the same meeting.4/

Since 1935, P'u-kuang and his wife have played an important part in Japanese Islamic affairs. When the newly built mosque in Tokyo was dedicated on 12 May 1938, they were prominent among the delegates of many countries who

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1/ See list of periodicals given in the Manshu Nenkan (Manchukuo Yearbook) of 1940, p. 395.

2/ Löwenthal, op. cit., p. 240.

3/ See Oriente Moderno 1935, p. 202, which summarizes the report in al-Fath, and which incorrectly refers to P'u-kuang as a nephew rather than a younger cousin of P'u-yi.

4/ Ibid.

attended that ceremony. P'u-kuang, in fact, is reported to have made a speech at the time in which he stated that it was the deep Japanese regard for Islam that had induced him to become a Muslim, and that every year saw more and more people of Manchukuo who were doing likewise.1/ Thus, although the Japanese Emperor himself has not yet become a Muslim (despite frequent rumors to this effect in various Near Eastern Islamic publications), the Japanese can at least point with pride to the younger cousin of the "Emperor" of Manchukuo, as concrete evidence of the deep regard for Islam entertained in the Japanese Empire.

Between 1932 and 1937 other Islamic events took place in Manchuria, but these have little connection with Chinese Islam proper, and are primarily concerned with those Turkic and Tatar groups which the Japanese have attempted to use in their activities against the Soviet Union. These events are therefore not described here, but will be found discussed in the report parallel to this, which deals with the USSR.

1/ Yang Ching-chih, in Ta Kung Pao of 9-11 November 1940.

APPENDIX B.

PLOT AND COUNTERPLOT IN CENTRAL ASIA

A. Sinkiang: The Asiatic Cross Roads.

The position of Sinkiang vis-à-vis Japan has been a somewhat paradoxical one. On the one hand, it is, save for Tibet, the most isolated from Japan of all the regions constituting Greater China. On the other hand, it is the only one in which the population is overwhelmingly (perhaps as much as 90 per cent) Muslim, and therefore it forms a logical focal point for Japanese interest in Islam. There are other reasons, too, why Japan should show considerable concern over what happens in Sinkiang.

Sinkiang's present significance in Asiatic politics stems only in small degree out of the international role played by its own population or the value of its natural resources (which, though largely undeveloped, may some day prove considerable). It arises primarily from Sinkiang's position as the Central Asiatic crossroads between three large powers: Russia to the north and northwest, Britain (via India and Afghanistan) to the southwest, and China to the east. Intrigues and political rivalries between these three countries have been frequent since the latter decades of the nineteenth century.

Chinese first established political control over Sinkiang in the second century B.C. Since then, however, the extent of their control has fluctuated with the internal political strength or weakness of China itself. Even today the Chinese form only a very small proportion of the total (predominantly Turki) population of Sinkiang, and have succeeded in maintaining political control more through skillful balancing of one local group against another, than through strength of arms. In recent decades they have been forced to apply a similar "balancing" policy toward certain outside countries which have cast covetous eyes on Sinkiang.

After the suppression in 1877 of the formidable Muslim rebellion of Yakub (aja'Qub) Beg, the Chinese succeeded in restoring sovereignty throughout the province, and more recently under the firm administration of Yang Tseng-hsin (governor of Sinkiang, 1912-28), the province enjoyed a peace and relative prosperity in striking contrast to the recurrent civil wars then afflicting China proper. Yang's assassination in 1928, however, abruptly brought this period to a close and introduced a complex series of disturbances. Even before Yang's death there were certain economic factors at work which were beginning to weaken the extent of Chinese political control. Thus from about 1925 onward, a steady improvement began in the communications between Sinkiang and Russian Turkestan, which, coupled with the continuing primitive state of communications to China proper, and the political weakness of China itself, led to an ever increasing economic alignment between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union. This alignment was greatly furthered by the completion of the Soviet Turkestan-Siberian Railroad in 1930. After 1934, moreover it was accompanied by a considerable degree of Soviet political influence in Sinkiang as well.

On 7 July 1928 Sinkiang's long quiet was broken by the assassination of its governor, Yang Tseng-hsin. In the complex series of events which followed Soviet Russians, White Russians, British, Japanese, Chinese, and various local Muslim groups (Turki, Tungans, and others) all played a confusing part.1/ The role of Japan in these events seems to have been far from negligible.

Following Yang's assassination, his position of governor devolved upon Chin Shu-jen, an unscrupulous man who is believed to have been the chief instigator of the assassination. Discontent speedily followed. In 1931 the Turki in Hami, eastern Sinkiang, broke into open revolt and appealed for help to their co-religionist in Kansu, the Tungan general Ma Chung-ying. The latter, a native of the Muslim center of Ho-chou, Kansu, where he was born in 1909, had entered military service at the age of fifteen, and at seventeen had become a colonel in Ma Pu-fang's Muslim army in Tsinghai. About this time a relative of Ma Chung-ying (some say his father) suffered unjust execution from Chinese troops led by the "Christian General," Feng Yu-hsiang, and Ma himself immediately took to the hills in a war of revenge against all Chinese. He succeeded in organizing a formidable force, which from 1928 onward ravaged and plundered parts of Tsinghai, Kansu, and Ningsia. Despite his youth (he was then barely twenty), Ma seems to have been already fired with the dream of creating for himself a great Islamic empire in Central Asia. He welcomed, therefore, the appeal made to him in 1931 by the revolting Turki of Hami, and in the summer of that year marched from Kansu into Sinkiang to their aid.

Ma succeeded in conquering part of eastern Sinkiang, but was finally defeated at Hami by the Chinese authorities, aided by White Russian troops. Early in 1932, therefore, he withdrew to Kansu, where he remained quietly for a whole year. In January 1933, however, the Turki rebels in Sinkiang besieged Tihua (Urumchi), the provincial capital. Although they were finally beaten off, wide internal discontent had by now been generated against Governor Chin Shu-jen because of his corrupt administration. As a result, on 12 April 1933, he was ousted from his position by a joint coup d'état engineered by the Chinese and White Russian troops under his direction, and forced to flee to the Soviet Union. His successor was a Manchurian, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, who had been one of those Chinese "volunteers" fighting the Japanese in Manchuria in 1931 and 1932, and had been a staff officer at Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters. In May 1933, Ma Chung-ying reentered the fray from Kansu, and soon had made himself master of much of Sinkiang, save for the extreme northern portion.

Meanwhile, in the same month, a new and serious Muslim rebellion broke out in the far west, at Kashgar. This rebellion was in the beginning a joint Turki and Tungan movement to oust the local Chinese authorities. No sooner had this end been accomplished, however, than the Turki and Tungans themselves came to blows. The Tungans, as a result, were forced to withdraw into the New Town of Kashgar (some miles from the Old Town), where for some six months they were under a state of siege by the Turki. The latter, for their part, had by September 1933 organized a formal movement for the

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1/ Turki (known to the Chinese as "turban heads") form the bulk of the population of Sinkiang. Tungans are Moslims of mixed Chinese and non-Chinese stock, who speak Chinese, and, unlike the Turki, are considerably sinified in culture. They are found not only in Sinkiang, but also in large numbers in the northwest of China Proper (Kansu, Tsinghai, Ningsia, etc.)

creation of an autonomous Muslim state in southwest Sinkiang. This movement was said to be under the leadership of a wealthy Kashgar merchant, Sabit Damulla (also referred to as Savit Domula), who was in turn the protege of the Amir of Khotan, a city southeast of Kashgar and not very far from the Indian border. Persistent reports from Soviet, and also Chinese sources at the end of 1933 and the first half of 1934 insisted that anti-Kemalist Turks were being invited from both India and Japan to populate the new state, and that the British were the real instigators of the whole movement. Evidence of the part played by the Japanese will be offered later.

The Kashgar independence regime was of short duration, for in February 1934, Tungan troops (nominally belonging to Ma Chung-ying's forces) attacked Kashgar, rescued their fellow Tungans from their siege in the New Town, and brought the Turki independence government to an end.

While these various developments were taking place in Kashgar, Sheng Shih-ts'ai was rallying his forces against Ma Chung-ying. Using Chinese, White Russian, and (according to some reports) even Soviet troops, and liberally equipped with Soviet supplies, he waged war with Ma during the last months of 1933 and early part of 1934. In mid-March of 1934 Ma was driven from his strongholds in eastern Sinkiang. On 11 April a Tass report from Moscow stated that Ma had fled to Kashgar, where fighting was reported to have broken out between his forces and those Tungans who already two months earlier had taken control of the city. On 10 July, it was reported, also by Tass, that Ma had unexpectedly fled across the border into Soviet Russia at Irkeshtan, west of Kashgar.1/ And finally, on 7 August 1934, Sheng Shih-ts'ai's forces are said to have occupied Kashgar, bringing all rebellion throughout the province temporarily to an end.

Since that time Ma Chung-ying has remained, in all probability, a prisoner somewhere within the Soviet Union, though unsubstantial rumors have at various times appeared, reporting his secret return to Sinkiang or Kansu or even that he was in Shanghai or Tientsin. Unless, as seems unlikely, one of these reports may some day suddenly become real, his hopes of creating a Muslim empire in Central Asia are probably forever dashed. Meanwhile, after his flight to Russia, his Tungan followers, under the leadership of one of his relatives, Ma Ho-san, evacuated Kashgar and proceeded southeast to Khotan. There they were permitted by Sheng Shih-ts'ai for some years to maintain a virtually independent regime -- a regime which Sheng suppressed, however, following the outbreak of renewed disturbances in 1937.

Meanwhile, Kashgar was being governed on behalf of Sheng by a triumvirate consisting of two Chinese and a Turki. The latter, a certain General Mahmud, had commanded the Turki troops that had been attached to Sheng Shih-ts'ai's forces when they occupied Kashgar in August 1934. He was known as a fervent Muslim, and "was leader of the Turki population of Kashgar and at the same time an opponent of the Red Russians and their Chinese henchmen, who were all on the side of Urumchi."2/

1/ For these various reports, see the China Weekly Review, 21 April 1934, pp. 286, 287; 21 July 1934, p. 298; 18 August 1934, p.455.

2/ Sven Hedin, The Silk Road (New York, 1938), p. 300.

For some time this triumvirate rule in Kashgar seems to have operated with reasonable satisfaction. In the spring of 1937, however, the initial spark of unrest was touched off when General Mahmud was summoned by the provincial authorities to appear at Tihwa, the capital. Instead of complying, he fled in the direction of India, where by 2 June he was reported to have reached Srinagar and to be contemplating a pilgrimage to Mecca. Meanwhile, his Turki troops seem to have left Kashgar secretly simultaneously with his own flight, and to have marched toward Yarkand, situated roughly midway between Kashgar and Khotan. Outside Yarkand they were met by General Mahmud, who handed over his command to one or two of his right-hand men, before continuing his flight to India.

Thereafter, the Tungans at Khotan, under the leadership of Ma Ho-san, seem in their turn to have awakened from their long quiet and to have united with the Turki for an attack on Yarkand. This was captured by the joint forces after a stiff fight, and following this initial success, the Turki-Tungan troops reversed their steps toward Kashgar. By 21 August 1937 it was reported that they had not only captured the Old City at Kashgar, but had marched onward to Aksu, some 250 miles to the northeast. There, however, the rebels ran into their first serious difficulties. It is not clear exactly what happened, though Hedin1/ claims that Ma Ho-san's Tungans fell a prey to Soviet propaganda. At any rate, a split developed between the Tungans and the Turki, and a large number of the former went over to the side of the Sinkiang provincial government. As a consequence, the rebel hold on Yarkand and the Old City at Kashgar was broken, and by September 1937 Ma Ho-san had fled (like General Mahmud) to India. Thereafter the rebellion was quickly suppressed with very little bloodshed, leaving the Sheng Shih-ts'ai regime (together with its Soviet advisers) in complete control of Sinkiang.2/

Since 1934, Sheng Shih-ts'ai has succeeded in maintaining an uneasy hold over the greater part of the province. Outwardly he has made repeated protestations of loyalty to the Chinese Central Government. It is difficult to evaluate the exact sincerity of these protestations, however, in view of the fact that, in order to hold his position, he has until very recently been compelled to follow the bidding of the Soviets. Russian influence in Sinkiang had been immensely strengthened by the events which occurred since 1928, though the Soviets have repeatedly asserted that this influence extended only to the Economic sphere and that they have refused, since

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1/ Op. cit., p. 500.

2/ The account of this rebellion has been wholly derived from Williams, Central Asian Revolt, pp. 85-7, 93-100, which in its turn derives its information chiefly from Hedin, op. cit., and the London Times of 3 June, 21 August, and 28 September 1937; also 5 January 1938.

1934, to meddle in matters concerning internal administration.1/

News from Sinkiang since the second half of 1942 has indicated a great increase in Chinese interest, both political and economic, in the province. Taking advantage of Soviet preoccupation with the war in Europe, the Chinese have moved pro-Chungking elements into the province, while Soviet forces have been withdrawn to Russia. Russian willingness to withdraw at this time may be explained in part by the fact that the Japanese designs in Sinkiang are, for the present at least, blocked. Moreover, while the war lasts the USSR can look to her allies, the United States and Great Britain, to prevent further Japanese encroachments in Central Asia.

B. Japanese Activities in Sinkiang, 1888-1928.

Sinkiang international politics, during the past fifty or more years may be said to have four major aspects: (1) the forward push of Russian economic and political influence, on the one hand, which, though temporarily checked by the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, has since continued on an accelerated scale; (2) the efforts of China, on the other hand, to retain political sovereignty in Sinkiang, despite internal weakness and unfavorable geographical factors; (3) sporadic efforts on the part of Britain in southwestern Sinkiang (principally around Kashgar) to maintain a sphere of influence there and to counter Russian power; and (4) political activities of Japan in Sinkiang, which have injected still a fourth disturbing influence.

That Japan, despite her distance from Sinkiang, should thus display an active interest in that area, is natural in view of her long standing rivalry with Russia, and her conviction that she alone has a right to play a leading role in China proper. It is logical that Japan should show alarm at any prospective growth in Russian power, and should be vitally interested in creating a series of Japanese-dominated, or at least neutralized, states along the outer reaches of China (including Sinkiang), to serve as protective buffers against Russian penetration. Because the Japanese Islamic program in Sinkiang has thus been based on a somewhat different motivation from that in China proper, and because of the widely divergent social and geographical conditions in the two areas, the story of Central Asia can best be treated here separately.

1/ For this brief political sketch, see the China Weekly Review, op. cit. and passim during the years 1933-34; also Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (New York, 1940), pp. 192-205; Sven Hedin, Big Horse's Flight (London, 1936), Introduction and passim; Wilbur Burton, "Tug-of-War in Central Asia, I. Sinkiang, Center of Intrigue," Asia, September 1935, pp. 517-20; Eric Teichman, "Chinese Turkestan," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 23 (1936), pp. 561-63; and Ella K. Maillart, Forbidden Journey, from Peking to Kashmir (London, 1937), pp. 210-21. Since the above account was written, we have been permitted, through the kindness of the author, Herbert H. Williams, to consult an unpublished MS., Central Asia in Revolt, the Moslem Uprisings in Sinkiang, 1928-1937, based Chiefly on Travellers' Accounts (University of California M.A. thesis, May 1940). This, while far more detailed than the political outline given above, confirms what has been written there in all essential respects.

Although Japanese activities in Sinkiang have become overt only during the past two decades, they have actually been under way for at least fifty-five years. What first galvanized Japanese interest in Central Asia seems to have been news of the projected building of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, actual construction on which was begun in 1891.

Already in the summer of 1887 a group of patriotic young Japanese had created at Shanghai and Hankow an organization known as the Rakuzen-do (Hall of Pleasurable Delights; Chinese name: Lo Shan T'ang and, branches were speedily established at Changsha, Chungking, and even Peiping. The ostensible purpose of this organization was to sell pharmaceutical goods, books, and miscellaneous wares throughout the Yangtze Valley. Its real aim, however, was to make careful investigation of conditions in all parts of China, and to send back reports to the homeland based on the information thus acquired. When the threat of Russia appeared on the horizon, this aim was enlarged to include such "investigation work" as would help stop the southward expansion of Russia from Siberia into Central and Eastern Asia.1/

It was in 1888, that a member of the Rakuzen-do, the first of a succession of Japanese "investigators," pushed his way into the reaches of Central Asia. Information on him and later investigators, as summarized in the following pages, is derived from the Black Dragon Society's publication, Toa Senkaku, to which the volume and page numbers cited after proper names refer.

Ura Keiichi (vol. 1, pp. 383-394 and 549). Ura Keiichi, a former newspaperman in China, who is also described as having been an expert on military matters since his student days, became a member of the Rakuzen-do in the autumn of 1887. He shared the general sentiment of the other members that the southward expansion of Russia should be checked, and conceived the idea of going to Ili in order to become advisor, if possible, to its then military governor, Liu Chin-t'ang.2/ While there, he hoped to carry out an eight-point program of investigation which would include the study of transport facilities in Ili, Kashgar, Aksu, and other parts of Sinkiang; means by which Muslims, Lamas, nomads, Chinese, and others in Sinkiang might be used "for our purpose" ; the current state of agriculture, sheep raising, and industry, and possibilities regarding their future development; the fiscal administration of Sinkiang; the strength of Russian military defenses bordering Sinkiang; Russian policy toward China; and the strength of the border defenses of India, Tibet, and Burma. From Ili, Ura hoped to penetrate into Siberia in order to learn more about the plans for the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

On 18 June 1888, Ura, together with two compatriots, Kitamikado Matsujiro and Kawara Tsunojiro, left Hankow for Lanchow, Kansu. All of them had grown pigtails and wore Chinese dress. At Lanchow they hoped to secure the aid of two other compatriots, Fujishima Takehiko and Oya Hanzaburo, who, equipped with a thousand yen worth of variety goods bought in Shanghai, had been planning to set up a shop (no doubt a branch of the Rakuzen-do), in Lanchow. When the three arrived in Lanchow,

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1/ See Tao Senkaku, vol. 1, pp. 343,344, 370, 383; vol. 3, p. 608 (biography of Arao Kiyoshi, founder of the Rakuzen-do).

2/ Ili's position in northwestern Sinkiang, close to the border of the Russian Turkestan has made it long a center of Japanese interest,

however, no such shop was to be found, and after vainly waiting thirty days for Fujishima and Oya to arrive, they were forced by lack of funds to return to Hankow, which they reached in January 1889. Fujishima and Oya, meanwhile, had been delayed because they were robbed by pirates on the Han river en route to Lanchow. They finally arrived in Lanchow only three days after the departure of Ura and his two companies.

On his return, Ura was severely criticized by other members of the Rakuzen-do for this fiasco, especially on the ground that his Chinese was inadequate; so inadequate, in fact, that he was forced to write, in characters anything he wanted to say. Nevertheless, on 25 March 1889, he again set out from Hankow, this time accompanied by Fujishima. They took with them books and pharmaceutical supplies up the Han river, and reached Sian in April, where they assumed the Chinese names of Sung Ssu-chai and Sung K'o-chi respectively. At the beginning of June they continued westward toward Lanchow, arriving there in September.

By now, however, they had run into serious financial difficulties. They had already spent over seventy taels on the trip so far, and there were only some fifty-five taels left. Hence it was decided that Ura should continue the journey to Ili alone, while Fujishima should return to Hankow. Fujishima returned safely to Hankow in April 1890, but Ura was never heard from again. Members of the Rakuzen-do established a shrine in Shanghai out of respect for his heroic memory.

Uehara Taichi and Hino Tsuyomi (vol. 2, pp. 840-43). The next two Japanese travelers enjoyed greater success. In 1902 Uehara Taichi[1] went to China, where he lived at Paotingfu, Chihli (Hopei), with a Captain Taga Muneyuki. He wore Chinese clothes, grew a pigtail, learned to speak excellent Chinese, and assumed the Chinese name of Yuan Shang-chih. For two years he studied in a Chinese military training school in Paoting, after which he was invited to become an instructor in the same institution. There he received exactly the same treatment as would a Chinese officer. But in the autumn of 1906 he gave up his post and, together with a Major Hino Tsuyomi, started on a journey which took him through Shensi, Kansu, and Sinkiang, and eventually brought him to Ili. At Ili, Hino left him to continue to Yarkand and Kashgar, and from there to India; in December 1907 he returned to Japan from India by boat, having been 474 days on his journey.

Uehara, meanwhile, remained in Ili, where he gained the friendship of Ch'ang Keng, the military governor, who is said to have treated him like a younger brother. Uehara, in fact, became head instructor in the military academy at Ili, and remained there for four years. During this time he studied Mongol and Russian (already having acquired a knowledge of Chinese and English), learned all he could about Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia, and "served our country in many ways through the reference material which he sent back." He made visits to territory never before traversed by a Japanese.

1/ Born 1883. Cf. Toa Senkaku, vol. 3, pp. 391-2.

In November 1911 Uehara crossed the Ili border into Russian Turkestan, but in February 1912 he was arrested and jailed by the Russian military police at Tashkent on the charge of being a "military investigator" for Japan. Araki Sadao, (later a general), then attached to the Japanese Embassy in St. Petersburg, did all he could to persuade the Russian authorities to release him; Majors Saito Tsune and Honjo Shigeru of the Japanese Embassy in Peiping made similar efforts through the good offices of Yuan Shih-Kai, then president of China. Finally, after a direct appeal to the Czar, Uehara was freed in August 1913 and withdrew to Ili, where he became military adviser to Yang Fei-hsia, successor of Ch'ang Keng as military governor.

In May 1914, however, he received a summons from Japan to return for military service. On his return to Japan he handed over to the state the records, maps, etc., which he had made during his stay in Central Asia. They are described by Toa Senkaku as being both numerous and accurate, and himself as being the leading Japanese authority on Central Asia.

Uehara's later history is brief. When Japan joined the Allies in World War I against Germany, he participated in the Japanese campaign against German-held Tsingtao (October to November 1914). Later, while Yuan Shih-Kai was trying to make himself Emperor (December 1915 to March 1916), Uehara went with Captain Taga, his former Pacting associate, to Nanking, where Feng Kuo-chang, whom he had known as head of the Paoting military academy during his own term there, was now military governor. In Nanking he worked hard to promote the cause of Sino-Japanese relations. Shortly afterward, however, he fell ill, and died in Japan in September 1916.

Tachibana Zuicho (vol. 1, pp. 509-10). Tachibana Zuicho, a young priest of the Nishi Honganji Buddhist sect, was sent at the age of eighteen by the head of his sect, Otani Kozui, on an extensive journey through Central Asia. In the spring of 1908 he left Peiping on an itinerary which took him through Mongolia and Sinkiang, and thence to India. Again, in the autumn of 1910, he set off on a second journey for which his starting point was Semipalatinsk, a city south of Omsk on the Irtysh river in Siberia. He proceeded southeastward as far as Sian, Shensi; then west through Sinkiang to Kashgar; from there along the uncharted northern frontier of Tibet; then northward once more through Sinkiang; and so back to Semipalatinsk. In the summer of 1912 he finally returned to Japan. Although the purpose of his two trips is said to have been to discover ancient traces of Buddhism in Central Asia, the account of his travels adds that he had also "given us much" information about Mongolia, Sinkiang, and other regions, which would have an important bearing on the future of East Asia.

Sato Kaisan (vol. 2, p. 852). Sato Kaisan was studying in Russia at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, and was interned in western Asiatic Russia. After the war he returned to Japan via Europe, and then set off on a journey which took him through Annam, Burma, India, then back to Burma again, and thence into southwest China. Later he went via Manchuria and Mongolia to Ili, where he stayed for three years, making many trips through the surrounding country. During this time he learned much about conditions in Sinkiang and traveled in regions no Japanese had visited. He later died at Tsinan, Shantung.

Soejima Jiro (vol. 2, pp. 843-45). After a middle school education which was interrupted by illness, Soejima Jiro went to Manchuria in 1915, where he joined a Mongol army. He also gave help for a time to the White Russian general Semenov, who was active at Chita, Siberia, during 1919-20. Later he contributed articles to the Peiping and Tientsin Times, as well as to the Dairen Far Eastern Weekly. During this period he was planning a journey across Asia.

On 1 January 1924, Soejima left Peiping for Paotow, where he was detained by the Chinese authorities for more than ten days, gaining his release only after he signed a statement saying that he would not hold the Chinese responsible for any mishap that might befall him. Soon afterward he was held up by bandits near Wu-yuan, west of Paotow in Suiyuan. At Lanchow, moreover, he was seized by a fever to which he almost succumbed. Nevertheless, he pushed determinedly westward, with the grandiose aim of charting a route for a railroad that would cross all Asia from China to the Near East (and thus, of course, be a serious rival to the Trans-Siberian). As he traveled, he studied the climate, topography, peoples, and languages of the regions he traversed, being especially interested in the conditions of the Muslims. He also investigated the status of white imperialism in Central Asia.

On reaching Russian Turkestan, Soejima was for a while refused an entrance visa, In July 1925, however, he succeeded in entering Kirghiztan, and on 6 September 1925, he arrived in triumph at Istanbul, having made an overland journey covering some 5,000 miles and lasting one year and nine months. He then returned via the Indian Ocean, arriving in Tientsin in January 1926. But while putting his records in order at Dairen, he died at the age of thirty. Some of these records, nevertheless, have since appeared in a book entitled Ajiya o Matagu (The Traversal of Asia).

It will be remembered that Sakuma Teijiro, founder of the Society of Light in Shanghai in 1923, had some time before that year passed through Sinkiang on his way to Turkey, during the course of his studies in Islam; also that Kawamura Kyodo had toured Sinkiang as far as the Tarim Basin prior to the extensive investigations of Islam made by him in China proper (for the most part probably during the 1920's).1/

So far the story has been based wholly on Japanese writings. From a Western source, however, there is evidence of large-scale Japanese activity in Sinkiang in the year 1919. Percy Thomas Etherton, former British Consul General and Political Resident in Sinkiang, writes that in the spring of that year "the Chinese were much perturbed at the arrival in Turkistan of twelve Japanese officers sent by the Japanese General Staff and stationed at various important points from Kashgar to Urumchi, Kuldja, and the Altai district in the north of the province. They came ostensibly to study commercial conditions, but devoted much of their time to political research and investigations into the Pan-Asiatic movement.... Several embarrassing but groundless statements were made by them in the north, notably at Kulja, where they declared we [i.e. the British] were acquiring Tibet, a sore point with the Chinese....

1/ Cf. above, Appendix A, sec. E.

These officers remained about two years in Chinese Turkistan, but the information gained was largely negative, for the Chinese had issued secret instructions to the local authorities that their attitude toward the Japanese was to be a passive one."1/

The same author remarks further that "some years ago" (as of 1925) several Japanese instructors had been brought to Sinkiang for the training of troops in the Ili region but lack of funds, and the consequent departure of the Japanese, had brought the project to nought; also that Japan (and, incidentally the United States) had been showing great trade interest in Sinkiang, but that much improvement in the quality of Japanese goods would be necessary if Japan were to gain a trade monopoly there.2/

C. Japanese Muslim "Prophets" Appear in Sinkiang.

Yang Tseng-hsin's assassination in 1928 was, as we have seen, a signal for a general scramble for influence in Sinkiang by several interested countries. It is not surprising, then, that this and the following years should have seen the entry of numerous Japanese Muslim "prophets" into the province. An article written in 1939 by an anonymous German who shows obvious close familiarity with conditions in Sinkiang, describes what happened as follows:3/

> "Some ten or twelve years ago /I.e. about 1928/ Japan sent paid 'prophets' into Sinkiang to rouse the Muslims against their oppressors, Russia and England, most probably with the idea of making Islam in Sinkiang her advance guard against Bolshevism in the West. I know only the names of three of these 'prophets': Mustapha Djarula, Mussa Bekh, and Dr. Schiakr; the last, it was said to me in Sinkiang, had been for some time in Germany. These gentlemen promulgated the gospel of freedom for Islam in Sinkiang and in Russian Turkistan, were followed and harassed while they were in Russian Turkistan, and were supposed to

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1/ Etherton, In the Heart of Asia (London, 1925), pp. 125-6.

2/ Op. cit., pp. 185, 186; 292, 293.

3/ This article originally appeared in the Berichte des Asiens Arbeitkreises, Siebenberg-Verlag, Vienna and Peking, 1939, and is very possibly by the German explorer and agent in Central Asia, Wilhelm Filchner, an English summary and translation, "The Russian Domination of Sinkiang," which is likewise unsigned, appeared in the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 26 (1939), pp. 648-53. Later citations will be to this English version. The passage here cited occurs on p. 648.

be fighting Communism by word of mouth and by their writings."1/

Confirmation of these statements is to be found in other articles. "More than ten years ago," writes Lyman Hoover in 1938, "a 'Japanese Muslim' appeared in Peiping and sought the acquaintance of the leaders of the important mosques there. The knowledge which he gathered was probably made available to the Japanese who later, usually as Muslim mullahs or pilgrims, entered Sinkiang and other Northwestern areas, presumably to investigate and counter Soviet agents there. At the same time military agents began the quiet cultivation of some of the Muslim military leaders whom they suspected of disaffection toward Nanking."2/

An article entitled "Koki Hirota and Japan's 'Black Dragon' Conspiracy,"3/ describes how, about two years earlier, the Chinese authorities in western Kansu had arrested a Japanese spy who had been intriguing with the Muslims. While returning to the coast in the company of an American automobile agent, this man, together with the American, was kidnapped and murdered by bandits in Shensi. The same article also touches on an incident directly connected with Sinkiang: "In September, 1933, two Japanese officers in civilian clothes who were on their way to investigate conditions in Sinkiang or Chinese Turkestan were detained by the Chinese authorities in Lanchow, Kansu province. They had chartered a plane belonging to the Chinese government Eurasia Aviation Corporation and were accompanied by a high Chinese military officer."

Even more striking (and undoubtedly to some extent exaggerated) are the assertions made in a dispatch which appeared in the China Times (Chinese-language Shanghai paper) early in May 1933 when troubles in Sinkiang were at their height. "The only newspapers published in Sinkiang," this dispatch claimed, "are owned by the Soviets and the Japanese. The Japanese have even built a number of Mohammedan churches /in Sinkiang?/ and many Japanese have been instructed to accept the Mohammedan faith. Similarly Mohammedan churches have been established in Tokyo for the benefit of the Mohammedans in Japan. To show Japan's good-will 250 Sinkiang Mohammedans have been admitted into different Japanese schools in Tokyo. Through these measures the Japanese have succeeded in cultivating the friendship of the Mohammedans. It is said that some of the Mohammedans in Sinkiang regard the British and Soviets as aggressors, but the Japanese as friends."4/

1/ The author, unfortunately, does not give the original Japanese names of these "Muslims." His Mussa Bekh is a misspelling for Mussa Beg or Bek, while his Dr. Schiakr should be spelled Dr. Schakr. Bare references to Mussa Beg appear in Soviet sources, which speak of him as a dangerous anti-Soviet agent operating from a "foreign country." [redacted]

2/ Hoover, "Chinese Muslims are Tough," Asia, December 1938, p. 722.

3/ The China Weekly Review 31 March 1934, p. 163.

4/ Quoted in the China Weekly Review, 6 May 1933, p. 385.

D. Ma Chung-ying and the Japanese

The question arises as to the extent to which Japanese "prophets" and other agents were responsible for the disorders that afflicted Sinkiang, particularly in 1933 and 1934. The anonymous German writer, already referred to, directly charges the three Japanese "prophets" named by him with having instigated the uprisings of the Turki in eastern Sinkiang during these two years. "How far they /i.e. the Japanese/ succeeded in Russian Turkistan I cannot say, but they did succeed in rousing the Sarts /i.e. the Turki/ in Sinkiang, and it is without any doubt through the propaganda of these three that the Sarts rose in 1933 and 1934."1/

It will be remembered that it was the Turki who, having raised the banner of revolt, appealed to Ma Chung-ying in Kansu for aid, thus encouraging him in his dream of Central Asiatic empire. The German author agrees that in this case, too, the Japanese played a part. "It was into this hotchpotch of peoples, religions, and politics that Ma Chung-ying brought the torch of war and with the help of the Sarts tried to wrest the governorship of Urumchi from the Chinese governor. He was helped by the Japanese, both morally and practically, and also by that section of the Chinese who hoped with his help to drive out Russian influence."2/

On this point the German author, though in general violently anti-Soviet, shows complete accord with opinions widely circulated in Russia at the time.3/ Late in 1933, for example, the Tass news agency reported that two Japanese army officers had been sent to Sinkiang to join Ma Chung-ying, and that though their entry into the province was refused by the local authorities at Tihua (the capital), they had nevertheless succeeded in making their way to Turfan in the east, where General Ma maintained his headquarters.4/

That there were at least two Japanese advisers attached to Ma's staff, is confirmed by Aitchen Wu (Wu Ai-chen), an official sent by the Chinese Central Government in November 1932, to be adviser to the Sinkiang provincial government, and who remained there until his return to Nanking in April 1934. Wu, during his stay in Sinkiang, actually visited Ma in a vain effort to arrange peace. He writes as follows: "The newspapers in Tashkent stated that Ma had Japanese advisers, and that with the Japanese in control of Turkistan the oilfields of Baku would be within reach of their bombers. Thus, said the writer, Russia will be attacked from east and west. This seemed to me fantastic at the time, but it is true that Ma did have at least two Japanese on his staff. How much influence these men had is hard to estimate."5/

1/ "The Russian Domination of Sinkiang," p. 648.

2/ Op. cit. p. 650.

3/ Cf. quotations from several Soviet writers cited by Fuad Kazak, Ostturkistan zwischen den Grossmächten (Berlin, 1937), p. 75, n. 78.

4/ This Tass report appears in the Osaka Mainichi of 16 December 1933. Cf. China Weekly Review, 6 January 1934, p. 229.

5/ Aitchen K. Wu, Turkistan Tumult (London, 1940), pp. 236-7.

Wu however, doubts the extent of this influence for he says: "The presence of Japanese advisers on Ma's staff lent colour to the persistent rumour that he was a tool in their hands. There was no truth in this, so far as I was able to observe. Men of the type of Ma Chung-ying are not easily made tools, and though Japan may have had 'observers' with his forces, they had probably little influence on the course of events."1/

It is quite true, as Wu here implies, that Ma was quite capable of conceiving of such a grandiose plan as a Central Asiatic Muslim empire, with himself as head. Nevertheless, it is obvious that such a plan harmonized perfectly with the aims long held by Japan vis-à-vis Russia. If Ma did indeed really use Japanese advisers, it seems extreme to conclude, as Wu does, that they may not have played a potent part in fostering his ambitions.

There is still another possible link between Ma Chung-ying and the Japanese, in the shape of Ma's chief military adviser, a certain Turk from Istanbul named Kemal Kaya. Japanese sources describe him as a member of the Young Turk Party who had fled from Turkey to Russian Turkestan after the World War, and who in 1931 had been "invited" to become military adviser to Ma in Kansu.2/ The anonymous German writer of 1939 gives a more detailed and somewhat different account of him as follows:

> "This remarkable man was before 1914 attached to a German infantry regiment on the Baltic, and, when he had learned all they had to teach him, went to Paris and studied military matters there in the Military Academy. He went back to Turkey during the World War and worked on the staff of Colonel von Epp on the Caucasus front against Russia, was taken prisoner, and at the time of the Russian Revolution was teaching Turkish in Harbin. Afterwards he came to northwest Kansu, and it is generally supposed that it is owing to him that General Ma made his attack on Sinkiang. Kemal understood modern methods of warfare, and his help and direction were invaluable."3/

This estimation as to the extent of Kemal's influence on Ma is shared by Wu, who writes; "It would seem that he was a fanatical Mohammedan who saw in the vast numbers of true believers between Samarkand and Kansu the makings of a new Moslem empire. Certainly he inspired Ma Chung-ying with

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1/ Wu, op. cit., p. 268.

2/ Kasama Akio, The Muslims, p. 154.

3/ "The Russian Domination of Sinkiang," p. 649.

thoughts of imperial dominion, and for the events which followed he must share the blame."1/

The points to be noted in these accounts are that Kemal Kaya was a Turk; that he may have been a member of the Young Turk Party, and hence antagonistic to the republican regime in Turkey; that he became Ma's adviser in 1931, i.e. not long before the latter joined the Sinkiang rebellion; and that he had at one time been teaching Turkish at Harbin. There is no doubt whatsoever that the Japanese have made extensive use of Turks in their Islamic program, especially those Turks exiled from their country after the founding of the Turkish Republic. Particularly have such Turks been used for espionage and other activities against the USSR. Harbin, moreover, as a city close to the Siberian border, has been an active center for Japanese-Turkish activities, such as the organization of Turco-Tatar congresses, etc.2/ It seems not at all improbable, therefore, that Kemal Kaya should have become an agent of the Japanese while living in Harbin, and have been sent by them to Ma in 1931 to spur him on in his ambitions.3/

1/ Wu, op. cit. p. 75. Further details about Kemal Kaya are given by Sven Hedin, who, when his Sinkiang expedition was at Turfan in February 1934, entertained Kemal Kaya one evening for dinner. Hedin remarks that Kemal spoke excellent French, and that he told him (Hedin) that he had had enough of Kansu and Sinkiang and longed to return to his native Turkey. Cf. Hedin, Big Horse's Flight, p. 62.

2/ See the report dealing with Japan's infiltration among the Muslims in the USSR.

3/ It is fair to note that certain writers try to exonerate the Japanese of complicity with Ma Chung-ying. Thus the anonymous German, despite his clear statement that Ma was helped in his rebellion by the Japanese, later completely reversed himself by viewing the whole Ma affair as a deep plot on the part of the Soviets for gaining control of Sinkiang. ("The Russian Domination of Sinkiang," p. 652.) This contradiction appears to arise out of his anti-Soviet bias, and consequent eagerness to pin ultimate responsibility on Russia for everything that has taken place in Sinkiang. Kazak (op. cit., p. 75) likewise cites Soviet accusations against Japan, only to deny them on the ground that Japan was too "distant" from Sinkiang to be vitally concerned. Perhaps the fact that Kazak is himself a Turk may have something to do with his eagerness to absolve Japan of complicity in events in which certain Turks have had a share. All other writers, such as Sven Hedin, Owen Lattimore, Wilbur Burton, Wu Aitchen, et al., agree that Ma Chung-ying and the Soviets were violently opposed to each other. Help for him from Japan would therefore seem only natural.

The German writer cited that in the summer of 1934, after the collapse of Ma's rebellion, Kemal cleverly detached himself from his former leader and swung over to the Chinese (i.e. the Soviet-supported) side![1]/ This is confirmed in a dispatch in the Chinese-language newspaper, Tientsin Wan Pao, of 26 June 1939, which speaks of a certain General Che-ma as having for years played a leading role in Sinkiang, and having been instrumental in arranging with the Soviets for the escape of Ma Chung-ying to Soviet soil in 1934. The Che-ma here spoken of is undoubtedly Kemal, in Chinese transcription. The article states further that General Che-ma is the Sinkiang representative on the Northwest Highway Transport Administration (an organ created after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War to facilitate the sending of supplies from Russia to China via Sinkiang), and that he has asked official representatives from Kansu and Ningsia to come to Tihua to discuss transportation problems. This, however, the article continues, the governors of Ningsia and Kansu have firmly refused to do, inasmuch as General Che-ma has for years been suspected of being a Communist sympathizer, who has won many Muslims in northern Sinkiang over to his side.[2]/

This extraordinary volte-face of Kemal's helps to explain how Ma Chung-ying, who had been fighting Soviet-supported troops, was later permitted by the Soviets to retreat into Soviet territory when his forces were crushed by Sheng Shih-ts'ai.

E. The Rise and Fall of a Turkish Prince.

Japanese imperialistic technique is exemplified in the story of the young Turkish prince, Abdul Kerim (Abd el-Kerim). That Ma Chung-ying received material aid from the Japanese during his Sinkiang campaigns is highly probable, and that he enjoyed their strong moral support is beyond doubt. Yet during the very months when Ma was waging civil war against Sheng Shih-ts'ai, the Japanese seem to have been astutely adding a second string to their Sinkiang bow.

Abdul Kerim, the "second string" in question, was a grandson of the former Turkish Sultan, Abdul Hamid II (deposed 1909), and a son of Prince Selim, present Ottoman pretender. Upon the expulsion of the Ottoman family from Turkey in 1822, he had fled with his father to Syria, and for several years prior to 1932 he lived in Damascus. There he received a meager pension of £5 per month from the local Waqf or Pious Foundation (generic name for organizations scattered throughout the Islamic world which do philanthropic work under the direction of local mosques). He seems to have left Damascus in September 1932 for eastern Asia. His purpose, according to the one source, was to make a world tour, but according to the other, it was to better his financial condition in India. After sojourns of roughly three months each in Iraq, India, and the Malay States, he "unexpectedly" received an official invitation from the government of Japan to visit that country. There he accordingly

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1/ "The Russian Domination of Sinkiang," p. 651.

[redacted]

proceeded, arriving in Tokyo 21 May 1933.1/

Initially, it is entirely conceivable that Abdul Kerim was unaware of any ulterior motivation on the part of his Japanese hosts. If so, he was very speedily disillusioned, for his stay in Tokyo almost immediately gave rise to widespread rumors that he was being groomed by the Japanese to become ruler of an "independent Muslim state" in Sinkiang. So persistently did these rumors become after he had been hardly two months in Tokyo, he felt called upon to deny them in an interview appearing in the Tokyo English-language weekly, Trans-Pacific.2/ In the course of this interview, after affirming that he was merely on his "way around the world for pleasure to observe nations and peoples and their ways of life," he asserted firmly: "I have no political connections or political ambitions, and all rumors to the effect that I am kept in Tokyo as the future Mohammedan ruler of Sinkiang are absolutely without foundation."

The rumors in question nevertheless continued, and some succeeded in spreading in exaggerated form as far as the Near Eastern Islamic world. The Jaffa newspaper, Filastin, for example, under date of 22 September 1933, reported that early in July Abdul Kerim had left Japan for Manchuria, accompanied by three Japanese officers and by a Turkish journalist named Jaban Oghlu Muhsin Bey; that in Manchuria the Japanese had placed all Manchurian troops at Abdul Kerim's disposal (sic!); that through lavish use of Japanese money he had succeeded in becoming the "sultan" of a certain group of people known as the Malu tribe, consisting of 30,000 fighting men; and that this tribe had since been attempting to make him ruler over all of Turkestan.3/ No "Malu" tribe is known to exist either in Manchuria or any other part of Greater China, but it may be that "Malu" is a mistake in the Arabic text for "Salar." The two words, when written in Arabic, are very easily mistaken, one for the other. The Salars would be a fit object for Abdul Kerim's attentions, for they are a group of rather fanatical Muslims of Turkic stock who live on the upper reaches of the Yellow river near the town of Hsün-hua, Tsinghai, and thus occupy the northwestern approaches of China proper to Sinkiang.4/

1/ The above information is a synthesis of two sources: (1) article in the Jaffa newspaper Filastin of 22 September, 1933, as recorded in Oriente Moderno 13 (1933), p. 525; (2) a Tokyo interview with the young prince which appeared in the English-language Tokyo weekly, Trans-Pacific, 27 July 1933, p. 14. As can be seen, the two accounts differ on certain points, and probably both contain mistakes. Most of the details concerning Abdul Kerim's life in the Near East are derived from source (1).

2/ 27 July 1933, p. 14.

3/ Cf. summary in Oriente Moderno 13 (1933), p. 525.

4/ Cf. G. Findley Andrew, The Crescent in Northwest China (London, 1921), 15-18. The Salars are said to have migrated to their present location from Samarkand in the fourteenth century.

So for Abdul Kerim's being in Manchuria, it is not unreasonable to suppose that were he to travel from Japan to Tsinghai and Sinkiang, he would pass through Manchuria on his way, Manchuria being then in Japanese hands and a center for Japanese Islamic activities. Still another basis of reality for the whole story lies in its mention of the Turkish journalist, Jaban Oghlu Muhsin Bey. Concerning this person, from other sources informations available of such a nature as to indicate almost surely that he was (and no doubt still is) a paid Muslim agent for the Japanese.1/ Despite this factual appearance of reality, however, the rumor could after all have been nothing more than rumor, inasmuch as it states that Abdul Kerim in early July had left Japan for Manchuria, whereas we know that in the latter part of the same month he was interviewed in Tokyo by the weekly Trans-Pacific.

The credibility of this and of the many similar reports which during the fall of 1933 and early months of 1934 continued to circulate in various Chinese, Soviet, and Near Eastern newspapers, was heightened by one significant fact. This was the ease with which the whole Abdul Kerim affair could be fitted into a standard Japanese pattern for political aggrandizement. Even as far away as the Near East, the similarity was noted between the Japanese efforts to restore a scion of the former Turkish royal family to the "home" of his forefathers in Turkestan, and their earlier restoration of P'u-yi, scion of the defunct Manchu ruling house, to his ancestral land of "Manchukuo."2/

Subsequent events in the Abdul Kerim affair are as follows: Allusion has been made to the two Japanese officers who in September 1933 attempted to reach Sinkiang by Eurasia. plane, but were prevented from doing so by the Chinese authorities at Lanchow (See above, section C). On 8 October 1933 the Chinese-language daily, China Times of Shanghai, described this Japanese expedition as a preliminary step toward the installation of Abdul Kerim in Sinkiang, but added with satisfaction that "the two Japanese officers, finding their way to Sinkiang blocked, have since returned to Shanghai."3/

1/ In 1934 he is mentioned as professor of Turkish in a Muslim school in Manchuria, and as having attended a Muslim Youth Congress held in Egypt in that year. On his journey he is said to have carried with him Islamic books which had been translated into Japanese and which the Muslim Association of Tokyo wished to present to the King of Egypt. At the Youth Congress he made the statement that the Japanese were favorably disposed toward Islam, and even that the Japanese government had recognized Islam as one of the religions of Japan. Cf. Oriente Moderno 14 (1934), p. 439. Again, in 1936, he is mentioned as correspondent in Japan of the Cairo daily, al-Balagh, and as having interviewed at Dairen for that paper the pro-Japanese Chinese Muslim general Li Chi-ch'un (on whom see above, Appen. A. Sec. H.) Cf. ibid. 16 (1936), p. 56. The correct form of Jaban Oghlu Muhsin Bey's name is Muhsin Bey Cioban-Oghlu.

2/ Cf. the Istanbul Haber of 16 September 1933, as summarized in Oriente Moderno 13 (1933), p. 586. Another reason why the Japanese may well have considered Abdul Kerim as an ideal instrument for their aims, is the fact that his grandfather, Abdul Hamid II, had in his day been famous as Islam's foremost exponent of Pan-Islam.

3/ Quoted in China Weekly Review, 21 October 1933, p. 322.

On November 1 it was reported by the Hsin Wan Pao, in a Nanking dispatch, that "a certain deposed Mohammedan prince" had arrived from Japan in Shanghai, where he was staying in a Persian hotel.1/ Early in December the Tass news agency claimed that propaganda bills, issued by Sinkiang Muslims resident in Tokyo, were being distributed in Sinkiang, and that, according to a report sent by Colonel Schomberg, British Intelligence officer, Abdul Kerim had already reached south Khotan in Sinkiang.2/

As if to counter the growing snowball of rumor, Abdul Kerim in the same month wrote from Shanghai a letter of "explanation" which appeared in the Cairo daily, al-Mokattam, of 1 January 1934.3/ In this remarkable document, which throws a strange light on Abdul Kerim's mental processes, he accuses the Soviets of responsibility for spreading the rumors that began with his arrival in Tokyo. These rumors, he continues, resulted in protests being lodged not only by the Soviet but also by the Turkish envoy to Tokyo. The latter, he bitterly remarks, might at least have been constrained by considerations of common race from hampering a movement looking towards the liberation of thirty million Turks from the Russian yoke, even if this movement were, after all, merely hypothetical (sic). In any case, the prince writes further, the rumors thus artificially fostered are devoid of any foundation indeed, were Japan seriously to consider such a plan, she would surely not turn to such a young man as himself, but rather would seek the services of an experienced man like his father. Owing to the strength of the monarchical ideal, the prince continues, the help of an Ottoman prince is needed to ensure the success of any movement for the eventual liberation of the Turks. Nevertheless, he concludes, all Turks, as well as Muslims generally, would be only too delighted were Mustapha Kemal some day to proclaim himself emperor of sixty million Turks.

This ambiguous "denial," like the earlier one of 27 July 1933, seems to have had no effect whatsoever. Three months later, on 23 March 1934, Tass reported from Moscow that Abdul Kerim had secretly reached Sinkiang from Shanghai, describing him as "a Japanese supported candidate for the throne of an 'independent Sinkiang state,' upon the establishment of which certain Japanese military groups are working in conjunction with Turkish emigrants, and energetically rallying commanding and propagandist cadres."4/ Again a month later, on 23 April Tass accused "the notorious Turkish prince Abdul Kerim" of having sent a special representative to Kashgar in order to take active part in the intrigues of the "independent regime" headed by the Kashgar merchant, Sabit Damulla.5/

1/ Op. Cit., 11 November 1933, p. 454

2/ Ibid., 6 January 1934, p. 229.

3/ Cf. Oriente Moderno 14 (1934), pp. 112-3.

4/ Cf. China Weekly Review 31 March 1934, p. 167.

5/ Ibid,, 5 May 1934, p. 382. See also above, Section A.

The Tass report suggests that the independence regime in Kashgar may have been linked to some extent with Japanese activities. This supposition is strengthened by the Russian accusations, earlier referred to (see above Section A), which state that the Kashgar regime was inviting anti-Kemalist Turks, both from India and from Japan, to populate the new state.1/ Still other reports, likewise of Soviet origin, accuse Japan and Britain of having had a secret agreement as regards Sinkiang. They state that Ma Chung-ying not only received financial aid from Japan, but also arms from Britain; and accuse a certain White Russian merchant (arrested by the Chinese at Tihua early in 1934) of having been a go-between between Ma and the Kashgar regime.2/

Abdul Kerim's visit to Japan would seem more likely to have been linked with Japanese hopes regarding Ma Chung-ying's activities in eastern and central Sinkiang, than with events occuring in its far western end at Kashgar. Nevertheless, Japanese activity in Kashgar is not to be absolutely ruled out, for quite aside from Abdul Kerim, there are yet two other persons who possibly link Japan with Kashgar, as we shall see in the following two sections.

Meanwhile, despite Soviet assertions to the contrary, it is evident that Abdul Kerim never succeeded in reaching his "homeland" in Turkestan. On 28 March 1934 it was reported in Shanghai that he still remained in that city.3/ Soon afterward he evidently returned to Japan, for on 19 May it was reported from Harbin that since 9 May a Turco-Tatar conference had been held in Kobe, and that Abdul Kerim was among the attending notables. This conference, at which many exiled Tatars, Turks, Kirghiz, and others resident in the Far East were present, was said to have as its object "the establishment of an Islamic Kingdom made up of certain districts of Sinkiang Province and Russian Turkestan."4/

1/ Cf. the AP dispatch (quoting Tass) from Moscow, in New York Times of 24 January 1934; also China Weekly Review of 3 February 1934.

2/ See Riga dispatches in the London Times of 4 and 6 April, 1934; the China Weekly Review of 2 February 1935, p. 327; and ibid. of 3 February 1934, p. 368.

3/ China Weekly Review, 31 March 1934, p. 167.

4/ Op. cit., 9 June 1934, p. 59. The dispatch also lists Ibrahim, long a leader of the Islamic movement in Japan, among the conference delegates, and incorrectly refers to him as the father of Abdul Kerim. For more concerning this conference, see the report dealing with Japanese Muslim activities in the USSR.

But in March 1934, while the prince was yet waiting hopefully in Shanghai, Ma Chung-ying's rebellion against Sheng Shih-ts'ai had collapsed. By 11 April Ma had fled to Kashgar, where he temporarily seized control, but by 10 July he had retired across the Soviet border and on 7 August Sheng's forces entered Kashgar, thus restoring order throughout the province. These events gave the Soviets a stronger hold on Sinkiang than ever before, leaving the Japanese, together with their would-be Muslim emperor, to console themselves by holding a Turco-Tatar conference in Japan at which they could merely make hopeful plans for the future.

The sequel to Abdul Kerim's story is short. In September 1934 he arrived in the United States and less than one year later, on 4 August 1935, the New York Times reported that the young prince had shot himself to death. In a note addressed to Police Commissioner Valentine, written in Turkish script, he said he was ill and had failed in his efforts to restore his dynasty to a throne. The account adds that he had arrived in the United States in September 1934 from "a mission in China on behalf of his father" which was "in connection with an attempted restoration" of his dynasty. A New York Times article of August 7 stated that only a few hours after his suicide a letter had reached him from an American automobile company instructing the Prince to go to Shanghai to qualify with the company there as representative in Chinese Turkestan.

F. A London Pickle Manufacturer Tries to Become "King of Islamistan"

The spring of 1934 saw the appearance of still another figure upon the stage of Sinkiang politics. On 13 March 1934 the following special dispatch from London appeared in the New York Times;

> "Mrs. Ghazia Sybil Sheldrake, wife of the former London pickle manufacturer, told tonight how she had received a message from China, saying she would soon be a queen.
>
> "Her husband is Dr. Khalid Sheldrake, an Englishman who was converted to Mohammedanism and who has been traveling in the Far East for the past sixteen months studying conditions among his fellow Moslems.
>
> "Dr. Sheldrake was sitting in a hotel in Peiping recently when a deputation from Chinese Turkestan arrived saying Sinkiang Province had been declared independent, and as the appointment of a king would probably end fighting, they had been commissioned to invite him to take the throne. He accepted.
>
> 'I felt rather worried when I received my husband's cable announcing his decision,' Mrs. Sheldrake said, 'but I approved especially as my husband is much beloved by the Moslems...
>
> 'As a youth my husband was destined for the church, but while he was studying he read works on the Moslem faith which converted him and later he converted me,' she continued. 'He suggested Islamistan as the name for the new state.'"

A Tass Dispatch of 27 April 1934, from London, reports a Reuter interview from Hyderabad, in the course of which, according to Tass, Sheldrake admitted he had accepted the offer made him in Peiping by the Sinkiang delegates, on the grounds that otherwise they might "become victims of political adventurers." Izvestia, commenting the next day on this Reuter interview, branded the whole affair a British plot for gaining control in Kashgar, and mentioned a certain Conrad Simpson as Sheldrake's chief backer.1/

From Hyderabad it would seem that Sheldrake soon afterwards returned to China, for on 21 May it was reported by Chekiai from Peiping that the self-styled "King of Islamistan" had secretly arrived there; that the British Legation in Peiping refused to say anything as to his movements, which, however, were being closely watched by Soviet and other foreign diplomats; and that "in view of the present confused state in Sinkiang, activities of Sheldrake may lead to startling changes in that province."2/

Finally, on 1 June 1934, a China Press dispatch from Peiping stated that in that city Muslims from Sinkiang had recently been conducted into the presence of their so-called "King of Islamistan" by a Briton named Simpson. In the ensuing conference an agreement had been reached to create an "East Turkey Empire" that would comprise the portion of Sinkiang surrounding Kashgar. According to the same dispatch, "Mr. Sheldrake, who has been putting up in the Grand Hotel de Pekin since his arrival in Peiping on May 22, was stated to have removed to a certain house in the legation quarter in order to shun public attention."3/

Nothing more is heard of him in the daily press since that time. The reason for this sudden eclipse is obvious. It is the success of Sheng Shih-ts'ai during these same months in bringing the disorders in Sinkiang to an end; a success which in the case of Sheldrake, as in that of Abdul Kerim, blasted all hopes they may have had to becoming ruler in that region.

From his copious writings in various Islamic periodicals, Sheldrake appears to be a fanatical and apparently completely sincere Muslim, working ardently for the propagation of the faith in England.4/ Letters and articles about him in these same publications, however, charge that he appropriated to his own purposes funds solicited in the name of Islam.5/

1/ For these Tass and Izvestia reports, see the China Weekly Review, 5 May 1934, page 382.

2/ Op. cit. 26 May 1934, pp. 489-90. Chekiai, which is frequently quoted by the China Weekly Review during this period, is apparently the name of a Chinese News agency. The agency no longer exists today, so far as is known.

3/ Op. cit., 9 June 1934, p. 59.

4/ The earliest article noted is "Christianity and Slavery," Review of Religions 10 (1911), pp. 265-70; the latest is "The Dawn is Breaking," Muslim Review 15 (1934), pp. 13-17.

5/ Review of Religions 27 (August 1928, pp. 3-4, reprinting letter by Mohammad Abdulla, a lawyer, in the Muslim Outlook of 28 June 1928; Vol. 12, pp. 56-63, by Ghulam Haider Khan. See also article and editorial in The Light, 16 Dec. 1935.

His most distinguished convert, the Dayang Muda of Sarawak, found it necessary to deny any connection with a tour Sheldrake was making with her cousin, Conrad Simpson, and that she had authorized the pair to collect funds from Indian Muslims in her name.1/ Simpson, who had also been converted to Islam by Sheldrake, had become the latter's "secretary."2/ This "secretary" is the Simpson who in Soviet and other dispatches is said to have been the backer of Sheldrake's "Islamistan" movement. The accusation is true only to the extent that it was probably through Simpson that Sheldrake obtained the funds for the extensive tour to the Far East that brought him eventually in contact with his co-religionists of Sinkiang.

This tour started from England in November 1932, and brought the pair to Bombay on the twenty-second of the same month.3/ From there they made slow progress across India, reaching Calcutta at the beginning of March 1933.4/ The two were in Tokyo in September 1933.5/ and were heard from again in January 1934, when Sheldrake wrote that he and Simpson were in Sarawak, having toured China, Japan, the Philippines, and North Borneo.6/ Concerning his sojourn in China it is known only that "it has been the good fortune of Mr. Simpson and I to say a prayer at the Tomb of the Maternal Uncle of Our Holy Prophet which is at Canton China.... It has been a happiness to me to be able to tour that land, and meet Muslims from all the different provinces, both north and south."7/

A charge made at a later time brings to light an additional facet of Sheldrake's character. In May 1937 an editorial "The Duce and Islam,"8/ states: "It is extremely disheartening to find, not to mention Eastern Muslims, even some Western Muslims duped by the glamorous promises of the Duce. We are surprised, for example, to find an English Muslim, Mr. Khalid Sheldrake, taking all that the Italian Dictator says at its face value, and actively engaging in the task of upholding him as the greatest champion of Islam in this age. His speeches and articles, as published in the Indian and South African papers, have very much shattered our hopes regarding the growing political wisdom of the Muslims."

1/ The Light, June 1 and July 16, 1933.

2/ Cf. Simpson's article, "Why I Became a Muslim," Muslim Review 11 (Oct. 1932), pp. 60-1.

3/ Interview in Trans-Pacific, Tokyo, 21 September, 1933, p. 10; Muslim Review II (December 1932), p. 64.

4/ The Light, 1 March 1933, p. 10.

5/ Trans-Pacific, op. cit.

6/ The Light, 8 January 1934, p. 10.

7/ Muslim Review 14 (January 1934), p. 11.

8/ Islamic Review, vol. 25 (May 1937) pp. 191-2.

Several factors therefore offer presumptive evidence that Sheldrake's ambitions regarding "Islamistan" may have enjoyed Japanese support. (1) His record of purported financial unscrupulousness in general, and his apparent sympathies for Mussolini in particular, would make him an ideal instrument for use by any totalitarian power. (2) His presence in Tokyo in September 1933, six months before reports regarding Islamistan began to emanate to the world. (3) The fact that Kashgar, although it occupies that part of Sinkiang farthest removed from Peiping and nearest to India, sent its "Islamistan" delegation, not to India, but to Peiping. The fact that the Kashgar delegation made its appearance in Peiping, on the other hand, establishes a strong presumption of Japanese connivance. (4) Inasmuch as very few Muslims of China proper, let alone Sinkiang, know any Western language or are accustomed to dealing with Westerners, some kind of intermediary must have been necessary for Sheldrake to make contact with the Kashgar delegation in Peiping. Who would this intermediary have been, if not Japan?

(5) Finally, there exists the strong possibility that Sheldrake may have been exposed to Japanese influence even before he left England. In the November 1927 issue of the Islamic Review, there appears a full-page photo of a "Togo Tzushima, London," accompanied by a brief statement extolling the merits of Islam. In the October 1929 issue of the same publication (p. 384), an account of the British Muslim Society's celebration of Muhammad's birthday in London on 12 September 1929, includes an expression of "cordial thanks" to "Mr. Togo Tzushima, Treasurer of the Society," for helping make the evening a success. The same journal, in 1933 and again in 1936, publishes a total of three extremely pro-Japanese articles, giving every suggestion of Japanese inspiration.1/ The smallness of the Muslim community in London makes it inconceivable that Togo Tzushima and Sheldrake should not have known each other, and it is probable that the former propagandized the latter.

G. The Kashgar Revolt of 1937

The above pages will have made it evident that by the first half of 1934 Japanese intrigue in Sinkiang had reached unprecedented levels. An anonymous article in the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society records the answers made by a prominent Sinkiang Turki, a visitor in Kansu, to a series of questions addressed him by a (presumably British) member of the Society, residing in that province.2/ Though the date of this interview is not given, internal evidence suggests it occurred in the early summer of 1934, shortly before Ma Chung-ying's escape to Soviet territory. The following portion of the interview, dealing with Japan, throws light on the views held at that time by politically conscious people within Sinkiang itself, and brings out two important

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1/ "An Invitation to Japan", vol. 21 (August 1933), pp. 262-9, and "The Rise of Japan," vol. 24 (January 1936), pp. 8-13, both by Sheikh Mushir Hussain; also in the latter number, pp. 2-8, "The Kobe Mosque, Japan," by Maulvi Aftab-ud-Din Ahmed.

2/ "Central Asia from Within," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 22 (January 1935), pp. 106-10, esp. p. 109.

points: (1) that Japanese interest in Sinkiang has been (as repeatedly stressed in this study) not so much economic as political -- the desire to create a buffer state against Russia; and (2) that this interest is but part of a much wider Muslim program:

"What do you consider Japan's line of action for Sinkiang? -- It is not a question of Sinkiang, but a larger issue, that of isolating Eastern Asia and Siberia.

"How will she effect this? -- She will occupy Mongolia and Sinkiang and at once cut the Transiberian Railroad and its feeders at 6 points: Ili river bridge of the Turk-Sib, Chuguchuk feeder to the Turk-Sib, Kobdo feeder to Trans-Sib, Urga, Northern Manchuria, and Vladivostok.

"What is the extent of Japan's 'dream' in this regard? -- Japan will link up with Turkey in Europe and later with Arabia to unite the Moslem peoples with the Japanese...

"Are you aware of the excellent Japanese maps of Sinkiang? -- Yes.1/

"What makes you think that Japan is interested in a Pan-Turanian movement? -- News of Eastern Asia is published regularly at Tokyo in the Turki language."

The comparative calm that prevailed in Sinkiang after the end of 1934, and the consequent strengthening of Soviet influence there, has prevented the more alarming predictions made in the foregoing interview from coming true. This calm was momentarily broken by one episode, however, which can be linked with some likelihood to Japanese activities. This is the short-lived rebellion at Kashgar in the summer of 1937.2/

About Japanese complicity in the Kashgar revolt of 1937, Yang Chih-ying says:3/

> "After the force of their propaganda had deeply penetrated, they [the Japanese] began to draw to themselves those influential elements who, because of the disturbances in Sinkiang, had fled to the Near East. Thus Divisional Commander Ma-mu-t'i, who had formerly held command over the Turki [lit., "Turban-Muslim"] army in Ma Chung-ying's forces, was in the winter of 1939 induced by the Japanese to go to Tokyo. There he hoped that by availing himself to their military supplies, he might be helped to regain his former political power. Under present circumstances, lacking any outside support, he has already remained quietly at Tokyo for

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1/ The excellence of Japanese maps of Sinkiang is confirmed by H.D. Hayward, of Suchow, Kansu, "Perplexing Sinkiang," Moslem World 25 (1935), p. 193: "It is a well-known fact that some of our best maps of the area are those made by Japanese engineers.

2/ See above, Section A of this Appendix.

3/ Ta Kung Pao of 15 March 1942.

for more than a year. They /the Japanese/ hope that in future when Japan makes a westward invasion, he may be of assistance to them."

What is peculiar about the above mentioned Ma-mu-t'i is that the first syllable composing his name, ma, is not written with the usual Chinese character, "horse," so frequently found in the surnames of Chinese Muslims, but with another homophonous character, "hemp," which occurs very rarely as a Chinese surname. Furthermore, the two other syllables, mu and t'i, meaning "wood" and "to raise," respectively, are not those that would ordinarily occur in the personal name of a Chinese or of a sinified non-Chinese. It is obvious, therefore, that these three characters are here being used by Yang to transliterate into Chinese some non-Chinese name. The similarity in sound between "Ma-mu-t'i" and "Mahmud" is very close; so close, in fact, as to justify the suspicion that they are the names of one and the same person. To be sure, if such be the case, Yang would appear to have erred in stating that this Ma-mu-t'i once held command over the Turki army attached to Ma Chung-ying's forces. His error may well be ascribed, however, to the fact that when Mahmud's Turki forces began the 1937 disturbances, they were quickly joined by the Tungans of Khotan -- Tungans who were led by Ma Ho-san, the relative of Ma Chung-ying. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that prior to Ma Chung-ying's flight to Russia in 1934, Mahmud (about whom we know next to nothing before that event) may have been associated with him in some manner, known to Yang Ching-chih, but not revealed in the sources available in preparing this report.

If the identification of Mahmud with Ma-mu-t'i is accepted as a fact, the question next arises, were the Japanese initially implicated with Mahmud in the 1937 Kashgar movement, or did they win him over to their side only after he fled from Sinkiang, and from there (presumably) made his pilgrimage to Mecca? This cannot be definitely answered from the information at present available. It is well to remember, however, that it was at Kashgar that Khalid Shaldrake, who may have received Japanese support, hoped to establish his Islamistan; also that it was to the same place that Abdul Kerim, who most certainly was so aided, is reported by at least one source to have sent a representative. These considerations together with the infiltration of Japanese and arms in the spring of 1937 (See Part V above) further strengthen the possibility, already a rather good one, that the Kashgar revolt of 1937 may likewise have been at least in part engineered by Japanese intrigue.

APPENDIX C

EVIDENCES OF REAWAKENING OF ISLAM IN CHINA

The movements which have led to a reawakening of Islam in China go back to the founding of the Republic in 1912. It is improbable, however, that they were then, or in the years immediately following, inspired in any way by the Japanese Muslim intrigue. Rather, they were but part of the wave of change and modernization that has swept over China since the overthrow of the empire.

The first year of the Republic (1912) saw the establishment of the first of several Chinese Muslim associations, some nationalin scope, and all indicative of a growing feeling of consciousness and solidarity. Concerning these organizations information is available from several sources which, however, frequently contradict each other. 1/ The following chronologically arranged, seem to have been the more important Muslim organizations established before the outbreak of war in 1937:

(1) Chinese Muslim Federation (Chung-kuo Hui-chiao Lien-ho Hui): Established in Nanking in 1912, and apparently the first Muslim organization of national scope ever created in China. It seems to have been completely overshadowed, however, by the one listed immediately below.2/

(2) Chinese Muslim Mutual Progress Association (Chung-kuo Hui-chiao Chu-chin Hui): Established in Peiping in 1912, it was the most important single Muslim organization until 1927. Its founder, Wang Hao-jan, had returned to Peiping in 1907 from extensive studies of Islam which carried him to Islamic countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe. On his return he founded a Muslim normal school which was the first modern type of Muslim school known to China. His Mutual Progress Association spread rapidly throughout China, establishing branches in the provincial capitals and many lesser cities. Its aim is said to have been strictly non-political, and to have been concentrated upon the propagation of Islamic doctrines through translations, schools, lectures, and the like, all in Chinese. It was this Association which first encouraged Chinese Muslims to cut off their queues and otherwise show their allegiance to the new Republic. In 1915 Wang Hao-jan was decorated by the Chinese government for

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1/ Fu T'ung-hsien, Chung-kuo Hui-chiao Shih (A History of Chinese Islam), Commercial Press, Changsha, 1940, pp. 199-205; Sun Sheng-wu, "On the Organizations of the Muslims" (article in Chinese), Hui-chiao Ta-chung Pan-Yueh-k'an (Muslim Masses Semi-Monthly), no. 3, Hankow, 25 March 1938; Ha Kuo-tung, "Mohammedanism" in the Chinese Year Book, Premier Issue of 1935-36, p. 1564, and Fourth Issue of 1938-39, p.64; Hoover, "Chinese Muslims are Tough," Asia, December 1938, p. 721.

2/ Sun Sheng-wu, op. cit. Ha Kuo-tung calls it the Hui-chiao Kung-hui, and places its founding in 1911 instead of 1912 (which is the first year of the Republic). It is not even mentioned by Fu T'ung-hsien or Hoover.

his services. By 1923 the association is said to have had no less than 3,000 branches scattered throughout China.1/

(3) Chinese Muslim Educational Association (Chung-kuo Hui-chiao Hsueh-hui): Established in Shanghai in 1925, this organization has since, according to Fu, been the most active in the purely educational field. Its work has included the translation of the Koran into Chinese, establishment of Muslim normal and primary schools, provision of scholarships for Muslim students, and creation of Muslim libraries.2/

(4) Chinese Muslim Association (Chung-kuo Hui-chiao Kung-hui): This organization was founded in 1927, with no definite headquarters, but with branches in several cities.3/ Hoover calls it the Mohammedan People's Association, and describes it as a Kuomintang-sponsored group. It has played a more active political part than did the old Mutual Progress Association, which since 1927 has lost something of its former importance.

(5) Chinese Muslim Young Students' Association (Chung-kuo Hui-chiao Ch'ing-nien Hsueh-hui): Established in Nanking in 1931, this is a pro-Kuomintang organization that has sought to unify Muslim youth and to harmonize Islamic doctrine with Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Doctrines (San Min Chu-i).4/

(6) Society for the Promotion of Education among Muslims (Hui-min Chiao-yu Ts'u-chin Hui): This was established in Nanking in 1931, according to Ha Kuo-tung; Fu gives the date as 1933.

(7) Chinese Muslim General Association (Chung-hua Hui-chiao Tsung-hui): Established at Tsinan, Shantung, in 1934. Its founder is Ma Liang who now serves as governor of the province under the Japanese. Hence it has fallen into disrepute since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War.5/

1/ Hoover and Fu, op. cit. Hoover calls the organization the Muslim General Forward Movement. Sun places its founding in July 1914 (perhaps a date which marked its spread through the provinces), while Ha Kuo-tung, as in the case of the Chinese Muslim Federation, erroneously gives the date as 1911. For the 1923 situation, see Hoover, "Chinese Muslims and the War" (unpublished MS. made available through kindness of the author), p. 11.

2/ Fu T'ung-hsien, op. cit. Ha Kuo-tung places its founding in 1927, but the earlier date is confirmed by Löwenthal's statement (Religious Periodical Press in China, p. 232) that the first issue of a journal published by the society appeared in January 1926.

3/ Fu and Hoover, op. cit.

4/ Fu T'ung-hsien, op. cit. Its existence and date are confirmed by Ha Kuo-tung, and by Löwenthal, op. cit., p. 233.

5/ Fu T'ung-hsien, op. cit. Sun Sheng-wu refers to it as the Chung-hua Hui-chiao Kung-hui, while Ha Kuo-tung mentions a "Chinese Mohammedan Association" as being founded in 1934, but with headquarters at Nanking, not Tsinan. On Ma Liang, see Part IV, Section E.

who had long been studying in Delhi and Luckhow, proceeded from India to join the other Chinese at al-Azhar.1/

In 1933 a "Chinese Students' Section" was formally created at al-Azhar, with Sha Kuo-chen in charge. By 1934 there were no less than eighteen Chinese Muslims studying in Cairo. In 1939 Sha Kuo-chen returned to China, bringing back with him the first batch of students who had gone to al-Azhar in 1931. The departure of Sha and his group is said to have left twenty-eight Chinese students still in residence at al-Azhar, so that it is evident that more must have followed the original eighteen sent to Cairo between 1931 and 1934.2/

1/ For the above student groups, see Chao Chen-wu, "Cultural Aspects of Chinese Islam during the Past Thirty Years" (article in Chinese); Yü Kung (Chinese Historical Geography), 5.11 (1 August 1936), pp. 18-19.

2/ China at War 7 (September 1941), pp. 52-54.

The vague and conflicting accounts of the above organizations indicate their frequently inconsequential and ephemeral nature. Of them all, probably only the Chinese Muslim Mutual Progress Association has had a lasting and national importance. Nevertheless, the successive founding of these and other lesser organizations, together with the establishment of many Muslim schools and of 100 Muslim periodicals since 1912, testify that some Chinese Muslims at least, have been consciously attempting a revival of Islam in China, even though their attempts have sometimes borne little fruit.

Prior to 1937 Chinese interest in the outside Islamic world was expressed chiefly in a sharp increase in the number of pilgrims to Mecca and in the forging of new educational ties with the Near East. For decades -- indeed, almost for centuries -- intellectual contacts between Chinese Muslims and their co-religionists abroad were of the slightest, and only a few ever made the Mecca pilgrimage in any given year. But during the eleven years immediately preceding 1934, no less than 834 Chinese pilgrims performed the Hajj, and this despite the fact that the round trip from Hankow (in Central China) to Mecca by steamer required CN $1,000 -- a sum prohibitive for any but a wealthy person.1/ By 1937, just before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, this number had so increased that 170 pilgrims sailed from Shanghai for Mecca on one steamer alone.2/

Even more important, however, were the new educational ties forged with the Near East. As early as 1921, two Chinese Muslims, Wang Ching-chai and Ma Hung-tao, went to Cairo and Istanbul respectively, to study at the famous al-Azhar University (the world's oldest institution of learning) and at the University of Istanbul. They were followed by two other Muslims, Wang Tseng-shan and Hai Wei-liang, who went to Turkey and India respectively. All four men studied in these countries at their own expense, but in 1931 a new phase began, when, for the first time in history, a group of four Chinese Muslims was sent on fellowships to study at al-Azhar. Other groups followed, as described below:

First group, 1931: one student from the Islamic Normal School (I-ssu-lan Hui-wen Shih-fan Hsueh-hsiao) in Shanghai; three from Ming Te Middle School in Kunming. Sha Kuo-chen (also known as Sha Ju-ch'eng), principal of Ming Te, accompanied the group and remained at al-Azhar for several years as adviser to this and later Chinese groups.

Second group, 1932: five students from Ch'eng Ta Normal School in Peiping. They were escorted on the trip by Ma Sung-t'ing, vice principal of Ch'eng Ta, who on arrival in Egypt was received in audience by King Fuad I.

Third group, 1934: three more students from Ming Te Middle School, Kunming.

Fourth group, 1934: five more students from the Islamic Normal School in Shanghai. Shortly afterward Hai Wei-liang,

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1/ Claude Leon Pickens, "The Mecca Pilgrimage, II. The Pilgrims from China," Moslem World, 24 (July 1934), pp. 231-5.

2/ Hoover, "Chinese Muslims Are Tough," Asia, December 1938, p. 721.

who had long been studying in Delhi and Lucknow, proceeded from India to join the other Chinese at al-Azhar.1/

In 1933 a "Chinese Students' Section" was formally created at al-Azhar, with Sha Kuo-chen in charge. By 1934 there were no less than eighteen Chinese Muslims studying in Cairo. In 1939 Sha Kuo-chen returned to China, bringing back with him the first batch of students who had gone to al-Azhar in 1931. The departure of Sha and his group is said to have left twenty-eight Chinese students still in residence at al-Azhar, so that it is evident that more must have followed the original eighteen sent to Cairo between 1931 and 1934.2/

1/ For the above student groups, see Chao Chen-wu, "Cultural Aspects of Chinese Islam during the Past Thirty Years" (article in Chinese); Yü Kung (Chinese Historical Geography), 5.11 (1 August 1936), pp. 18-19.

2/ China at War 7 (September 1941), pp. 52-54.

APPENDIX D

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A. Books and Articles

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English version of an anonymous German article in the Berichte des Asiens Arbeitkreises, Siebenberg-Verlag, Vienna and Peking, 1939. The original may very possibly be by the well-known German explorer and agent in Central Asia, Wilhelm Filchner. Though marked by a violent anti-Soviet bias, it contains much valuable political information.

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Sketchy and says nothing on Japanese activities.

(continued on p. 130, second page from here)

China (Peiping, Tientsin, Shanhaikwan, Suiyuan, and Chahar), studying conditions of the Muslims there under Japanese rule. His article is one of the most important sources of information on Japanese Muslim intrigue, not only in China, but in other parts of the world. It is unfortunately not documented, but the correctness of many of its statements can be checked through comparing them with the Toa Senkaku and other Japanese publications, from which they are probably derived. His historical survey contains some omissions (for example, he says almost nothing about intrigue in Sinkiang), and also some inaccuracies. The most serious of the latter is his dating of the Japanese Muslim pact in 1900 instead of 1909. On the other hand, Yang is particularly valuable for what he says about Japanese Muslim activities in China in recent years.

A summary of Yang's latest article has been prepared by the British Ministry of Information at New Delhi, and published in this country in Pacific Affairs, 15 (December 1942), pp. 471-81, under the title, "Japan---Protector of Islam!" This summary not only omits some of the most interesting details in Yang's study, but also contains numerous inaccuracies, especially in regard to the romanization of Japanese names. It has therefore not been used for the present report, save for its Part II (pp. 479-81). This Part II is not concerned with Yang, but gives a few "notes" as to the present day attitude of Chinese Muslims toward the Chinese government. The source of these notes, though not revealed, is actually the American, Lyman Hoover (see above in this Bibliography).

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[redacted]

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Contains invaluable summaries of Far Eastern (particularly Chinese) events, as recorded in the Chinese, Japanese, Russian, and American press. Noted for its liberalism and honesty.

Christian Science Monitor, Boston.

[redacted]

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Analysed in detail in this report, pp. 38-40.

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The earlier of these two articles is largely superseded by the later one. Yang is a prominent Muslim from North China who holds a high post in the Organization Bureau of the Central Kuomintang, and is directly concerned with espionage work. At the beginning of his later article (in Ta Kung Pao of 9 March 1942) he states that for ten years he has been studying Japanese activities among Chinese Muslims, and that he himself has traveled extensively through enemy-occupied North

(continued on p. 133, third page back)

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Tries to do for Japan what the China Weekly Review does for China, but far less successfully.

APPENDIX E

WHO'S WHO

The following alphabetical list of persons connected with Japanese activities among the Muslims in China contains some identifying information, and page references to the pertinent parts of this report. Birth and death dates are given when possible, as well as characters for Chinese and Japanese names if available.

The Who's Who is divided into four parts:

A. Japanese
B. Chinese helping Japanese
C. Other Chinese
D. Other Nationalities

A. Japanese

Abdullah, see Takagaki Shinzo

Aoki, 青木
colonel who helped Fukuda Kikuo, 85-86

Aoyagi Katsutoshi, 青柳勝敏
1879-1934; signer of 1909 Japanese Muslim pact, 89

Araki Sadao, 荒木貞夫
Japanese general, 107

Cheng Ch'ao-tsung, see Fukuda Kikuo

Dazai Matsusaburo 大宰松三郎
made estimate of Chinese Muslim population, 1925, 18, 97

Enomoto Momotaro, 榎本桃太郎
Muslim pilgrim to Mecca, 1937, 59-60

Fukuda Kikuo, 福田規矩男 ;
Chinese pseudonym; Cheng Ch'ao-tsung, 鄭朝宗
worked with Chinese revolutionaries and Muslims, 85-87

Fujishima Takehiko, 藤島武彦 ;
Chinese pseudonym: Sung K'o-shi, 宋克己
associate of Ura Keiichi, 105-6

Hashiguchi Komura, 橋口孝村
director of Chinese Muslim Youth Corps, All China Muslim League, 39

Hayami, 頓宮
aided the Light Society, Shanghai, 94

Hino Tsuyomi, 日野強
investigator in Central Asia, 1906-07, 106

Honjo Shigeru, 本庄繁
major in the Japanese Embassy in Peiping, 107

Hosokawa Susumu 細川将 ; Muslim name: Muhammad Abd el-Mun'im,
Muslim pilgrim to Mecca, 1937, 59-60

Inukai Tsuyoki, 犬養毅
1855-1932; Premier of Japan, 89

Kawamura Kyodo, 川村狂堂
member, Black Dragon Society; important organizer of Chinese
Muslims, 47, 90-91, 97

Kawano Hironaka, 河野廣中
1849-1923; signer of Japanese Muslim pact, 1909, 90

Kikuchi Enzo, 菊池圓蔵
one of founders of Eastern Light Society, early 20th century, 85

Kita Seiichi, 喜多誠一
major-general who is important in present North China Japanese
regime, 31

Kawara Tsunojiro, 河原角次郎
associate of Ura Keiichi, 105

Kitamikada Matsujiro, 北御門松二郎
associate of Ura Keiichi, 105

Koike Sadao, 小池定雄
adviser, Chinese Muslim Youth Corps, All China Muslim League, 39

Ma Ch'eng-lung, see Nami Hidenari

Matsuoka Shinichiro, 松岡新一郎
gave help to Light Society, Shanghai, 94

Matsuoka Yosuke, 松岡洋右
born 1880; helped Light Society, Shanghai; Foreign Minister
of Japan, 1941, 93, 96,

Mitani Toru, 三谷亨
adviser, All China Muslim League, Peiping, 39

Miyata Shinichi, 宮田信一
1875-1929; one of "five men of the Yangtze", 87, 93

Mizuno Sobai, 水野疎梅
1864-1921; one of "five men of the Yangtze", 87

Shimura Masamitsu, 志村正三
honorary adviser, All China Muslim League, Peiping, 39

Shinoda Munehira, 篠田宗平
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