



**PAPERS AND LECTURES
THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH
22 - 27 JAN. 1986**

**THE PRESENT SITUATION OF
THE SOVIET MUSLIMS:
IN THE EXAMPLE OF KAZAN TATARS**

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Nadir Devlet

The Muslim population of the Soviet Union is between 45 and 50 million, making it the sixth largest in the world after Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Turkey, far ahead of Egypt or Iran. In the USSR the term "Muslim" is generally used to describe a people who before the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution belonged to the Muslim religion and culture. It has, therefore, a national and cultural significance beyond the purely religious one.

The majority of the Soviet Muslims are of Turkic ethnic origin. They live in the Volga-Ural region, Northern Caucasus, Central Asia and other parts of the Soviet Union. After the Red Army's victory in the Volga-Ural region in the autumn of 1918, instead of one single state Moscow created two small republics: Tatarstan and Bashkiria, and granted to those small republics no more than an autonomous status. The destruction of Turkic unity in Volga-Ural was a model to be followed later in other Muslim territories. Nowadays in this region there are approximately 6,5 million Muslims.²

The North Caucasus is a mosaic of ethnic groups which were separated from each other by high mountains, speaking dozens of different languages derived from three linguistic families: Turkic, Iranian and Ibero-Caucasian. These ethnic groups had different social structures, historical traditions and economic orientations. But there was one uniting factor: Islam. This region is divided by the Adige and Karachai-Cherkes autonomous region, Kabardin-Balkar, Chechen-Ingush, North Ossetin and Dagistani ASSR. Their total number is roughly over 4 million.³

In the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic and Nahchevan ASSR, which have common borders with Iran and are situated in the Caucasus, and in the neighbouring republics there are about 6 million Muslims most of whom belong to the shia sect.⁴

The administrative division of Central Asia was completed by a political division: instead of one "Turkistani" nation, the Soviet authorities created several nations and nationalities, each with its own territory and written literary language. Of the six major indigenous groups the Uzbeks are the largest and the Karakalpaks the smallest Muslim nation. All of

them except Tajiks are Turkic. The Uzbeks form a majority of their own republic. Kazakhs are a minority in their republic, second in numbers to the Russians, having sustained a loss of almost one million people between 1926 and 1936 as the result of collectivization campaign which they resisted. Kirghizs are also like Kazakhs a minority in their republic, but they are the largest group there and with the other Turkic nations: Uzbeks, Tatars, Uighurs and Kazakhs they constitute the majority. The Turkmen and the Tajiks are in the majority in their republics and substantial numbers of Tajiks live in Uzbekistan.⁵

In Central Asia we meet other Muslims, namely Kazan Tatars, Crimean Tatars who were deported in 1944, Uighurs and Dungans: Chinese Muslims. There are also some Azeri Turks, Kurds and Beluchis. The number of Muslim inhabitants of the USSR all together reaches 45 million.⁶ Given the high rate of birth among Muslims the All-Union Muslim census today must be about 50 million.

The policies of the Soviet state toward Muslims are characterised by the same lack of uniformity and coherence which were once the mark of tsarist policies. To be sure, the main goal of the new regime has remained unchanged since 1917. The bolshevik leaders launched a "total war" against all religions as soon as they came to power but the policies which they employed to achieve this goal varied, reflecting at all times their tactical flexibility. Consequently, after the fragile modus vivendi of the first decade of Bolshevik rule, the Muslims had to contend with a very aggressive anti-Islam campaign, a frontal attack on Islam which subsided only with the coming of the war. The modus vivendi of the post-war period has been shaped, among other factors, by the awareness of the Soviet leadership that the "Muslim face" of the Soviet Union could become an asset in its relations with the Islamic revival in the Middle East from "contaminating" its Muslim regions. The intensification of the anti-Islamic campaign in the press in the past four years, and the proliferation of scholarly studies of Islam which focus on Russian Islam reflect in particular some of the efforts of the Soviet leadership aimed at discrediting Islam and underlining its backward nature and antisocial character. Initial measures taken under Chernenko suggest that the anti-Muslim campaign will be pursued with a vengeance. There is nothing to indicate a fundamental change in the Soviet attitude, either in the near future or at some more distant time. Any such change would be tantamount to coming to terms with a rival ideology whose capacity to mobilize outstrips that of Communism; ultimately, it might lead to abandoning Marxism-Leninism.

In the eyes of the authorities, moreover, Islam as a religion is still what it was 50 years ago, not just an anachronistic legacy of a pre-socialist past, but also and above all a major obstacle to the advent of homo sovieticus, the final stage of the biological and cultural symbiosis of Russians and Muslims.⁸

Unfortunate as it is, we observe that the Soviet regime preserves the officials of religious capacity purely for propaganda purposes. For example the imam-hatyp of the Moscow mosque, Ahmedjan Mustafin, who had his religious education in a Kazan mederse(?), said recently in an interview that there are a hundred mosques, and about thousand mahalla and village masjids. And all are open for praying.⁹ But we know that of the 28,000 mosques from the Russian Empire period today remains only about 400 mosques.¹⁰ A further point, it is a fact that there is no mederese in Kazan, therefore the above mentioned imam-hatyp could not have had his religious education in Kazan. In the Soviet Union there is only two medreses in function, the Baraq Khan (now Imam Ismail al-Buchari) in Taskhent and the Mir-i Arab in Bukhara. Both are directed, one of the four muftiats, the muftiat of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and produce about 50 graduates a year. The Quran was published here twice in Arabic, but projects for Turkic translations of it were discouraged by this muftiyat, not unlike the famous Tatar translation by Musa Jarullah Bigiev (1875-1949) under the last Tsars. The Russian translation of the Quran from the late Academician I.Iu. Krackovskii's unfinished manuscript remains the only one in the Soviet period and was published in Moscow in 5,000 copies to become a bibliographic rarity.¹¹

Although the Soviet constitution does not forbid being religious, a religious person is not popular and has minimum chances for a promotion. And to propagate Islam is strictly forbidden while atheistic propaganda is an obligation for all.

Atheistic propaganda in the Soviet Union is systematically conducted on a far reaching scale. It is an essential function, for example, of all educational institutions (from kindergarten to university). Atheist propaganda already begins in the nursery school. Scientific atheism is an obligatory part of the curriculum of universities in the USSR. Training and retraining teachers in scientific atheism is one of the primary tasks of the atheist propaganda. No effort is spared in trying to create "the model atheist teacher". Seminars on teaching scientific atheism have been incorporated into the system of political training for teachers at secondary schools. For workers, the

departments of propaganda and agitation of the Communist Parties in the different republics have developed a special system of atheist indoctrination. The primary Party and Komsomol organizations are obliged to oversee the effectiveness of atheist propaganda among workers. Large enterprises have special Soviets for the purpose of conducting atheist propaganda. Many factories also have atheist schools. As in urban enterprises, primary Party and social organizations in the countryside are obliged to conduct atheist propaganda on Sovkhozes and Kolkhozes. In one form or other, all public organizations and mass media promote the doctrine of atheism. Professional agitators are not only obliged to wage antireligious propaganda at places of business and learning but are also responsible for going to people's homes to reeducate believers and awaken interest among those who are indifferent towards the religious elements among the population. The authorities try to augment the ranks of professional agitators by recruiting ordinary teachers, students, pupils, blue-and white-collar workers, and Kolkhozniks for such work. Some of these persons are charged with combating vestiges of religion while on the job; others are supposed to take up the cause of fighting religion in their free time. A generally accepted estimate of the number₁₂ of persons engaged in such activities is six million.

In Tajikistan SSR alone between 1965 and 1980 twenty dissertations were written on the problems of scientific atheism. And from twelve doctoral dissertations on "Scientific atheism" between 1978 and 1980 almost half were on Islam.¹³ In Tajikistan in the academic year of 1981/1982 in 16 high schools the certificate thesis was on history, theory and practice of scientific atheism.¹⁴ In November 1983 an "All-Union conference on the Complex Study of Islam and Its Role in Contemporary Ideological-Political Struggle" was held in Moscow.¹⁵ And in May 31, 1984 the Azerbaijan Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education jointly with the Azerbaijan State University organized in Baku a "Conference on Methodological Problems in Soviet Studies of Islam".¹⁶ As we see from these examples the Soviet state is trying very hard to annihilate this obstacle: Islam. But with little success. For example according to the April 1984 issue of "Nauka i Religiya" (Science and Religion), the antireligious effort against Islam in Daghestan is running into difficulties among both the young and the old. S. Muslimov, a specialist on antireligious questions, reports that many Daghestani students believe either that religion serves a positive function in society or that it, at least, is not harmful and need not be combated.¹⁷

Until quite recently, the Soviet Muslim republics were protected from outside contamination by the iron curtain. Today, under the impact of many different factors, including the Iranian revolution, the war in Afghanistan, Arab fundamentalism, this iron curtain has ceased to be impenetrable, and contacts between Soviet Muslims and their fellow Muslims abroad, which were broken off around 1920, are now becoming more frequent. For the Soviet authorities, the new situation is both positive and dangerous. The resumption of contacts may indeed help them in their penetration and psychological conquest of the Muslim world; but if they were to lose control of these same contacts, then the latter could serve as a "transmission belt" through which subversive ideas could find their way into Muslim republics and help destabilize them.¹⁸ In our time of modern communications the Soviet rulers are challenged by foreign broadcasts, especially those in Turkic languages; namely by VOA (Voice of America) in Uzbek, Azeri, RL (Radio Liberty) in Tatar, Turkmen, Uzbek, Kirghiz, Kazakh, Azeri, Tajik and Saudi Arabia in Uighur, Radio Iran in Azeri and Persian. Therefore such broadcasts are heavily jammed. Besides, more recent Soviet reports tell of finding audiocassettes with an Islamic message appearing throughout Soviet Central Asia in all kinds of institutions, including officers' clubs. Some contain speeches of Ajatullah Khomeini and other religious figures, recorded from Radio Iran and other religious speeches from Saudi Arabia.¹⁹ But this positive development from the viewpoint of Islam doesn't imply that there is a new Islamic revival in the USSR.

Every group of Muslims in the Soviet Union has its own characteristics and differences and all need separate and special attention. But for a closer investigation of Soviet Muslims I choose a particular, may be a radical, example: The Tatars and Bashkirs, the Muslim people of the Volga-Ural region. They are an extreme example because they were the first to fall under Russian domination 433 years ago and hence are more suppressed. When we examine their case we observe that a bare majority of these Muslims still uphold their religious belief. Their case, may be, is not a common example for the other Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union, but in any case it provides us with an approximate idea of the actual state of Islam in the USSR.

When in 1552, with the decline of the Chanate of Kazan, the peoples of the Volga-Ural region, particularly the Turkic Tatars and Bashkirs, passed under the Russian yoke and were heavily suppressed by the Orthodox Russians, Islam alone enabled these Turks to keep their national identity. Islam had had a long tradition in the Volga-Ural region. Already approximately 70 years

before the Russians adopted Christianity as their official religion, Islam had been recognized as the state religion by the then Turkic Bulgar state.²⁰ Mufti Talgat Tajeddin, Chairman of the "Muslim Religious Board for the European Part of the USSR and Siberia", confirms that the Bulgars of Chan Almas had officially accepted Islam on 16 Muharram 310 (16 May 922).²¹ In 1552 following the conquest of Chanate of Kazan (1473-1552) the mosques were destroyed or converted into Orthodox churches. The state supported the arbitrary dealings of the Russian Orthodox church which lasted for more than 200 years and, among other things, forced Muslims to be baptized. In the year 1756 in the province (gubirna) of Kazan 418 out of the existing 536 mosques were destroyed.²² Until 1759 Volga Tatars were not permitted to build mosques and medreses.²³ Catherine II started a more liberal policy towards her Muslim subjects. "The Religious Administration" (Duhovnoe Sobranie-Orenbur Mahkeme-i Serriyesi) was founded in Ufa on December 4, 1780.²⁴ Its main duty was to examine and appoint the religious leaders requested by the Muslim congregation. This religious administration in a way functioned as a controlling organ of the state. The Russian Orthodox church, in the meantime, had done missionary work among the native, non-Russian population under the protection of the state. The results, however, did not live up to the expectations; particularly the Tatars rejected these conversion attempts. At the fifth census taken in 1796 103,050 male and 108,290 female Tatars lived in the province of Kazan, of these only 13,384 men and 13,922 women were baptized.²⁵

After Catherine II's reforms, printing in Arabic writing had become possible, the Muslims began reproducing mainly religious literature and distributing it among the population. From 1801 to 1855, 577 books were printed in Kazan. This figure is quite impressive considering the fact that during this same period in all Russia only, 1463 books were published.²⁶ From 1842 to 1852, 23,600 copies of the Quran and 44,300 Heftiyek (seventh part of the Quran) were printed, and from 1853 to 1859 82,300 copies of Quran and 165,000 Heftiyek.²⁸ In 1868 already 729 mosques existed in Kazan province and the number rose from year to year.²⁹ The spiritual work of the mullas had good results. In Nijni-Novgorod, in 1802 the first Tatar Christians openly apostatized from Christianity.³⁰ The Orthodox church was extremely alarmed at this act and missionaries like the famous Ilminskij (1822-1891) started diverse actions to keep christened Tatars in the church.³¹

The Muslims were not discouraged by limited success; on the contrary, new ideas and initiatives were added.

The "Jadid" (renovation) movement, inspired by Ismail Gaspirali (1851-1914), was met with great enthusiasm in the Volga-Ural region. The idea of this movement was to create unity among the Turkic peoples of Russia - unity in language, ideals and action - and reformation of religious schools was begun so that, in addition to religious subjects, worldly subjects were taught as well. Due to the "Jadidism" the Turks of the Volga-Ural region succeeded in using Islam also as a political power.

When the manifesto guaranteeing religious freedom became effective on November 17, 1905, the Turkic peoples were permitted to practise their religion and profess Islam, masses of those who had converted left the church. In the eparchy of Kazan alone 23,860 of the native population turned their backs on the church and converted to Islam.³² At the same time, the first political endeavors were made. On April 8, 1905, the Muslim intellectuals of the various parts of the country gathered for the first time in Nijni-Novgorod.³³ According to official statements the religious administration in 1907 cared for 6 thousand mahalle in which 5 million Muslims were included.³⁴ Also according to official figures, in 1913, 680 churches and monasteries³⁵ and 1,890 mosques existed in the province of Kazan. In 1917 there were 2,223 mosques and 3,683 recognized mullas in Tataristan.³⁶

During the first year of the Bolshevik revolution, the Soviet communists were forced to consider Islam not only as a religion but also as a politically potent movement representing millions of Muslims. This was even acknowledged in the newly adopted policy by Moscow and announced in the famous declaration of December 20, 1917, addressing the Muslim workers. The Soviet government then promised the Muslim workers freedom of religion and practice³⁷ of their manners and customs without restrictions. After having come to power, the Soviet government, however, broke all these promises: religious leaders were persecuted, religious institutions were closed, religious education was not permitted and churches and mosques still "working" were highly taxed. As these administrative measures did not prove sufficient for the Soviet leaders, they started organizing anti-religious propaganda, in which the "Union of Militant Atheists" (Sojuz ojnstvujushchih bezbozhnikov: SVB) played an important role. In 1926, the "Militant Atheists" had two thousand members in Tatar ASSR and their number rose to 25 thousand in the year 1930. In Bashkiria the SVB numbered 12 thousand in 1930, in 1938 they were already 40 thousand.³⁸

To boost the morale of the Soviet peoples during World War II, the Soviet government revised its policy of

persecution against religion and Islam. The Soviet government managed³⁹ to take advantage of this new political situation. The mufti of Ufa, Abdurrahman Resulev, one of the few survivors of the religious persecutions from 1932-1938, proposed normalization of relations between the Soviet government and Islam to Stalin in 1942. Stalin accepted Resulev's proposal, a treaty was concluded as a result of which an end was put to antireligious propaganda, at least, for the most part. After 34 years Islam regained its "legal" status and Ufa became⁴⁰ the seat of the Islamic administration. But after the war in 1953 Chrushevov continued with administrative and psychological attacks under the motto "back to Lenin". The number of "working" mosques in the entire Soviet Union was reduced to approximately 400 and that of "registered" religious leaders to 2,000.⁴¹ According to later information⁴² in the year 1982 there are 17 mosques in Tataristan.

In actuality, the religious administration in Ufa does not possess any authority. For instance, in Ufa only a calendar in Arabic, which can be read only by a generation older than 60 years, is being printed. This religious administration in Ufa, which is responsible for the European part of the USSR and Siberia, is not permitted to print further publications and educate religious leaders. In the Soviet Union children in general do not receive a religious education. Also the ulema are not allowed to do any work outside of the mosque, such as in the field of welfare, maintenance of hospitals and religious institutions or in lectures or publications.⁴²

One of the four religious administrations, "The Muslim Religious Board for Central Asia and Kazakhstan", has the privilege to educate religious leaders and to publish. The Uzbeks and their capital Tashkent are being used by the Soviet Union with the same aim in mind as were the Tatars by Tsarist Russia for their expansionist aims. Since 1965, the four Muslim religious administrations have been controlled more severely and directed more tightly by Moscow. By decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of December 8, 1965, the "Council for Religious Affairs" was created. Officially, this council has the duty to coordinate the relations with the Muslims outside the USSR. Further, this council and its representatives in the republics and administrative regions (kray, rayon) is responsible⁴⁴ for the cooperation with the local councils.

Anti-Islamic, atheistic propaganda and measures taken by the state, which have lasted more than 70 years, have made the observance and expansion of Islam impossible and the number of believers, or more

correctly, of practising Muslims has decreased. That does not necessarily mean, however, that Islam has entirely disappeared in Tataristan and Bashkiria. Since the measures applied so far did not bring the results hoped for, the Soviet leadership during the last years decided to carry out atheistic, and particularly anti-Islamic propaganda on an intellectual basis. As a consequence, in Kazan alone more than 25 anti-Islamic works were published between 1960 and 1981.⁴⁵ In this way, the authors of these works and various articles were given the opportunity, without being criticized, to insult and abuse Islam and the believers and to create insecurity among the latter. Garif Gobej, a Tatar atheist, writes in the third edition of his book "The Mysteries of the Quran", among other things: "There are 225 contradictions in the Quran. 225 contradictions in the book of Allah, who created the world out of nothing! Now look at unbelieving Lenin. He could not even create a fly. In his work consisting of 55 volumes there is not one single contradiction. This, even the religious leaders of today cannot deny."⁴⁶ Arguments of this kind are easily made since it is known that the contrary in written or oral form cannot be maintained under a totalitarian regime. The Soviet Muslims have no opportunity either to repel these arguments or to let their interpretation of these reproaches be known.

Religious rituals as, for instance, circumcision, deeply rooted in the people as a national custom, is declared unhealthy and unhygienic.⁴⁷ Fasting is question. In 1961, Mufti Shakirjan Chayaletdin was forced to publish a fatwa in which he declared that those working, including the Kolhoz workers, did not have to fast. His fetva, however, did not meet the approval of the mullas and was not further circulated.⁴⁸

When in 1917, the city of Kazan counted only 206 thousand inhabitants, of whom only 22% were Muslim, the city could boast of 13 mosques.⁴⁹ Today Kazan has a million inhabitants; half of them are Tatars. This number of Tatars - certainly a great part of them are Muslim - has only one mosque at their disposal. According to Imam Zeki Safiullin more than two thousand believers attend the Friday prayers in the Merjani Mosque, which was constructed more than 200 years ago.⁵⁰ Only six young men from Kazan are permitted to study in Bukhara and yearly only two Muslims from the Volga-Ural region are allowed to make pilgrimage to Makka.⁵¹

Scarce sociological research results and statistics show that the atheistic policy of almost 70 years has brought positive results for the Soviet leadership and

negative ones for the Muslims. In Tataristan the percentage of those who consider themselves believers is, according to official figures, not very high. A sociological study performed by the Atheistic Institute in Penza Oblast shows that among the Russians 28,4% are believers, among the Tatars, who are believing Muslims, the percentage is 31.5%; in Gorkov Oblast the percentage of believing Muslims is 61 among the Tatar women and 40 among the men.⁵² Belief in Islam is stronger among the rural population and older people than the urban population. 73.9% of the retirees in the Bashkir ASSR questioned stated that they observed the Islamic tradition.⁵³ In 1965, in various Tatar villages, 40-50% of the parents named their children according to Muslim tradition and had their sons circumcized, 55-60% had a mulla perform the marriage ceremony and 90%⁵⁴ had their dead buried according to religious ritual.

The believing Muslims of the Volga-Ural region can be divided into three categories. The first one consists of strictly believing Muslims; they attempt to observe closely Islamic commandments and bans; their number, however, is small. The second category includes mostly elderly people who had had a religious education and for this reason carry on Islamic tradition; their number is also not high. The third category - in it a multitude of intellectuals can be found - is by far the biggest. They are not particularly religious, most of them attend mosques only on high religious holidays, yet they deem it correct to preserve Islamic manners and customs as part of their national and cultural heritage.⁵⁵

As a summary and conclusion, the following is to be said about Islam among the Soviet Muslims: Islam was and has remained a part of the national identity. If today the national, non-religious consciousness is even stronger, this fact is nevertheless due to Islam. The Volga-Ural Muslims have succeeded in keeping their religion through a period of missionary work and reprisals by the state lasting longer than 200 years. Religious freedom subsequently declared by the state gave them the opportunity to expand their religious institutions extensively. The following Soviet rule having lasted almost 70 years again made it extremely difficult for the Soviet Muslims to practise their religion; the Soviets even succeeded in reducing the number of believing Muslims considerably, but they could not exterminate the influence of Islam as an important part of their national identity. Were the Soviet Muslims given the opportunity to practise their religion without pressure from the state, as in 1905, certainly the number of Muslim believers would rise in the USSR.

FOOTNOTES

1. A. Bennigsen - M. Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, Beckenham, Kent, 1983, p. 1.
2. Naselenie SSSR. Po dannim vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1979 goda (Population of the USSR according to Data of the All-Union Census of 1979), Moscow 1980, p. 27-30.

	Total population (in thousand)		In RSFSR
	<u>1970</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1979</u>
Tatars	5931	6317	5011
<u>Bashkirs</u>	<u>1240</u>	<u>7688</u>	<u>1291</u>
Total	7171	7688	6302

3. Ibid., p. 23-66.

<u>Persian speakers</u>	population (in thousand)	
	<u>1970</u>	<u>1979</u>
Ossetin	488	542
Kurd	89	116
Persian	28	31
Tat	17	22
Beluchi	13	-
Afghan	4	-
<u>Caucasians</u>		
Chechen	613	756
Kabardian	280	322
Ingush	158	186
Adige	100	109
Cherkes	40	46
Abhaz	83	91
Abaza	25	29
<u>Daghistanis</u>		
Avar	396	483
Lazgin	324	383
Dargin	231	287
Laks	86	100
Tabasaran	55	75
Rutul	12	15
Tsakur	11	14
Agul	8	12
Dungan (Chinese Muslims)	39	52

<u>Turkic</u>		
Kumuk	189	228
Karachay	113	131
Turk	79	93
Balkar	60	66
Nogay	52	60
Total	3554	4197

4. Ibid., p. 10-29.

The total number of Azerbaijanis was in 1970, 4,380,000 and in 1979, 5,477,000.

Azerbaijanis living in (1979)

Azerbaijan SSR	4,709,000
Nahchevan ASSR	239,000
Georgian SSR	256,000
Armenian SSR	161,000
SFSR	152,000
Total	5,517,000

5. Ibid., p. 27-30.

Major Muslim groups (in thousands)

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1979</u>
Uzbek	9195	12456
Kazakh	5299	6556
Tajik	2136	2898
Turkmen	1525	2028
Kirghiz	1452	1906
Karakalpak	236	303
Total	19843	26147

6. Ibid., p. 2730.

The Muslim Population of the USSR (in thousands)

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1979</u>
Uzbek	9195	12456
Kazakh	5299	6556
Tatar	5931	6317
Azerbaijani	4380	5477
Tajik	2136	2898
Turkmen	1525	2028
Kirghiz	1452	1906
Bashkir	1240	1371
Karakalpak	236	303
Uighur	173	211
Dungan (Chinese Muslim)	39	52
Muslims of Caucasia	3554	4197

(see f.note 3)		
Crimean Tatars	300	400
(estimate)		
Total	<u>35460</u>	<u>44172</u>

7. A.A. Rorlich, "Sufism in Tatarstan: Deep Roots and New Concerns," Central Asian Survey, Vol. 2, Nr. 4, Dec. 1983.
8. A. Bennigsen, "Islam and USSR," Geopolitique Contents, Nr. 7, Fall 1984, s. 54-55.
9. O. Veroispovedaniy, "About Religion," Sovietskiy Soyuz, Nr. 1 (419), 1985, p. 26.
10. A. Bennigsen, Opt. cit., p. 55.
11. S.A. Shuiskii, "Muslims in the Soviet State: Islam, a Privileged Religion? (1955-1980)," Oriente Moderno, Nr. 7-12, July-Dec. 1980, p. 386.
12. O. Antic, "The Promotion of Atheism in the Soviet Union Today," RL 258/77, November 8, 1977.
13. Islam v SSSR "Islam in USSR," Moscow: 1983, p. 141.
14. Ibid., p. 141.
15. Assessment and Research, Report 905-AK, August 27, 1984, p. VI.
16. Ibid., p. VIII.
17. Ibid., p. 19.
18. A. Bennigsen, opt. cit., p. 60.
19. The magnetic appeal of Islam, USSR," Arabia, March 1985, p. 46.
20. N. Devlet, 1905-1917 Yillari arasinda Ruysa Turklerinin milli mucadele tarihi (The history of the national struggle of the Turks of Russia between 1905-1917) Dissertation, Istanbul: 1982, p. 71.
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22. N. Devlet, opt. cit., p. 4.
23. A. Ibrahimof, Coban Yildizi (Northern Stern), St. Petersburg: 1907, 2nd ed., p. 14.

24. N. Devlet, opt. cit., p. 18.
25. J. Glazik, Die Islammission der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche, The Islamic mission of the Russian-orthodox church), Munster: 1959, p. 112.
26. N. Devlet, opt. cit., p. 13.
27. J. Glazik, opt. cit., p. 151.
28. N. Devlet, opt. cit., p.13.
29. Ibid., p. 9.
30. J. Glazik, opt. cit., p.114.
31. Ibid., p. 141-142.
32. Ibid., p. 147-148.
33. N. Devlet, opt. cit., p. 111.
34. A. Ibrahimof, opt. cit., p. 27.
35. Sh. Chafizov, Obrazovanie Tatarskoy ASSR (Learning the Tatar ASSR), Kazan: 1960, p. 6.
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38. A Hakimoglu, "Forty Years of Anti-Religious Propaganda," The East Turkic Review, Munich 1960, Nr. 4, p. 67-68.
39. G.V. Stackelberg, opt. cit., p. 28
40. A. Bennigsen - M. Broxup, opt. cit., p. 71.
41. Ibid., p. 48.
42. L. Wieland, "Der schiefe Turm von Kasan (The oblique tower of Kasan," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27.3.1982.
B. Kueppers, "Unter den Minaretts und Kirchenturmen von Kasan in Sowjet-Tatarien (Under the Minarets and church-towers of Kasan in Soviet Tataria," Deutsche Press Aentur, 12.3.1982.
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44. Islam dini turbinda bilishme-suzlik (Dictionary about the Islamic Religion), Kazan: 1878, p. 151.
45. Ibid., p. 202-206.
46. G. Gobey, Kuran sirleri (The secrets of Quran), Kazan: 1973, 3 rd ed., p. 364.
47. Islam dini turinda...., p. 159.
48. G. Gobey, opt. cit., p. 373.
49. R.K. Valeev, I.M. Ionenko, I.R. Tagirov, "Kazan v 1917 godu (Kazan in 1917), Stranitsy Istorii Goroda Kazan (The history pages of Kazan city), Kazan: 1980, p. 66-67.
50. L. Wieland, opt. cit.
51. Ibid.
52. Islam v SSSR, p. 66.
53. Ibid., p. 39.
54. G. Gobey, opt. cit., p. 408.
55. Islam v SSSR, p. 68.